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REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY  
REVIEWING THE EFFECT OF REGIONALISATION  
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF  
HOMICIDES

FEBRUARY 1990

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RECOMMENDATIONS

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(i)

REGIONALISATIONISSUE:

Effectiveness of regionalised Homicide Units.

BACKGROUND:

The Homicide Squad which formed part of the previous Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB) evolved, over a number of years. It was regionalised in 1987, after consideration was given to certain objections raised, see Annexure 'A'.

There has been an undercurrent of resistance to the regionalisation. On 13 December, 1989, the Commissioner directed that a Working Party be formed to review the effect of regionalisation on the investigation of homicides.

On 17 December 1989, in an article in the Sun Herald, the State Coroner, Mr. Waller, was stated to entertain concern relative to the effectiveness of the regionalised Homicide Units, see Annexure 'B'.

CURRENT POSITION:

The Working Party was formed as directed, Page 4 and executed its task by:-

- \* reviewing statistics held by the Department, Page 6 and Annexure 'C' - these confirmed that the incidence of homicide had decreased and the clear-up figure increased since regionalisation.
- \* analysing effectiveness of Homicide Units vis-a-vis jobs attended, Page 6 and Annexure 'D' - this showed that there has not been any significant change in the number and nature of uncleared homicides since regionalisation.
- \* conducting a survey of Region Command and Homicide Units as to perceived problems arising from the regionalisation of the homicide function, Pages 7, et seq, Annexures 'G' and 'H'. The responses received, therefrom, augmented by some 22 issues thrown up by Working Party members, were carefully considered by the Working Party and have resulted in the first 11 recommendations, Page (iii).

(ii)

- \* inviting, through the Commissioner, the N.S.W. Police Association to make written submissions in support of its assertions that regionalised Homicide Units were not effective. No response has been received. However, a transcript of an interview on radio station 2GB of Mr. Day, President of the N.S.W. Police Association, is attached, Annexure 'E' and the salient features considered, Annexure 'F'. Those matters of substance were considered with the issues raised generally.
- \* The State Coroner, Mr. Waller, SM, was interviewed. He claims the article of 17 December, 1989, published his comments out of context. His only remaining concerns, the number of unsolved homicides, does not directly bear on regionalisation as the clear-up rate is basically the same as before regionalisation. However, his concern has been noted and is reflected in Recommendation 12, Page (iii).
- \* Region Commanders and Staff Officers (Operations), have unanimously supported the continued regionalisation of homicide investigation. Three of the five Region Crime Squad Leaders also give similar support whilst the remaining two qualify their support only with the need for additional personnel, Page 20.
- \* the Working Party saw a need for a Standing Committee to co-ordinate certain functions impacting on the Statewide capability to investigate homicide, Page 17 and Recommendation 11 seeks to provide accordingly.
- \* finally, the Working Party is of the firm view that Homicide Units should remain regionalised, Page 23 and Recommendation 13.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the recommendations, detailed at Page (iii), be considered for implementation.

REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY REVIEWING THE EFFECT OF REGIONALISATION  
ON THE INVESTIGATION OF HOMICIDES

TERMS OF REFERENCE

On 13 December 1989, the Commissioner of Police directed that a working party be formed to review the effect of regionalisation on the investigation of homicides and report accordingly.

BACKGROUND

The offence of homicide is so serious, so horrendous, that it is regarded as a crime against humanity. It attracts the most severe legal sanction and claims the attention of the community which has a deep seated expectation that justice will swiftly follow the crime. Conversely, public confidence is severely shaken when police investigations are perceived to be less than adequate. Consequently, law enforcement agencies, world-wide, have traditionally accorded the highest priority to the investigation of homicide, ensuring that the most experienced members are allocated the task. In some cases these members form an identifiable unit, a 'homicide squad'.

In New South Wales, Homicide Units have their genesis in the 'General Duty Detectives' section of the Criminal Investigation Branch. Until 1968, a number of highly experienced detectives attached to that Section were responsible for the investigation of murders and other serious crime. They were utilised where the perpetrators continued to elude the best efforts of divisional detectives or where the circumstances raised such a public outcry that it was considered prudent to demonstrate a determination to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. Requests for assistance were frequently delayed until the investigation was virtually hopeless. There was little or no provision for the acquisition of specialist skills by juniors. Indeed, members performing the 'General Duty Detective' function were not accommodated as a group and there was only intermittent interaction between pairs. Despite significant success, the Section was far from the most sought after area of the Criminal Investigation Branch.

In 1968, the decision was taken to change the name of the 'General Duty Detectives Section' to the 'Special Crime Squad'. At the same time, it was decided to allocate a rank structure and to accommodate members in the same room. These moves served to give the Squad an 'identity'. The infusion of highly motivated detectives and an involvement in numerous successful investigations focused attention on Squad activities. Success earned administrative support resulting in procedures to ensure early notice of homicides on a State-wide basis and the allocation of quality support services, particularly from the Physical Evidence Branch. A high level of professionalism in both the investigation and court presentation stages was achieved and maintained. Esprit-de-corp was extremely high and membership of the Squad was keenly sought.

The title 'Homicide Squad' had, for many years, been opposed by various Commissioners, chiefly because the Squad was utilised on duties other than homicides. Indeed, members had led numerous other major investigations involving prominent political figures, unions, public institutions and other Services. Nevertheless, in deference to continued requests by members, the Squad name was changed from 'Special Crime' to 'Homicide' in the mid 1970's. The structure of the Squad and the duties of members remained fundamentally the same. However, between the time the Special Crime Squad was formed until the regionalisation of the Criminal Investigation Branch, the authorised strength increased from 12 to 38 units.

Of significance to the matter presently under consideration is the fact that at no time during the evolution of the Homicide Squad, was formal training provided for members. Skills were acquired on an ad-hoc basis with juniors relying, to a very large extent, on the senior member of the pair in much the same manner as was then the practice in the legal profession. Formal meetings for the purpose of communicating experiences were unknown; the process being limited to the informal exchange of information during morning tea in the canteen. In this regard it was normal procedure for members actively engaged on an investigation to work from a place convenient to the scene of the crime and not return to the Criminal Investigation Branch unless required to do so for a specific purpose.

Conversely, it was quite common for small groups of homicide investigators to discuss particular problems as they were encountered with other members known to have expertise in that area. The position of Officer-in-Charge was filled by a member with long experience and highly developed skills in the field of homicide investigation who was available for advice and guidance at any time. Each pair was led by an experienced detective sergeant or, in a few cases, by an experienced detective senior constable. Again, the analogy with the legal profession is inescapable.

In 1987, the decision was taken to regionalise the Criminal Investigation Branch. The circumstances surrounding the operation of each Squad were independently reviewed following receipt of suggestions and recommendations from all interested members including those then serving on the particular Squad.

Very close attention was accorded the Homicide Squad. Its overall importance in the general scheme of crime detection was well appreciated. A number of objections against regionalisation were received. These were reduced to nine principal issues which are detailed at Annexure 'A', together with the current Working Party's comment. Those issues were critically examined in 1987. Although basically sound they were found to be of insufficient weight to warrant the retention of the Homicide Squad as a centralised Unit. The current Working Party is similarly persuaded.

It is relevant to note, however, that the decision taken by the Working Party in 1987 was based, to a degree, on the provision of flexibility between Region Crime Squads and the implementation of formal procedures to support interaction and retention of specialist expertise.

It is abundantly clear, that the decision to regionalise the Homicide Squad was not supported by some members. Rumblings of discontent, albeit lacking specific detail, emerged. Late in 1989, the printed media commenced to take an interest in the matter, culminating in the publication of an article purporting to report comment by the State Coroner, Mr. Waller, in the Sun Herald on 17 December 1989. See Annexure 'B'.



Effective management dictates that all major change should be monitored. It is expedient to review the effect of regionalisation on the investigation of homicides at this time; particularly in view of the continuing comment and the recent publication of the Report of the Criminal Investigation Working Party.

#### WORKING PARTY

The Working Party formed at the direction of the Commissioner is comprised of:

- \* Executive Chief Superintendent Parrington, State Command,
- \* Chief Superintendent Maroney, State Investigative Group,
- \* Chief Superintendent Johnson, State Intelligence Group,
- \* Chief Superintendent Gilligan, Liverpool District, and
- \* Superintendent Hill, New South Wales Police Academy.

Collectively these members possess years as active homicide investigators; their experience embraces duty at the National Crime Authority, State Drug Crime Commission, the Bureau of Crime Intelligence, supervision of matters appertaining to crime at State, District and Divisional level and lengthy terms of divisional detective duty.

