# 2022 Special Commission of Inquiry into LGBTIQ hate crimes 

Before: The Commissioner, The Honourable Justice John Sackar

At Leve1 2, 121 Macquarie Street, Sydney, New South Wales

## On Tuesday, 6 December 2022 at 10.25am

(Day 11)

Mr Peter Gray SC (Senior Counsel Assisting)
Ms Christine Melis (Counsel Assisting)
Mr William de Mars (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Kathleen Heath (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Gráinne Marsden (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Meg O'Brien (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Claire Palmer (Counsel Assisting)
Mr Enzo Camporeale (Director Legal)
Ms Kate Lockery (Principal Solicitor)
Also Present:
Mr Mark Tedeschi KC (for NSW Police)
Mr Anders Mykkeltvedt (for NSW Police)
Mr Ken Madden (for Sergeant Steer)

THE COMMISSIONER: What I'm about to say is not to be taken in lieu or in substitution for the detailed reasons which I will deliver in a moment, but by way of brief explanation.

Yesterday, Mr Tedeschi of King's Counsel argued before me that certain matters were not the subject of, in effect, the Terms of Reference and were therefore not matters in respect of which I could investigate.

For the reasons that are set out in more detail in a published judgment I propose to hand around in a moment, I reject those arguments. In my view, each of the matters that he identified yesterday falls squarely within the Terms of Reference and are matters in respect of which I am entitled, if not obliged, to investigate.

Mr Tedeschi, I will then publish my reasons, which are detailed, and they will be distributed to you, and I think we have got extra copies for Mr Mykkeltveldt and others and Mr Madden, insofar as Mr Madden needs them.

Two things. The first is, you mentioned yesterday that your side hadn't had an opportunity to check the annexures to, if I may use the description without intending any disrespect, the Crandell statement, Mr Crandell's statement. First, do you need any more time for that purpose? Secondly, would it be of any assistance if I permitted you and Mr Gray to have a short discussion to see whether whatever issues, if any, are still outstanding can be identified so as to make the disposal of those issues more efficient?

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, there were, I think, two documents that we felt should not have been included in the bundle that is going to be made public. My understanding is that that has been communicated.

There is still, I think, one document in the supplementary tender bundle, a statement of a police officer by the name of Page, that is still the subject of suggested redactions by us, I think in order to protect a trial that is anticipated but not yet listed. You, Commissioner, would know which one I'm referring to.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 I'm really indicating to you - it's not a direction by any means; it's only a - sorry.

MR TEDESCHI: Sorry.
THE COMMISSIONER: No, no, you are getting helpful assistance or not as the case may be.

MR TEDESCHI: A very short discussion would assist us, thank you. We don't think --

THE COMMISSIONER: May I say something about the matter that you have adverted to, without any concerns. I think I know what it is you are referring to. In the first instance, I would be disposed to allow you to have a discussion with Mr Gray. If there can be an accommodation as a matter of pragmatism, whatever it is, I am content. If both you and Mr Gray tell me that there has been an accommodation, I am happy to proceed and Mr Crandell can come and give some evidence.

Would it be convenient, then, if I go off for five or 10 minutes just to allow you to explore that?

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you very much.
THE COMMISSIONER: I will adjourn for, say, 10 minutes, and let me know via some means - there is plenty of capacity to do that - if you need any more time, and whatever time is reasonably available is available.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: All right. I will adjourn shortly, then, thank you.

## SHORT ADJOURNMENT

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, thank you for that time. We have resolved all the issues and we are ready to proceed.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr Crandell, would you be kind enough to come forward, thank you.
<ANTHONY CRANDELL, affirmed:
[10.44am]
<EXAMINATION BY MR GRAY:
MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, if I may, I will address you
as "Mr Crandell" rather than using your title every time. I hope you don't mind.
A. Thank you, Mr Gray.
Q. You gave some evidence before the parliamentary committee in November 2018, just over four years ago. Do you remember that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. That was about four or five months after the Parrabell report had been published?
A. Yes.
Q. And you made some very frank and open remarks in the course of your evidence, which I would like to take you to briefly. They are in the tender bundle at what is volume 10, tab 235, [SCOI.82089]

Now, Mr Crandell, if you at any time - and if you are like me you will prefer this, to have the paper document in front of you, or I think for the most part they will be put on the screen, but if at any time you would like the paper, then all you have to do is say so and we will have it.

The parts that I wanted to ask you about, if they can't come up on the screen, perhaps Mr Crandell could have volume 10, or maybe he can find it behind him - it is at tab 235.
A. Yes.
Q. Can you find that?
A. Yes.
Q. If we go to page 13, which is in fact the first page of the text?
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked if you would like to make an opening statement, and you say yes, you would. I'm looking at the second paragraph there, the one beginning "Within the period under review"; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. You said, very fairly, in the third line:

The NSW Police Force is acutely aware of and acknowledges without qualification the

> shocking violence directed at the LGBTIQ communities during the seventies, eighties and nineties. It is clear that the level of violence inflicted outside of Strike Force Parrabell's charter because of the victims' survival, was elevated, extreme and brutal. It is equally clear that many of these cases were not properly investigated and that victims were let down. The NSW Police Force accepted a culture and society that marginalised people who happened to be sexually or gender diverse.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. May I take it that you adopt those statements, stand by them today?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Then at page 15, two pages on, about just below halfway down the page, the context is that one of the members of the committee is asking you about one particular case, and you can see it referred to there just above where your name appears, and the parliamentarian is asking you why did the police persist in the stance they took in the three successive inquests in that case, and your answer included on the second line:

> The comment I ought to make about that is that [that] case, and many other cases, originally go before a Coroner. The Coroner, under section 10 of the Coroner's Act, has to be satisfied that the evidence before him or her is appropriate and that appropriate and full inquiries are being conducted. This was a difficulty with Parrabell too, by the way. Parrabell looks at that. When a coroner says, "This is what I find", they are in a much better position than we are because that person has looked at it objectively.
> They have all sorts of different evidence before them.

Again, I assume that you stand by that statement and adopt it today?
A. Yes, I do.

MR GRAY: Pausing there, Commissioner, I should have, I think, resumed my tender of the tender bundle, and it perhaps should be marked exhibit 6.

THE COMMISSIONER: I wil1 mark it exhibit 6 subject to, if I just note for the moment, the arrangements between counse1. If that can be reflected, if $I$ can be told in due course that my exhibit 6 reflects those arrangements so that $I$ don't look at anything that is not the subject of arrangement between counsel.

MR GRAY: Certainly.
EXHIBIT \#6 TENDER BUNDLE
MR GRAY: Q. On page 17, towards the top of the page, you were responding to a criticism that was attributed to ACON.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Gray, could you just pardon me a moment?

MR GRAY: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Sorry, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crande11, at page 17, the chair referred to a criticism attributed to ACON that the police were not collecting enough information on the COPS system - do you see that's the context?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Your response was, in that paragraph, on the third 1ine:

The difficulty for me is that the officers on the ground do not necessarily have the time or wherewithal to go through all of the details to determine whether or not it is a [bias] crime.

That should be "bias", I think, not "vice", this is page 17. There we are. Yes, that's the passage,
thank you. Going on you said:
I think they need support from people in positions of supervision who can make a call on whether an incident is or is not ...

Then you said:
The difficulty for me is the actual recording of it, because an archive cannot show bias if it is not recorded in the first place.

And that's still your view, I take it?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Indeed, the absence of records relating to the possibility of bias crime was a central problem for the whole Parrabell exercise; correct?
A. Yes. Yes, it was.
Q. Because Parrabell was only assessing whatever was written down in the old original files about each case in the first place?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. And so, if nothing was written down back in 1972 or 1982, then no assessment about the presence or absence of bias was possible; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Then a bit lower down that same page, there is a question from the Hon Greg Donnelly. It goes to the solved and unsolved topic. Mr Donnelly asks, do you see just above the middle of the page:

If the brutal killing of an individual is conducted behind closed doors, so to speak, how does one start to comprehend whether or not that crime involved bias?

And then a few lines below that in the same paragraph he says:

If there is a public incident, it might be easier to determine whether the crime
involved bias, but if it is behind closed doors, how does one discover bias?

And a fair question, of course, and you gave a fair answer, which was:

It is very difficult. The sole purpose of
an investigator, if they want to determine
bias, is to jump into the mind of the
perpetrator and what is motivating that crime.

That's your view still?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And Mr Donnelly asks if that is undertaken by the investigating officer. You say:

Yes.

And you go on to say:
When you have a look at Parrabell
statistics, the solved matters will show us
greater indicators of bias or no bias
because we have evidence of what the
perpetrator was thinking or intending to do
at the time. If we can get that evidence
from the perpetrator, then it is quite
simple to allocate it as a bias crime.
And that's still your view?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. The point is, isn't it, as I understand it, if you don't know who the perpetrator was - in an unsolved case it's very hard to work out whether bias was present or not? A. Yes.
Q. So for solved cases, where the perpetrator is known, you might be able to learn or to infer something about motive, although even then not necessarily; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But for unsolved cases, that may be simply impossible?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, I will turn also just briefly at this initial stage to the Parrabell report itself. So you can put that volume away. The Parrabell report is found in what was exhibit 1 , ie, an exhibit from the November hearing, at tab 2 [SCOI.02632]. I don't know whether you have that there, Mr Crandell. I think you do but I'm not certain.

## It has been found on the screen.

A. That's fine.
Q. That is progress.
A. That's fine. I'm okay with it on the screen, Mr Gray.
Q. Thank you. I think you probably can for the moment. I'm sure you are pretty familiar with this document?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. But we'11 find it for you during the course of the morning?
A. No problem.
Q. So this is the actual final report of Strike Force Parrabell of June 2018. I main1y just want to outline now with you what is in it, how it is structured. If we go to the first substantive page after the lists of which officers were involved and the lists of the cases reviewed, we get to page 11.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Crandell, I don't know whether it is on the screen immediately in front of you. That's probably more convenient than trying to look across the hearing room.

THE WITNESS: Yes, thank you, Commissioner.
MR GRAY: Q. Again, I don't want to do this at any length but I just want to see whether you still adhere to some of the, if I may say so, also very frank remarks that you made here. When I say "you", you were the commanding officer of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And were one of the authors, if not the main author, of the actual police part of the report?
A. Yes.
Q. On page 11 you refer to the 1978 Gay Mardi Gras and you describe it as having attracted a response from police involving excessive force and arrests, followed by the publication of participants' identities in a public shaming exercise. And you don't shrink from that language now? A. No, I don't.
Q. You refer to the degree of animosity towards gay men not being isolated to any particular section of society, and you add that within that context, the NSW Police Force was no different, with the backing of legislation that identified criminality by natural behaviour - meaning, in this case, homosexuality?
A. Yes.
Q. And that remains your view of things?
A. That remains my view, yes.
Q. If we turn over to page 12, and I do this briefly, at the bottom of the page and over on to 13 you refer to some of the features of recent modern history that play a part in the events that we are all concerned with - the onset of AIDS, the Grim Reaper campaign, over on page 13, and then in the third paragraph, beginning "In the eyes of many gay men", you say in the second sentence:

The link between anti-gay violence and moral panic associated with the spread of AIDS in Australian states is well documented.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you refer to an article by Stephen Tomsen and Gail Mason. Now, when you used the phrase "moral panic" there, what were you referring to?
A. I'm referring to people feeling uncertain about their safety, particularly towards members of the gay community, particularly towards gay men.
Q. Because of AIDS, do you mean?
A. Because of the AIDS epidemic at the time and the increased publication, I suppose, of that sentiment.
I mean, they were very emotional campaigns and --
Q. The Grim Reaper?
A. The Grim Reaper campaigns, very emotional, and I think whilst that might have been fine for an advertisement, in the gay community the feedback that $I$ have is that it was very, very bad for gay men; it became even more dangerous for people in that category.
Q. Is that because, according to what you were told -A. From the gay community, yes.
Q. -- by the gay community, that there was a view abroad that the AIDS crisis was the fault of gay men?
A. Yes.
Q. And, did it go this far, that therefore gay men were, in effect, fair game?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Then in the paragraph below that you refer to "beats", and to the fact that some of the most highly publicised disappearances and deaths of men during this period were at known beats, including the Bondi headlands?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, over on page 14, the next page in the top paragraph you say that there is no doubt that police culture inhibited the kind of impartial support now becoming a feature within LGBTIQ community relationships, so you are referring to "now" as in 2018, but you are saying, I take it, that in the period in question, 70 s , 80s, 90s, police culture itself was an inhibitor to, for example, gay men in particular but gay people, lesbians, reporting incidents of violence to police?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Many people have said this, but you have no doubt about it yourself?
A. No doubt.
Q. You say:

Strike Force Parrabell was developed to show proactivity, from this point ... at least, in the investigation of anti-gay bias crime.

We will come back to that later when we look at what you have said in your statement.

Then lower down page 14, under the heading beginning "Context", you said this - and I am not doing this, Mr Crande11, to, as it were, make you say things that you might otherwise prefer not to have to say, but I just want to establish that these are still your view?
A. Yes.
Q. So you say there:

The NSW Police Force is acutely aware of and acknowledges without qualification both
its and society's acceptance of gay
bashings and shocking violence directed at
gay men, and the LGBTIQ community between
1976 and 2000.
So the Force, through you, was acknowledging its acceptance, its having accepted, gay bashings in that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And you don't move away from that position?
A. No, I don't.
Q. You say, very fairly, below that, a few lines below:

It is clear and beyond question that levels
of violence inflicted upon gay men in
particular were elevated, extreme and often brutal.

And you are referring there to the period specifically between 1976 and 2000?
A. Yes.
Q. And it is that era of 30 or so years generally, I take it?
A. Yes.
Q. Then in the bottom paragraph leading to the top of page 15, you refer to the fact that the gay and lesbian bodies, such as the Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby and the AIDS Council, actually kept records of violence from during that period, and you say, "usually comprising self-reported incidents of gay-hate violence". You were aware of that at the time, or did you become aware of that later, that they were keeping these records?
A. I became aware of that when I undertook the sexuality and gender diversity and intersex corporate sponsorship and that information was given to me by the CEO of ACON and senior members of ACON, saying that there were written records at the time of up to at least 20 reports per day of bashings of gay men.
Q. Thank you. You, I presume, immediately appreciated that that was a much higher reporting scale than had been reported to the police?
A. Absolutely.
Q. You accept - and I don't again mean to overdo this that that is because, largely, gay people were mistrustful of the police and unwilling to report to police?
A. Yes, and I think there's elements of that today.
Q. Still?
A. Still.
Q. You say, again very fairly, at the top of page 15 , that:

This inherent lack of consequences or accountability --
ie, flowing from the fact that people weren't reporting --
meant that perpetrators were given a kind of "social licence" to continue inflicting violence upon members of the gay community.

