

## ANNEXURE I

<b>Security Classification/Fol 2000</b>	Official sensitive
<b>Fol Requests on rationale</b>	<a href="mailto:npcc.request@foi.pnn.police.uk">npcc.request@foi.pnn.police.uk</a>
<b>Author</b>	Paul Giannasi
<b>Force/organisation</b>	Hate Crime Portfolio
<b>NPCC Coordination Committee</b>	Equality, Diversity & Human Rights
<b>Telephone number</b>	X
<b>Date created</b>	X

**Chief Constable**

Force A Police

**Hate Crime Audit****1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1.1 As can be seen in the national data in the table at paragraph 2.16 below, Force A Police saw an 11.4% reduction in referrals to the CPS for 'all crime' between 2014 and 2020. The comparative data for hate crime shows a greater drop in referrals of 25.8%, despite a significant national increase in hate crime recording levels during that same time period. Force A Police is not alone in this situation, with the national average showing a 43.5% drop in hate crime referrals and a 15.6% differential to all crime, at 27.9%.

1.2 This data covers a period of severe governmental austerity measures that have challenged policing and reduced operational resources and the capacity of key partners. To add to this, it was also a time where our hate crime responses have faced a number of huge societal challenges, such as the broadening of political divisions in the UK, the movement of refugees out of global conflict zones and the ubiquity of social media, which amplifies hostility in reaction to critical incidents such as the murder of George Floyd in the USA. In recent years, we have observed that such incidents can have an immediate and profound impact on our communities and a tendency to increase hate crimes. It is perhaps expected, albeit not accepted, to see crimes in 'retaliation' to incidents such as the Islamist terrorist attacks in 2017, however it is counter-intuitive that we would note a significant increase in anti-Muslim attacks in the wake of the Christchurch, New Zealand attacks, where the only role of Muslims was as victims of a white supremacist terrorist.

1.3 Whilst global events and national politics have undoubtedly caused rises in hate crime, we have seen a huge increase in the percentage of actual hate crimes that are recorded by the police. A comparison of recorded crime data and data from the Crime Survey of England and Wales would suggest that we have gone from 1 in 6 hate crimes

being recorded in 2009 to 1 in 2 being recorded in 2019. It is possible, but not easily quantified, that these efforts to reduce under-reporting and the rise in online offending have brought forward more crimes that are less likely to be 'detectable'.

1.4 The police service has come under scrutiny for this data, including in parliamentary select committees, and DCC Mark Hamilton, the National Policing Lead for hate crime, has asked forces to assist with an examination of national responses, to help understand the causes of this apparent reduction in performance. We are grateful that Force A Police agreed to participate in this work.

### **Audit findings**

1.5 The full findings are listed below and the spreadsheet has been shared with the force for reference but, in summary, **the general standard of service offered by Force A Police was found to be generally of a good standard. We were particularly impressed by the structured leadership demonstrated and the robustness of the systems of scrutiny and supervision.** It is clear that there is a strong strategic approach to hate crime in the force, with a nominated lead at Chief Superintendent rank who has strategic oversight of policy and operational performance. She is supplemented by 4 district coordinators who have regular scrutiny processes to monitor qualitative as well as quantitative performance. This comprehensive oversight serves victims well and is a model advocated in national guidance, but which is not always in place and often lacks the depth shown here. This depth can be seen in some of the decision making around individual enquiries, which indicates that the leadership makes a genuine difference as demonstrated in some of the examples mentioned below.

1.6 As we tend to find in these audits, there are a few outliers where the service received stands out as exemplary and others where the service apparently failed to meet the needs of the victims. We should, however, state that our examination almost exclusively concentrated on computer records and we know from experience that there are many occasions where this record does not reflect the actual responses, usually by underselling the depth of the investigative and victim support activity.

1.7 The types of hate crime viewed mirrored national trends, with the majority of crimes being racist and the majority of crime types being public order and violent crime. At 36.4%, 'repeat victim' rates were significantly higher than the national average, which is around 27% for household and 16% for personal hate crimes<sup>1</sup>. I am informed that the is likely to be brought around by the practice of recording repeat victims of all crime, rather than being repeated victims of hate crime so this may cause a natural discrepancy.