#### METHODOLOGY

The Working Party drew heavily on the personal experience of members in order to situate issues in proper context. Due weight was accorded to:-

- \* Departmental statistics relating to the crime of homicide;
- \* An analysis of the extent and nature of homicides perpetrated prior and subsequent to regionalisation;

Perceptions of others were sought by:

- \* Input from the New South Wales Police Association;
- \* Reference to issues raised at the time the decision was taken to regionalise the Homicide Squad
- \* Canvassing Region Officers, including homicide unit members.
- \* Discussion with the State Coroner.

The Working Party based its deliberations on the hypothesis that, in accordance with accepted Departmental policy, all resources should be regionalised unless there was shown to be compelling argument to the contrary.

#### SPECIALISATION

A fundamental issue of the question of whether specialist homicide investigators were necessary in the current policing environment - was addressed at the outset.

The Working Party is cognisant that a corpus of opinion supports the view specialists should be replaced by detectives competent to investigate any serious crime. Further, the policy to place resources at the lowest practicable level of command is noted.

The Working Party acknowledged the high level of expertise possessed by detectives performing duty in other fields. Nevertheless, it considers the investigation of homicide required both enhanced detective skills and, in addition, special expertise in other areas including:-

- \* a penchant to detail;
- \* the ability to assess the value of factors in isolation;
- \* the ability to evaluate cumulatively;
- \* the ability to conceptualise;



- \* appreciation of forensic-medical matters particularly in relation to changes to the human body;
- \* appreciation of social behaviour and, in particular, deviations from the accepted norm;
- \* ability to plan, control and motivate lengthy, complicated investigations;
- \* extraordinary patience;
- \* ability to prepare complicated reports and briefs;
- \* an enhanced knowledge of the rules of evidence;
- \* an ability to present evidence under the most stringent conditions.

Some of these skills spring from the individual personality and cannot be acquired by training. Many are sheer anathemas to detectives engaged in other fields of investigation.

Consequently, the Working Party has no difficulty in forming the view that specialist homicide investigators should be retained.

RECOMMENDATION 1: That specialist homicide investigators be retained.

#### STATISTICS

The Working Party were furnished with official statistics detailing the number of homicides perpetrated and the number of such crimes cleared for the years 19 to 19 . See Annexure 'C'. These statistics are accurate to the date of publication.

In addition, the Working Party had the benefit of an analysis of the 'jobs' attended by homicide investigators over the past five years, see Annexure 'D'. The data utilised for this analysis was gleaned from homicide records. These records are constantly up-dated and do not, therefore, necessarily agree with the official statistics published in the various annual reports of the Police Department.

The Working Party has carefully considered the abovementioned statistics and analysis. These indicate that:-

- \* the annual incidence of homicides has not increased since regionalisation;
- \* there has been a decrease in the reported number of homicides since regionalisation;
- \* regionalisation has had no impact on the incidence of homicides in this State;
- \* there has been no appreciable change in the number of investigations attended by members of the Homicide Squad;
- \* the clearance rate for investigations attended by homicide members has actually risen since regionalisation.
- \* there has been no significant change in the pattern of unsolved homicides.

Consequently, the Working Party is satisfied statistics clearly indicate that regionalisation has not had a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of homicide investigators in so far as the ability to clear up crime is concerned.

#### SURVEY

As previously mentioned, the matters raised in 1987 have been documented, together with comment by the current Working Party, at Annexure 'A'.

Despite an invitation to do so the Police Association of New South Wales has not made a formal submission. A transcript of an interview between Mike Bailey, of radio station 2GB and the President of the Association, Mr. Day, is to be found at Annexure 'E'. Details of relevant issues raised by Mr. Day, together with comment by the Working Party, are extracted at Annexure 'F'.

An amalgam of 22 issues initially raised by the Working Party and subsequently reinforced and/or extended by members attached to Regional Crime Squads and Homicide Units, together with comment by the Working Party, is to be found at Annexure 'G'.

A summary of the comment made by Region Commanders, Staff Officers (Operations), Commanders Region Crime Squads and Leaders of Homicide Units, together with comment by the Working Party, is attached at Annexure 'H'.

Careful perusal of each of these documents reveals that the majority of issues raised might be conveniently discussed under separate headings:-

- \* Selection
- \* Training/Development
- \* Service Delivery
- \* Management and
- \* Sundry Issues.

Each will now be addressed in seriatim.

#### Selection

Members referred to the practice previously adopted by the centralised Homicide Squad. Then applicants were carefully vetted by the Officer in Charge together with other senior members of the Squad. Those members who knew the applicant were invited to comment on his suitability in the light of the high standards and the demanding conditions he would be required to meet as a Squad member. Only where an applicant received general approval was his attachment to the Squad approved.

Under regionalisation it appears that, in some instances at least, members are transferred for duty to Homicide Units without prior consultation with the Leader of the Unit or other members attached thereto.

As already stated, page 5, the Working Party is of the firm view that a member must possess special qualities to become a successful homicide investigator. Consequently, the Working Party considers experienced homicide investigators should be involved in the selection process.

It is considered this requirement might easily be met by requiring each application for transfer to a Homicide Unit to be referred to the Leader of that Unit for written report of the applicant's suitability prior to being actioned by the Staff Officer (Personnel). The Transfer Committee should be charged with the responsibility of monitoring the process.

**RECOMMENDATION 2:** That a member of the Service be transferred for duty with a Homicide Unit only after the Leader of that Unit has reported, in writing, on the suitability or otherwise of such member.

#### **Training and Development**

There is a perception at Region Crime Squad level that the training and development of junior Homicide Unit members is not of the standard offered prior to regionalisation. This perception is based on a number of factors including:-

- (a) the lack of a minimum training period of two years;
- (b) senior detectives attached to the Homicide Squad are not, now, necessarily experienced homicide investigators;
- (c) there is no formal facility for the development of members during their training period in practical investigative and relevant support areas, e.g., forensic science techniques;
- (d) regionalisation of the Homicide Squad means that some members will never have the opportunity of gaining experience in certain types of homicide.

These issues are recorded in detail vide Items 1 to 16 of Annexure 'G'.

(a) Training Period:

The Working Party is of the view that Detective Constables attached to Homicide Units should not be regarded as 'experienced' homicide investigators until they successfully complete a two year training period.

RECOMMENDATION 3: That a minimum period of 2 years training be completed by junior members of Homicide Units prior to them being regarded as experienced investigators.

(b) Structure:

The Working Party acknowledges the importance of the structured development of homicide investigators and the potential for factors raised to erode that development. Critical in the process is the retention, at Region Crime Squad level, of a nucleus of highly experienced homicide investigators led by a member demonstrably outstanding in that area of endeavour.

The major impediment in attaining this ideal is the loss of experienced members promoted to other areas of policing. It would appear the most practical means of retaining the necessary experience would be to restructure Homicide Units so as to reflect the high level of expertise, experience, responsibility and accountability demanded of experienced homicide investigators. Accordingly, the Working Party is of the view that each Homicide Unit should be led by a Detective Inspector, that the majority of pairs be each led by an experienced Detective Sergeant and each of the remaining pairs be led by an experienced Detective Senior Constable.

RECOMMENDATION 3: That the rank structure of each Homicide Unit be increased to reflect the responsibilities of the position.

(c) Skill Development:

The Working Party notes with interest the penchant for further training held by those seeking a career as homicide investigators. No facility has ever existed in the Department for such training. Nevertheless the trend is commendable and should be actively supported. It is considered essential that, in an age of increasing technology, investigators be afforded the opportunity of maintaining and advancing skills in their area of specialist interest.

The Working Party is aware that Police Academy staff are presently reviewing the Detective Training Programme and considering the possibility of significant changes in both content and presentation. This action is strongly supported. Nevertheless, the Working Party is of the firm view that to develop into accomplished homicide investigators junior members must complete formal courses, be exposed to the day to day guidance of experienced members and be afforded the opportunity of discussing trends with persons experienced in the particular discipline.

It is proposed that each quarter a seminar of one day duration be conducted under the auspice of State Command. This seminar should address all significant matters affecting the investigation of homicide that have arisen during the previous three months both in Australia and overseas. The more important matters should be presented by experts in the particular field, e.g., forensic science. All members attached to Homicide Units should attend these seminars provided workloads permit.

RECOMMENDATION 5: That quarterly seminars designed to increase the expertise of homicide investigators be established.

(d) Broadening Experience:

Despite the fact that each region embraces many types of culture and strata of society it is possible that investigators in one region may not have the opportunity of gaining experience in a certain type of homicide which occurs in another region; e.g., Region North investigators may not often have the opportunity of working on homicides involving prostitutes or the racing fraternity.

