P190B

NSW POLICE FORCE



STATEMENT OF POLICE

In the n	natter of:	Special	Commission	of Inquiry	into L	_GBTIQ	hate crimes
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Date: 31 October 2022

Name: Anthony Crandell Tel. No:

Rank: Assistant Commissioner

Station/Unit: Commander, Digital Technology & Innovation

STATES:

- 1. This statement made by me accurately sets out the evidence that I would be prepared, if necessary, to give in court as a witness. The statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I will be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything that I know to be false, or do not believe to be true.
- On 21 September 2022 I received a request to provide a statement from the Special Commission
 of Inquiry into LGBTIQ hate crimes (Inquiry). I hereby provide a statement addressing the
 questions contained within that request.

Service background

- 3. I am currently the Commander of the Digital Technology & Innovation Command, New South Wales Police Force (**NSWPF**).
- 4. I joined the NSWPF in 1986 and have served across a broad range of areas since that time. I was designated as a Detective in 1994, admitted as a solicitor in 2001 and have held managerial and leadership roles since 2002 across a range of metropolitan and rural operational and key corporate service areas. I have received 22 medals, awards, commendations, citations and complementary remarks throughout my career and hold numerous tertiary qualifications.

- 5. As a Constable, Detective and team leader I worked in Flemington, Bankstown, Bass Hill, Southwest Region Crime Squad, Lismore and the Blue Mountains. I was promoted and appointed as a Commissioned Officer and held the rank of Inspector at Richmond Command.
- 6. In 2005 I was promoted to the rank of Superintendent and served as Commander of Deniliquin, Kings Cross and Surry Hills Commands.
- 7. In 2017 I was promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner and served as Commander at the Education and Training Command, State Intelligence Command and Digital Technology and Innovation.
- 8. A copy of my curriculum vitae (current) is annexed and marked "1".

Prejudice Related Crime Data Collection Project

- 9. I am not familiar with the 'Prejudice Related Crime Data Collection Project', nor did I have any involvement with that project. I am therefore not in a position to specifically address questions 2 and 3 as requested of me.
- 10. I believe Sue Thompson may be able to provide further information about this project, however she is no longer an employee of the NSWPF.
- 11. I am aware that current procedures allow the identification of events within COPS as 'hate crime related'. The categorisation of incidents or crimes as suspected bias/hate crime related is not straightforward given the generally subjective nature of assessment and there have been instances where the decision of relevant officers not to designate a particular event a hate crime has attracted criticism. An example was an incident just prior to Mardi Gras 2014 when the ANZ Bank created 'GayTMs' with decorations adorning ATMs across the city of Sydney. A GayTM on Oxford Street was damaged by an intoxicated pedestrian with police not classifying the incident as a bias/hate crime without evidence of intent, given the perpetrator had not been identified. Community concern that a bias/hate crime had not been properly classified was expressed throughout gay and mainstream media, citing circumstantial evidence of location, timing and appearance of the property damaged. This incident, along with my experience with Strike Force Parrabell investigators and reviewing academics led to my engagement of Dr Phil

Birch, then working for Charles Sturt University, to research and recommend better, more streamlined bias crime classification criteria for the NSWPF.

Bias Crime, Bias Crime Coordinator, and Bias Crime Unit

12. Except for general awareness of the existence of the Bias Crime Unit (which I understand has been re-structured and re-branded since its inception) and my interactions with that unit in relation to "Operation Parrabell" (outlined below), I have no particular knowledge about the background to, reasons for establishment, day to day business or the roles of the personnel within that unit. I am therefore unable to address questions 4 - 14 as requested of me. I understand that efforts are being made to provide answers to these questions from other members of the NSWPF.

Engagement and Hate Crime Unit, Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command

13. Except for general awareness of the existence of the Engagement and Hate Crime Unit (EHCU) (which I understand to be the current iteration of the former Bias Crimes Unit), I have no particular knowledge about the background to, reasons for establishment, day to day business or the roles of the personnel within that unit. I am therefore not in a position to address questions 15 - 17 as requested of me. I understand that efforts are being made to provide answers to these questions from other members of the NSWPF.

Appointment as Corporate Sponsor for 'Sexuality, Gender Diversity & Intersex' and contextual background to Strike Force Parrabell

- 14. By way of background, in 2013 I was of the rank of Superintendent and the Commander of Surry Hills Local Area Command, within the Central Metropolitan Region.
- 15. At that time, Chief Superintendent Donna Adney (retired) was the Corporate Sponsor for 'Sexuality, Gender Diversity & Intersex' (SGDI). I replaced Chief Superintendent Adney (retired) as Commander of Surry Hills Local Area Command in February 2011. Chief Superintendent Adney (retired) then transferred to the Operational Communications and Information Command under NSWPF Corporate Services.