**1.8 The force's own victim satisfaction survey shows a significant improvement on the previous year and presents levels that far outperform the national average, as presented by the Crime Survey of England and Wales (90% in the last survey, compared to a national rate of 55%)**

### **Call handling process**


---

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate-crime-1920-hosb2920.pdf> (page 23)

1.9 We found a generally high standard of responses from call handling colleagues, with 80% of the deployments and time of first attendance complying with force policy. Only 18% of crime records and one non-crime hate incident record were graded as poor. Despite the well-recognised challenges of workload pressure within call centres, 60% of crimes and 78% of incident records were deemed to be good or excellent. The actual deployment response was also generally good, with just 12% of crimes and 6% of incidents having a poor response.




**Scrutiny and supervision**



1.10 It is often difficult to accurately gauge from records whether supervisory intervention has been provided, but not recorded, however we were able to find evidence of 'control room' supervisory intervention in just under a third of crimes and territorial supervision in just over a third. The force policy of including the investigation plan on the incident was common and, whilst some were 'formulaic', many had supervisory contribution. This approach is likely to contribute to the improved performance the force has observed.

**Investigation standards**

1.11 I am grateful for the advice of Community Team Prosecutor, XXXX, who leads on hate crime and offered advice to the reviewers in relevant cases. Suspects were identified in 65% of the crimes examined, with around a quarter of these being referred to the CPS. **36% of the identified suspects were dealt with through restorative justice or other 'out of court disposal' and notably, all were reviewed to be acceptable or higher in their quality, suggesting that such outcomes are being used appropriately.**



1.12 The standard of investigations and disposals decisions was deemed to be good or excellent in 62% of occasions, with 21% being graded as poor. There was no clear trend

in the causes of poor investigations and it was reassuring to see that interventions had been made by supervision and Evidence Review Officers in some cases where the response was initially not acceptable.

### **Non-crime hate incidents**

1.13 The response to non-crime hate incidents was generally good, and only one (out of the 20 examined) should have been recorded as a crime rather than an incident, which is lower than seen in other audits. 80% of responses to incidents were deemed to be good or excellent.

## **DETAILED REPORT**

### **2. Background**

2.1. DCC Hamilton monitors national performance on behalf of fellow chief officers. He leads on the development of policy and partnerships to help improve the way that we monitor and record hate crime.

2.2 The importance of effectively combating hate crime and non-crime hate incidents is well recognised to be essential in maintaining the confidence of affected communities, particularly within the 1999 report of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. It helps us to meet national and international legal requirements and to prevent the escalation of community tensions. Strategies have been in place since the inquiry to decrease the under-reporting of hate crime and to improve criminal justice responses.

2.3 The police and partners have been successful in giving victims the confidence and routes to report hate crimes and have effectively reduced, but not eliminated, under-reporting. As previously mentioned, in the most recent decade, we have effectively moved from 1 in 6 hate crimes being recorded nationally by the police to 1 in 2<sup>2</sup>. It has to be said that this comparison is illustrative and reporting levels are not consistent for all groups, with those who are more socially isolated being much less likely to report.

2.4 Despite the huge advances in recording, there are still worrying trends in hate crime data. The Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) indicates that:

- Hate crime victims are less likely to be satisfied with the response from the police - 55% were satisfied compared to 66% of general crime victims.
- Victims of household crime are more likely to be repeat victims - 27% compared to 20%.
- Victims of hate crime suffer more extensive psychological harm - 33% suffered panic or anxiety attacks compared to 13% for all victims.

### **Referrals to prosecutors**

---

<sup>2</sup> Comparison of date from Crime Survey of England and Wales and police recorded crime statistics 2009-2019. Methodology is consistent but not an exact comparison, as CSEW is a household survey that does not include children under 16 or tourists etc.

2.5 One emerging national performance concern has been an apparent drop in referrals to the CPS for hate crime decisions. Despite year-on-year increases in recorded crime, cases submitted for a decision has dropped each year, suggesting that the percentage of 'successful outcomes' may be diminishing. This situation has led to concerns and criticisms about police performance, including scrutiny in parliamentary select committees.