You stand by that today?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. On page 16, if we turn over the page, under the heading "The NSW Police Force Response", you say very directly:

The NSW Police Force must acknowledge and has, to some extent, acknowledged its part in marginalisation of the LGBTIQ community during the 1970s, 80s and 90s especially.

Again, you stand by that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, at the bottom of page 17, there is a heading "Why These 88 Deaths." I don't want to get bogged down in this but I wonder if I can just ask you a couple of questions about this. The report says:

During 2013 a number of articles were published in mainstream Sydney media --
and there is certainly no doubt about that and we will have a look at some of those later. You say --

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together with a scholarly article published
by the Australian Institute of
Criminology ... relating to }88\mathrm{ suspicious
deaths ...
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Now, there are various references, including in this report and many others elsewhere, to the origins of this list of 88?
A. Mmm.
Q. I don't think it needs to be a major issue but I wonder if I can see if you have the same understanding of this as I do, putting aside whatever has been written?
A. Yes.
Q. That in fact, the articles about 88 didn't start back in 2000 or 2002 ; they came later?
A. That's correct.
Q. And the scholarly article in the Australian Institute of Criminology journal was one in, I think, 2002 referring not to 88 deaths but to about 37 deaths in a slightly different time span?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. So that are, for whatever reason - which I don't propose to delve into - there has been a little bit of confusion or a bit of a mishmash in the way that has been described?
A. Yes. I agree, from what $I$ know now, by the way.

I didn't know that at the time it was written but I do now.
Q. No, but you accept it now?
A. I do, yes.
Q. At page 18, the overriding objective is described, of

Strike Force Parrabel1, which is the laudable objective of bringing the police and the LGBTIQ community closer together, et cetera. Now, accepting that, the actual task that the strike force set itself is what we see at the bottom of page 19 under the heading "Investigative Review", where you say:

On 30 August 2015 Strike Force Parrabell commenced a thorough investigative review to determine whether 88 deaths --
and I will pass over the next bit for the reasons we just touched upon --
A. Yes, thank you.
Q.
... and commonly referred to by media representatives, could be classified as motivated by bias including gay-hate.

And that, in summary - and we'11 have to go into a bit more detail - is what Strike Force Parrabell set out to do?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Two paragraphs below that, you say:

Up to 10 criminal investigators were seconded to Strike Force Parrabell over an 18-month period ...

Again, I don't mean to suggest that this is an earth -shattering point, but the numbers of police officers who worked on Strike Force Parrabell fluctuated over the time? A. Yes, they did.
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think in total it seems that 13 had some involvement at some or other point along the continuum?
A. Yes.
Q. But the number actually on the job at any one point would have been lower than that?
A. Yes. There was some overlap between them, and when I say "up to 10", I'm probably indicating some of the ones
from Surry Hills, because Surry Hills really took carriage of the overall oversight. So when I think of the crime manager, Craig Middleton, the investigations manager - all those people in that governance structure, I suppose I was probably thinking of those as well.
Q. Yes?
A. But, yes, that's probably why I have selected "up to 10", but you're right, there was crossover throughout that 18-month period.
Q. At page 20 , a bit below halfway down the page, there's a heading "Strike Force Parrabe11 Terms of Reference", and then some half a dozen short paragraphs in quotes. There doesn't seem to be an actual document called "Terms of Reference" anywhere, at least that we have been provided with. Is that your understanding as well?
A. Yes. Yes, it is. I haven't been able to find that document either. I can only assume that I've been given that information from somewhere for that final report, but when I look at that time frame as well, our original time frame wasn't 18 months; our original time frame was six months and we actually said three months at one stage. So really we had not a great insight into the enormity of the undertaking, and that required me to continually go back to my assistant commissioner and ask for the extension of resources. So when I look at that 18 months, that's not a terms of reference at the very start; that's something that has probably been added to.
Q. I see.
A. Otherwise, that would have said six months, not 18.
Q. Quite so, yes.
A. But along with you, I can't find the actual original Terms of Reference, albeit I know there was one.
Q. I won't pursue the detail of what appears in those five paragraphs except just to flag, because it will come up later, on the top of the next page, the second-last paragraph within this "Terms of Reference" section, which says:

Each incident will be filtered through the NSW Police Force 10 bias crime indicators as a general guide to identify direct or circumstantial evidence of bias motivation.

Now, two things: the strike force did indeed use the list of 10 bias crime indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. And we will come to that?
A. Yes.
Q. When, if you know, do you think this "Terms of Reference" document, if it was a document, or the "Terms of Reference" set of paragraphs was created?
A. I believe they were originally created prior to the commencement of Parrabell, because that was to guide the investigators and the investigation itself. So I believe that that document would be prior to 30 August 2015.
Q. Although you mention that, as at 30 August 2015 you wouldn't have been expecting 18 months?
A. No, no. So that's what I mean - that's obviously something that I have probably added in, because it was an 18-month undertaking, albeit originally that should have said six months, not 18.
Q. The last section in this quoted "Terms of Reference" part reads:

Examine and report upon evidence capable of identifying suspected bias of the original police investigator.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in summary, is it fair to say that, in the end, that topic was not able to be pursued to any significant extent?
A. Yes.
Q. And why is that?
A. We had difficulty separating investigative
incompetence from bias. And without reinvestigating matters, we found it very difficult to attribute any deliberate bias towards any investigator. And as you said at the very opening, if something's not recorded, then it's very difficult for me to then review that on paper and say there was or there wasn't bias. Comforting to me was that the academic team also had difficulty in that regard, because I felt that we could come to a view on the
investigators' bias, but it soon became apparent to me that we could not, and as I understand it, the academics had the same difficulties.
Q. Just on the academics, if we could just scroll slightly down further, the next thing that appears on page 21 is that funding was approved by the police for an academic review of the strike force by Flinders University, and we know that that did indeed occur. May I just ask this at the outset - and I will need to explore it in a bit more detail later - but the material that the academics were given was the completed bias crime indicator forms in each - for the 88-odd cases; correct?
A. Yes. Yes, they were.
Q. And perhaps speaking a little generally, those completed forms, at least going on the ones that I have seen, typically seemed to have been around 20 -odd pages? A. Yes.
Q. And so for 88 , we're looking at about 1700 pages or something of that order; is that your understanding?
A. Yes. Look, I don't know whether they were provided other material. The reason I say that is because my review of Derek Dalton's emails and correspondence indicated that he was concerned about the number of documents that he had to go through, and he was including in that the ACON report and the ACON documents. So I don't know whether he had access to other material - I would probably have to check that with the senior investigators - or whether it was just the bias crime tools, indicators.
Q. Thank you. I will come to that with you.
A. Sure.
Q. But of course, if you don't know, you don't know, but so it is clear, on your understanding, subject to correction, is that the academics were given the completed bias crime indicator forms for the 80 -odd cases, but were not given the voluminous original historical holdings that the Parrabell police officers looked at?
A. Yes. So I can guarantee you that they did not get all of the holdings that the investigators looked at, because that was about 400 boxes, from my memory.
Q. Yes.
A. There is no way that they got that much information.

I'm just wondering whether they had any further documentation besides just the bias crime indicator tools. I could probably make some inquiries in that regard.
Q. Okay, thank you. If you can do that overnight I would be very happy for to you do that. Certainly it's clear, as you say, that at some point at least Dr Dalton and perhaps the others had some material from ACON?
A. Yes.
Q. And indeed, that was partly why he suggested that perhaps the payment needed to be increased a bit?
A. Yes.
Q. You recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. If you can check overnight, I would be grateful, because, as I say, our understanding, rightly or wrongly, is that the investigators - putting aside the ACON material - only had from police the completed, filled-in bias crime indicator forms?
A. Yes.
Q. If you could check that, I would be grateful.
A. Certainly.
Q. Now, at the middle of that page, a sentence above - in fact, a paragraph or two above where we are on the screen, thank you, reference is made to the fact that recommendations have been fashioned for improvements to the NSW Police Force system of bias crime classification. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Without making you turn over to it or have the screen turned over to it, at page 39 there is indeed a list of recommendations, and one of them, number 3, is that there needs to be some improved or better system of identifying bias crimes. Do you recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. I'11 leave that there. I'll need to come to that topic later.
A. Sure.
Q. A couple of paragraphs below that - just scroll down
slightly more, thank you - the report says that a number of cases had to be left as "insufficient information" - we know that that is correct.
A. Yes.
Q. You say then:

To be clear, NSW Police Force investigators assigned to Strike Force Parrabell applied a general tenet to case classification by answering a simple question: "Is there evidence of a bias crime?"

Appreciating that you are here giving a kind of summary --
A. Yes.
Q. -- but the true position was a little bit more complex than that, wasn't it?
A. Yes. Yes, it was more than just that one question. That was probably the start but there was a number of questions particularly in terms of motivation beyond them.
Q. At the bottom of that page, the few lines that we can see there, you say, quite accurately:

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... the academic team did not necessarily
adopt the same classification
interpretation ...
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In fact, the word "necessarily" is really superfluous there, isn't it?
A. Yes. They did not.
Q. They did not, in fact, adopt the bias crime indicator methodology at all?
A. No, there was - some of the factors that they looked at were consistent with what Strike Force Parrabell
investigators looked at, but their method of classifying different bias or animus, as they called it, was completely different.
Q. Completely different, yes. So again, without meaning to be nitpicking, at the top of the next page, page 22, this sentence appears:

Whilst different findings and
classifications were made, each team
understood and endorsed the systemic approach of the other.

Is that something of an exaggeration in the case of the academics' view of what the strike force did?
A. No, I don't think so, because what I'm referring to there was probably more discussions with Derek Dalton and the team and saying to them, "Look, this is how we went about it. This is the way that we identified bias or no bias." Because there's some findings that are polar opposites where you have a finding from Strike Force Parrabell that says "no bias" and you have "gay hate bias" from the academics.

So we discussed those cases and said, "We11, how can that be?" That's what I'm referring to there. So they're saying, "We understand how you have come to that, but we don't resile from the position that we have on the basis of our - the way that our methodology has worked." So they understood our methodology. They didn't necessarily agree with the way that we went about it, as they may have written in their report, but I think they understood why we were using the bias indicators that we used.
Q. Sure.
A. Particularly given they were part of our policy arrangements.
Q. Sure. Thank you, that's helpful. I want to just put to you, though, that to say that the academics, for their part, endorsed the approach of the police is not really right?
A. No, I know what you are saying. Look - yeah.
Q. Because they said that the form was not really the way to do it?
A. No, that's right. So I was probably more thinking about our verbal interaction, but when you read their report, I think you're correct. They don't say, "We think that's a better way of doing it"; they obviously support their own way and methodology, yes.
Q. Just before we have a break, as I expect we will I am sorry you don't have the document in front of you, but you probably remember it, and it can be scrolled through quickly, but for the next 15 pages or so, 23 onwards -A. Yes.
Q. -- there are various pie charts and graphs?
A. Yes.
Q. And statistics of one form or another?
A. Yes.
Q. Which are, in effect, the output and the results of the strike force review of the 80 -odd cases?
A. Yes.
Q. And so, for example, one page tells us that 63 were solved and 23 remain unsolved; another page tells us that of the 86 - because a couple weren't dealt with for one reason or another --
A. Yes.
Q. -- eight found evidence of bias crime, 19 suspected of bias crime, 34 , no evidence of bias crime, 25, insufficient information. You remember these pages?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And there are various other pages with various breakdowns of other statistics in terms of what was found?
A. Yes.
Q. And then at 39 to 41 we have the recommendations, 12 in all?
A. Yes.
Q. One of which was about the bias crime tool or method?
A. Yes.
Q. And then from 43 to 46 there's an annexure, which and you may or may not remember this --
A. Yes.
Q. -- sets out a kind of summary of the way in which records were kept by the police generally speaking?
A. Yes.
Q. Sequentially over the 70s, 80s, 90s and 2000s; do you recall that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And although it is a summary, it is presumably, as far as you know, basically accurate?
A. Yes.
Q. Then from pages 47 to 133 , which is a much longer part, we have the academic review?
A. Yes.
Q. And at the very back of that, as an annexure, I suppose - yes, it's annexure B - we have the bias crimes indicator review form set out?
A. Yes .
Q. Being one that the Parrabell police officers used?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you for that. I want to just turn now to some aspects of your statement, especially the preliminary parts about your career and how you came to be in the corporate sponsor role?
A. Yes.
Q. Perhaps I'11 make a start.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think make a start, given the fact we started slightly late, and I will take the adjournment in a few minutes, thank you.

MR GRAY: Q. You need your statement, I'm sorry, which is in volume 1, I think it is tab 4 [SCOI.76961].
A. Did you say tab 4, Mr Gray?
Q. Yes, tab 4, I believe.
A. Yes.
Q. Is it there?
A. Yes.
Q. Good. So you are currently - I'm looking at paragraph 3 - the commander of the Digital Technology and Innovation Command within the force?
A. That title has now changed, since 16 November, it's now called Technology Command.
Q. It's now what, sorry?
A. Technology Command.
Q. Commander of the Technology Command?
A. Yes.
Q. In paragraph 4 you tell us that you joined the force back in 1986 and you became a detective in 1994. May I ask you fairly briefly, what was the training or the requirements to become a detective, when you became detective?
A. So you originally were allocated a position in a detectives office and you would sit what they call a bullring, which they still have today, which essentially does look like a bullring where you have a number of senior detectives that sit around and ask you a number of questions on your capability as an investigator, what you know about criminal law, and you're given a number of documents to read and familiarise yourself with.