- 16. During the 2013 Mardi Gras Parade on Oxford Street in Sydney, there was an interaction between a NSWPF officer and a member of the LGBTIQ community that resulted in allegations of police brutality and poor treatment of LGBTIQ community members by NSWPF. That incident was well publicised in the media at that time and resulted in significant community unrest.
- 17. Slightly less than a week following that incident, a protest march was held by LGBTIQ community members and groups, during the evening of Friday 8 March 2013, against police brutality and ill treatment of LGBTIQ members. It was clear and apparent that there was significant dissatisfaction amongst the LGBTIQ community in that regard with an estimated 1,000 people marching to the Sydney Police Centre (SPC). A rally followed with activists placing a banner across the front of the SPC reading 'All Cops Are Bastards'. I was the Police Commander for that protest march and rally that saw several speakers address a crowd in Goulburn Street from the balcony of the SPC.
- 18. During the evening of Tuesday 19 March 2013, a community meeting was held between NSWPF and approximately 450 prominent LGBTIQ community members and groups. As the Commander of Surry Hills Local Area Command, I was invited to participate in that meeting, as was Chief Superintendent Donna Adney (retired) and others. The purpose of that meeting was to provide members of the LQBTIQ community with an opportunity to constructively engage with NSWPF to convey concerns about the relationship between NSWPF and the LGBTIQ community, and any concerns about the NSWPF treatment of, or attitudes towards, the LGBTIQ community. The meeting also covered topics of Mardi Gras policing tactics and use of drug detection dogs, both at Mardi Gras-related events and generally.
- 19. After the community meeting, I created a document with 12 points that outlined objectives for the policing of future Mardi Gras Parades and a further 10 points for policing Drug Detection Dog Operations at future Mardi Gras Parade After Parties at the Hordern Pavilion. The 10 points relating to drug detection dog operations formed the basis of changes to operating procedures across the NSWPF. In preparing both the drug dog and Mardi Gras Parade policing strategy points I was seeking to take into account the concerns raised at the community meeting in 2013.

- 20. Among other things, the strategies I sought to implement for the Mardi Gras parade and After Party included briefing police in the presence of the Mardi Gras CEO; presentations from the LGBTIQ community and Mardi Gras organisers in relation to community expectations; the deployment of all Surry Hills senior management personnel to supervise police activities during the parade; the deployment of local police wherever possible; a permissive approach to the opening of Oxford street to spectators after the passage of the parade; ensuring that more senior officers were in charge of Drug Detection Operations; amending the instructions sheets in relation to the conduct of searches; using media messaging in relation to the presence of drug dogs together with the adoption of a harm minimisation approach.
- 21. The principles contained in those documents were helpful in guiding the approach of the NSWPF in subsequent Mardi Gras Parades that followed from 2014. For example, in 2013 there were a significant number of complaints that followed the Mardi Gras Parade relating to the conduct of police officers associated with the parade and in relation to strip searches undertaken outside the Hordern Pavilion. In 2014, after introduction of the changes identified there were zero complaints received by the NSWPF.
- 22. In August 2013, I was appointed by then Deputy Commissioner Nick Kaldas as the NSWPF Corporate Sponsor for SGDI. The corporate sponsorship for SGDI was handed over to me by Chief Superintendent Adney (retired), who previously held this role.
- 23. Chief Superintendent Adney (retired) had assisted to improve trust and understanding between the NSWPF and LGBTIQ communities over the previous 5 years. I understand my appointment was due to Chief Superintendent Adney moving, and remaining in a corporate position within the NSWPF and away from field operations. My appointment would keep the leadership role consistent with community engagement principles, given my position of Commander, Surry Hills Local Area Command which boasts a strong LGBTIQ community. The change of leadership would also see the start of a new relationship between NSWPF and the LQBTIQ community. It was my understanding that it was considered more appropriate for me, as Commander of Surry Hills Local Area Command to be the Corporate Sponsor for SGDI due to the connection between the LGBTIQ community and the Command as well as my networks and familiarity with LGBTIQ issues and relationship with key community members.