The Working Party does not accord this factor the same level of importance as others impacting on training and development. Nevertheless, it is proposed that this aspect be kept in mind when members are identified for secondment to 'Initial Response' duty, which is discussed next under 'Service Delivery'.

Service Delivery

It is in this area that the proponents of centralisation have proven most vocal. They claim that regionalised Homicide Units have been unable to deliver a service at the required level and point to a number of factors including:-

- (a) insufficient homicide investigators attached to each Region;
- (b) utilisation of investigators for other than homicides;
- (c) lack of homicide investigators during the critical initial period;
- (d) lack of co-ordination between Regions.

These matters are fully detailed, together with the comment of the Working Party, at Items 17 to 42 of Annexure 'G'.

Statistics, Annexures 'C' and 'D', do not support the contention that a satisfactory service is not being delivered to the people of this State. Indeed those statistics indicate the contrary. Nevertheless, from the material placed before it, the Working Party formed the view that the factors raised have the potential to lower the effectiveness

of homicide investigations and, eventually, lead to a significant loss of effectiveness. Of immediate concern is the distinct possibility that failure to redress any genuine concerns will almost certainly lead to unnecessary stress within the organisation and a lowering of morale.

(a) Authorised Strength:

Turning firstly to the question of authorised strength. Material furnished by the various Commanders directly associated with the management of Region Crime Squads is detailed at Annexure 'H'.

Briefly the situation is as follows:-

<u>Region</u>	<u>Authorised Strength</u>		<u>Incidents Attended</u>
			<u>1988/1989</u>
North			
i) Newcastle	6	(2)*	11
ii) Chatswood	5	(2)*	14
North West	11	(7)*	24
South West	12	(8)*	35
South	15	(7)*	25

\* Denotes number of Squad members with more than 12 months experience on homicide duty.

It is clear from the facts provided that both Region North and Region South West have, on a number of occasions, been unable to provide experienced homicide detectives to investigate murders in their respective Regions.

It may well be that the division of Region North's Homicide Unit into two parts has significantly contributed to the difficulties experienced in that Region. The rationale for such a division, in so far as it relates to homicide investigation, should be re-examined in the light of current trends.

A cursory examination of the authorised strength of Homicide Units vis-a-vis reported workloads indicates a need may exist at this



time for a reassessment of authorised strengths. The Working Party is of the view that the minimum practical strength of Homicide Units is 10 units. However, it also believes that the assessment of authorised strength is a matter for the Establishment Review Branch.

RECOMMENDATION 6: That the Establishment Review Branch review the authorised strength of all Homicide Units.

(b) Multiple Tasking:

An issue ranked highly when considering problems associated with service delivery by Homicide Units was that of secondments. At the present time Homicide (South) has seven members on secondment to task Forces. Commanders were highly critical of the practice of seconding members to Task Forces without prior consultation.

The practice of utilising homicide investigators on crime not associated with homicide was also strongly criticised. The principal objection in this regard is the non-availability of members when a homicide occurs due to the fact they are engaged on some other type of work or attending court re same. It is noted that this was not generally permitted when the Homicide Squad was centralised. Then, on the rare occasions members were not tasked on current homicide investigations, they were usually detailed to re-examine unsolved murders; sometimes resulting in the matter being cleared.

The Working party supports the view that members of Homicide Units should not be seconded to Task Forces other than those engaged on homicide related crimes and that only in exceptional circumstances should they be utilised for the investigation of other offences.

RECOMMENDATION 7: That members of Homicide Units should not be utilised for the investigation of crimes not associated with homicide.

RECOMMENDATION 8: That investigators attached to Homicide Units be seconded to homicide related Task Forces only after consultation with the Commander of the relative Region Crime Squad.

(c) Critical Initial Stage:

Criticism of the lack of homicide personnel available during the critical initial stage of an investigation is detailed at Items 19 and 20 of Annexure 'G'. It was common practice prior to Regionalisation for the Officer-in-Charge of the Homicide Squad to ensure that as many homicide detectives as practicable were assigned to a fresh homicide investigation during the critical initial stage. The length of this stage varied from one day in those instances where there was 'nothing to go on' to 14 days in more complicated matters; the maximum period being determined by the limitations of human recollection rather than the work-load. The desirable situation was to have at least one pair of experienced homicide detectives to lead each section of the investigation, e.g., the scene and its environs, canvassing witness interrogation, etc. In practice this was achieved by making a senior pair responsible for the investigation and then recalling all available homicide investigators from older investigations to make up the short-fall for the critical initial stage.

There is a school of thought that the additional resources needed during the critical initial stage may be drawn from other than Homicide Units. Without, in any way, attempting to denigrate other Sections of the Force, the value of which has been demonstrated on many occasions, it is crucial that the Chief Investigator be completely confident that every link, albeit minute, in the investigation has been properly investigated and recorded. This may only be achieved, during the initial stage, by assigning experienced homicide detectives possessing a full appreciation of the value of material and of the overall concept of homicide investigation to take charge of relevant sections. After the end of the initial stage time has lost its tyranny, case management prevails, work is prioritised and, generally speaking, the ancillary resources revert

to their former command. There are numerous instances where failure to observe this strategy has seriously affected major investigations.

It is clear that sufficient attention has not been accorded this aspect of homicide investigation. The Working Party supports the concept that homicide resources throughout the regions should be co-ordinated at State Command level, to ensure the critical initial stage of fresh investigations are adequately serviced.

RECOMMENDATION 9: That the State Commander be responsible for implementing procedures designed to co-ordinate homicide resources to service the critical initial stage of a homicide investigation.

(d) Inter-Region Assistance:

Items 24, 25 and 31 of Annexure 'G' express concern that relief has not, until the recent 'North Shore Murders' been provided between Regions. In support of this contention it is noted at page 5, Annexure 'H', that one Region requested assistance on no less than five occasions and, not once, received relief from other Regions. More recently, it was found that a Region was unable to give relief to others because of the very large number of homicide detectives attached to that Region permitted to proceed on annual leave simultaneously.

In 1987 it was recognised that the principal advantage of a centralised Homicide Squad was its flexibility. Whilst there may be a reasonable expectation that there will be between 90 and 100 murders perpetrated in this State each year it is impossible to predict the time, place or nature of those crimes. Any trained body of homicide detectives must be sufficiently flexible that every murder will be serviced without delay irrespective of where, in the State, it occurs.

The Working Party views the current situation with concern. It is of the view that matters impacting on the availability of homicide investigators should be co-ordinated at State Command level to ensure maximum service delivery.

RECOMMENDATION 10: That matters impacting on the inter-region availability of homicide resources be co-ordinated at State Command level.

#### SUNDRY MATTERS.

At Item 49 of Annexure 'G' it is claimed the rate of homicides in New South Wales has increased under regionalisation and the clear-up rate decreased during the same period. This proposition was advanced by the President of the New South Wales Police Association and is clearly not supported by statistics.

Other matters, e.g., Item 7, detailing the need for a profile of the 'homicide detective' and Item 6 referring to training of detectives in the use of lap-top computers and the like, are presently under review. The Working Party is of the view that these are really separate matters disassociated with the key issue; the question of effectiveness of regionalised unit.

A number of other issues, impacting on 'Service Delivery' were raised in the survey. These included the fact that junior members of Homicide Units were detailed to lead investigations, the fact that homicide detectives were not dedicated to tasks for sufficient time and the potential for criticism by courts because of delays flowing from heavy work loads. The Working Party considers these matters, as reported, do have the potential to impact on the effectiveness of investigations. However, the Working Party is of the view that by implementing the issues already addressed, together with those that follow the grounds for the expressed concerns will be substantially eliminated.



MANAGEMENT

Prior to regionalisation the greatest problem confronting the use of specialists in homicide and other investigations was duality of command. In the early stages of evolution homicide investigators were very much orientated to the role of assisting divisional police. Subsequently, commensurate with recognition of their specialist skills, they took a leading part in homicide investigations until finally, by 1987, it was common practice for the homicide element to completely assume command and responsibility for the entire investigation. At no point during this lengthy evolution was a situation reached which was completely compatible with the management scheme in place at that particular time.

One of the principal perceived advantages of Regionalisation was the elimination of the problems associated with duality of command. The matters raised at Items 22, 31, 37 and 47 of Annexure 'G' brings into question the success of the concept in this area. Briefly, those items address such matters as -

- \* the curtailment of investigations on budget grounds;
- \* delay in seeking assistance from homicide detectives;
- \* case overload;
- \* line of command.

The Working Party recognises that the matters raised have the potential to impact on the effectiveness of major investigations. However, it would appear that all could and should be addressed by application of the principles expounded in the Final Report of the Criminal Investigation Working Party, by adaption of the Major Investigation Plan for intra-region use and by normal region command procedures.