2.6. Our colleagues in the CPS have provided force-level data for file receipts for all crime and for hate crime. It is clear that the austerity measures that saw a reduction in officer numbers will have had an impact on performance, **but this does not account for the data indicating that national hate crime rates dropped at a greater rate despite the recording increase.**

2.7. A drop in referrals does not definitively prove reduced performance but it is undoubtedly a worrying indicator. DCC Hamilton has committed to examine the reasons for the reductions, in order to understand the causes of this disparity. Early efforts identified a number of potentially contributing factors, including that:

- Our service standards are slipping.
- Changes in response policies mean that less crimes are being allocated out for investigation.
- Increased recording has brought forward more crimes that are difficult to detect e.g. anonymous reports or Internet-based abuse.
- More enquiries are being resolved through 'out of court disposals'.
- Better recording standards are bringing to the surface a situation that was present but previously unidentified.

2.8 In order to gain understanding of the situation, we have agreed to engage in a range of local audits that will be analysed to produce a national report. This will give a 'snapshot' of national performance and hopefully indicators of the cause of the reduction in referrals. DCC Hamilton asked for a number of forces to work with us to analyse a random selection of hate crime cases to identify the causes.

2.9. Force A Police volunteered to take part in the audit and it was agreed that the reports for the participating areas would be protected and only circulated within the programme and to the individual Chief Officer. Any information that forms part of the generic report will be in an anonymised form. **This is the protected version of that document sent to yourself and the participants only** - data will only be shared nationally as a composite of all contributing forces. You are, of course, free to share it however you see fit and the National Policing Lead would liaise with yourself over handling should he get any requests under the FoI Act or similar.

2.10 The anonymous national performance information from the audit will be made available, in future, to all chief officers in a composite report, together with the Audit Tool, which will allow all areas to self-assess their service and identify any necessary improvements in service. Given the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, this national report has been delayed and is expected to be circulated in Autumn 2022.

2.11 This report refers to the audit that took place in conjunction with local policy leads within Force A Police, members of the national Independent Advisory Group and the regional CPS hate crime lead. We examined a random sample of 75 reports (55 crimes and 20 non-crime hate incidents), which were all recorded during 2020.

2.12 A victim survey was carried out where deemed appropriate. 11 victims were deemed suitable and were prepared to cooperate.

2.13 The audit examines non-crime hate incidents as well as crimes. The importance of responding to non-crime hate incidents was a key finding of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and has been accepted by criminal justice executives and governments since. They are seen as essential, as they are often pre-cursors to more serious offending and risk creating civil tensions and undermining the human rights of affected communities.

2.14 The Equality Act of 2010 creates a duty on authorities such as the police to consider the need to eliminate the harassment of citizens based on their protected characteristics and also to promote good relations between people with different characteristics. We consider an effective response to non-crime hate incidents to be evidence of cognisance of those duties. Another reason for their inclusion is that, in a round of national audits in 2012, we found a large number of non-crime hate incidents that should have been recorded as crimes (over 50% in one survey). We formed a view, at that time, that a concentration on measuring success through reduction and detection figures provided a disincentive to good service and reduced the accuracy of hate crime data.

2.15 Our policy in this area is not universally supported and came under scrutiny in a recent Judicial Review that challenged the College of Policing’s Hate Crime Operational Guidance.<sup>3</sup> The Court found that the guidance was ‘important’ and that passed every legal test applied to it. The court did, however, refer to the need for police responses to non-criminal action to be compliant with the principles of the Human Rights Act, particularly in the proportionality of police responses.

**Comparison of national and local data**

2.16 The below chart shows year-on-year performance for Force A Police compared to the national average and the performance ‘extremes’.

	CASE FILE RECEIPTS TO CPS																All crime change	Difference	
	ALL PRE-CHARGE RECEIPTS (BY POLICE FORCE)							HATE CRIME PRE-CHARGE RECEIPTS (BY POLICE FORCE)											
	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018	2018-2019	2019-2020	2014/20 % Change	2014-2015	2015-2016	2016-2017	2017-2018	2018-2019	2019-2020	2014/20 % Change					
National Total	324,045	305,820	287,919	274,490	253,538	233,497	-27.9%	15,816	14,594	13,643	13,059	10,866	8,930	-43.5%	-27.9%	-16%	Hate Crime significantly worse than all crime		
Force with the greatest Differential	9,034	8,639	7,827	7,362	7,433	8,002	-11.4%	271	233	196	205	201	201	-25.8%	-11.4%	-14%	Hate Crime significantly worse than all crime		
Force with the least differential	2,551	2,646	2,320	2,480	2,539	2,534	-1.1%	109	119	107	103	85	57	-47.7%	-1.1%	-47%	Hate Crime significantly worse than all crime		
Force with the least differential	2,252	1,910	1,672	1,765	1,919	1,559	-30.8%	55	37	55	67	50	53	-3.6%	-30.8%	27%	Hate Crime results better than all crime		