If you pass through that bullring process, you then would typically do an investigators course or something similar, which would lead into a detectives designation course or the detectives education program, is what I did. That was a program of about 18 months, where you would prepare briefs of evidence and you would present them, as well as learning along the way different proofs and different aspects of the criminal - mainly criminal law and evidence, they were the two main subjects that you would learn.
Q. So was that a full-time course or something you did while also doing your day job?
A. Yes, something you did while also doing the day job, but the intent was to teach you various aspects and then have you put them into practice, if at all possible, and then to come back and reflect upon your learnings.
Q. By 2005 - I'm up to paragraph 6 - you had been promoted to the rank of superintendent.
A. Yes.
Q. We know from your CV, which I probably don't need to take you to because you will remember this, that at the rank of superintendent you held three successive commands, local area commands?
A. Yes.
Q. Deniliquin, then Kings Cross, and then Surry Hills?
A. Yes.
Q. What is a command?
A. A command is really an area geographically defined and you have a number of police resources within that command they might be at different stations - and basically you are responsible for policing of that particular area.
Q. So we have local area commands, LACs?
A. Yes. They're now called police area commands, just
a bit of change in terminology, but the same concept.
Q. But are there other commands that aren't geographical?
A. Yes, there are, yes. Well, Technology Command is one.
Q. For example?
A. Yes.
Q. Again, I don't want to pursue this very far but how many commands are there, dozens or hundreds?
A. No, there is high 50 s, so around about the 60 mark in operational field commands, but then you have other support commands. So they are from corporate areas, obviously my area is in a corporate area, but you also have counter terrorism, prosecutions, those different commands that feed in to support field operations.
Q. Thank you. Then in 2017 you were promoted to assistant commissioner. How many assistant commissioners are there?
A. There's 20 now.
Q. And in your case, as assistant commissioner in 2017, you were appointed commander of the Education and Training Command?
A. Yes.
Q. And you held that command until 2019 ?
A. Yes.
Q. What does or did that Education and Training Command do?
A. So that command is responsible for basically education and training of all police officers and unsworn officers or employees of the NSW Police Force; also responsible for weapons training and defensive tactics training; also for bringing in mandatory training that might be required because of hearings such as this, or others, and developing new ways of educating police officers through technology.
Q. And would that include such things as detective training courses?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. And are they now - that is, detective training courses - more elaborate or more extensive than they were in your time or much the same?
A. No, I believe they're more elaborate. I only know that because when I was there, we changed the way that the detectives undertook their course, and it really - it really does look at what separates a person with specialist criminal investigative knowledge from the rest of the people in the organisation and also focuses in a great deal on practical experience, as to how you put your learnings into practice.
Q. Then briefly, from 2019 you were at State Intelligence Command?
A. Yes.
Q. In a nutshell, what does that do?
A. So that basically provides support to State Crime Command, in terms of all of their different squads. It also provides support and gives direction to intelligence officers right across the state, and provides leadership and direction in the development of intelligence products and the value that they can give to people on the front 1 ine.
Q. And then earlier this year you were appointed to your present position?
A. Yes.
Q. Meanwhile, back in 2013, when you were still a superintendent and the commander of the Surry Hills local area command, you were given another appointment, namely, corporate sponsor for sexuality, gender diversity and intersex?
A. Yes.
Q. You tell us that later on in your statement at around paragraph 22. So, first of all, what does the term "corporate sponsor" mean in the context of the police?
A. So the corporate sponsor becomes the spokesperson for the organisation on behalf of the Commissioner. The corporate spokesperson is, in my sponsorship, responsible for maintaining community relations with different
communities in the LGBTIQ space; also for educating police officers throughout the organisation about bias, gender, sexuality issues and the importance of maintaining impartiality, in a nutshell. It's very challenging.
Q. Thank you. How many of these corporate sponsor positions are there?
A. I could check. As a rough estimate, I would say that almost every assistant commissioner at that time would have had some sort of a sponsorship, or in my case, it was a superintendent that turned into an assistant commissioner. So I would say there'd be around about 20 different sponsorships.
Q. And the title or the concept was applicable to the individual, is that right, rather than there being an apparatus under that individual?
A. Yes, so Operational Programs, which is where Sergeant Steer was attached to, they had different areas, so you can imagine for domestic violence, for example, there were a number of support and policy officers in that area, multiculturalism, they would have a number of support officers, and then they would provide support to the corporate spokesperson.

In my area, I had an officer, a policy officer, who assisted me, but $I$ also had a big gay lesbian liaison officer network and $I$ used to draw upon them to come in and help us if we needed more assistance to deal with events or issues that arose in the portfolio.
Q. But you were, of course, in what $I$ inaccurately cal 1 your day job, the commander of the Surry Hills local area? A. Yes.
Q. But this position, corporate sponsor position, presumably was - we11, I won't presume it, I wil1 ask you -state-wide?
A. Yes, definitely. That was in addition to my day job, say.
Q. Yes. You succeeded Chief Superintendent Donna Adney in that corporate sponsor role?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you stil1 hold that position?
A. No.
Q. When did you cease to be the corporate sponsor?
A. It would have been in 2019. That then handed over to Assistant Commissioner Gelina Talbot. She gave evidence in a recent --
Q. At the parliamentary inquiry?
A. Yes, she did. And now she has been replaced with Assistant Commissioner Tony Cooke, since about - since earlier this year.
Q. As at 2013, when you were appointed to that role, there was also a corporate sponsor for bias crime?
A. Yes.
Q. Who at that time was Superintendent Danny Sullivan?
A. Yes.
Q. What were the responsibilities, as you understand them, of that role and how did it overlap or not overlap with your role?
A. Yes, so in my mind, the bias crime, so Danny Sullivan's area, looked at elements of bias not just in LGBTIQ community but right across the board. So he has a number of other areas, whether that be homelessness, racial, there was a number of different categories of bias crime, so he was concentrated in that area. I had a fair bit to do with his portfolio, simply because there was a great deal of bias towards marginalised community of LGBTIQ.

But LGBTIQ had a much broader remit in terms of not just the bias aspect but also the community engagement aspect. We had several significant events each year that we would prepare for and show support to the community for. So there was a community arm side of it, there was also a bias side of it, and Parrabell came into that bias side.
Q. In paragraph 13 - in fact, I should start at paragraph 12, really, referring to the Bias Crime Unit, you say that you have no particular knowledge about the background to or reasons for establishment or day-to-day business or roles of personnel within the Bias Crime Unit. Given what you have just been explaining to us about your role as corporate sponsor and the interrelationship with the bias crime sponsor, it seems surprising that you would have such little knowledge?
A. Yes, I think I'm saying it from now. So now - because the Bias Crimes Unit, when Geoff Steer - when I knew about Geoff being involved in it, I know that he was appointed to the role, he was taken out of the role and he was reappointed to the role, and then obviously he went out I think in 2017 - that, when I left my portfolio, the one one of the main things that I wanted to pass on was the Strike Force Parrabell recommendations to change the way that we look at bias crime.

I'm happy to say that that has occurred in terms of our current standing operating procedures, but in terms of the structure of that unit now, given it now sits under a different area of the organisation, it now sits under Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command, I didn't have knowledge of that unit as it's constructed now or what their remit is, other than me reading their standard operating procedures.
Q. I see. But in 2013 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and the years up to, say, 2017 when you were doing Parrabell --
A. Yes.
Q. -- we shouldn't understand you to be saying that you had no idea what the Bias Crime Unit was?
A. No, no. I had an idea of what the bias - look, I had an impression of what had happened with the Bias Crimes Unit. I didn't actually research what they did, but to me, Geoff Steer was the person that was the Bias Crimes Unit. Essentially, he was not a - you know, not a lone actor but he held a great deal of responsibility.
Q. Does the same answer, in effect, apply to paragraph 13, which talks about the Engagement and Hate Crime Unit which, in effect, is the name for the body which includes what used to be the Bias Crime Unit?
A. Yes. So I believe that was born out of the - or perhaps built upon what Geoff had started on, and I know Geoff went out in 2017, so I'm presuming that the Engagement and Hate Crime Unit was born some time after that.

I had a discussion with them before I left my portfolio based on the outcome, the recommendations, of

Parrabell and what really needed to be progressed in terms of those recommendations, and I believe that they took them on board. But other than that, I can't tell you how they operate now or - I could guess at their numbers but it would be certainly more than --
Q. No, that's okay. What I was interested in was checking whether what you were saying there in those two paragraphs was that you didn't know anything about it at the time, but that's not what you're saying?
A. No, no, that's right. I mean, the Engagement and Hate Crime Unit I don't know, because that was created after the period in question, but the Hate Crimes Unit and Geoff Steer, I did have dealings with Geoff in the time between 2013 and 2017.

MR GRAY: Is your Honour proposing to take a break?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I will take a break now. Yes, I'11 take a break, thank you. I'11 adjourn, thank you.

SHORT ADJOURNMENT
THE COMMISSIONER: I need to adjourn today at about 10 to one. I have a matter that I need to attend to. So if you can keep that in mind and if we need to catch up the time, I can sit a bit later this afternoon, if that becomes necessary. All right, thank you.

MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, I just want to ask you, on the topic of the Bias Crime Unit, some questions about what in fact its history was as it appears. To do that, could you find volume 7, behind you, tab 190, [SCOI.77469].

Now, this document is called "Bias Crimes Unit Handover". We know from the last page of it that it's dated 15 June 2018. I just want to run through with you mainly what is on the first page of it, under the heading "Unit History". Have you got that?
A. Yes.
Q. So we learn that in 2006, then Senior Constable Steer proposed a hate crime capability for the police. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you I imagine also know, although it's not stated
here, that that was prompted by or followed the Cronulla riots?
A. Yes .
Q. Do you recall that that was the catalyst for this initiative?
A. Yes.
Q. And so following Constable Steer's proposal, the position of hate crime coordinator was established in 2007, and basically that position was comprised of himself, Geoff Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. And we see in the last paragraph of that, that in 2009 the position was de-established. So it existed for a couple of years and then for the next three years, 2009 to 2012 - well, certainly he wasn't in it but when it says "de-established", that means the position ceased to exist, doesn't it?
A. I would say yes, because it was only a temporary position in the first place, so "overstrength" just means it's in addition to our strength which means it's not a permanent position.
Q. So it was not a permanent position and then for three years, it was de-established, to use the word that's there? A. Yes.
Q. Then in 2012, a slightly changed name from hate crime coordinator to team leader, bias motivated crimes, was re-established - effectively the same position, as I understand it?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, the position filled by then Sergeant Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Operational Programs Command means what? What are Operational Programs?
A. Operational Programs Command basically have predominantly policy officers that look at the different corporate sponsorships. So you'll have a policy officer for LGBTIQ, which was me, you'11 have a number of other officers for domestic violence, and they all come in under Operational Programs Command.
Q. And that's the area, "Operational Programs Command", where Shobha Sharma was located?
A. Yes, she's the manager - she was the manager there.
Q. The manager of that unit; is that what we call it?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Is she a sworn police officer?
A. No. No, she's unsworn.
Q. In the hierarchy, if this is a coherent question, where does she sit in terms of, for example, a superintendent or yourself?
A. I would say she would be at a level of inspector to superintendent level, so a fairly senior role.
Q. So reasonably high up the totem pole?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Then back to this document, we see that in 2015, there was a second person added to Sergeant Steer, namely, Senior Constable Corbett, on loan?
A. Yes.
Q. So that, in effect, created the Bias Crimes Unit, because there's now two people; is that how we understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. And again in 2015, a third person was added, a civilian intelligence analyst, and in 2016, using the language you pointed to before, an overstrength position was added attaching the on-loan officer, Corbett, permanently to the unit. Now, I don't pretend to understand all of that entirely but is the net result that by that point there were three people?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the next paragraph tells us that there was a senior policy officer who had responsibilities for bias motivated crimes and vulnerable communities --
A. Yes.
Q. -- also in the picture. So there were three and a half people, in effect?
A. Yes.
Q. Then we are told that in July 2017 the Bias Crimes Unit was affected by a restructure. It was realigned to the newly created Fixated Persons Investigation Unit?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know that, when that was happening?
A. Yes, I knew, I knew that was the case, and I think that came in under Commissioner Fuller.
Q. Commissioner Fuller?
A. Yes.
Q. And according to this document, in an overnight fashion - before I ask that, the Fixated Persons Investigation Unit was under a different command, namely, Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was as a result of the restructure, I take it?
A. Yes.
Q. And did the Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command have a number of units apart from the Fixated Persons Investigation Unit?
A. Yes, certainly. I think from memory the Fixated Persons Investigation Unit was a new unit that was established by Commissioner Fuller, but Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command comprised many other areas, whether it's anti-terrorism intelligence units, investigation units, public order and riot squad, tactical operations squad, all of those units fall in under Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics.
Q. And so the concept of fixated persons, is this right, in the main, at least, is looking at extremists and radicals of one sort or another, rather than something to do with LGBTIQ?
A. Yes, look, I think - I'm not sure whether LGBTIQ fell in under that charter as well, but predominantly it was for people that, for whatever reason, would fixate on particularly targets, people for targets, which, as I understand it, was alluded to in research for counter terrorism. I don't pretend to be an expert in any of that, but that's where the genesis was, and it also found that there was a number of people with mental health issues that would become fixated people, and so we were trying to get
ahead of that and try to prevent the fixation before it occurred.
Q. Now, the Bias Crime Unit, and Sergeant Steer as the bias crime coordinator, was looking at bias generally, as I understand, not just sexuality or gender bias but other forms of bias; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Such as race-based bias or ethnically based bias or religion-based bias, and so on?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And it does look, looking at that paragraph, when we're told that the Bias Crimes Unit has been meshed in with under the counter terrorism command, as though it's been sort of buffeted from pillar to post somewhat in terms of where it's been located within the police; is that a reasonable observation?
A. Yes, look, I don't know the reasons for moving from Operational Programs, but certainly bias crimes now obviously sits in with the Engagement and Hate Crime Unit, which is still within Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command.
Q. Back to where I was, the document tells us that, in an overnight fashion, this restructure, which had the features we have just looked at, caused 75 per cent of the staff that is, three out of the four people - to leave the Bias Crimes Unit. Did you know that that was what happened?
A. No, no, I don't.
Q. And as it points out, the Bias Crimes Unit after two short years had reduced from four staff and reverted back to just one, Senior Constable Corbett. Did you know that? A. No. Sorry, I knew that Sergeant Steer had left in 2017. I didn't know the circumstances around that.
Q. This seems to be telling us, but correct me if I'm wrong, that, in effect, three of the four were redeployed elsewhere, leaving only one survivor in the Bias Crimes Unit, as now moved under counter terrorism; is that right? A. Yes, it - that's what it appears from the document.
Q. And then the document says that several months later, in 2017 - although in fact, from another document that I can show you, if I need to, it may have been slightly
later than that but it perhaps doesn't matter very much the Bias Crimes Unit, now consisting of one officer, was again realigned with counter terrorism from the fixated persons unit to the Engagement Intervention Unit, so it moves again with the structure?
A. Yes.
Q. And we're told that at that time, from November to December, the police force effectively had no Bias Crimes Unit, for the reasons that are spelt out there. We're told that in January 2018 the vacant team leader position was laterally filled by Sergeant Husseini, and then, reading through the balance of that paragraph, Sergeant Husseini had to go and do something else, so again there was really only one person. Are you following me through that?
A. Yes, I am, yes.
Q. Then the last paragraph tells that that person, Senior Constable Corbett, was going to be leaving the unit in 2018 which would leave the Police Force with no Bias Crime Unit at all. Was all of that rather forlorn history known to you?
A. No.
Q. I probably don't need to make you get this document out, but in fact if you turn to next one, it's actually the next two on, tab 192 [SCOI.82046]
A. Yes.
Q. This is an issues paper dated December 2019, and it tell us, under the heading "Background", that the Bias Crimes Unit had sat within the Engagement Intervention Unit since November 2018?
A. Yes.
Q. Which may be slightly different from the one we just looked at, which said 2017 ?
A. Yes, '17, yes.
Q. And the recommendation being made is that the in effect, combined units, engagement and intervention, and bias crimes, be changed to a single unit called "Engagement and Hate Crime", which is how we come to have that one now. You may or may not know this. Is this known to you?
A. The process wasn't known to me but I do know the outcome of it now currently being the Engagement and Hate