Of greater interest to the Working Party is the strong assertion, both directly and by imputation, throughout the issues raised at Region Crime Squad level, see Annexure 'G', of the real and potential danger of a loss of professionalism due to the regionalisation of homicide investigators. The Working Party has carefully examined this aspect and is of the view that there is a need for co-ordination at State Command level in relation to:-

- \* selection processes  
(previously mentioned at page 8);
- \* providing seminars for the development of homicide investigators  
(previously mentioned at page 11);
- \* co-ordinating homicide resources for critical initial response  
(previously mentioned at page 14);
- \* co-ordinating matters impacting on ability to provide relief to  
other regions  
(previously mentioned at page 15);
- \* facilitating discussion at Unit Leader level;
- \* the provision of an Advanced Training Course for Managers of  
Major Crime Incidents;
- \* Oversighting the effectiveness of homicide investigations and  
prosecutions on a State-wide basis.

Of the two issues not previously discussed in this paper, the facilitation of discussions between Unit Leaders merely requires scheduling such meetings on a regular basis and ensuring they are accorded the required level of prestige to ensure active participation by all parties.

The second matter, provision of a Crime Manager's Course, is perceived by the Working Party to be of burgeoning importance. For a number of reasons, including accelerated promotion, a large number of detectives possessed of in-depth skills in the investigation of homicide are no longer associated with such investigations. There is a very real danger that, unless immediate action is taken, knowledge and skill, not to be found in a definitive form in text books, will be lost forever. Despite the continuing reasonable clear-up rate members of the Working Party feel there is a need for present senior homicide detectives to be afforded the opportunity of attending such a course, which should be based on general management principles with a strong bias to the application of those principles to homicide and other serious crime investigation. Development of the Course should rest with the Police Academy with strong support from identified members with outstanding investigation ability.

The perceived necessity to oversight the effectiveness of homicide investigations at State Command level arises from concerns expressed by the State Coroner, see page 21.

The Working Party is of the view that each of the seven matters discussed under this general heading of 'Management' should be co-ordinated at State Command level by a Standing Committee, chaired by the Commander, State Investigative Group and comprised of the Commander of each Region Crime Squad and the Commander, Tactical Intelligence Unit, State Intelligence Group.

**RECOMMENDATION 11:** That a Standing Committee be established at State Command level to co-ordinate on a Force-wide basis training, resource, communication and review matters affecting homicide investigation.

#### Command Comment

The overall effectiveness and continued regionalisation of Homicide Units is unanimously supported by all Region Commanders. See Annexure 'H' and by all Superintendents, Staff Officers (Operations). Unequivocal support is also given by three of the Region Crime Leaders; qualified support is accorded by two Region Crime Leaders: the qualification relates only to the question of increased authorised strength. Only one Senior Officer has expressed a view that Homicide Units should be again centralised. That Officer's duties are not connected with the control of Homicide Units and his views are based on the factors raised in the 1987 review. see Annexure 'B'.

One Officer, see Item 54 Annexure 'G', expresses the view that perceived unrest in the homicide investigation area may result from broader issues not related to the quality of homicide investigation. These 'broader issues' were not identified by the Officer. However, the Working Party is mindful that regionalisation has been accompanied by a number of changes affecting homicide investigators including:

- \* closer supervision;
- \* tighter budgetary control;
- \* smaller geographic responsibility;
- \* Region rather than State identity;
- \* loss of interstate, and overseas role.



The Working Party accepts that these changes have the potential to impact financially on members and to affect attitudes whilst not directly impacting on effectiveness. The Working Party is of the view that the action recommended in this paper will serve to overcome the effect of these changes.

#### THE STATE CORONER

The article, 'Alarm at Unsolved Murders', published in the Sun-Herald on 17 December 1989, see Annexure 'B', wherein the State Coroner was reported as being alarmed at the high level of unsolved murders in New South Wales has been discussed with Mr. Waller, S.M...

Mr. Waller expressed his embarrassment at the article and requested that Commissioner Avery be so informed. Mr. Waller stated that his involvement with the article was limited to responding to a telephone call from the author, Cindy Jones, who had informed him that the incidence of homicide was increasing and the clear-up rate decreasing. Ms. Jones had then asked him whether this was a matter of concern. Mr. Waller had replied that, on the basis of what she had said he, in common with most people, was concerned. The State Coroner now accepts that statistics do not support the assertion made by the reporter and that, in fact, there has been a decrease in the incidence of homicide and an increase in the clear-up rate for that offence since regionalisation of the Homicide Squad.

Whilst conceding he had no personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding particular incidents, Mr. Waller held reservations in relation to the number of some uncleared murders. The State Coroner concluded the discussion with the comment that he had a very high regard for the Police and the manner in which investigations were conducted.

Statistics do not support the proposition that the incidence of unsolved homicide is of greater concern now than prior to Regionalisation. However, the Working Party considers it prudent that the review of unsuccessful homicide investigations be included in the charter of the Standing Committee recommended to co-ordinate homicide investigations on a State-wide basis and that the Chairman of that Committee be responsible for liaising with the State Coroner in this regard.



RECOMMENDATION 12: That unsuccessful homicide investigations be reviewed by the Standing Committee responsible for co-ordinating homicides State-wide and that the Chairman of that Committee be responsible for liaising with the State Coroner in relating to those matters.

#### CONCLUSIONS

After considering all available material the Working Party concludes that:-

- \* a number of relevant matters have been raised;
- \* these matters do not appear to have adversely impacted on the overall success of homicide investigations;
- \* these matters have the potential to significantly impact on the expertise of homicide investigators;
- \* some of the problems flow from regionalisation, others are generic to specialist investigation;
- \* action proposed in the recommendations detailed in this paper should eliminate perceived dangers;
- \* the recommendations may be conveniently implemented within the concept of regionalisation;
- \* the problems could equally be met if the homicide investigation function was centralised;

- \* centralisation would reintroduce the management concerns of:-
  - duality of command
  - uncertainty of supervision, and
  - difficulty in controlling resource expenditure.
- \* eliminating these concerns was a key issue in regionalisation;
- \* no compelling argument has been advanced supporting centralisation vis-a-vis regionalisation.

RECOMMENDATION 13: The Working Party unanimously concludes that the investigation of homicide should remain regionalised.

ANNEXURE 'A'

HOMICIDE SQUADQuestion of RegionalisationIssues Considered by the 1987 Working Party      Comment by Present Working Party

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Effectiveness of the Squad would be sacrificed with regionalisation (because of the smaller size of each regionalised unit).          | The Working Party concedes that in the absence of appropriate controls to ensure flexibility and general co-ordination effectiveness could be adversely affected.  |
| 2. Because of its high public profile swift, identifiable action resulting in justice being seen to be done is expected.                 | Agreed.  |
| 3. Extensive interstate liaison occurs during investigations.  | The Working Party is unable to perceive how these agreed procedures, are affected by regionalisation.  |
| 4. A high level of expertise is required.  | The Working Party agrees that regionalisation increases the measures that must be taken to ensure skills are maintained at the desired level. Such measures include appropriate rank structure, specialised training, seminars and meetings.                                       |
| 5. There is a great need for homicide personnel to be utilised, in force, during the first 24 hours to 4 days of a murder investigation. | The Working Party totally agrees with this assertion and, in fact, believes the critical period may extend to the first seven days... There is a need for co-ordination in this area... The Working Party suggests this should be through the Commander State Investigative Group. |
| 6. Local knowledge is not of particular value in relation to homicides.  | The Working Party agrees that, in so far as the matters usually attended members of the Homicide Squad are concerned, local knowledge is not critical. In any event it can be furnished by local police.   |

Annexure 'A' (Continued)...

7. To maximise effectiveness members of Homicide Squad should not be utilised in the investigation of other types of crime. The Working Party is in agreement with this statement.
8. The Homicide Squad has proven successful in its operations. Can the Department afford to take the risk involved in regionalisation? The Homicide Squad has now been regionalised for over two years and statistics reveal effectiveness has not been adversely affected.
9. Centralisation permits the Squad to remain in close proximity to numerous critical resources, e.g., Division of Forensic Medicine, Forensic Odonrology Unit, Division of Analytical Laboratories, Universities, etc. The Working Party does not consider this statement to be valid. The degree of proximity should be measured from the place where the murder occurred or, at least, the premises from which the investigation is being conducted. In any event, with the gradual decentralisation of Coroners' Courts and other resources the question of proximity becomes even less relevant.