<sup>3</sup><https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/miller-v-college-of-police-judgment.pdf>

### 3. DETAILED FINDINGS FROM THE Force A AUDIT

#### 3.1 Recorded hostilities

Primary Hostility	Crimes	Incidents
Disability	10	3
Race	20	5
Religion	6	3
Sexual Orientation	13	5
Transgender	6	4
	twelve crimes and 2 incidents had a secondary hostilities recorded	

#### 3.2 Types of crimes

Primary Type	% of total
Public Order	33
Violence	18
Criminal damage	5
Comm's Offences	11
Harassment	22
Burglary	2
Domestic abuse	4
Sexual assault	4
Stalking	2

#### 3.3 Repeat victimisation

36.4% of crime victims were 'repeat victims', which is higher than the national average of 27% for 'household' crime and 16% for 'personal' crime.

### INITIAL CALL HANDLING

3.4 Call handling standards were generally of a good standard, with 84% being deemed to be acceptable or better.

All but 8 calls (90%) of crimes and incidents were deemed to have been correctly categorised to comply with force deployment policy.

An officer was deployed to 84% of all crime reports and, of the 9 reports that were not immediately deployed, only 1 of these was deemed to be outside force policy.

Deployment times were generally good, with 82% of the deployments and time of first attendance complying with force policy.

There was evidence of the attention of communications room supervision in 29% of cases and 'territorial' supervision on 36% of incidents. Others may have had such attention but it has not been recorded, and many more had supervisory contributions to the investigation.

### Assessment of quality of incident records

	Crimes %	Incidents
Excellent	12	10
Good	39	65
Acceptable	30	20
Poor	18	5
No incident log	9	

3.5 The reasons for the recording of a poor rating for the incident record included:

Should have allocated or created a diary for the victim
not attended, missed opportunity to locate and arrest offender
Police failed to record damage to the victims car- only recorded offence against themselves

### Assessment of quality of incident responses

	Crimes %	Incidents %
Excellent	16	25
Good	41	55
Acceptable	30	15
Poor	12	5

## HATE CRIME INVESTIGATIONS

3.6 Roughly two thirds of hate crime perpetrators were 'known' to the victim. The most common relationship was as neighbours (a quarter of all crimes). 7% of the total crimes were 'customers' and the same percentage were friends or family.

### Identifying hate element

3.7 The victim identified the 'hate element' in half of the hate incidents and just over two thirds of crimes. It is positive that the police were the first to record the hate element in 10% of crimes and 20% of incidents, as this indicates that they see the value of recording and not merely responding to victim demands.

It is obviously not known how many other crimes could have been so identified but were missed, but this is an encouraging indicator, especially in those crime types where the victim is less likely to demand their rights, such as disability hate crime.



**Notable case**

One non-crime hate incident (**Reference 37731/20**) related to apparently racist language used during a partnership meeting. A PCSO present has challenged the person who agreed to use correct language.

The officer has then recorded the non-crime hate incident and the rationale for actions taken and made a reasonable assessment that no further action is needed.

This level of service demonstrates strong community leadership from Force A Police. It is likely to prevent an escalation and build confidence in the organisation because of the proportionate response.

**Length of investigation**

3.8 The National Crime Statistics Bulletin<sup>4</sup> notes that hate crime enquiries tend to be 'live' for longer, indicating more robust investigations. For racially and religiously aggravated violent offences, they are open for an average of 38 days, compared to 19 days for non-hate crime equivalents. This trend is reflected in Force A, with half of the investigations being open for more than 14 days.

**Updating victims on investigations**

3.9 Victims were generally kept updated as to the progress of investigations, with only 2 crimes which did not record this update, and at least one of these was a 'linked' offence so it is possible that such details were on other files.

**Referral to victim support**

3.10 The records show that, in 20% of instances where there was no referral to victim support services, this was considered to be an appropriate decision (e.g. because the victim was a business), but there was 11% of cases where referral was appropriate but records did not show that this had taken place. It is possible that some of these were done but not recorded or picked up through automatic referral systems.