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- 24. I received a portfolio "handover" report from Chief Superintendent Donna Adney.
- 25. The role of the Corporate Sponsor for SGDI is to promote positive engagement by and on behalf of NSWPF with sexuality, gender diversity & intersex issues and promote and develop a fair, reasonable and positive relationship between the NSWPF and the LGBTIQ community.

Operation Parrabell

- 26. Following my appointment as Corporate Sponsor for SGDI and as a result of familiarising myself with that portfolio, I became aware that the (then) Bias Crimes Unit was conducting an operation known as "Operation Parrabell".
- 27. As I understood it, due to the Bias Crimes Unit's portfolio in relation to bias and hate related crime, "Operation Parrabell" was seeking to re-investigate several historical suspected gayhate homicides. Upon examination of Operation Parrabell and consultation with members of the Bias Crimes Unit, it was apparent to me that "Operation Parrabell" did not have clear direction, governance or support in respect of that operation (although I do not direct any criticism towards that unit or those operating within the field of bias crimes at the time, given my unfamiliarity with the operation of that unit and the involvement of extremely limited resources).
- 28. I am aware that Sergeant Geoffrey Steer (the then Coordinator of the Bias Crimes Unit) was directing Operation Parrabell, with Senior Sergeant Jo Kenworthy, who was also a senior NSWPF Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer (GLLO) in support. I am not aware whether any other staff within the Bias Crimes Unit were appointed to Operation Parrabell. I do not believe that Sergeant Steer or Senior Sergeant Kenworthy had any specialist investigative background, in that neither were designated as detectives, albeit I was advised by Sergeant Steer in 2018 that the purpose of Operation Parrabell was to determine whether the location of Scott Johnson's death was associated with any hate crimes (including relating to the death of Mr Johnson). My understanding as at 2014 was that Operation Parrabell was conducting a re-investigation of the Scott Johnson case.. I was concerned that the task was too large and resources too limited for such an undertaking which led to my questioning of Operation Parrabell's purpose and objectives.

- 29. It was my view that the Bias Crimes Unit at the time did not have the capacity as a two-person team (as I understand it), to undertake the re-investigation (or review) of 88 unsolved homicides and/or deaths. For example, the re-investigation into the death of Scott Johnson consisted of five Detectives over a 2-year period, which was led by a very experienced Detective Inspector from State Crime Command. I understood that "Operation Parrabell" had been re-investigating a single case, also the death of Scott Johnson, as part of that operation for approximately 12 months.
- 30. I formed the view that "Operation Parrabell" was well-intentioned and that the objective of reexamining the listed 88 deaths with potential gay hate motivation was a worthy one. However, I did not consider it appropriate that this undertaking be pursued within the Bias Crimes Unit, which had other important functions and was not resourced or equipped to conduct investigations of that type.
- 31. In light of my assessment, I formed the view that that operation should be reconsidered in terms of resourcing and approach. As the Corporate Sponsor for SGDI, neither Sergeant Steer nor Senior Sergeant Kenworthy were under my direct command. Although I am aware that Senior Sergeant Kenworthy was re-assigned shortly after I raised my concerns.
- 32. Once Operation Parrabell ceased, there was little to be done regarding re-assignment of cases given the only case worked on was that of Scott Johnson.
- 33. Subsequently, as will be considered further below, I decided that a further consideration of these 88 cases was in fact warranted – it was that thought process that led to the creation of Strike Force Parrabell. However, I did not think that could be achieved by a wholesale reinvestigation of all 88 cases in sequence. Rather, I believed the re-investigation of cases should be undertaken by the Unsolved Homicide Unit in accordance with its usual practices and protocols. My intention was that Strike Force Parrabell would work with the Unsolved Homicide Unit if and whenever required.
- 34. Given the above, it is not correct to say that Operation Parrabell "became" Strike Force Parrabell. I will return to this question below.
- 35. A copy of the "Terms of Reference" for "Operation Parrabell" is annexed and marked "2".