Crime Unit.
Q. Namely, that outcome?
A. Yes.
Q. So from the document we were looking at first, the one at tab 190 [SCOI.77469] the position seems to be that the BCU, the Bias Crimes Unit, was essentially disbanded overnight; correct?
A. I can't comment. I don't know.
Q. Well, that's what the document --
A. The document indicates that, something similar, but --
Q. So three of the four were deployed somewhere else, including Sergeant Steer; correct?
A. Yes, that's what the document says, yes.
Q. Do you know where he was redeployed to?
A. I know where he is currently, and I don't believe that's changed. He's at Hawkesbury at the moment.
Q. Is that where he was sent in 2017?
A. I believe so.
Q. And what are his duties at Hawkesbury?
A. He's a team leader - he's a team leader of general duties police.
Q. General duties police?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Have you read Sergeant Steer's statement in this --
A. Yes, I have, yes.
Q. You'11 recall that he speaks of having been forced out in 2017. I can show it to you, but obviously, but do you recall him saying that?
A. Look, I accept what you say, yes.
Q. Is that language that you would agree with? Do you understand that he was forced out?
A. I really didn't have any vision of that at the time.
Q. One way or the other?
A. No, no.
Q. Who would have been making these decisions about disbanding the unit and sending Sergeant Steer off to Hawkesbury?
A. My understanding was that the Bias Crimes Unit had the support of Deputy Commissioner Kaldas. He was a large supporter of bias crimes investigation. It may have been a change from deputy to relocate, bearing in mind we had a new commissioner at that time as well, in 2017.
Q. So - I'm sorry, I missed that?
A. In 2017, with the arrival of our new commissioner, that being Commissioner Fuller, I know that it was his intent to create the Fixated Persons Unit, and - but I'm not sure of the impact on the Bias Crimes Unit to create that unit and I'm not sure whose decision that would have been beyond understanding that Mr Fuller wanted a Fixated Persons Unit created.
Q. Just remind me if you can, because I just don't have the date in my mind, when was the Lindt Cafe siege?
A. That was in December. I don't want to misstate the date. I'm thinking it was the 10th --
Q. No, but which year?
A. -- of December. That was in two thousand and --

THE COMMISSIONER: Fourteen.
THE WITNESS: Fourteen.
MR GRAY: Q. 2014, I'm told.
A. Yes, 2014, yes.
Q. Was the Fixated Persons Unit in part a response to that?
A. I'm not sure. I'm just thinking - end of 2014, Mr Fuller comes in in 2017. It may well have been, particularly given the coronial inquest may well have been around that time as well, so I would say probably probably very likely.
Q. Which inquest?
A. The Lindt Cafe inquest, I would - I'm thinking would have been around about that time. Certainly it was prior to the appointment of Commissioner Fuller. And I don't know whether that was a recommendation from the coroner, but certainly Mr Fuller brought that, in to my mind, as
a mandate.
Q. Briefly - and it wil1 be brief - could I ask you to find volume 10 of the bundle and turn to tab 249 , [SCOI.79872].
A. Yes.
Q. If we start from the back, because it is an email chain, there is an email from Geoffrey Steer to Derek Dalton on 29 May 2017. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. First of all, you may or may not have ever seen this before. Have you ever seen this before?
A. I don't believe so. I've seen a lot of documents but I don't believe this one.
Q. Sure. And it is not addressed to you?
A. No.
Q. It's between Steer and Dalton. But I just need to ask you, and I accept your answer that you haven't seen it yes, if it can be put on the screen that would be helpful. It's tab 249.

Now, I will just give you a moment to read Sergeant Steer's email there to yourself.

MR GRAY: Commissioner, I am told - and Mr Tedeschi - that these additional documents in tab 10 are not yet able to be put on the screen. I don't know if you have paper folders, but the documents have been provided.

If it's inconvenient, $I$ can come back to this later. I don't want to put someone at a disadvantage.

THE COMMISSIONER: We11, no, I think if everyone has the document. Is the document, though, at tab $249 ?$

MR GRAY: Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: If Mr Tedeschi and others have it, then I think we should proceed, and if the witness has it, then that's perfectly satisfactory.
Q. Mr Crande11, I assume you've got it?
A. Yes, I have, Commissioner.
Q. You've got this email?
A. Yes, I do Commissioner.
Q. All right. I won't interrupt you again. Keep reading it whilst Mr Tedeschi and others get a copy.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Have you had a chance to read that, Mr Crandell?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. According to Mr Steer, in that email on 29 May, the effect of the restructure that was happening at this time, which is the one we've just been looking at, was that the Bias Crimes Unit would effectively cease to exist.
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. And he says:

Bias crimes will be left to the relevant corporate sponsors and the unit will focus on right wing, left wing and anti-government groups. The capability around bias crimes will no longer exist.

And at the bottom of that long paragraph he says:
The ability of the [NSW Police] to identify, investigate and respond effectively to bias crimes in my opinion is not there.

Now, appreciating that you haven't seen it and appreciating also that you say you didn't know everything about what was happening at this time, but from having just read the document at tab 190 of volume 7, [SCOI.77469] the handover document, Sergeant Steer's description of the effect of the restructure seems to be pretty accurate, doesn't it?
A. Look, I can't recall whether there was a substituted capability for bias crimes. To be honest, if it was removed in that fashion that Geoff has described, as in Sergeant Steer's described, it would be surprising, but I'm not saying that that's not the case. I simply didn't have that vision at that time.
Q. Then just for completeness, because it's not really
what I need to ask you about, but $\operatorname{Dr} \operatorname{Dalton}$ responds at the front --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the first page of that chain, to say that he's troubled, and so forth. But again, was this something which at the time neither Steer nor Dalton raised with you? A. No, I don't recall Derek Dalton raising any of that with me. You may well point to an email that I'm not aware of, but I don't recall having a conversation with Derek in relation to that. I can't even recall speaking to Geoff about that, to be honest. All I know is that Geoff left in 2017, but I didn't really know the circumstances why.
Q. You don't know the circumstances?
A. No, not the specific circumstances that you've outlined to me today. I wasn't aware of those at the time, as to why he was - he left the unit. Sorry, I knew that there was a restructure, but the circumstances of him leaving I wasn't aware of.
Q. And including a lack of awareness of what at least in his mind amounted to his being forced out?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that something you weren't conscious of?
A. No, no.
Q. I just want to pursue that again briefly and then we will move on to something else. If we turn to volume 4 , so you can put that one away and go to volume 4 , and turn to tab 126, [SCOI.74679]. Now, this is an email from Sergeant Steer to you about a year later, June 2018, a lengthy email?
A. Yes.
Q. He is prompted to write it, he tells us - or he tells you, I should say - by an article in The Australian about that time. Do you remember this email?
A. I do remember this email. I was very concerned about it.
Q. He touches upon - and I'll come back to this in another context, but just in the present context - some of the history of the Bias Crimes Unit including in relation to himself?
A. Yes.
Q. You can see that, and again it's pretty long, so even though you've seen it before, if you need a bit of time to remind yourself what's in it, that's fine.
A. Did you want me to read --
Q. Well, if you need time to check anything, let me know, otherwise I'11 just take you to the bits I want to ask you about?
A. If you could take me through, I'm happy with that.
Q. On the last page he says:
... I don't expect a response ... but if you wish to discuss anything with me I will be more than willing ...

As best we are aware, he didn't get a response, you don't seem to have responded to this?
A. No, I didn't respond to Geoff, I responded - because in part, I think he was upset about comments that I had made --
Q. That's right.
A. -- in relation to having a look at a different way of classifying bias, which was reported upon. I was actually concerned for him at that time and I sent an email to his commander, Jim Stewart, Superintendent Stewart, and asked him to have a conversation with him and just check on him to make sure he was okay, but I didn't think it was helpful for me to respond given the length of the email and obviously the passion that he had put into those words, particularly given - I stood by what - I don't - I can't remember exactly what was reported, but I stood by the fact that we should look at how we classify bias crimes because 10 bias crime indicators was very, very difficult for an officer on the street to look at a crime and say, "Well, let me go through those 10 indicators", and given the experience with Parrabell, I thought that it was most appropriate to have a look at another way of allowing officers to better classify bias crimes much quicker and much earlier.
Q. Yes. I can take you to the actual article or $I$ can just remind you of what you are quoted in the article as saying?
A. Sure.
Q. If anyone needs it, it's at tab 225 of volume 8, [SCOI.82032]. It is an article in The Australian, and you are quoted as saying, more or less as you have just said:
... Strike Force Parrabe11 would recommend a better assessment tool for "bias" crimes.

And you're quoted as saying:
Our current bias assessment tools are not practical for everyday police officers on the frontline.

A new system would ensure "bias motivation" is considered in every investigation.

That's the gist of it?
A. Yes.
Q. That's what you recall saying?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's what has evidently prompted his email?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I just want to take you to a couple of bits of it again. In the first couple of lines he uses the expression that he was "forced out"?
A. Yes.
Q. Something that he says was confirmed by multiple sources. So you say that you don't know anything about that?
A. To be honest, the tenor of the document led me not to necessarily take everything that he said with - not honesty but complete value, if that makes sense. So I - he was obviously upset and, you know, "forced out" or otherwise, I didn't read into that. I just thought he was a deeply hurt person at that time.
Q. He refers in the third line to "ongoing attacks and harassment by the NSWPF" with respect to his work in the hate crimes field. Did you have any understanding of what he was referring to there?
A. No, no.
Q. And if you turn over to the third page - his paragraphs are numbered --
A. Yes.
Q. -- at paragraph 8, and slightly going over the same ground, he says that he had been forced out nearly 12 months ago - ie, in about July 2017 it would seem, given the date of this email - and that the actions taken by the police with respect to the BCU had effectively crippled the NSW Police Force capability in that area, so he's saying that that's the case in 2018. Did you have an understanding in 2018 as to whether that was right or wrong?
A. No. In 2018, my belief was that we could do better in relation to the education component particularly, and that was indicated in the Parrabell recommendations, but the status of - so I guess what I'm saying is that the status of our education, at least, in terms of bias crimes, needed work, absolutely, so I would agree with him there, and that's indicated in the Parrabell recommendations.
Q. Well, can I just pick up on that. You have put that very gently, understandably, no doubt. At the bottom of his email on the third page, in effect paragraph 11, that's sort of just below the number 11 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- I will give you a moment to read that, but according to him in that email, in reality:
... the issue has always been that hate crimes have never been accepted by the NSWPF and has never had organisation support.

What's your view on that?
A. I think that to policing it's - for policing in New South Wales I think the concept of hate crimes was something fairly new, particularly when Geoff started off as the original bias crimes coordinator, and then obviously the position is devolved and then he's brought back in. So I think that there has probably been an evolution of understanding the importance of hate crime, and also I mean, I presume it was Geoff's area that did analysis, intelligence analysis, of bias crimes, because I used to get a report regularly, at least every quarter, on bias crimes as they related to the LGBTIQ community, and you
would see areas, pockets of bias crime, for example, just prior to Mardi Gras, you would see, which seems remarkable to me nevertheless, pockets of bias crime occurring particularly in my local area command of Surry Hills.

So to me that was helpful, and no doubt other portfolio holders and corporate sponsors would have found that helpful. But I personally think that there was probably an evolution to where we are now to actually give value to bias crimes that we do - that I think we do now. I can't tell you categorically because I don't know exactly the scope of their work, but I don't know that I would put it in the terms that Geoff's put it given at the time that he wrote this I think he was extremely upset, and obviously he will give evidence later. And at that time I believe he would have thought that there was no corporate focus on bias crimes. I would say that our awareness has evolved.
Q. Just pursuing that point, in a couple of lines below in that same paragraph, he says this:

> My experience with hate crimes in the [New
> South Wales Police Force] fully supports the concept of organisational cognitive dissonance. If the information supplied differs from the core belief then all information, no matter how relevant or accurate will be disregarded to avoid conflict with core belief systems. As the [New South Wales Police Force] clearly has fought every attempt to integrate a hate crimes response into every day policing, I am not surprised by the way it has ended.