**Force A Police Practice**

Hate Crime Coordinators send out bespoke victim care packs to all hate crime victims, detailing local support services. The HCC's are also available to advise investigating officers on additional support.

It is difficult to know from the incident/crime records what services were delivered. Whilst there may be a practice of engagement with victim services that is not routinely recorded onto crime or incident records, there was a sense that investigating officers were not

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.report-it.org.uk/files/hate-crime-1920-hosb2920.pdf>

directly engaged with victim services and, as such, were less likely to know how they might assist victims and particularly what 'specialist or culturally sensitive' services may be available. This type of audit is perhaps not the best method to assess the quality of these services and, if not already done elsewhere, it may be helpful to consider with the OPCC whether available services meet the needs of victims and how robustly they are offered.

### **Risk Assessments**

3.11 The thematic inspection of hate crime carried out by the HMICFRS in 2018 recognised the value of risk assessments in responding to hate crime and it was critical of the inconsistency found in this area. Force A Police has implemented a policy of expecting investigations to have an investigation plan and a risk assessment to inform responses. Whilst the recording of these occurs in differing formats, they are found on the majority of crimes where appropriate and there are examples of supervision requiring them to be added retrospectively. These two processes clearly contribute to the levels of consistency found in the audit.

## **CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS**

### **Notification of hate crime element**

3.12 Of the 9 files submitted to the CPS, all but one had clearly noted the hate crime element and the other was an ongoing case.

### **Victim Personal Statements**

3.13 Of the 9 files submitted, 8 included a VPS and one was not found.

### **Case disposal**

	Crimes	% of 40 cases with suspects identified
Charged	2	5
File submitted to CPS	5	13
Cautioned	3	8
Conditional Caution	1	3
Restorative Justice	8	20
Marked 'Out of Court disposal' (Possibly also RJ)	5	13
Victim does not support prosecution	7	18
Other No Further Action	9	23

## Quality of outcome decisions

3.14 The question of the suitability of the police decisions in criminal justice outcomes is a key consideration for the audit from a national perspective. For non-court outcomes, it was assessed that;

### Cautions

3 were considered to have been good quality and 1 poor.

**Note:** Reviewers were asked to record comments by exception, so will tend to note the reasons why a service stood out as being excellent or concerning. For this reason, reading the comments alone can give a false impression of the standards overall. They are included to give pointers to any issues that may need to be considered by managers rather than to give a over-view. Overall performance is better assessed from the data that accompanies the comments.

#### Notable cases

The cautioned case considered to be poor (**14/87180/20**) was a racially aggravated public order case against an on-duty police officer. The incident appears to mention an assault but this has not been recorded.

Examiners mentioned the following in their review:

There was an ero review following the suspect being in custody- however limited information on the crime record

Very scant details on the crime report - statements taken but no victim personal statement. Fact that it is an on duty PC should have same level of standard as member of the public. indeed no victim or witness details recorded as victim being a PC.

### Community resolutions

Of the 5 community resolutions identified, 2 were deemed to be excellent and 3 were deemed to be acceptable outcomes.

### Victim does not support action

7 such outcomes were recorded. 2 were assessed as good, 3 acceptable and 2 poor.

For the poor cases, the following observations were recorded:

There are linked crimes and reports so there may be updates to information on other incidents but it seems this was Originally closed as advice offered and referred to housing to send warning letters.

Picked up by Scrutiny Process and new actions in place to change category and PCSO attention

Can not see evidence that victim was referred to support services but incident has been reopened

Poor investigation, updates, or links to other investigation. Wrongly classified and other offences not identified and recorded.

### Restorative Justice

There were 8 instances of cases being resolved through Restorative Justice. National policy has been slow to develop and occasionally conflicting as to when out-of-court disposals should be used by leading forces to develop local policy responses. The National Policing Lead for OoCD has agreed pilot programmes with the Director of Public Prosecutions, which will hopefully lead to clarity in due course, but a concern has been raised that this outcome allows perpetrators to avoid robust sanctions. For this reason, we are keen to see if decisions are appropriate. This appears to be the case in Force A Police, where 7 outcomes were deemed to be good and 1 was acceptable. Assessors noted that, in many instances, Restorative Justice was used in cases that would otherwise have been recorded as NFA, as the victim was not willing to support court proceedings.