Witness:		Signature:		
	Jarnes Asimacopoulos	_	Anthony Crandell	
	Inspector		Assistant Commissioner	
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Establishment of "Strike Force Parrabell"

- 36. In the time following the incident referred to above between a NSWPF officer and member of the LGBTIQ community that occurred at the 2013 Mardi Gras, I became aware of a number of articles and media publications concerning 88 particular historical deaths that were considered by some members of the media and/or LGBTIQ organisations to be potentially "gay-hate" motivated and of particular interest to the LGBTIQ community.
- 37. I did not have involvement in the selection of those deaths or the preparation of those media articles or publications. My understanding was that Sue Thompson, a former employee of the NSWPF who was heavily involved in the LGBTIQ portfolio in the early 1990s prepared a list based upon research conducted during her employment tenure. Ms Thompson is likely to be able to provide more information about how the list was developed though, as I have mentioned above, she is no longer an employee of the NSWPF.
- 38. Given the community interest in the 88 deaths and the observations I had made of the work of Operation Parrabell I decided, in my capacity as Corporate Sponsor for SGDI, that NSWPF should take steps to examine each of the 88 deaths that were reported to be of concern to the LGBTIQ community. Such an examination could not at that time include a comprehensive reinvestigation of each case, but I saw it was a way of attempting to offer some form of resolution to or otherwise give support to the community concerns, which I considered to be valid. I therefore considered that NSWPF should take the initiative of establishing a formal "Strike Force" to perform that exercise.
- 39. The reason that I considered that a "Strike Force" would be the appropriate mechanism by which to conduct that exercise is that a "Strike Force" generally refers to a structured and planned investigation that is managed using the NSWPF "E@glei" electronic investigation management system. The benefit of a "Strike Force" is that there is additional governance and a clear objective is set out to be achieved. The use of E@glei system also ensures all materials are uploaded into a central management system, where the progress of the investigation is able to be updated and managed.

$40.\mathrm{Whe}$	ereas the terr	n "operation'	' generally r	efers to police	operations, su	uch as co-ordina	ting
logis	stics for majo	r events. Fo	r example, 1	New Year's Eve	e, COVID-19 ł	notel quarantine	and
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sporting grand finals etc. With that difference in mind, I took the view that it was most appropriate that a Strike Force format be adopted for the review of the 88 deaths.

- 41. I held a number of initial planning meetings with various persons to discuss the objectives of Strike Force Parrabell in around early 2015 with a view to determining the viability of the Strike Force conducting an "investigative review" of the 88 identified deaths, the scope of that exercise and the development of appropriate "Terms of Reference" and a structured "Investigation Plan".
- 42. Those meetings were attended by (then) Detective Chief Inspector Craig Middleton who was ultimately appointed as the head investigator for the purposes of Strike Force Parrabell, and others, such as (then) Detective Sergeant Paul Grace and Detective Senior Constable Cameron Bignell (who was also a NSWPF GLLO at the time). I appointed Chief Inspector Middleton as head investigator of Strike Force Parrabell because of his acumen as a senior investigator and the position he held as Crime Manager, Surry Hills Local Area Command, which meant he was familiar with members of the LGBTIQ community and was familiar with community concerns relevant to Strike Force Parrabell's formation.
- 43. As a result of those planning meetings, the below documents were ultimately prepared:
 - a. "Terms of Reference"
 - b. "Investigation Agreement", annexed and marked "3"
 - c. Strike Force Parrabell "Coordinating Instructions", annexed and marked "4"
- 44. A copy of the Terms of Reference of Strike Force Parrabell appears at pages 20 and 21 of the Strike Force Parrabell 'Final Report'.
- 45. The ultimate objective of Strike Force Parrabell was formulated to be (as appears on page 18 of the Strike Force Parrabell 'Final Report'):

"To bring the NSW Police Force and the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex and Queer community closer together by doing all that is possible from this point in history".

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Signature:

Anthony Crandell
Inspector
Assistant Commissioner
31 October 2022

Signature:

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Assistant Commissioner
31 October 2022

- 46. There were no "Standard Operating Procedures" prepared for the purposes of Strike Force Parrabell. This is because Standard Operating Procedures are not generally prepared in respect of Strike Forces and are usually reserved to control the operational or administrative behaviour of people and sections of the NSWPF. For example, when police are required to use body-worn video cameras or steps to prepare and execute search warrant operations. Terms of Reference documentation articulates the scope of Taskforce work, expectations of behaviour, and outcomes. Additional documentation in the form of the Investigation Plan and Coordinating Instructions gave investigators appropriate guidance surrounding expectations of behaviour and outcomes.
- 47. Although "Strike Force Parrabell" shares a name with "Operation Parrabell", it was distinct from "Operation Parrabell". As noted above an 'operation' is used more generally for police operations, whether or not requiring investigation capability whereas a 'strike force' has a particular scope and focus and will inevitably require an investigative response according to the Terms of Reference and objectives outlined. There was no particular significance to the name "Parrabell", other than the fact that I believed the name "Parrabell" was suitable due to continuation of the concept and process of "Operational Parrabell". NSWPF has available an automatic operation and strike force name generator to appoint code-names when a new operation or strike force is commenced.
- 48. During the planning of Strike Force Parrabell, I approached and obtained general advice from the Bias Crimes Unit (through Sergeant Geoffrey Steer) in relation to the assessment of "bias crimes". Although Sergeant Steer was not involved in the scope of Strike Force Parrabell, he was invited to the initial planning meetings that were held by the Strike Force Parrabell investigation team, given his earlier role in Operation Parrabell and position as the NSWPF Bias Crimes Coordinator.
- 49. Sergeant Steer was not included in Strikeforce Parrabell because he was not part of the review team of investigators. He advised on use and rationale regarding the bias/hate crime indicator tool, and to my mind commenced looking at the 88 gay hate crimes through Operation Parrabell, however aside from a brief advisory role, he was not involved in Strikeforce Parrabell's daily operations.