Now, putting aside for the moment the level of passion or upset that might be involved in his writing to you at all about these matters, but just focusing on the substance of what he's suggesting there and the concept of - I don't mean this has any magic but he uses the expression "organisational cognitive dissonance", a kind of disconnect between information available and unwillingness to react appropriately --
A. Yep.
Q. -- is he on to something there, in your view?
A. It's hard for me to comment in that regard. You know, I'm sure that that was his perception. I can't tell you --
Q. Yes. I do have to press you a little bit. You were a person who was the corporate sponsor --
A. Not for bias crimes, I wasn't.
Q. No, but you were the corporate sponsor for sexuality, gender diversity and intersex --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and as you candidly told us earlier, there was an obvious intersection between that role and the world of bias crime --
A. Yes.
Q. -- for the reasons you gave?
A. Yes.
Q. So you must have a view, I suspect, as to whether what he is saying there has some force?
A. Look, I know what you're saying, Mr Gray. Can I say this: my interpretation of the product that was being produced and how I used it, I think that was appropriate as to how it should be used. So I was looking for trends, I was looking for patterns, I was looking for indicators of bias crimes from my particular section. Whether all the other corporate sponsors did that, I don't know. The intelligence product I could get in other ways, if I wanted to, and I probably did that, without Geoff's being there to provide me with that. But whether or not that means that the organisation turned its back on bias crimes, from my perspective in LGBTIQ, I would say absolutely not.
Q. All right. I'11 ask you some questions about some other parts of that email later, but not on this point. A. Sure.
Q. Let me turn to the next topic, which is that the year 2013, when you were appointed to your corporate sponsor position, was a year which saw a great deal of publicity about gay-hate murders, wasn't it - you would remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. You make a brief reference to this in your statement at paragraph 36, where you've referred to it. Perhaps if you have your statement - sorry, you're being bombarded with these folders. It's in volume 1. So it's at tab 4,
[SCOI.76961], I think.
A. Yes .
Q. At any rate, you've found it, I think. You have your statement?
A. Yes, I have, yes.
Q. So at 36 , you refer to the 2013 Mardi Gras, which was in early March 2013 that year, I think as most years. You said you became aware of a number of articles and media publications concerned 88 historical deaths, and at paragraph - I should say before I go back - you'd recall as well, I expect, that about two years later, in 2015, there was another wave of publicity about gay-hate murders and related matters after the Lateline interview of DCI Pamela Young. You would remember that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. In paragraph 38 you say, given the community interest in the 88 deaths and the observations you've made of the work of Operation Parrabell, which I'll come back to, you decided as corporate sponsor that the Police Force should take steps to examine the 88 deaths. Now, that decision to, in effect, create what became Strike Force Parrabell is at a time which is 2015 rather than 2013, isn't it - that's when you were --
A. Yes, closer to 2015, yes.
Q. And you explain in paragraph 41 that you had a number of initial planning meetings with various people to discuss the objectives of Strike Force Parrabell in around early 2015.
A. Yes.
Q. Would it be fair to say that that reference to early 2015 - I don't mean to pin you down precisely - would have involved the April 2015 Lateline burst of publicity?
A. Yes, it wasn't - my recollection was that Parrabell wasn't necessarily just because of that, it wasn't motivated by that Lateline interview, because when I think back now, I think of - there were questions being asked in parliament by Alex Greenwich. There was a lot of political interest and the 88 list kept getting referred to, and it just struck me that, as a policing organisation who specialise in investigation, we should be looking at. How we did that is another question and I think Geoff Steer was on the right path; it was just the process of how he went
about that, that Strike Force Parrabe11 --
Q. Yes, and we'11 come to that. When you say he was on the right path, you are referring there to Operation Parrabell?
A. I am, yes.
Q. And is this right, by "on the right path", he had in mind, it seems, at the Operation Parrabell stage, an actual investigative approach --
A. Yes.
Q. - - to the 88 cases?
A. Yes.
Q. And you're saying he was on the right path?
A. I mean, if he had unlimited resources and he was able to resource that, absolutely, for those cases that warrant reinvestigation, absolutely. The problem was that he didn't have resources and he didn't really have the standing in the organisation to organise those resources, whereas I did.
Q. I follow that.
A. So that was the difference.
Q. No, thank you. That's very helpful. And I will come back to that, but thanks for that. I'11 come back to paragraph 41 and the meetings about setting up Strike Force Parrabell, but firstly, I want to just go with you through some of these media articles from 2013 and we find a lot of them in a tab that I'11 take you to, but just to orient you and the Commissioner in terms of chronology, you will recall that in June 2012, there was the findings of the second inquest into the death of someone at North Head? A. Yes.
Q. And that was obviously something that you were aware of at the time?
A. Yes.
Q. And an earlier finding of suicide was overturned and instead there was an open finding?
A. Yes.
Q. And the coroner referred in her findings to the evidence that had been gathered in Strike Force Taradale in
the early 2000s about deaths of gay men at Bondi?
A. Yes.
Q. So that's June 2012. Then on 11 February 2013 there was an ABC Australian Story program about that death, and I imagine you were aware of that at the time?
A. Yes.
Q. And following that Australian Story program in 2013, Strike Force Macnamir was established to reinvestigate that death?
A. Yes.
Q. And I imagine you were aware of that as well?
A. I was.
Q. Then could I ask you to find volume 8 in the bundle.
A. Yes.
Q. At tab 207, [SCOI. 82071], there is an article in the Sydney Morning Herald of 13 February, which is two days after the Australian Story program, mainly about the death that had been the subject of that second inquest the previous year.
A. Yes.
Q. But on the third page - if we could scroll through to that, and just scroll slightly lower again, please, thank you, in fact, scroll a little bit further down as well - we get a reference to the theory that was advanced at the second inquest and subsequently, based on the murders of men in the Eastern Suburbs as distinct from North Head? A. Yes.
Q. And there's reference to Coroner Milledge's findings that violent gangs had probably hurled three men to their deaths in Marks Park. You remember all that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. This is one of the articles that you were conscious of, no doubt?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And then if we turn over to tab 208, [SCOI.82031], this article is in the Sydney Morning Herald on 4 March, and I can tell you, if you're happy to accept it from me, that on 2 March was the Mardi Gras parade?
A. Yes.
Q. So the Saturday, the 2nd?
A. Yes.
Q. So this article was by Paul Sheehan on 4 March, headed "Gay hate: the shameful crime wave", and you will recall this one as well. This is one of the ones you had in mind? A. Yes.
Q. He talks about, on the bottom of page 2, that it was mainly groups who preyed upon the men; on page 3 , just a bit lower down, he talks about a wave of crime washing through Sydney between 1985 and 1999; in the next paragraph he says that they are now seen to fit a pattern of gay-hate murder; he refers to Sue Thompson's estimate of deaths in a period of 10 years from 1989 to 1999; he refers to an article by Stephen Tomsen in 2002 referring to 50 gay-hate murders in a different period between 1985 and 1995. He says - Paul Sheehan says - that these estimates now appear to understate the problem.

Then on the next page, after he talks a bit about the particular one that had been the subject of the second inquest, you will see, if we scroll just down a bit further, $p l e a s e, ~ t h e r e ~ i s ~ a ~ p a r a g r a p h ~ b e g i n n i n g ~ " T h e ~ f i r s t ~$ sign":

The first sign that any police were picking up the pattern of murder came in August, 1991, when Detective Sergeant Steve McCann filed a report ...
et cetera.
A. Yes.
Q. By the time 2013 came around and you were reading this article, or earlier, if it's the case, were you aware of these reports of Sergeant McCann?
A. No, I wasn't. I've since become aware of them.
Q. You've since become aware but you didn't know about them at that point?
A. No.
Q. Then the article refers to the fact that McCann's report formed the basis of Operation Taradale?
A. $\quad \mathrm{Mmm}$.
Q. And refers to the Milledge inquest, it refers to the 2012 second inquest on the last page of the article, and then the Australian Story, and the next day the police announcing Strike Force Macnamir. So all of that was material that you read and indeed were aware of at the time?
A. Yes. Yes, I was aware of Steve Page's investigation certainly. Yes, I was aware of that.

MR GRAY: Commissioner, is this the time when you need to --

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, it is, I'm afraid. Thank you. I'11 adjourn unti1 2 o'clock.

## LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr Crandell, please come back into the witness box. Yes, Mr Gray.

MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, I was just moving to the next article, which is at tab 209, [SCOI.82027]. It's a follow-up article two days, I think, or three days, after the last one, again by Paul Sheehan and this time on 7 March 2013; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. The heading is "Digging up the past to reveal scale of gay-hate deaths". I take it you would remember this one as well?
A. Yes, generally.
Q. In general, yes. On the first page, towards the bottom, the author, Mr Sheehan, says:

The number of gay men murdered in gay-hate crimes between 1985 and 2000 ... may be as high as 70.

He refers to Sue Thompson in the first paragraph and says that she estimated that there were 46 gay-hate murders in the state between ' 89 and '99, which was what was in his first article. He refers as well to the Tomsen estimate, which we looked at in the first article, and then the author, Mr Sheehan, says with the benefit of hindsight and
more evidence, the numbers might be higher. In effect that's the point that's being made.
A. Yes.
Q. You remember that kind of suggestion being publicised.
A. Yes.
Q. At the bottom of the next page, or almost at the bottom, there's a paragraph beginning "The biggest mystery"; do you see that one?
A. Sorry, at the bottom of that page?
Q. Almost at the bottom of that page, there's a paragraph beginning "The biggest mystery"?
A. Yes.
Q. The biggest mystery --
says the author --
is why it has taken 25 years for the scale of the awful possibilities to be understood.

He then lists four factors, and I just wanted to run through them and see if you agree with them. The first is:

The structure of the police, divided into area commands and treating all these crimes as local.

Is that something you would agree with as a factor as to why it took so long for the scale to emerge?
A. Not necessarily. I think at the moment the structure, and the structure then, was local area commands in regions, so you do have coordination in regions and then between regions themselves. So there is an element, particularly in intelligence, of connection with like crimes, so it may be a factor, but I don't think it would be a predominant factor.
Q. Sorry, you don't think it would be --
A. I don't think it would be a predominant factor.
Q. Predominant factor, right. What about the second one, which he says was:
... the culture of the police, which had an overt institutional distaste of gay men 20 years ago.
A. I would say that would be more the case, not necessarily - I mean, "a distaste" - I'm not sure about that, but I do think that there were - that the police were a reflection of society and I do think that society has been on an evolution. Those times, particularly in the 70s and 80 s and 90 s , I do think that there was a misunderstanding of gay men and a disinterest in necessarily pursuing justice for them.
Q. The third factor he suggests was AIDS, and I take it you would agree with that?
A. I would.
Q. After this morning?
A. Yes.
Q. And the fourth factor is the association of AIDS with gay men also contributing to the malicious attacks. And you would agree with that?
A. Yes, I agree with that.
Q. Now, then if we turn to 210, [SCOI.77369], and I won't go through all of these in detail, but from 210 to 211 to 212 to 213 are four articles in the Sydney Morning Herald in July 2013 by Rick Feneley?
A. Yes.
Q. You would remember this series of articles, I think? A. I do.
Q. The first one, at tab 210, [SCOI.77369], was in the Good Weekend, the lift-out supplement on the Saturday paper. You know what I'm talking about?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's a very big headline, "Up to 80 men murdered 30 cases unsolved". Now, in this article - and I'm sure you remember this - the author publishes quite a deal of material about conversations that had been recorded on listening devices and so on, among people thought to have been possibly involved in some of these attacks. You remember that?
A. Not specifically, no.
Q. Well, just if you read the first few paragraphs, you'll see what I am referring to.
A. Yes, I have read that.
Q. And the author says that the two - the people that are being referred to in those first few paragraphs became known as among those who formed the Alexandria Eight?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you're familiar with that expression?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. It's an expression that covers the people who killed Richard Johnson in Alexandria in 1990?
A. Yes.
Q. The article goes on to talk about, among other things, the three deaths at Bondi - the deaths and/or disappearances - of Mr Mattaini, Mr Warren and Mr Russel1? A. Yes.
Q. And talks about the Tamarama Three, as another group of people who had actually been convicted of the murder of the Thai national, Mr--
A. Rattanajurathaporn.
Q. Thank you. And the Bondi Boys, who were another group of young people, widely understood or believed to have been involved in bashings of gay people at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. So the article refers to gay men not trusting police to report?
A. Yes.
Q. And that building on itself and causing more problems in the way that we discussed before lunch?
A. Yes.
Q. It talks about gay beats and talks about Operation Taradale, and that's the operation conducted by Detective Stephen Page --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and talks about various of the deaths that have in one way or another, many of them, become very well
publicised over the years?
A. Yes.
Q. So it was a very prominent article and it made a splash, obviously?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it was followed up - well, not followed up, on the same day, if we turn to 211 - this is the same day, the same Saturday newspaper - there was a breakout article headed "Murderous rampage of gay-hate gangs", with pictures and some details about some of the victims?
A. Yes.
Q. At 212 , on the next day, the Sunday, the $28 t h$, an article headed "Breaking the silence over gay killings", which is mainly to do with the death of John Russell?
A. Yes.
Q. And about Marks Park being a well-known gay beat?
A. Yes.
Q. And about the findings of Deputy State Coroner Milledge in 2005?
A. Yes.
Q. And then we have at 212 also on the Sunday - I am sorry, that's the hard copy version of the same article, really, but at 213, on the Monday, 29 July, another article, headed, "Easy game, not only for vicious gang but for police intimidation", and this article is mainly about allegations suggesting wrongdoing of one sort or another by police in connection with gay hate; you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Those four articles are among those - and they're often referred to specifically, but they're among those that prompted people within the Police Force, including Sergeant Steer and others, to feel that something needed to be done by the police to react to this publicity being given to accusations that so many cases were unsolved; you agree?
A. Yes. I guess when I think about Sergeant Steer, though, my understanding was that he originated Operation Parrabel1 in 2013.
Q. That's right. Well, these articles are from 2013.
A. Okay. So I can't really speak for him, but to me that would be a motivating factor, to start off at least something that's aspirational in terms of Operation Parrabell.
Q. I'11 come to this in a minute, but it didn't only prompt Sergeant Steer to have that kind of reaction; it prompted others in the Police Force as well, didn't it? A. I would expect so, yes.
Q. If we turn to 214 , we have about a week later, a little over a week later, on 9 August 2013, another article by Rick Feneley in the Sydney Morning Herald - do you see that one?
A. Yes.
Q. Headed "Public help sought with evidence of gay-hate killings". Do you see in the second paragraph, Detective Superintendent Mick Willing is quoted as saying, "We can't solve some of these cases without the help of the community".
A. Yes.
Q. Who was Mick Willing?
A. He was the commander of the Homicide Squad at the time.
Q. Is he still in the Police Force?
A. No. He went on to become a deputy commissioner and he left the Police Force when - shortly after the appointment of Commissioner Webb.
Q. Because?
A. I'm unsure. There was a message circulated from the Commissioner indicating that Mr - that Deputy Commissioner Willing was leaving the Police Force, and wishing him all the best with his future.
Q. Was he a contender for Commissioner?
A. Yes.
Q. And passed over or not selected?
A. Not selected, yes.
Q. In the next paragraph, Superintendent Willing is quoted as saying:

> I know I've been quiet until this point and there is a reason for that - and that's because we're quietly working away on it.