# ALARM AT UNSOLVED MURDERS

**EXCLUSIVE**  
By CINDY JONES

## Coroner slams clear-up rate

THE State Coroner is alarmed at the high level of unsolved murders in NSW.

Mr Kevin Waller's comments coincide with an appeal by the police union to Commissioner John Avery to return to a centralised Homicide Squad in a bid to improve results.

Mr Waller told *The Sun-Herald* he was concerned the clear-up rate for murder had dropped.

"As a coroner I only get the deaths that aren't cleared up and I'm seeing more unsolved murders and am somewhat concerned," he said.

### Clear-up rate

"I have been told that there are delays in attending to suspicious cases because of a lack of staff."

The clear-up rate for murders in NSW is well down from its high point six years ago when 95 per cent of homicides were solved.

This calendar year, the figure is only about 80 per cent. And those responsible for at least 15 of the 80-odd murders remain on the loose - including the North Shore serial "granny" killer who has struck five times.

After meeting Mr Avery to discuss the problem, Police Association secretary Lloyd Taylor said there were mounting complaints from detectives that the break-up



COMMISSIONER AVERY

made investigations less effective.

And he called on the commissioner to return to the centralised system abandoned in 1987 as part of a wide-ranging anti-corruption drive within the CIB.

One Homicide Squad detective, who would not be named, said murder investigations had to be put on hold because they were under-



CORONER WALLER

we used to be quite efficient. Two or three pairs of homicide detectives were sent out to each murder and there was a solid core of detectives available," he claimed.

"Now, for half the murders that are committed, homicide detectives aren't sent out to the scene - they're just not available."

A former serving officer said: "The Homicide Squad

had to be regionalised to fight corruption, but the rate of unsolved murders is the price you have to pay."

But a spokesman for Commissioner Avery rejected the claims, arguing that the clear-up rate for homicides had steadily improved since 1985.

The spokesman contended that as the number of murders was usually between 80 and 100 every year it was easy to get statistical anomalies like the 95 per cent clear-up figure for 1982-83.

"There are no plans to discontinue decentralisation," he said.

### Hitches

"We believe it has been proceeding as per expectations and while there have been some hitches, that could only be expected in an operation of this magnitude."

The murder clear-up rate has barely altered since regionalisation began. However, it is well below the 90 per cent-plus recorded in earlier years.

● Unsolved murders of '89: special report

TO BE SUPPLIED AFTER

THE SUPPLY LEVEL

LEVEL

Continued



ANNEXURE 'D'**HOMICIDE SQUAD ACTIVITIES BEFORE AND AFTER REGIONALISATION.****Issue:**

Jobs reported to and attended by Homicide Squad from July, 1984 to 30 June, 1989.

**Background:**

Press reports during the month of January, 1990 critical of Homicide Squads, and suggested that since Regionalisation unsolved murders had risen dramatically.

**Current Position:**

Prior to Regionalisation in October, 1987, records of all jobs reported to the Homicide Squad were kept by way of a Homicide Activity Sheet. From October, 1987 these sheets have been kept by Homicide Unit, Tactical Intelligence Section, until July 1988 when all Homicide Activity Sheets were recorded at the Registry, State Intelligence Group, on FAIRS computer system.


Figures relating to following tables were obtained from Homicide Activity Sheets. Each sheet being a job, attended to by the Homicide Squad or not, or nominating an activity of interest to the Homicide Squad. A murder of one or more persons, ie, murder of three persons in a domestic situation and suicide of the offender, allocated one job number.

Figures relating to unsolved categories relied on the reporting officers suggestion as to possible reason for offence. Category described as 'other' includes jobs where no real reason for the incident could be given.

A table breakdown of Jobs July, 1984 to 30 June, 1989 reported to and attended by Homicide Squad has been completed along with Category of unsolved jobs. (Annexure A).

**Analysis:**

The tables presented in Annexure A, indicate **no significant change** in relation to the number of jobs attended by Homicide members nor the number of unsolved incidents attended by members since Regionalisation commenced.

  
Warren T Chambers.  
Detective Sergeant.  
T.I.S.. 23 January, 1990.

## ANNEXURE 'D-1'

**JOBS JULY 1984 TO 30 JUNE 1989 REPORTED TO AND  
ATTENDED BY HOMICIDE SQUAD**

YEAR	JOBS REPORTED TO HOMICIDE SQUAD.	JOBS SOLVED.	% OF JOBS SOLVED.	JOBS HOMICIDE ATTENDED	% HOMICIDE ATTENDED
1984-85	90	79	87.7%	29	32.2%
1985-86	91	73	80.2%	49	53.8%
1986-87	111	89	80.2%	53	47.7%
1987-88	94	78	82.9%	50	53.2%
1988-89	84	70	83.3%	41	48.8%

**CATEGORY / UNSOLVED JOBS.**

YEAR	GANG/DRUG	ROBBERY	SEX	OTHER	TOTAL & % UNSOLVED.
1984-85	5	1	1	4	11 - 12.2%
1985-86	5	2	1	10	18 - 19.8%
1986-87	2	6	1	13	22 - 19.8%
1987-88	4	5		7	16 - 17.0%
1988-89	2	5	1	6	14 - 16.6%

'Other' includes all unsolved not able to be placed in selected category.

ALL unsolved murders attended by Homicide Squad members.



ANNEXURE 'E'MIKE BAILEY.

Reports of dissension in the ranks of the States Police unfortunately seem most common place these days. One of the most constantly controversial issues in the Force has been the Regionalisation of Police operations, especially in the Homicide Squad. We talked with Association Secretary, Lloyd Taylor just before Christmas on this programme and he gave that as one of the major concerns that he and the Association as a whole had about Police operations. While Commissioner John Avery has just agreed to a review of the Squad, in the wake of criticism of its apparent inefficiency and claims that it is not achieving an adequate strike rate in solving major murders, including the North Shore Serial Killings, quite often referred to, of course, as the Granny Killings.

Police Association President, Tony Day, is with us now, to look at what is right and what is wrong in the Regionalisation of the Homicide Squad.

Mr. Day what are the problems associated with this matter to begin with.

TONY DAY.

Well I would think that we would have to agree that unfortunately the number of Homicides has increased and certainly the solving rate of those crimes have decreased. We see at the present time where there are a number of murderers still free on the streets, unable to be detected, and I dont believe thats the fault of the Police that are working on the cases by any means they are throwing everything they can into it, but unfortunately they have to carry out so many other duties as well.

MIKE BAILEY.

I'm sure they are obviously working hard as most of our Police do, but go back to square one on this. Why was the Force split up in the first place.

TONY DAY.

Well I think there was a need to bring in Regionalisation where we were broken into four parts throughout the State. Certainly for one man to be responsible, which he still is of course, the Commissioner, overall, it was hard to have a proper line of communication through to him, other than have persons set up as we have today, four Assistant Commissioners in each of the Regions who have their Personnel staff, Operations staff, etc, under them, and every body feeds back through them. I think it flattens out the administration if nothing else and allows people to have a direct line of communication with their bosses.

MIKE BAILEY.

Were there any positive theory behind the split up in the first place as you said.

TONY DAY.

Most definitely and I believe there is a lot of positive things have come out of Regionalisation. I think probably the negative that has come out of it, certainly is the breaking up of the Homicide Squad, where we see so many outstanding crimes today still not solved. No, I think that comes about because of the information that is normally supplied to those 40 to 60 experts who were in the Homicide Squad at that stage. They had their informants and they certainly had a lot of information at their finger-tips, that they could call upon from this centralised bureau which they had themselves. In splitting them up in the

- 3 -

Regionalisation, we find that they just can't, it's just impossible for them to just concentrate on Homicides.

MIKE BAILEY.

Are you suggesting there has been a communication breakdown through that move.

TONY DAY.

Unfortunately, I believe that's the case.

MIKE BAILEY.

What about the question that's often raised in matters such as this, that competition, maybe between groups, can actually improve efficiency. Do you think that there is any indication that, that may have worked in this case.

TONY DAY.

Well certainly not with the Homicide Squad, no. We have had fears with Regionalisation, there has been a lot of positive things that have come out of it and if you look on the negative side of it, I think the positives far out weigh the negatives, certainly negatives are what we are looking at today with the Homicide Squad, it should definitely be put back together, to give every body that chance of solving these atrocious crimes that are occurring.

MIKE BAILEY.

What's special about the Homicide Squad versus the other Squads, that are obviously benefited as you see it from Regionalisation.

...4/

TONY DAY.

Firstly, I think you have to look at the fact that they can concentrate in one field alone and that in fact would be Homicide. As we see it today on the other hand they are used in their Regional Crime Squads, but then not only used for Homicides, they could be pulled into the Arsons, they could be pulled into the break and enters, the car thefts, the child mistreatment unit, we need I believe to have the Homicide Squad concentrating solely on homicides.