50. The development of the scope of Strike Force Parrabell was heavily assisted by Detective Chief Inspector Middleton and Detective Sergeant Paul Grace.

The nature and extent of any enquires made by NSWPF as to whether the 88 deaths referred to in the Strike Force Parrabell "Final Report" represented all, or only some, of the deaths in the relevant period where there may have been a "sexuality or gender bias" factor

- 51. Strike Force Parrabell did not make any enquiries as to whether any other deaths that had occurred in NSW beyond those included in the 88 deaths considered as part of Strike Force Parrabell were suspected "gay-hate" homicides or motivated by sexuality or gender bias.
- 52. I was aware at the time that Sue Thompson had consulted widely and, together with other community partners, developed the list of 88 deaths, potentially gay hate related but not necessarily recorded or investigated as such. My understanding was that Sue Thompson's list had been reviewed by mainstream media journalists and that suggestions of investigative impropriety arose in relation to the initial investigation of some of the relevant deaths. This understanding influenced my decision to have investigative impropriety examined during the review process of Strike Force Parrabell.
- 53. Material and information identified in respect of each death was "reviewed" and each matter not "re-investigated" in the sense that term is normally used (i.e., re-interviewing and finding leads). I chose to adopt the review approach because the Unsolved Homicide Unit is the appropriate team to conduct investigations and re-investigations. As part of the review process, if new materials were uncovered, this would then be referred to the Unsolved Homicide Unit for further investigation. I understand that at least two cases were solved after Strike Force Parrabell (using the term 'solved' in the same way that was used by Strike Force Parrabell to categorise matters).
- 54. In saying that, I cannot say with certainty that Strikeforce Parrabell was the sole reason for cases being solved, however I have no doubt that the heightened awareness created, both in the community and NSWPF, was a strong factor in leading to two outstanding cases being solved.
- 55. I was appointed to oversight Strikeforce Welsford, which was a reinvestigation into the murder of Scott Johnson after a third Coronial inquest. That Strikeforce had 5 investigators assigned, including the lead investigator, Detective Chief Inspector Peter Yeomans. The investigation

crimes

commenced in 2018 with the accused, Scott White arrested, charged in May 2020, and convicted in May 2022.

- 56. The other case was Raymond Keam, who was found dead in a park known as a gay beat at Alexandria in 1988. Investigators reviewed and reinvestigated that case with an offender being charged with Raymond's murder within the past few years. Awareness of this historical gay-hate crime was created by Strikeforce Parrabell.
- 57. A broader examination of deaths beyond the listed 88 was not undertaken for a number of reasons. Initially, the inquiries attributed to Sue Thompson were thorough in that they involved a certain subset of homicides related to victims that were predominantly gay men, or men perceived as gay by their attackers. It was this list that the community had been consulted upon and agreement reached that further attention was required. With resources limited by numbers and timeframes, together with the enormity of reviewing 88 cases, some of which had extensive records and others none at all, a decision was made to limit inquiries to the 88 deaths identified, unless of course inquiries led to uncovering other deaths that required Strike Force attention.
- 58. To my mind the limitation was consistent with community concerns and did not close the door on future inquiries should other matters come to light. The 88 deaths in question were never said to be an exhaustive or complete list of crimes that may have been gay-hate-related and may require further investigative attention.