Now, this is on 9 August 2013. To your knowledge, was there some police work being done as at August 2013 about these Bondi killings or Bondi deaths?
A. Not to my knowledge, but things may happen in unsolved homicide that I'm not aware of.
Q. But at least to your knowledge, you're not aware of any actual reviews or reinvestigations of these deaths being under way as at August 2013?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. The article goes on to say - not clear whether this is said to have come from Mr Willing or not, but the article says:

Police are reviewing the cases covered
by ... Operation Taradale ...
Namely, according to the bullet points, John Russell, Ross Warren and Gilles Mattaini?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says the review will also consider the murder of Mr Rattanajurathaporn?
A. Yes.
Q. But you're not aware of any such review being under way as at that time?
A. I'm not. Having said that, if the Deputy Commissioner, or at that stage the Commander of the Homicide Squad, said that he was working on it, I would take that on its face.
Q. It won't be a question for you, because you obviously don't know, but we'11 be looking at that a little later.
A. Thank you.
Q. In February 2013, in the wake of the Australian Story broadcast, as we mentioned this morning, Strike Force Macnamir was set up, and that was to reinvestigate the death of the man at North Head?
A. Yes.
Q. The officer in charge of Strike Force Macnamir was DCI Pamela Young?
A. Yes.
Q. Of the Unsolved Homicide Team?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that at the time, I presume?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Now, the others who were in senior positions in Strike Force Macnamir were, as officer in charge, Detective Sergeant Penelope Brown; did you know her?
A. Yes. Yes, I did.
Q. And as case officer, Detective Senior Constable Alicia Taylor?
A. I don't specifically remember that name, but --
Q. In 2013, I'm not sure precisely when - and you may be able to help or you may not - we know that Sergeant Steer instigated the establishment of what was called Operation Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. Can I show you two documents, and you will need volume 1 for this, and if we turn to tab 10, [SCOI.75072] --
A. Yes .
Q. -- this is a document called "Program Development Team Project Proposal Form". The banner at the left is "Operational Programs"?
A. Yes.
Q. It's a document, and I can show you if you need it, the email when you got this, but it's a document that some time later Sergeant Steer sent to you?
A. Okay .
Q. Take it - trust me on that.
A. I accept what you say.
Q. I will bring you to that.
A. Yes.
Q. He sends it to you. You may have seen it earlier, but
he sends it to you two years later in May 2015. I'11 come to that.
A. Okay .
Q. But at any rate, this is a document that you've seen before?
A. Okay.
Q. And the project title is, in the first line:

Review of potential gay hate crimes and deaths from 1970's to 1990s to determine if any bias crime indicators exist.

Do you see that?
A. Yes. Yes, I do.
Q. This document is not dated, but if you look at the bottom of the page, the bottom of the first page, you see it says:

The Sydney Morning Herald ... recently ran four articles over three days ...
A. Yes.
Q. It would be fair to say, wouldn't it, that he's referring there to those four articles in late July 2013? A. Yes, I - well, I would agree with that, also on the basis that he talks about police heavy handedness at "this year's Mardi Gras parade", and 2013 was when we had that incident.
Q. So it puts it not only at 2013 but some time after late July?
A. Yes.
Q. Because that's when the four articles were?
A. Yes.
Q. Just looking at that project title, the stated purpose of the proposed review was:
... to determine if any bias crime indicators exist.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. So that point - that doesn't, on its face, indicate an investigative or re-investigative exercise?
A. No.
Q. On the bottom of the page, just after the mention of the Sydney Morning Herald, four articles over three days, in the last line, he says - after referring to police heavy handedness at the Mardi Gras --
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

These articles have significant potential to damage the reputation of [the NSW Police] ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And he goes on:
and [also to] damage the relationships with the [LGBTIQ] community and police, especially after the negative [media coverage about the Mardi Gras] ...
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

There is significant risk that if NSWPF fails to undertake a comprehensive investigation --
he is now bringing the concept of investigation into it --
and review of these cases from a bias crime perspective these articles will continue to be published and continue to damage our reputation.

So it seems that, in his mind, according to what he has written, the need to respond to the negative media is a large factor in coming up with the idea of doing something like this?
A. Yes.
Q. So the "Objectives" heading - I should say, in the third paragraph on that page he says:
[It will be] different from a Homicide investigation as its primary focus will be in determining whether any of the identified deaths were in fact motivated by an anti-gay bias ...
A. Yes.
Q. So far - and I will do this in more detail - it begins to have some of the kind of component ideas that Strike Force Parrabell later had?
A. Yes.
Q. Under the heading "Objectives", he says that the objective is to do this review:

To determine if an anti-gay bias was a motivating factor.
A. Yes.
Q. He talks about what the time frame might be and, as with your own exercise, was perhaps a little optimistic -A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. -- saying 3 to 6 months. And under the heading "Additional notes", he says the risks that doing this might result in continued negative media, might result in further damage to relationships, and it might damage the reputation, if there was further negative media; you see all of that?
A. Yes .
Q. Then he says the opportunities are - and the first one he notes is that the police may be able to use it as a positive media story.
A. Yes.
Q. So you would agree that, overall, it's pretty clear that a dominant part of the thinking behind what became Operation Parrabell was responding to negative media and trying to generate positive media?
A. Yes.
Q. Then if we go to tab 12, [SCOI.75056] - I won't do this in detail now because I'll come back to it a little later, but this one's headed "Bias Crimes Investigation Agreement"?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Do you remember - if you trust me again, you did receive this, at least in 2015, but do you remember seeing it?
A. No, I don't. No, I don't remember that one or the previous one, but if I've received it, then I accept that.
Q. I'11 come to it in due course, but just assume for the moment that you did.
A. Yes.
Q. This one also is not dated, but again, from the very first line:

The Sydney Morning Herald recently ran four articles over three days ...

It's a fair inference that it is probably around August 2013?
A. Yes.
Q. Again, the first paragraph talks about the significant potential of the articles to damage the reputation of the police?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the mission is then described slightly differently again in these terms:

To conduct a bias crime assessment of suicides and suspicious deaths in [two areas] the Northern Beaches and Central Metropolitan Region areas, between 1976 and 2000, to determine if an anti-gay bias was involved ...
A. Yes.
Q. So not all unsolved homicides in that period, just the ones under the heading of "Suicides and suspicious
deaths" - agree?
A. Yes.
Q. And not state-wide?
A. Yes.
Q. And under the heading "Agreement", paragraph 2, he spells that out:

The assessment will be limited to ...
Those very points that I've just mentioned.
A. Yes.
Q. Then at the top of page 2, he has said these incidents will be filtered through the current 10 bias crimes indicators.
A. Yes .
Q. And he says:

The purpose of [that] is to identify potential deaths that may have a bias motivation.
A. Yes.
Q. Not whether it did in fact but that it may?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that? And he spells out that:

The indicators do not mean that an incident was in fact bias motivated, but suggest a possibility of a bias motivation.
A. Yes.
Q. His proposal for the Operation Parrabell then had a heading "Local Crime Analysis \& Profile" which involved an analysis of areas to identify patterns and so on. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It's right, isn't it - and I don't say this critically - that that's not something that Strike Force Parrabel1 ventured upon?
A. In relation to patterns?
Q. In patterns, in terms of areas?
A. No. Strike Force Parrabell really looked at the 88 names.
Q. Yes, and similarly under his heading "Victim Profile", the procedures that he's suggesting he had in mind there is also not something that Strike Force Parrabell set out to do?
A. No, that's true.
Q. And the same applies for "POI Profile", on the next page?
A. Well, that may have been part of the process, but only to the 88 deaths.
Q. Sorry?
A. That may have been part of the process, but only in relation to the 88 deaths, as in looking at MOs and group make-up, et cetera. Yes, that process would have been undertaken by the investigative team, but only for the 88; it wouldn't have been a broader scope to look at whoever might fit into that category.
Q. But if it was undertaken by the investigative team that is, to develop a POI profile, where is that? Has that been produced?
A. No. I guess what I'm saying is that when the team looked at the bias crime indicators, part of that would have been the person and whether they're associated with any organised hate groups, for example, so that was included as one of the indicators, as it were.
Q. Then, under the heading "Miscellaneous", Mr Steer or Sergeant Steer had in mind various sources that would be utilised and one of them was discussions with the beat users.
A. Yes.
Q. That's not something that Strike Force Parrabell did?
A. No, no.
Q. Another one was discussions with victims of similar incidents or other bias motivated incidents, and that's not something that Strike Force Parrabell did?
A. No, no.
Q. And the document, although it's not signed, appears to have been intended to be sent, or perhaps was sent, to various people, one of them being you --
A. Yes.
Q. -- as corporate sponsor for sexual and gender diversity, and one of them being Superintendent Sullivan as corporate sponsor, bias crimes, and one of them being Chief Superintendent Shepherd as commander of operational programs?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know if it ever was signed - and I'm not expecting that you would necessarily know it?
A. I don't know, simply because I can't remember the document. To my mind, if this document was going to be forwarded, it would normally go through Chief
Superintendent Shepherd, as Mr Steer's supervisor or commander, and then come to myself and Danny Sullivan for endorsement.
Q. I'll come in a little while to the email that appears on what I have available to me is when you certainly got it - whether or not you got it earlier is another matter? A. Yes, I'm just trying to work out what happened to it after then.
Q. But for the moment, let me just move to a slightly different topic. Would you agree with this: what Operation Parrabel1, which was indeed set up in 2013 -A. Yes.
Q. -- actually did in 2013 was to provide assistance to Strike Force Macnamir with respect to the reinvestigation of the North Head death?
A. Yes, I agree with that.
Q. Which had been the subject of the second inquest?
A. Yes.
Q. And Operation Parrabell did that by carrying out a bias crime assessment in respect of the gay beat at North Head?
A. Yes, by comparison with the Marks Park.
Q. Well, two documents, in fact. If you turn to tab 13,
[SCOI.74085], there was, first of al1, a bias crime assessment of the North Head beat itself, which is dated on the front page October 2013?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there is, secondly - and by all means I can put this in front of you, it's in volume 10, though, at tab 231, [NPL.0116.0001.0001] - this second document, which is the comparison between the Marks Park beat and the North Head beat?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's dated May 2014?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware either at the time, 2013, 2014 or at some later time, that those two exercises had been done by Operation Parrabell?
A. Yes - I can't say that I was aware of it in 2014. Certainly I'm aware of it now. I did read certainly the comparison document. I recall that in 2013 or '14 I was concerned about the use of Parrabell and what they were actually doing - as in Operation Parrabell - because to my mind, this didn't really fit what Operation Parrabell had been put together for, and I guess the other thing I was concerned about was the length of time and resources that were being consumed by this one aspect.
Q. A couple of things about that. Both of these documents, the one at tab 13 in volume 1, [SCOI.74085], which is the bias crime assessment, and the one that we are now looking at in May 2014, according to the last page, before we get to the annexures, it says:

Copies disseminated to ...
And one of them in each case is yourself as corporate sponsor for sexuality and gender diversity. It's not signed, as I say, but does that indicate to you that it probably was disseminated to you, both of these?
A. I would say so. I guess - it depends on how it was disseminated, too. Usually, these things would come through as a formal document, through the chain of command. But if it's done by email, you know, there's a number of ways to get it to me, I suppose.
Q. The comparison, though, the one at tab 231,
[NPL.0016.0001.0001] --
A. Yes.
Q. -- was also, would you agree, a task undertaken by Operation Parrabell by way of assistance to Strike Force Macnamir?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Were you aware, or are you aware now, even, of Operation Parrabell actually doing anything else in 2013 and 2014 apart from those two - generating those two assessments?
A. No.
Q. So as far as you know - and I don't say this critically of anyone - Operation Parrabell had not got to the point of starting to do any review or reinvestigation or anything else with the 80 -odd cases?
A. Yes, that's right, and that was my concern, I think. Because - mind you, just to clarify, there was really only two people that I saw working on that, so that was Geoff Steer, who had a much larger portfolio to look at, as well as Jo Kenworthy, who was a gay and lesbian liaison officer.
Q. And as I think we've established this morning, they basically were the only two people in the Bias Crime Unit? A. That's right.
Q. So those two resources were the only two resources it had?
A. Yes.
Q. So in a sense, it's not hard to see why you might think that it was too big a job for one or two people? A. Absolutely.
Q. If you turn to volume 2, just briefly, and turn to tab 50, [SCOI.77313], this is the, I suspect, parliamentary question that you referred to a while ago?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that come to mind, a question on notice from Mr Greenwich, the MP?
A. I know Mr Greenwich did ask a number of questions on notice, absolutely.
Q. At any rate, he has asked these questions, it seems,
in October 2014, and that seems to have produced some responses from the various officers, including at tab 51, if you go to tab 51, [SCOI.74080], the second page of the email chain, Geoff Steer, at the bottom of the page, is responding to a question from Nicole - I don't know who Nicole was, but you might know. Was she someone in the media department or something?
A. I'm not sure who Nicole is. I know Jackie Braw was my policy officer for LGBTIQ portfolio.
Q. At any rate, whoever exactly Nicole was, Geoff Steer is responding to a request from her to provide some information as part of the answer to the parliamentary question?
A. Yes.
Q. And what Geoff Steer says - and this is at October 2014 - Operation Parrabell was started to assess all 80 cases, and it seems that he meant by that started with the idea of assessing the 80 - but he says:

Unfortunately Parrabel 1 is on permanent hold due to workload and resourcing.
A. Yes.
Q. That's as of October:

Even with the 2 new staff Parrabell will remain on hold as anti-Muslim [organised hate groups], Skin crews, Squadron 88 [and other matters] will be the priority.

So as of 2014, October, Parrabell was on permanent hold? A. Absolutely.
Q. And if we look, just to wrap that up, at the next tab, tab 52, [SCOI.74083], it is an issues paper from Shobha Sharma dated February 2015, and under the heading "Comment", she also says that Operation Parrabell was then on hold?
A. Yes.
Q. And she mentions that given current staffing levels it would take Operation Parrabell a very long time to do this exercise.
A. Absolutely.
Q. And on the second page, she summarises essentially what you have just told us about what Operation Parrabell had in fact done - namely, the two assessments - and she says in the last paragraph:
... any suggestion that Operation Parrabell
is not a current priority will undoubtedly
receive adverse reactions.
And she refers to negative media commentary.
A. Yes.
Q. Did that issue paper come to you?
A. I don't recall seeing it. I know I'm not in the chain of command. She put that through her chain of command.
But that doesn't mean that I may not have been aware at the time of this information, because Shobha was working fairly closely with myself and Jackie at the time.
Q. And at tab 54, [SCOI.74081], there is an email from Shobha Sharma to you of April 2015, where she says, among other things:

Nothing is happening with Parrabell at present, which is something Alex will not like to hear.