### Quality of Investigation

3.15 Of the 55 crimes examined, the quality of the investigations were assessed to be:

	Crimes (% of total)
Excellent	13
Good	47
Acceptable	18
Poor	22

The reasons recorded for the cases deemed to be poor included:

There was an ero review following the suspect being in custody- however limited information on the crime record indeed no victim or witness details recorded as victim being a PC.

Initial call was re damage to victims motor vehicle. Officers attended although tagged for fcb to deal. Only recorded the abuse at them and not the complaint by the member of public

There is limited details on the investigation- clearly somewhere there is sufficient evidence to support a prosecution- but not contained within this report
enquiry log lacks updates throughout
hate element and perception of victim not given importance
Not classed as a hate crime initially
There are linked crimes and reports so there may be updates to information on other incidents but it seems this was Originally closed as advice offered and referred to housing to send warning letters.
Picked up by Scrutiny Process and new actions in place to change category and PCSO attention
Can not see evidence that victim was referred to support services but incident has been reopened
Linked offence of the shoplifting for which suspect charged. No evidence attached to either crime so difficult to review evidence
No investigation has taken place. Attending officer never identified offence only submitted vul adult form. Crime picked up in audit and recorded. Neg PBE obtained 10 days later.
No initial contact. Never confirmed if actually a hate crime. Could have disability instead of sexual orientation - assumption made due to comments of suspect?!!
There was lots of advice and oversight from the Hate crime coordinator that was not answered in the write off and ignored. There was a request for this to be referred to YOT, however an RJ was issues with very wooly conditions. There was a secondary offence identified with the mother as the victim being threatened by the suspects parents which is not been recorded or dealt with.

## CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASEWORK

3.16 From the examined files, 9 were submitted to the CPS for decision or after charge.

	Cases
Excellent	1
Good	5
Acceptable	3
Poor	2

Assessors recorded the following comments:

discussions with victim not logged
Needed more updates in enquiry log
no statements or cctv evidence, hate element appears to be an afterthought
Not referred but victim declined to support prosecution
Good example of case that would have been simple undetected if not RJ
Outcome 22 used incorrectly. Neighbour dispute addressed but not hate element. Should be outcome 8 if CJU 10 signed if offence admitted

Q for CPS about their view of RJ outcome - Insufficient detail to agree process.  
No rationale for the decision recorded on the file

***(Drafting note) - One case has been raised by separate report as it raises victim issues that are ongoing. In short it raised a case where partial information led to charge decisions which did not address all of the issues disclosed by the victim and the CPS view was that charge advice should have been obtained given the multiple factors involved in the complaint.***

### **Victim perception**

3.17 10 victims were traceable and agreed to give their views. All had made the initial call to police themselves. 3 had experienced and reported other hate crime. 5 recalled being asked this on the call, 1 did not think they were asked and the rest were unsure.

### **Perception of initial call**

3.18 2 victims felt that the initial call was poor, 3 good and 5 thought the service that they received on the initial call was excellent. All except 1 victim felt that the call handler obtained sufficient details.

Victims commented the following:

*"The call was very efficient they got all of the information needed and stayed on line to obtain [the perpetrator's] movement. I have mental health condition and they were very compassionate"*

*"Very helpful asking for detail [they were] pretty brilliant - asking questions to keep updated."*

The one victim who felt that the response was poor reported a negative experience throughout the police response to his call. He had reported abuse from his mother but, as enquiries progressed, he was arrested, charged and convicted of counter complaints. He said of the call that:

*"[They] didn't really seem interested once the family issues were mentioned. "*

### **Perception of overall service**

3.19 All victims except 2 were satisfied with the speed of response. One said that it took 3 days to arrive and, even then, this was only to arrest him for the counter-allegations from his mother. The other (subject to a separate note) said:

*"Took too long to arrive - very stressful this was one of several calls and the others were emergency calls over a period of time"*

3.20 The victims who answered this question said that the investigating officers spent enough time with them (except for the arrested individual) and all were very positive about the attitude of the officer, including the person who was arrested, who said:

“The arresting officer was very reasonable and showed empathy, but the overall outcome was one-sided [against him]”

Other victims offered these comments:

Yes - they even called wife and they showed great comfort
Thorough interview from investigating officer who took detailed statement over 2.5 hours
Called first to say he had been arrested and visited the next morning. Statement taken next morning - officer was very caring
Very happy was very good and that made him
Brilliant
Had met PC before and she was very friendly and kept victim calm. And she kept on as OIC
Dealt with over the phone as IP was concerned about the footage going online
Offender interviewed and given warning satisfied with outcome. “If I was to grade on 1-5 stars I would give them 7”
All interactions with the police were ‘Spot-on’ and would have no hesitation in calling the police if he were to suffer similar crime in the future.
updated regularly and left with a very good impression of the police.