The reasons for the selection of the BCIRF as the tool which Strike Force Parrabell was to use, and who made that selection

59. During the establishment of Strike Force Parrabell and my discussions with Sergeant Steer of the Bias Crimes Unit, I became aware that the Bias Crimes Unit possessed and used a tool called a "Bias Crime Identification Review Form" (BCIRF) that it used to assess and determine whether a particular crime was "bias related". My understanding is that that tool was developed by the Bias Crimes Unit based on a similar tool that was used by the 'United States Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime' (as referred to in Annexure 4 of my statement in pages 4 to 13 of the Strike Force Parrabell Coordinating Instructions).

- 60. I considered the BCIRF tool was appropriate for adoption and use by Strike Force Parrabell because it was comprehensive and clearly showed the factors and indicia to be taken into account when considering whether a crime may be bias related. Whilst the tool addressed several key aspects of a bias crime it carried a qualification that all indicators could be present and the crime still not be bias related, and that conversely no indicators could be present and the crime still be classified as bias related. That is to say, the tool was not definitive, and the reviewing officers still needed to exercise their judgment independently. A key component in my opinion was the intention of the accused, whether shown expressly or by circumstantial evidence of behaviour and setting. Of course, many cases did not have evidence of intent. In those cases, in particular the BCIRF tool was a useful guide.
- 61. I also considered that it was useful to be consistent with the approach utilised by the Bias Crimes Unit and across the NSWPF at the time.
- 62. A copy of the BCIRF template is Parrabell's Final Report.
- 63. I do not have any knowledge of the history of the adoption of that tool by the Bias Crimes Unit beyond what has been outlined above. I was aware that Sergeant Steer had undertaken significant research into this tool and the BCRIF.

The personnel who comprised, or participated in, Strike Force Parrabell; the qualifications and experience of each of them; and the criteria by which, and the persons by whom, they were chosen

64. When Strike Force Parrabell was being planned, I gave consideration to the staffing requirements that would be necessary for its purposes. I considered that police officers with investigative and 'strike force' experience would be most appropriate. I considered that resources would need to be drawn from within the Central Metropolitan Region generally (which included the Surry Hills Local Area Command, of which I was the Commander) rather than only from within the Surry Hills Local Area Command which, like all other commands, had limited resources available. Accordingly, I approached the then Region Commander of the Central Metropolitan Region, Assistant Commissioner Michael Fuller (later Commissioner Fuller) to supply staff for the

purposes of Strike Force Parrabell. That request was approved by Assistant Commissioner Fuller.

- 65. I recalled there was a 'ready preparedness' attitude by Assistant Commissioner Fuller to provide resources immediately for Strike Force Parrabell. By that I mean, Assistant Commissioner Fuller immediately agreed to supply staff for Strike Force Parrabell without hesitation.
- 66. I did not have any involvement in the particular selection of the staff that were allocated to me for the purposes of Strike Force Parrabell by Assistant Commissioner Fuller, and I am not aware whether any particular criteria were used for the selection of those personnel. This is with the exception of Chief Inspector Middleton, Detective Sergeant Grace, and Plain-Clothes Senior Constable Cameron Bignall who was within my Command at the time. I personally arranged for the appointment of Plain Clothes Senior Constable Bignall to Strike Force Parrabell because Senior Constable Bignall had investigation experience and was also at the time a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer with a strong understanding of the LGBTIQ community.
- 67. Assistant Commissioner Fuller initially allocated eight full-time staff from within the Central Metropolitan Region for Strike Force Parrabell on a "secondment" basis.
- 68. The substantive Strike Force Parrabell investigation team comprised of the following staff (each officer's role within Strike Force Parrabell is also indicated):

Name	Role
Detective Inspector Craig Middleton	Lead investigator
Detective Sergeant Paul Grace	Senior Investigator
Detective Senior Constable Cameron Bignall	Senior Investigator

Detective Senior Constable Timothy Ryan	Senior Investigator
Detective Senior Constable Hugh Brandon	Investigator
Detective Senior Constable Kathleen Collins	Investigator
Detective Senior Constable Andrew Agostino	Investigator

Plain Clothes Senior Constable Jody Gibbons	Investigator
Plain Clothes Senior Constable Sarah Fleming	Investigator
Senior Constable Rebecca Parish	Investigator
Senior Constable Brad Yusuf	Investigator
Constable Christopher Borg	Investigator
Constable Ashley Grimes	Investigator

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Witness:		Signature:	
	Janes Asimacópoulos		Anthony Crandell
	Inspector		Assistant Commissioner
	31 October 2022		31 October 2022

The reasons for the decision to obtain an academic analysis of the review carried out by **Strike Force Parrabell**