And she says two paragraphs down:
I have also attached a brief from Unsolved
Homicide Team from about September 2013
which refers to 30 of the names
from ... Sue Thompson's list of names ...
Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And that list - sorry, that brief, I should say, from September 2013, is the document at tab 47, [SCOI.74906], I believe - perhaps you could confirm.
A. Yes, is that from Lehmann?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, I did read that document.
Q. It's a reasonably lengthy issue paper from DCI John Lehmann of 25 September 2013 about Sue Thompson's list and his response, if you like, to Sue Thompson's list.
A. Yes.
Q. And you saw that?
A. Yes.
Q. It was obviously sent to you by Shobha Sharma?
A. Yes.
Q. Just to wrap up the timing question, given the material we've just been looking at, you are appointed corporate sponsor for sexuality, gender diversity and intersex in August 2013?
A. Yes.
Q. Operation Parrabell only started at about that time, as it happens?
A. Yes.
Q. The bias crime assessment for North Head was completed in October 2013, and the pattern between North Head and Marks Park was completed in May 2014 ?
A. Yes.
Q. And thereafter, it would seem that Operation Parrabel 1 essentially does nothing further?
A. Yes.
Q. Correct? Then in May 2015, Sergeant Steer emails you some documents, and I'11 take you to that email.
A. Yes.
Q. It's in volume 2, which I think you still have, at tab 55, [SCOI.74110]. I think you did have it open. It must be one of those ones at the top, I think
A. Sorry. So, sorry, what was the tab?
Q. Tab 55, [SCOI.74110].
A. Yes.
Q. So if we start from the back of this email chain, you will see the first one in sequence at the back is from Geoffrey Steer to you of 19 May 2015? Down the bottom of that page?
A. Yes. Yes, I do, yes.
Q. And the heading is - the subject is "Operation Parrabel1"?
A. Yes, sorry, I've been copied in to that. So it's not to me, but obviously I'm aware of it.
Q. Quite right, thank you. It's to Craig Middleton?
A. Yes.
Q. Copied to you. And he starts off "Boss and Paul"?
A. Yes.
Q. "Paul" being Paul Grace?
A. Yes.
Q. And you being the boss --
A. No, no, the boss - he'll be calling Craig Middleton the boss.
Q. Oh, would he?
A. Yes, so it's a policing thing. I'm also the boss, but I'm the cc'd boss, if that makes sense.
Q. Understood. So he tells Mr Middleton and Mr Grace that they have both been added to Parrabell, which at that point was still Operation Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And he says, "Attached are the following documents", and there are six documents attached in the bullet points. One of them is the original proposal. Do you see that's the second-last bullet point? Do you see that?
A. Sorry, the second-last point?
Q. Yes, "Proposal Bias Crimes "?
A. Yes.
Q. That's what we just looked at a minute ago?
A. Yes.
Q. And another one of them is the investigation agreement, which is the one we also looked at a moment ago. A. Yes.
Q. And there are others, which I don't come to for the time being, but you remember the ones we just looked at -A. Yes.
Q. -- including that investigation agreement --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and what Steer had in mind?
A. Yes.
Q. So Middleton then sends his email to you and he does address you as "Boss"?
A. Yes.
Q. And he comments on the documents that Steer had sent through.
A. Yes.
Q. And he says:

I must admit $I$ wasn't aware that there was an existing Investigation Agreement.

He says:
... in some respects it goes beyond what I would term "review".

It goes on, $I$ won't read it all, but you can see especially down the bottom:
... it's no wonder Geoff has taken 4 months to review one matter.

And he goes on to express the view, basically, that this is too much and too broad?
A. Yes.
Q. In the light of that, at about May 2015 - can I just take you to your own statement, if you've got that handy --
A. Sorry, is that in volume 1?
Q. Yes, it is. It's tab 4, [SCOI.76961], your own statement?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. At paragraph 26 and following, you talk about becoming aware of Operation Parrabell and of what you realised about it and what view you came to form about it and what you did. What I want to suggest to you, given what we've just
been going through, is that that time period for your paragraphs 26 through to about 31 or so is 2015; it seems, in the light of what we have been looking at, it must be around about early 2015.
A. For Operation Parrabell?
Q. For your becoming aware of these things?
A. Yes.
Q. Because I've shown you the Steer email sending you through these documents --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and Middleton saying, "This is all too extensive and we need to", in effect, "trim it back"?
A. Yes.
Q. And that all happens in May 2015?
A. Yes.
Q. And can I suggest that, therefore, what you are saying in these paragraphs is associated with that time frame?
A. It may be, I suppose. I know in my mind, in 2013, that I - it might have been 2013 or 2014, I held concerns, just simply because there'd only been one thing or two things, as it turns out, in terms of the assessment of location by Operation Parrabel1. And then when Craig Middleton received all the documentation, he quickly came to a view that the parameters were too broad and did not believe that we could deliver any sort of a reinvestigation.

I was asking those questions because $I$ wanted reinvestigation as well, if I could get it - if I could get reinvestigation. But at the end of the day, there simply wasn't the resources to do a complete reinvestigation.

And even when I think Sergeant Steer talks about a five-year time frame with him doing it alone, I don't believe that he would be able to do that in five years. So to me, that wasn't - that time frame was never going to be acceptable to the community, and so that's when I went to Craig Middleton and said, "Well, then, tell me what can be done with resources, and I'11 go to bat for the resources".
Q. Okay, thank you. I'll come back to that topic of what, in the end, could have been done and what choices
were made --
A. Sure.
Q. -- because it's an important matter. But before I do that, I just want to diverge slightly to some other things that were happening in 2013 and 2014, and if you still have volume 2 nearby, that's what I'd like to go to. Start with tab 47, [SCOI.74906].
A. Yes.
Q. This is the Lehmann issues paper of September 2013? A. Yes.
Q. There are a couple of things I want to try to establish about this. He also starts off by referring to the Feneley articles in late July 2013, and he says about six lines down that the articles quoted a number of persons including Sue Thompson, who claimed that up to 30 matters could be unsolved homicides. He says that at that time, July 2013, he contacted Sue Thompson, requested that she provide information, and that as a result, she forwarded "me" a list of 80 cases. If we turn to tab 56, [SCOI.74113] --
A. Yes.
Q. -- there is a short email chain between John Lehmann and Craig Middleton?
A. Yes.
Q. The first one in time, in sequence, which starts at the bottom of the first page, is Middleton to Lehmann, referring him to the articles, the July articles?
A. Yes.
Q. And saying that you cop a fair bit of pressure - this is in the third paragraph - "to provide an update as to Operation Parrabell". And he says to Lehmann that he, Middleton, has Lehmann's 2013 document, and he tells Lehmann that there's reference in Lehmann's document to Sue Thompson 's list of 80 and he asks Lehmann could he send him the list. Then we go to tab 56A, [SCOI.77314]. A. Yes.
Q. In fact, before $I$ do that, the actual response comes back from Lehmann, DCI Lehmann, I should say, I guess:

Attached is what we received from Sue $T$.
A. Yes.
Q. And at 56 A is the attachment.
A. Yes.
Q. You will see that it is a two-page list of names of deceased persons. At the very bottom of the second page, there's a line item that says "Total = 87", but for the anal amongst us, if one actually counts them up, one gets to 88 ?
A. Right.
Q. To your knowledge, is that what has become known through the years as "the list"?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Now, on page 4 - they're not numbered but the fourth page - second from the top, number 12 --
A. Sorry, I'm just lost.
Q. Stil1 in tab 47, [SCOI.74906].
A. 47, sorry. Yes.
Q. On the deaths, the people are numbered, and we get to number 12. You can see that one on the fourth page?
A. Yes.
Q. This is Mr Lehmann speaking - it is his document - and you can see what he says in the last two or three lines of that entry, "at this late stage of the investigation"?
A. Yes.
Q. And so he's talking about Strike Force Macnamir under DCI Young?
A. Yes.
Q. On page 9 in the conclusion, under the heading
"Summary", part of what's under the heading "Summary", the last bullet point, which is on the last page, the page that has his name as the author - do you see the last bullet point?
A. Twelve cases?
Q. No, on the very last page of this summary or issues paper --
A. Yes.
Q. -- he says - Mr Lehmann says:

On7y 8 cases from 30 were probable or possible "gay hate" motivated murders ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And he says in the next paragraph:

There is no doubt that anti-gay hostility, particularly in the 1980's and 1990's resulted in a number of murders and serious crime of violence in NSW.

You see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He then offers his opinion which is:

In my opinion, the suggestion of 30 "gay hate" related unsolved murders is a gross exaggeration.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. He goes on to say what he thinks about the Sydney Morning Herald for publishing that?
A. Yes.
Q. That particular version of it is unsigned, but if we go to the next tab, 48, [NPL.0113.0001.0156], there is an issues paper signed by Michael Willing a few months later, on 10 January 2014 - do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And he, Michael Willing, then detective superintendent, commander of the Homicide Squad, is talking about, in response to correspondence from the office of the Commissioner, some questions that he is evidently being asked to address which are listed in the three bullet points there towards the top of the first page. In answer to the first two questions, he refers to DCI Lehmann's September 2013 one that we just looked at? A. Yes.
Q. And indeed, he attaches it, as you can see, to this document in a form where it's signed by Mr Lehmann and initialled or noted in various ways by various recipients, including Michael Willing. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. What Mr Lehmann - sorry, what Mr Willing says under the heading "Comment", is to pick up what Lehmann had said in his September 2013 note, and refer to the articles published by the Herald, he says in early August 2013, and a couple of paragraphs down he says that Sue Thompson provided a list - do you see that, the paragraph beginning "Following liaison"?
A. Oh, yes. Yes, I do.
Q. He says Sue Thompson provided the list, and he, Willing, says in this document that that list "were assessed by Detective Chief Inspectors John Lehmann and Pamela Young"?
A. Yes.
Q. So it seems that the assessment that we just looked at, and which is attached to this one, although signed by Lehmann, was also participated in by Pamela Young?
A. Yes.
Q. Agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr Willing says, in the second-bottom paragraph, picking up what Lehmann and, as it turns out, Young had said, that the suggestion of 30 unsolved gay-hate related murders was a gross exaggeration and it actually was only eight out of the 30 that were assessed as probable or possible.
A. Yes.
Q. In the last couple of paragraphs of this issues paper, under the heading - and you'l1 see the heading in about the middle of the page, there's a heading "Further comment" and then there's a subheading and then a second subheading -A. Yes.
Q. -- and he's talking about the work of Strike Force Macnamir; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He refers in the next paragraph to Strike Force Macnamir investigators having been diverted from other unsolved matters; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And he says that they, Strike Force Macnamir investigators, have not discovered any evidence at all to confirm that the person in question was the victim of a homicide, let alone a gay-hate murder, so that is evidently the view of the Strike Force Macnamir people, including Pamela Young, as at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's a view that Superintendent Wiliing is, in effect, adopting or endorsing?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you mentioned that Mr Willing is no longer with the force?
A. Yes.
Q. And DCI Young, I understand, is also no longer with the force?
A. That's right.
Q. What about DCI Lehmann?
A. I believe he still is with us.
Q. Do you know where he is?
A. He would be something to do with homicide.
Q. Having regard to the views of DCI Lehmann in September 2013, which were evidently the views of DCI Young as well, and the views of Superintendent Willing as at 2014 , would it be fair to say that, at least as at 2014, there was a widely held view at senior levels of the police that claims relating to the numbers of gay-hate related murders and bashings, especially in the 80 s and 90 s, were exaggerated and unfounded?
A. Based on this documentation $I$ would have to agree.
Q. And was there a widely held view, do you think at that time, that such claims about the numbers of gay-hate related murders and bashings needed to be publicly refuted? A. I would say so, given the document that you have just read from is advice to the minister - I would say so.
Q. Would it be fair to say this, that both at that time, which is 2014, and subsequently, many senior police officers, to your knowledge, have wanted to downplay such claims about the numbers of gay-hate deaths and to suggest that the scale of the problem was much less serious?

MR TEDESCHI: I object.
THE COMMISSIONER: What's the objection?
MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, how can he say what is in the mind of other people?

THE COMMISSIONER: He can say what his understanding is, Mr Tedeschi, surely.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Sorry, could you - I apologise.
MR GRAY: Q. Would you accept that it is a fair proposition, based inter alia on what we have just been looking at, that at that time, 2014, and subsequently, many senior police officers, to your knowledge or in your understanding, have wanted to downplay claims about the levels of gay-hate murders and to suggest that the scale of the problem was less serious?
A. I would say not necessarily downplay, but I would say certainly in the case of - in my case, I actually wanted to get some truth around - get some investigative truth around the numbers and around what was in fact thought to be gay hate and what was not.