MIKE BAILEY.

You believe that for example, lets be specific, that the split up of the Homicide Squad may have directly impeded some of the investigations in those North Shore serial killings.

TONY DAY.

Well it has to a certain extent, in so far as the Police that are working on it are throwing everything they possibly can into it and we have unfortunately had multiple murders there, as we have seen, and as we all know about, and we have the situation thats arisen now where other Police have had to be called in actually to assist. In the days prior to Regionalisation where a homicide occurred, the Homicide Squad people, who are experts in their field, would move in and they would take complete control and do the surveying of the local scene and the local witnesses and the house to house calls, where information is gathered in relation to what evidence can be found. Today that is being done in many many cases by the General Duties Police, who have a lot, lot of other work to do as you can well imagine it just never stops, and they are also thrown into this and they have to add that load to the workload that they have already got and its almost an

impossibility to be able to carry out such a load of work.

MIKE BAILEY.

I take it that the people in the Homicide Squad will be very happy to hear that Commissioner Avery has agreed to review the Squad.

TONY DAY.

I imagine they will be most happy. They have spoken to us on many occasions in relation to the centralisation of the Homicide Squad and the reasons for it and we have backed them to the hilt over it and I say that it has been over a 13 month period that we have spoken to Commissioner Avery about it and now that he has agreed to review it I think that we will find them coming back together as a centralised unit.

MIKE BAILEY.

It is only a review though, what happens if the review recommends the other way, keeping things the way they are now.

TONY DAY.

Well one would, of course, have to examine exactly what's come out of the view if that was the case. I don't believe that will be the case, of course.

MIKE BAILEY.

Is there any chance that the Police involved could take any further action, I know you must have had talks with the Commissioner over the matter for quite a while, but what else can you do.



TONY DAY.

Well I think its a matter of the Commissioner looking into whats exactly there in front of him when he gets his review done, when he has is facts back, him himself speaking with members of the Homicide Squad, the same as what we have and I'm sure he will be quite convinced that it needs to be centralised.

MIKE BAILEY.

Has the Commissioner given you any indication as to how long the review is likely to take.

TONY DAY.

I believe January 8 is the call back time on all documentation in relation to it. Now he will review that after he receives all that back and no he has not given any indication at this stage.

MIKE BAILEY.

January 8, not all that far away, thats next Monday. Does that indicate that there could be action on this fairly quickly.

TONY DAY.

Well I would suggest there difinitely will be.

MIKE BAILEY.

And as you would see it, if there was action quickly then it could well lead to increased efficiency at least in the Homicide Squad.

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TONY DAY.

Certainly in bringing back together the experts in that field.

MIKE BAILEY.

But again, just the Homicide Squad, the Regionalisation has worked in other areas.

TONY DAY.

Most definitely.

ANNEXURE 'F'HOMICIDE SQUADQuestion of RegionalisationIssues raised by the President  
NSW Police AssociationWorking Party Response

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. The number of homicides has increased. (1)  | Not supported by statistics.  |
| 2. The solving rate of those crimes (homicides) have decreased. (1).   | Not supported by statistics.  |
| 3. At the present time where there are a number of murderers still free on the streets, unable to be detected. (1).  | The Working Party agrees with this statement which, unfortunately, has always been the case in all countries.   |
| 4. I believe there is a lot of positive things have come out of regionalisation.... I think probably the negative that has come out of it, certainly is the breaking up of the Homicide Squad where we see so many outstanding crimes today still not solved. (2).                               | Whilst there are clearly a number of unsolved murders each year, statistics do not support the suggestion that, since regionalisation, there has been any significant change in the solvability rate.   |
| 5. The information that is (was) supplied to those 40-60 experts who were in the Homicide Squad at that stage. They had their informants and they certainly had a lot of information at their fingertips, that they could call upon from this centralised bureau which they had themselves. (2). | The authorised strength of the Homicide Squad at the time of regionalisation was 47 units. The Working Party is unaware of a 'centralised bureau' available to the centralised Squad. Nevertheless, the Working Party believes there is value in establishing venues for both the formal and informal dissemination of information between members attached to Homicide Units. It is considered this should be arranged through Superintendent Maroney, State Intelligence Group. |
| 6. We need, I believe, to have the Homicide Squad concentrating solely on homicides. (4).  | The Working Party agrees with this assertion.   |

( ) numbers refer to pages of transcript of an interview between Mike Bailey and Mr. Day - ANNEXURE 'E'

Annexure 'F' (Continued)...

7. In the days prior to regionalisation where a homicide occurred, the Homicide Squad people, who are experts in the field, would move in and they would take complete control.
- The Working Party concedes that this was the situation during the later years of the centralised Homicide Squad, and that the procedure is still highly desirable.
8. Today, that canvassing is being done in many cases by the General Duties Police, who have a lot of other work to do.
- General Duty Police have always had a role in canvassing. Over the last 10 years, action has been taken to train TRG and other police in this important function. It is anticipated that, as the training programme progresses, more General Duty Police will be competent to perform canvasses..... The work-load of respective sections of the Service is not within the charter of the Working Party.
9. They (Homicide Squad members) have spoken to us (Association) on many occasions in relation to the centralisation of the Homicide Squad and the reasons for it.
- The Working Party is aware that there has been agitation by some unidentified homicide investigators for the Homicide to be re-centralised.
10. Certainly, (if there was action quickly then it could well lead to increased efficiency) in bringing back together the experts in that field.
- Statistics do not support this contention.
11. Regionalisation has worked in other areas (other than the Homicide Squad).
- The Working Party agrees that regionalisation is working.

HOMICIDE SQUADQuestion of RegionalisationIssues Raised by Regions  
and Working PartyWorking Party ResponseSECTION A: Selection & Training

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Criteria for selection prior to regionalisation was made by senior experienced homicide investigators at the Squad taking into consideration recommendations of other members of the Squad.   | The W.P. agreed that the process described was of value. It still is of value and its implementation would present no problem intra-region....in so far as inter-region transfers are concerned the W.P. recommends that arrangements could be made through Superintendents Maroney and Coe. |
| 2. Upon selection the appointee was placed under the supervision of a senior experienced homicide investigator, and did not become a leader of a team until he had achieved the level of proficiency required by the Squad.                                | The W.P. agrees with the validity of this statement and recommends its reintroduction at all RCS.  |
| 3. It was considered that at least two years training under the direction of an experienced officer was necessary before that person was considered to be an efficient member of the Squad.  | The W.P. agrees with this recommendation in general terms.   |
| 4. At the present time, the allocation of personnel to the Homicide Units is at the discretion of the Commander, Region Crime Squad, who has not necessarily had experience in homicide investigations, or understands the complexities of investigations. | Agreed but considered adequately met by implementing (1) above.  |
| 5. Personnel transferred to homicide duties only receive training, expertise and experience commensurate with the level of expertise of the most senior or most experienced member of the group.   | Agreed but W.P. consider situation would be adequately met by implementing (1) to (3) above.   |



SECTION A (Continued)...

6. Present members of Homicide Squads lack training in the use of lap-top computers, desk-top PCs, running sheet programs and the use of modems. The W.P. was of the view that many younger members are computer literate to the required level. It is noted the Academy intends to include further computer training in future investigators' courses.
7. There is a need to profile the role of 'homicide manager', 'homicide investigator'. Agreed. Det. Insp. McNamara, SIG, will prepare draft profiles for presentation to the W.P. The Det. Insp. will make full use of material provided by the Commander Bramshill Police College, England.
8. Regular training, on a State-wide basis, should be available for members of Homicide Units in order that they may improve and maintain expertise. The W.P. agreed that regular specialised members during the two year training period. The W.P. will consider areas to be addressed and confer with Supt. Hill, Academy, as to how they could be presented.
9. Homicide members need specialised training. The W.P. considered this issue was covered at (8) above.

SECTION B: Experience

10. With the exception of South Region, there is no senior homicide investigator in charge of the Homicide Unit. Prior to regionalisation, the Homicide Squad had a Chief Inspector, 2 Detective Senior Sergeants, 13 Detective Sergeants and 19 Detective Constables. It is agreed that this is a true statement of the situation. The W.P. recommends that each Homicide Squad be led by a Det. Inspector and 2 Senior Sergeants and that the Senior member of each pair be a Detective Sergeant.
11. Isolation of personnel in Regions does not expose them to all types of homicide investigations, e.g., North would not be involved in Vietnamese murders, Kings Cross Drug murders, Campsie Lebanese drug murders, etc. The W.P. agrees that this situation is possible. Supt. Maroney will oversight this aspect and ensure Homicide members in training are afforded the opportunity to gain the desired experience.