## NON-CRIME HATE INCIDENTS

4.1 We examined 20 non-crime hate incidents, as set out above. The incidents were a broad range of incidents including neighbour disputes, workplace bullying and Internet abuse. One involved eggs being thrown at a Mosque. All incident response categories were deemed to have been correctly classified.

4.2 18 of the 20 incidents had an officer deployed and one of the non-resourced was in line with force policy. The one assessed to be incorrect is discussed below.

### Should incidents have been recorded as hate crime?

4.3 Out of the 20 incidents, we found just 1 report that was incorrectly recorded as incidents when crimes were made out. One risk of the incorrect recording of crimes as incidents is that the true picture of hate crime is inaccurate, another is that they tend not to be subject to the same level of managerial scrutiny and therefore a prone to a less thorough service. This was evident in the following;

#### Notable case

One non-crime hate incident (- incident reference 80367) was reported by email. From the record it appeared that the circumstances should have been recorded as a disability hate crime. The complainant identifies public order offence by threatening woman who uses crutches to be punched in the face and claiming to have a knife. There is mention of a CCTV covering the incident but it this does not appear, from the record, to have been seized.

Supervision appears to have checked this file before closure but does not cause it to be correctly recorded. The positive responses evidenced in the rest of the audit would suggest that, had the matter been correctly recorded as a crime then these apparent failings in the response would have been picked up by supervisory oversight.

4.4 Despite the apparent erroneous recording above, the general responses seemed thoughtful and proportionate with a victim-focussed service in most cases and evidence of a cognisance of the need to reduce community tensions. It was particularly pleasing to see the 'pro-active' recording of incidents from officers. One such example (Reference 91530) relates to a serious domestic abuse investigation where a woman reported serious crimes against her ex-partner but during the investigation it is disclosed that he would deliberately 'mis-gender' the victim's transgender son. The proactive recording of this appears to show how the investigating officer has a deep understanding of the value in recording hate incidents and preventing the escalation of such hostilities. Another good response can be seen in the below.

**Notable case**

One non-crime hate incident (dated 26.5.20 - incident reference 86645) was a report of eggs being thrown at a Mosque. The complaint received an excellent response. Officers attended and discovered that no permanent damage had been caused but recognised the huge fear that such attacks could cause and the potential for escalation or retaliation.

SB and Prevent colleagues were briefed by supervision and reassurance offered to Mosque users. Attempts were made to identify an offender on CCTV. A media plan was agreed and local authority alerted. CCTV images were circulated in an attempt to identify the person who threw the eggs.



## 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

### Recommendation One

This type of audit is perhaps not the best method to assess the quality of victim support services, but there did not appear to be a strong interaction between the investigating officer and victim support services. Given the important support victims can gain from a culturally sensitive service and how this can help demonstrate compliance with the 'Enhanced Service' required by the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime<sup>5</sup> it would be helpful to understand the depth and quality of these services and whether they meet the 'sensitive' needs of hate crime victims. If managers have not already done so, it may be helpful to consider with the OPCC whether available services meet the needs of victims and how robustly they are offered.

### Recommendation Two

That Force A Police reviews the ongoing threats from crime (Reference 14/69684/20) to consider the future threat posed to the victim on the planned release of the perpetrator from this crime (subject to separate document)

### Recommendation Three

That Force A Police considers revisiting this and previous internal audits periodically using a similar methodology to assess progress against strategic goals and service standards.

### Recommendation Four

That Force A Police examine repeat victimisation levels to satisfy themselves that the disparity with national data is a result of more inclusive recording practices, rather than more occurrences.

---

<sup>5</sup> [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/476900/code-of-practice-for-victims-of-crime.PDF](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/476900/code-of-practice-for-victims-of-crime.PDF)