- 70. During Strike Force Parrabell, it became apparent to me that in order to ensure transparency of the methodology employed by Strike Force Parrabell and ensure that its results were credible, a full independent academic analysis of the methodology and results of Strike Force Parrabell should be conducted. The purpose of the academic review was also to provide an independent account of Strike Force Parrabell's systemic validity; where possible, identify evidence of poor or biased police investigations; guide future policing strategies of community engagement; and develop a more suitable bias crime identification process. By systemic validity, I mean the system investigators used to determine whether or not a crime was bias or gay hate related; using the BCRIF and following the procedures set out in Strike Force Parrabell documentation (Terms of Reference; Investigation Plan; and Coordinating Instructions) to arrive at the determinations recorded. I also wanted the academic reviewers to determine whether investigative malfeasance was present if possible and compare findings with those of the Strike Force investigators.
- 71. In my view, it was critical that an impartial analysis took place in parallel with Strike Force Parrabell. I was cognisant of avoiding a 'check box' exercise and instead, aimed to ensure that the academic review carefully scrutinised the review of the NSWPF's processes. I was concerned that the LGBTIQ community would not accept a review conducted by police alone given significant community concern at the time over police investigating police during internal investigations. An academic review, as independent as possible from policing in NSW was the goal in attracting a suitable tender.
- 72. I also note that I did not wish for the 'anti-paedophile bias' to be included and referred to as part of Strike Force Parrabell. I was conscious that this may suggest a connection between homosexuality and paedophilia, which is not synonymous, is erroneous and often broadly misunderstood. However, the animus towards paedophilia was subsequently included in the academic review because of perceptions at the time, which the academics believed were often independent or inseparable from the animus towards homosexuality due to attitudes and widespread ignorance of the times.

The procedures by which the Flinders University academic review team came to be selected

- 73. I decided that the entity to undertake the academic review should be selected by way of formal procurement and tender process, so as to formally structure the arrangement and further ensure the transparency and credibility of the exercise. A copy of the request for quotation for 'Strike Force Parrabell Project' that was used for the purposes of taking the project to tender is annexed and marked "7".
- 74. . A copy of the draft "Supply Agreement" is annexed and marked "8".
- 75. In response to the invitation to tender, the NSWPF received 3 x proposals to perform the academic review in respect of Strike Force Parrabell. Those were from: Dr Nicole Asquith (Western Sydney University) and others; Professor Murray Lee (Sydney University) and others; and Professors Derek Dalton, Willem de Lint and Danielle Tyson (Flinders University).
- 76. A copy of the "proposal" submitted by each of those vendors is annexed and marked "9".
- 77. Each proposal was evaluated by NSWPF using a standardised "evaluation table".
- 78. The completed "evaluation table" in respect of each of the 3 x vendors identified above is annexed and marked "10".
- 79. In general, the proposal submitted by Flinders University was considered to be the most comprehensive, independent and suitable. Flinders University was considered to be best placed to undertake the academic review, as suggested by the evaluation score of the Flinders University proposal. There is little doubt that the tenderers from Sydney and Western Sydney Universities were competitive and comprehensive, however intense local knowledge meant greater perceptions of less independence. It was critical for the credibility of the review that any selected university could withstand criticism that findings were influenced by local vested interests or preconceptions (either for or against the NSWPF). I am not suggesting lack of impartiality on the part of Sydney or universities within NSW; however, those perceptions were clearly addressed with an out-of-jurisdiction contractual appointment. A copy of the document named 'QEC Recommendation' with Flinders University selected as the preferred vendor by the evaluation panel, including reason for selection, is annexed and marked "11".

- 80. A Supply Agreement was ultimately agreed between NSWPF and Flinders University. A copy of that Supply Agreement, executed in part by Flinders University is annexed and marked "12". The Supply Agreement includes the financial arrangements pursuant to which Flinders University would conduct the academic review.
- 81. I authorised the finalisation and execution of the Supply Agreement with Flinders University. I was satisfied that the costs to be incurred were reasonable having regard to the nature of the academic review to be undertaken.
- 82. The cost of the academic review was borne, either wholly or in part, by the budget allocated to me as Commander of the Surry Hills Local Area Command. I am unsure as to whether any contribution was made from any budget allocated to the Corporate Sponsorship for SGDI.
- 83. I considered that Strike Force Parrabell was a priority and an important project to be undertaken by the NSWPF and subsequently critically analysed via the process of academic review. Under those circumstances I felt a contribution from the budget of my Command at the time was most appropriate even if that necessitated corresponding spending restrictions in other areas.
- 84. In total, I recall Flinders University was paid approximately \$50,000 to conduct the academic review.