SECTION B (Continued)...

12. There is no pool of experience in any of the Region Homicide Units.
- The W.P. considers this to be a universal problem across the Service. The proposal to ensure assistance across Regions, mentioned later, will assist to mitigate concerns.
13. Homicide investigations rely on the professionalism of the investigators in the following areas:
- a) The up-to-date techniques used in forensic science.
- b) Developments in technology in the area of computerised case management.
- c) Developments in the physical evidence area.
- d) Changes to legislation, court requirements and other aspects of the law relating to homicides.
- e) Overseas developments in the investigation of homicides including serial killings, offender profiling, recognised courses conducted by F.B.I., Metro Police and the like.
- f) Maintaining and enlarging contacts in the forensic field.
- The W.P. accepts there is a need to formalise the exchange of information between Homicide Units and between Homicide Units and Physical Evidence and other experts involved in homicide investigations.
- The W.P. recommends that quarterly seminars be established at which all available homicide detectives will attend in order to be apprised of advances in the investigation of homicides. Appropriate members of the Physical Evidence Branch and/or other experts will also attend on a need basis. Supt. Maroney to arrange.
14. There is a need to greatly increase the ranks of personnel attached to Homicide Units in order to retain experience.
- W.P. considers this issue met in (10) above.
15. Homicide personnel should not be rotated through other Units and so retain experience on homicide investigations.
- W.P. agrees that Homicide members should be dedicated to homicide duties.
16. Homicide structure should consist of one Detective Sergeant to each Detective Constable.
- Dealt with at (10) above.

SECTION C: Availability

17. Insufficient trained staff in each Region to perform homicide function.
- The W.P. agrees that there appears to be a disparity in the allocation of strength to the various RCSs. The W.P. recommends that the Establishment Control Branch be requested to review the work-load and strengths and advise accordingly.
18. Instances have taken place where homicide investigators are utilised on other investigations, at the direction of the Commander.
- The W.P. is of the firm view the members attached to Homicide Units should only be used to investigate homicide related matters.
19. Previously, when a homicide occurred, members of the Homicide Squad would move in and take complete control doing all tasks themselves. Today these tasks are being done by a variety of police.
- The W.P. agrees that it is highly desirable, if not critical, that as many Homicide personnel as possible be assigned to a fresh matter for the first 7 days of the investigation. The W.P. considers this could be best achieved through State Command co-ordinating movements across Regions during this critical period.
20. It is essential to have a maximum number of homicide trained personnel working on the investigation during the critical first 7 days. This does not occur under regionalisation.
- As Above.
21. The allocation of members of a centralised Homicide Squad, in fact allowed the Patrol and Region Crime Squads after the initial investigation, to return to their normal duties and to allow the continuing lengthy investigation to be conducted by the Homicide Team.
- Agreed.

SECTION C (Continued).....

22. The allocation of homicide personnel was a resource allocation to the Region, which in the case of lengthy investigations was not a drain on the Region. Since Regionalisation there has not been the appreciation or recognition by the Commanders for the need to continue with lengthy investigations and that decisions to curtail the investigation is made on the costings both in terms of personnel and resources.
- The W.P. accepts that the question of which cost centre is to pay for overtime and travelling allowances for Police seconded from other Regions may be an inhibiting factor.  
The matter will be discussed at the next Region Commanders' meeting with a view to obtaining agreement.  
It is noted that in so far as intra-region costs are concerned these should be provided from RCS budgets.
23. Previously, homicide personnel could concentrate on homicides whereas now they are utilised for various serious crime investigations and are unavailable when a homicide occurs.
- Answered at point (18).
24. In many cases where homicide personnel are not available to carry out investigations, personnel from other disciplines from within the Region Crime Squads are placed in charge of often lengthy homicide inquiries. This results in the loss of trained investigators in that area from which they were drawn.
- The W.P. is of the firm view that homicides should be investigated by Homicide personnel.
25. Apart from the present North Shore Murder Task Force, there have been no instances where Regions have supported other Regions with personnel and resources to supplement homicide investigators.
- The W.P. accepts that, generally speaking, this statement is correct.
26. The creation of special Task Forces to investigate particular homicides, e.g. underworld murders, does not address the need for the allocation of experienced personnel, and relies on the resources of other trained groups.
- The W.P. noted that the serious matters investigated by Task Forces have always been investigated by experienced detectives. Conversely, the W.P. believes Homicide Unit personnel should be used only on homicide related inquiries.

SECTION C (Continued).....

27. The drain of experienced members from Homicide Units to Task Forces and specialised areas is a major factor in servicing investigations.
- The W.P. agrees with this assertion especially in relation to Region South.
28. The lack of consultation with Commanders prior to homicide members being seconded, results in the loss of key personnel and may seriously affect the outcome of the investigation.
- The W.P. agrees that only in the most extreme circumstances should personnel be seconded without due consultation.
29. Left alone without external interference with resources, Homicide Squads can adequately attend requirements.
- The W.P. agrees that if calls by Task Forces were reduced to an absolute minimum the problem of staff shortages and lack of experienced members would be significantly diminished.
30. The increasing complexity of homicides is placing additional workloads on Homicide Units.
- The W.P. is not convinced that murders have increased in complexity in recent years.
31. Since regionalisation, homicide investigations are being left to Patrol Detectives who may, or may not be assisted by Homicide Detectives.
- The W.P. agrees that in those instances where circumstances indicate Homicide detectives not should attend then that should occur. The W.P. is of the firm view that the Leader of the relative Homicide Unit should be informed of all murders and suspicious deaths, without delay. The W.P. further considered that formal guidelines should be developed in this regard. Supt. Gilligan will prepare a draft for consideration by the W.P.
32. A major problem is the inability of Patrol Commanders to dedicate staff for a long-term commitment.
- The W.P. is of the firm view that Homicide Squad personnel should service long-term investigations.
33. With regionalisation junior members are being required to lead investigations before they have gained sufficient experience.
- Answered at point (10).



SECTION C (Continued).....

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|--|---|
| 34. Existing problems will remain, to some extent, whether Homicide Squad is centralised or not.                               | The W.P. agrees with this statement.  |
| 35. Lack of depth of experience is caused, in part, by promotions and transfers to areas seeking highly experienced personnel. | Agreed, but should be rectified by implementation of point (10).  |
| 36. Workloads cannot be predicted in homicide investigation.   | It is agreed that no-one can predict when and where homicides will occur. However, the number is relatively static. Good management procedures, co-ordinated State-wide, would ensure maximum response at any one time. Utilisation of Case Management procedures will also assist. |
| 37. Case overload, brought about by protracted investigations and lengthy court proceedings has brought some criticism.        | It is agreed these factors could engender criticism.  |
| 38. Attendance delay has been caused on a number of occasions by Patrol Commanders not requesting assistance.                  | Answered at point (13).   |
| 39. Centralisation permits a larger pool from which to draw experienced members during the initial stage of an investigation.  | The W.P. considers the same effect could be achieved by the implementation of points (19) and (20).   |
| 40. Centralised investigators may become too specialised and thus impair career path.  | The W.P. does not agree with this statement. Experienced Homicide personnel are keenly sought by all sections of the Service.   |
| 41. Multiple offenders protract investigations and court proceedings impacting on workload.                                    | The W.P. agrees that this may occur.  |
| 42. Regional demarcation has resulted in the lack of homicide personnel being assigned to murder investigations.               | Whilst this may have occurred in the past the W.P. is of the view that the strategies detailed at points (19) and (20) will overcome this problem.  |

SECTION D: Interaction & Professionalism

43. There is no provision for, and in fact there are no, formal lines of communication between Homicide Units. The W.P. agrees that better communications is needed. This will be provided by point (13).
44. Prior to regionalisation the Homicide Squad was recognised, respected and accepted by all levels within the law enforcement area as being professional. The W.P. agrees with this assertion.
45. Recognition as professionals, did not lead to elitism, but set standards for each member of the Homicide Squad to adhere to. The W.P. agrees with this assertion.
46. Since regionalisation, the use of the Police Running Sheet system has been at the discretion of each Region, and the standardisation, which previously existed for the accurate recording of intelligence is now open to variation. The W.P. does not accept the correctness of this statement. In fact, since regionalisation, there have been significant advances in the methodology of maintaining 'running sheets'. Running Sheet management is addressed in the Major Investigation Plan, a Force-wide initiative!
47. There is a need to clearly define responsibility for the management of homicide investigation. The W.P. is of the view that the Major Investigation Plan can be applied to murder investigations.
48. Regionalisation has flattened the structure and permits easier communication with Senior Officers. The W.P. agrees with this statement.
49. The number of homicides have increased and the clear-up rate has decreased since regionalisation. This statement is not supported by statistics.
50. There is a communication breakdown between regionalised Homicide Units. Dealt with at (43) and (13).
51. The lack of consultation with Commanders prior to homicide members being seconded, results in the loss of key personnel and may seriously affect the outcome of the investigation. Dealt with at (28) and (29).

SECTION D (Continued)...

52. Sharing of knowledge/resources by Homicide Squads on both an intra and inter Region basis is indicative of the professionalism and commitment of members. The W.P. agrees with this statement to the extent that sharing currently exists.
53. Results obtained clearly indicate a high level of professionalism. The W.P. agrees with this statement.
54. The publicised unrest in the criminal investigation area may be indicative of broader issues, not simply related to the quality of homicide investigation. The W.P. is unaware of the 'broader' issues, so called, and therefore offers no comment.
55. A centralised Homicide Squad facilitates the exchange of information including advances in forensic science and increases the expertise of homicide investigators. The W.P. agrees but considers the strategy outlined at point (13) will ensure an equal if not enhanced, expertise.
56. Homicide investigations are hampered by an increasing lack of experience in the Physical Evidence area and delays in gaining results from the Division of Forensic Medicine. The W.P. has not researched resources of the Physical Evidence Branch but is aware that Assistant Commissioner Gibson is leading a W.P. reviewing that area. This matter is to be referred to Mr. Gibson.

ANNEXURE 'H'HOMICIDE SQUADSummary of RegionalisationSummary of Comment Tendered by RegionsREGION NORTHRegion Commander - Assistant Commissioner PARSONS

Recommendation: "I fully support the recommendations that the Homicide Unit remain regionalised and special training seminars formulated....".

Staff Officer (Operations) - Superintendent CAMPBELL

Recommendation: "That Homicide Units remain regionalised. That special training days be formulated involving Homicide Units, Divisional Detective Sergeants and Forensic Experts from all Regions".

Comment: Homicide Units are operating efficiently and effectively. The availability of more trained Homicide personnel to act as 'back up' would be beneficial.

Commander Region Crime Squad (Newcastle) - Detective Inspector RANKIN  
(Strength: 6. 2 with over one year homicide experience).

Recommendation: "Homicide Units should remain under the control and direction of Region Crime Squads".

Comment:

- No difficulties have been experienced in servicing homicides in the Region (5 murders and 6 suspicious deaths attended during 1988/89.
- No delays have been occasioned in providing service.
- Regular training and instructional courses should be held for homicide personnel on a State-wide basis.
- Courses should include 'major crime management' for senior personnel.
- Members should be committed to homicide duties.
- There is a need for Physical Evidence personnel to be better trained.
- Delays in obtaining results from the Division of Forensic Medicine impact adversely on investigations.
- Homicide Units should be structured so that there is a Detective Sergeant for each pair of investigators.

Commander Region Crime Squad (Chatswood) - Detective Inspector HAGAN  
(Strength: 5. 2 with over one year homicide experience).

Recommendation: "That the Homicide Unit be centralised or increased in strength in order that members have the opportunity to gain proper training and development".

- Comment:
- Some difficulties have been experienced in servicing homicide investigations (14 investigations made during 1988/89).
  - Homicide personnel have not attended some homicide investigations because of other commitments.
  - There have been two occasions when delay occurred in servicing a homicide investigation due to lack of notification from Patrol level.
  - North Region has received assistance from other Regions on only one occasion... 'Granny Murders'. There were other occasions when assistance from experienced investigators from Regions would have been helpful and desirable.
  - The secondment of two of the most experienced members to a Task Force for three months had a detrimental effect of the effectiveness of the Unit. Lengthy absences whilst these members attend associated court cases will prolong the problem.
  - Due to staff shortages the Unit has been unable to follow-up inquiries relating to outstanding murder investigations.
  - There is a need for ongoing communication between Homicide Units.

#### REGION NORTH-WEST

Region Commander - Assistant Commissioner POULTON

Recommendation: "That the Homicide Unit, Region Crime Squad, North West be retained at its present location".

Staff Officer (Operations) - Superintendent BEVERSTOCK

Recommendation: "The Homicide Unit in this Region is operating at maximum efficiency and centralisation of the Unit would not be beneficial to the Region".

Commander Region Crime Squad - Detective Chief Inspector INGLIS

Recommendation: "That the Unit be retained as an integral part of Region Crime Squad, North West".



Leader Homicide Unit, R.I.G. North West - Detective Inspector TURNER  
(Strength: 11. 7 with over one year's homicide experience).

Recommendation: "That the Homicide Unit be retained in its present form... 'I am able to say, unequivocally, that in this aspect of regionalisation the North West Region is now better served than ever'."

Comment: - During the previous 12 months, concern has been expressed by Homicide personnel in relation to a number of matters including:-

- . late notice of instances of homicide requiring investigation
- . crime scene preservation
- . management of homicide investigations
- there has been no delay in attending investigations; during 1988/89 over 24 homicide matters were investigated, many involving multiple offenders.
- no requests were made for assistance during the 12 months 1988/89.
- assistance was given to another Region, North, on one occasion (Granny Murders).

#### REGION SOUTH WEST

Region Commander - Assistant Commissioner STIRTON

Recommendation: "That all elements of Region Crime Squad South West be retained and the Squad progressively converted to a multi-skilled Major Crime Squad".

Staff Officer (Operations) - Superintendent HARDING

Comment: "In my view the level of professionalism displayed by the South West Region Homicide Unit is of the highest order. The proposal to form a multi-skilled Major Crime Squad is supported".

Commander Region Crime Squad South West - Detective C/Inspector ALLINGHAM

Comment: - Advantages of centralisation include:

- . access to pool of experienced homicide investigators at critical initial period
- . higher potential for training junior personnel

- Disadvantages of centralisation include:
  - . career paths narrow as personnel becomes more specialised
  - . back-up resources drawn randomly, to the disadvantage of patrols
  - . more difficult to identify personnel for specific tasks
- Regionalisation cannot be shown to be inadequate on a global perspective.
- Problems will remain whether Homicide Unit is centralised or not.
- There is a need for responsibility for each major investigation to be clearly stated.
- Case overload causes delay and attracts criticism from Coroners.

Leader Homicide Unit Region Crime Squad South West -

Detective Sergeant HOLLIS

(Strength: 12. 8 members have over one year's homicide experience).

Recommendation: "That the Homicide Unit be centralised or increased in strength".

- Comment:
- 35 matters involving homicide attended during the year ended 31 December 1989.
  - On 6 occasions there were delays in the notification of the Unit, of a death, in one case the delay was 6 months.
  - On 5 occasions requests have been made to other Regions for assistance and on each occasion the request was refused.
  - Investigations are being jeopardised by an inability to have sufficient experienced homicide investigators on fresh matters during the critical initial period.
  - Reliance cannot be placed on patrol resources due to the work-load at that level.
  - There is a need for the continual exchange of information in order to retain expertise.
  - There is a need to provide better training for junior members of the Unit.

REGION SOUTHActing Region Commander - Chief Superintendent COMAN

Recommendation: "There is no justification for amalgamation of Homicide Units into a centralised operations group".

Staff Officer (Operations) - Superintendent ISEDALE

Comments:

- Arguments that efficiency/effectiveness of homicide investigation has declined because of regionalisation cannot be supported on the basis of statistical analysis or qualitative output.
- Suggestions that the infra-structure of criminal investigation needs to be enhanced may be relevant.

District Commander - Chief Superintendent WILLIS

Mr. Willis supported objections raised against the proposal to regionalise the Homicide Squad in 1987. He now reiterates his objections and cites the lack of Homicide Unit involvement in current murder inquiries in his District.

Commander Region Crime Squad South - Superintendent STEPHENSON  
(Strength: 15. 7 with over one year's homicide experience).

Recommendation: "That the Homicide Unit retain its present form".

Comment:

- There have been no delays in providing service. 25 matters were investigated during 1988/89.
- No request has been made for assistance from other Regions... assistance has been provided to other Regions on two occasions.
- Experienced homicide personnel have been lost because of promotions and rotational duty.
- Seven members of the Homicide Unit are on secondment to Task Forces.

Mr. Stephenson concludes -

"The fact that Task Forces continue to develop to investigate serious/major crimes, clearly indicates a deficiency occasioned by the devolution of the Criminal Investigation Branch. During one lengthy period, this Crime Squad had in excess of 20 personnel so committed..... Left alone without external interferences..... homicide investigation in this Region can be adequately attended".