The methodology, protocols and arrangements pursuant to which the Strike Force Parrabell personnel were to, and/or did, carry out their respective tasks

85. The general methodology employed by Strike Force Parrabell, as suggested by the Strike Force Parrabell 'Final Report', was that it would: obtain all available documents (both internal to NSWPF and external, such as the State Archives) in relation to each of the 88 deaths that fell within its scope; allocate an examination of each case to one or more officers within the Strike Force Parrabell investigation team; form a view as to whether each case had any evidence of "bias" and complete a BCIRF sheet; ensure that all material was uploaded on to E@glei. This methodology was adopted until all 88 cases had been exhausted and in total Strike Force Parrabell took approximately 18 months to complete. Oversight of all review procedures,

Witness:		Signature:		
	James Asimacopoulos		Anthony Crandell	
	Inspector		Assistant Commissioner	
	31 October 2022		31 October 2022	

considerations and findings rested with Chief Inspector Middleton and Detective Sergeant Grace, both of whom briefed me and members of the LGBTIQ community, including local academics, as required.

- 86. For the purposes of the examination of each case, all police holdings were identified and sourced from other entities, such as the State Coroner. All relevant records were made electronic and stored on the E@glei system. Hard copies were returned to their original point of location once recorded electronically because Surry Hills had no suitable storage facilities for records that had been drawn from archives. Original documents created to evidence inquiries made were also recorded electronically before being destroyed.
- 87. Where a death was not originally treated by NSWPF as a suspicious death and therefore no criminal investigation was undertaken (such as where a death was at the time treated as a suicide or drug overdose), there were no "investigation" records to assess, and sometimes only limited material was available in respect of a particular death. Strike Force Parrabell Investigators gathered as much material as possible for each case under review. The material discovered ranged from nothing at all in some case to masses of archived boxes containing an enormous number of documents (this was especially common in those cases that had progressed to prosecution). Regardless of case size the same procedures were followed, guided by the BCRIF, which was completed using the material actually able to be gathered in the particular case.
- 88. At the completion of Strike Force Parrabell, all material and results were provided to the Flinders University academic review team for the purposes of conducting the academic review. There was some discussion between me and Detective Chief Inspector Craig Middleton with the Flinders University academic review team in respect of results. Those conversations centred around methodology leading to inconsistent findings between the academic review team and Strike Force Parrabell investigators. The conversations were not attempts to persuade either team; it was predominantly intended for the academic team to understand the approach of Strike Force Parrabell and vice-versa, and as a consequence, to improve the teams' understanding of how data had been interpreted as a result of the different methodology used between Strike Force Parrabell and the academic review. From my recollection, there may have been two inperson meetings, and other meetings took place over the telephone. There were no agendas or

minutes of these discussions. It was vital that the academic review remained completely independent to Strike Force Parrabell and that the results of Strike Force Parrabell did not influence the results of the academic review. That position was reinforced by me, Detective Chief Inspector Middleton and Detective Sergeant Grace.

- 89. I prepared a "master" case summaries document that was completed at the conclusion of Strike Force Parrabell and gives a detailed summary of each case examined by Strike Force Parrabell. A copy of that "case summaries" document is annexed and marked "14".
- 90. At the conclusion of Strike Force Parrabell, a "Final Report" was prepared which annexes the final 'academic review" prepared by Flinders University. That report is undated however it was published on 27 June 2018, after a media release created by the NSWPF Public Affairs Branch.
- 91. I created and sought organisational endorsement of the Strike Force Parrabell "Final Report" and academic review. I have read the report recently and confirm that its contents accord with my memory of the relevant events.

The methodology, protocols and arrangements pursuant to which the Flinders University team were to, and/or did, carry out their respective tasks

92. The methodology, protocols and arrangements pursuant to which the Flinders University team were to, and/or did, carry out their respective tasks is outlined on the academic review which is annexed to the Strike Force Parrabell Final Report. I had general discussions with the Flinders University academic team in the preparation of the academic review in relation to their findings. I had no oversight of the Finder's University academic team's methodology or conclusions. From my review of the report and my discussions with the members of the Flinders University team, I have no concerns about the validity of their approach.

Witness:

James Asimacopoulos
Inspector
31 October 2022

Signature:

Anthony Crandell Assistant Commissioner 31 October 2022