Now, what that outcome was did not concern me and does not concern me now, but I wanted to have some evidence that we had actually gone through a process to determine whether or not these deaths were homicides and were gay-hate related.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. And is it fair to say that at the time, you were sceptical about the numbers that were being discussed?
A. I'm sorry, Commissioner?
Q. Is it fair to say that at the time, back in 2013 or '14, you were sceptical personally about the numbers of
alleged gay-hate murders that were being discussed?
A. I thought they were high.
Q. I'm so sorry?
A. I thought the number was high.
Q. So is it fair to say you were sceptical about the numbers that were being discussed?
A. I would say so, simply because - and the reason I say that, Commissioner, is because I was eager to do an investigation, to review these cases.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Thank you. Yes.
MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, thank you for those answers. I just want to go back, though, and I appreciate, as my friend says, you can't be literally inside the mind of someone else. I understand that. But you, like the rest of us, know, in the way that one knows things, what people's views are. Is it fair to say - apart from yourself, taking yourself out of the equation --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that at 2014 and later, subsequently, there were many senior police officers, to your knowledge, who wanted to downplay the claims about the numbers of gay-hate murders and the numbers of unsolved gay-hate murders?
A. I don't think - I don't think that there was an intention to downplay. It's hard for me to separate myself from the equation. My view was that I wanted to know the truth about what was happening. I don't know - I don't think that there was any - anything overt that I knew, from more senior people than me, but I do think that there was concern about the numbers. Whether or not to downplay is another question, but there was concern about the numbers on the basis that 88 gay-hate deaths, in my opinion, was a lot.
Q. It is one thing, though, for there to be concern about the numbers, as in "Dear me, that's a lot and we should be worried about it", on the one hand --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and concern about the numbers as in "That's ridiculous; of course it's not that many" - they are two different types of concern. I'm really asking you whether, to your observation or in your understanding, there was at
least a part or a component of the force who held that view, namely, that these numbers were exaggerated and, in effect, ridiculous?
A. Well, I would have to agree with that when I look at the comments from homicide, as a part of the force.
Q. Now, just picking up our timeline, so Sergeant Steer sends you those documents in May 2015, and Mr Middleton gives his comments. Just before that, about a month before, actually, in April 2015, there had been another burst of publicity about gay-hate murders and about the North Head death in particular?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would recall this, I am sure?
A. Yes.
Q. On 13 April 2015, then State Coroner Barnes decided to hold a third inquest into the North Head death?
A. Yes.
Q. That very night, 23 April, DC Young went on $A B C$ Lateline and had an interview with Emma Alberici?
A. Yes.
Q. In the course of that interview, as I am sure you remember, DCI Young said a number of things which led to a great deal of media commentary?
A. Yes.
Q. And one of them was that, according to DCI Young, the police minister at the time, Mr Gallacher, had "kowtowed" to a family member of the North Head victim --
A. Yes.
Q. -- when he had agreed to establish Strike Force Macnamir?
A. Yes.
Q. And she said - she, DCI Young, said - that the minister's conduct in that regard had been "very wrong"? A. Yes.
Q. And she, DCI Young, said in that Lateline interview that suicide remained the most likely explanation for the North Head death, and she went on to say that there was hardly any evidence of homophobia at North Head?
A. Yes.
Q. And you would remember all that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And then the next night, Mr Gallacher, the former minister, went on Lateline and denied all of those things?
A. Yes.
Q. Or at least the allegations against him, I should say?
A. Yes.
Q. And what Pamela Young said on Lateline caused the coroner, Mr Barnes, to demand that the police remove DCI Young from that investigation?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr Barnes, the coroner, said that what she had said had the potential to undermine public confidence in the impartiality of her investigation and her commitment to it, and all of that, everything that I've just been putting, was then the subject of quite a lot of media coverage?
A. Yes.
Q. For the record, but I don't need to take the time, I don't think, with you Mr Crandell, but in volume 8, tabs 216 to 220, there is a selection of various articles in newspapers about those very matters?
A. Yes.
Q. But you remember that?
A. I do.
Q. Again, if I speak generally, that media attention was for the most part, perhaps not entirely but largely, negative from the perspective of the police; you would agree with that?
A. Yes, I agree.
Q. And it was in that context, wasn't it, post Lateline, that two strike forces were created a few months later in 2015. One of them was Strike Force Parrabell - when I say in the context, I mean timing-wise it was in that context --
A. Yes, yes.
Q. -- and the other one was Strike Force Neiwand. Now, yours, Strike Force Parrabell, was at least under way, I'm not quite sure what the correct date is for its establishment, but it was under way by 30 August?
A. 30 August is when it started, 2015, yes. Mind you sorry - there was a little bit of preparation prior to that, obviously, to get it started.
Q. I understand. I'll come to that in a little bit. But 30 August is, in effect, the start date --
A. Yes.
Q. -- for Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And Neiwand, it seems, from material we have been provided with, was initially set up in October 2015. Did you know about the setting up of Neiwand --
A. No, I didn't.
Q. -- when it was set up in October 2015?
A. No.
Q. I do want to ask you a few questions about Parrabell and Neiwand, which were set up, as a matter of history, at almost the same time. Firstly, as to Parrabell, the investigation pl an for Strike Force Parrabell, which I will take you to now, seems to have been in existence or prepared by as early as 25 May - I don't know whether you would have that in mind?
A. That's possible, yes.
Q. If you can find volume 1 of the bundle, and go to tab 14, [SCOI.74385] --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you will recognise this, I'm sure. It's the investigation plan for Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And the reason I mention 25 May is that on the last page, under Mr Grace's name, there is a date, 25 May.
A. Yes.
Q. Under Mr Middleton's name, there's a different date, namely, 3 August?
A. Yes.
Q. But does it follow, as it would appear to, that if the document bears two dates, one of which is 25 May, presumably, it was in existence by then?
A. Yes.
Q. Or does that not follow?
A. No, I - I would think that's reasonable. I'm not sure why Detective Inspector Middleton signed it three months later, but --
Q. No.
A. Albeit I presume there's a signed copy.
Q. I must say, speaking for myself, I haven't seen a signed copy, but there may be one somewhere?
A. I would expect there would be one somewhere.
Q. I do want to ask you a couple of questions about it. Before I do, the next tab, 15, is the coordinating instructions. Do you have tab 15, [SCOI.75071]?
A. Yes.
Q. For Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, these are undated coordinating instructions. I will come later to some surrounding documents that may help you, but before I do, if you know, when were these coordinating instructions drafted and created?
A. This would have been prior to the commencement of the operation, definitely, because any new staff that came in to work with Operation [sic] Parrabell would require this documentation to orientate them.
Q. All right. So whenever it was - the drafting of it was commenced, it would have been completed by 30 August? A. Yes.
Q. Was this document, the coordinating instructions, provided to all the various officers who worked on Strike Force Parrabell when they started?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, generally for a strike force to be set up, what is the approval process? What rank has to approve it? How does it work?
A. It - to my mind, I don't know if this is the corporate position, but it would depend on resourcing. So essentially, I could seek to set up a strike force if I was a commander and I'm using my own resources, but if you want additional resources from somewhere else, then you would have to go to a higher level of command and seek permission from that commander who owns those resources to apply them to a particular strike force.
Q. I see. So at the level of commander, you can establish a strike force subject to resources?
A. Yes, absolutely. That's my understanding. The reason that I had to go to my region commander was because I was asking for resources outside of my control.
Q. And your regional commander then happened to be then Assistant Commissioner Fuller?
A. Yes.
Q. So it was, in effect, a budgetary question or a personnel question?
A. More a personnel, because I was - essentially we took resources from different commands under the control of the region commander at the time.
Q. Thank you. Now, as to Strike Force Neiwand, which I appreciate you were not a member of --
A. No.
Q. -- the original Terms of Reference, you can accept they're in the bundle, in fact, I can show you, they're at tab 16, seem to have been dated - tab 16 of volume 1 , [SCOI.76962.00001].
A. Sorry, I've got a "blank" notice.

THE COMMISSIONER: So have I.
MR GRAY: I'm in a better position than most.
THE COMMISSIONER: That's what I have, what is showing on the screen.

MR GRAY: I'11 come back to that, in that case, Mr Crandell.
Q. I will ask you then just to accept from me for the time being that according to a document I'm looking at,
which nobody else seems to have, the original Terms of Reference for Neiwand dated from October 2015?
A. Right.
Q. And the original investigation supervisor was DCI Lehmann?
A. Right.
Q. And the original officer in charge was Detective Sergeant Penelope Brown?
A. Right.
Q. And we know Penelope Brown was the officer in charge of Macnamir?
A. Yes.
Q. And we know that Lehmann had written that issues paper of September 2013 which was also the view, evidently, of DCI Young?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you've said, I think, that you were not aware of the setting up of Neiwand yourself, at the time?
A. No, no.
Q. When did you become aware of the existence of Neiwand?
A. I'm really not sure. It wasn't something that was in my mind back in 2015. It's not unusual that I wouldn't necessarily know about that. I presume that was a strike force under the Homicide Squad.
Q. Yes, under the Unsolved Homicide Team?
A. Yes. Normally I wouldn't be privy to any strike forces that they put together.
Q. A11 right. Do you know who it was who instigated or sought the setting up of Neiwand?
A. No, I don't. I'm not exactly sure of their scope, either, of Neiwand. I'm thinking that was a review of Taradale cases - was that --
Q. Basically?
A. Essentially?
Q. Essentially, yes.
A. I think I've read that, though, in the material, rather than having knowledge of it in 2015.
Q. I see. So if it was Detective Superintendent Wi11ing - and I'm not necessarily suggesting it was - who set it up or wanted to have it set up, you don't know?
A. No, but it would make sense to me that -
that Commander Willing would have endorsed the strike force, if he's using his own resources.
Q. I was going to ask you that next. If it was, speaking generally, a reinvestigation of Taradale, the three Taradale cases, would Superintendent Willing, as commander of homicide, have been able to authorise that himself?
A. I think he would. However, it may well be, particularly in that environment of State Crime Command it's probably likely that he would get endorsement or agreement from his commander, being the assistant commissioner in charge of State Crime Command, or at least he would make him aware of that.
Q. And who was that?
A. I think that was Mark Jenkins - Assistant Commissioner Mark Jenkins at the time.
Q. Now, at some point along the 1 ine - and perhaps you can tell us when, if you recall - you became aware that the objective of Neiwand was to investigate the three Taradale deaths?
A. Yes.
Q. So you're aware of that today, but when did you become aware of that?
A. I don't know. I don't think I knew that in 2015.

I certainly didn't know that there was a closeness of commencement between Parrabe11 and Neiwand. I wasn't aware of that until you said it. Essentially, Neiwand - Neiwand, I can understand how it would have a relationship with Parrabe11, but it would not be unusual for me not to know what was going on unless I was specifically told by homicide.
Q. Now, I just need to put a few things to you about the subject matter of Neiwand, nonetheless, some of which, at least, you wil1 be familiar with?
A. Yes.
Q. The three deaths had been the subject of a lengthy inquest before Deputy State Coroner Milledge, back in 2003
and 2004. You knew that?
A. Yes. I'm aware of that, yes.
Q. And the Commissioner of Police had been represented throughout that inquest by counsel and solicitors?
A. Yes.
Q. And the coroner, Milledge, had made express findings
at the end of the inquest about those three deaths?
A. Yes.
Q. That is Mattaini, Warren and Russell?
A. Yes.
Q. And her findings were, in summary, that as to Warren, he was the victim of a homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. As to Russell, he was the victim of a homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. And as to Mattaini, first of all that he was dead?
A. Yes.
Q. And, secondly, that the cause and manner of death could not be determined?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were aware, I take it, because this was all very public at the time, that Coroner Milledge also stated, as to Warren and Russell, that the evidence "strongly supported the probability" that they met their deaths at the hands of "gay-hate assailants"?
A. Yes.
Q. You knew that?
A. Yes.
Q. And as to Mattaini, she, Coroner Milledge, said that there was a "strong possibility that he died in similar circumstances to the other two"?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in the light of those definite findings and those strong remarks back in 2005, after a lengthy inquest, speaking as at today, why was Strike Force Neiwand set up in 2015 to reinvestigate those deaths?
A. I don't know.
Q. (We know - and I'm presuming that you know, now - that Strike Force Neiwand, having been set up in late 2015, extended through until the end of 2017 or the very beginning of 2018, and it did reinvestigate those three deaths. I assume you know that now?
A. That Neiwand didn't reinvestigate?
Q. Neiwand reinvestigated those three deaths?
A. Yes --
Q. I'm assuming you know that now?
A. Sorry, are you saying they did reinvestigate them?
Q. That they did reinvestigate those three deaths between late 2015 and late 2017?
A. Okay.
Q. Is that something you know or not something you know?
A. Not necessarily. I didn't know whether they were reviewing them, whether they would - I don't know. But I do know the outcome that they came to.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Sorry, can I just interrupt and ask is this the first time, then, that it has been brought to your attention that Neiwand was a reinvestigation of those three deaths?
A. Commissioner, I just can't tell you that $I$ knew that it was a reinvestigation.
Q. So this could well be the first time you've heard --
A. It could be.
Q. -- that Neiwand was a reinvestigation?
A. Yes - yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. Yes?
THE WITNESS: Sorry, Commissioner, can I just clarify that?

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Of course. Of course.
A. So I may --
Q. You did say you had heard about it?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr Gray will ask you some more questions. I'm just - I've just watched your response and your response indicated to me that you were hearing something potentially for the first time, but maybe I was wrong?
A. Yes, the only qualification of that is I may have picked it up in the material that I've looked at, so
I might have known about that a little bit earlier, but I didn't - I don't know the scope of Neiwand. I didn't have a lot to do with it.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Now, as at the same time that I've just mentioned, namely, 2015, 2016, 2017 of course, Strike Force Macnamir was still under way --
A. Yes.
Q. -- having started back in 2013, and as we have seen, the original officer in charge or supervisor - perhaps I may have the language wrong - for Macnamir was DCI Young?
A. Yes.
Q. But in about April 2015, she had been removed from that investigation, as we have seen?
A. Yes.
Q. But if you have volume 1 still available, just turn to tab 9, [SCOI.82018].
A. Yes.
Q. Tab 9 is an email from the general counsel's department within the police just notifying the Special Commission who were the members of Strike Force Macnamir. You can see that down towards the bottom of the page?
A. Yes. Yes, I can.
Q. And we're told that the original officer in charge of Macnamir was Pamela Young, and a subsequent officer in charge was Penelope Brown?
A. Yes.
Q. And over the page, other members of Macnamir were Detective Sergeant Morgan - you'll see on the second line? A. Yes.
Q. And a couple of lines down, Detective Senior Constable

Rullo?
A. Yes.
Q. And a few lines from the bottom of that iist, Detective Senior Constable Chebl?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And then it seems that there was a kind of second version of Macnamir called Macnamir 2, and all of the same people were in that, including the ones that I have just mentioned?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if we turn to tab 16 - you, of course, don't have tab 16, [SCOI.76962.00001]?
A. No.
Q. Again, if you take it from me --
A. Yes .
Q. -- that Detective Sergeant Penelope Brown was also the officer in charge of Neiwand?
A. Yes.
Q. Just as she was in Macnamir, and that Detective Chief Inspector John Lehmann was the original investigation supervisor for Neiwand. And that's the DCI Lehmann who wrote the September 2013 issues paper saying that 30 unsolved gay-hate homicides was a gross exaggeration?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your view of the suitability of DCI Lehmann, having expressed that view, for the role of supervising a reinvestigation of three of the deaths in question?
A. Yes, look, I - I think that his - what he has expressed in terms of his understanding of those cases would probably exclude him from that investigation.
Q. Do you think he might have been chosen precisely because he held those views?

MR TEDESCHI: I object.
THE COMMISSIONER: I allow it.
THE WITNESS: I can't say. I don't know.

MR GRAY: Q. He expressed the views very trenchantly, didn't he - gross exaggeration, the Sydney Morning Herald was irresponsible, and so on?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was basically bucketing Sue Thompson's view of the world; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And of all people, he's the one chosen to reinvestigate three of those very 30 deaths?
A. Yes.
Q. It's a very striking choice, don't you think?
A. Yes. I think it's an unfortunate choice but the motivations for that choice I can't assist with. I don't I just don't know.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. It certain1y doesn't aid the notion of objectivity, though, does it?
A. No, sir, no.

MR GRAY: Q. Who chose him?
A. I'm speculating but I would assume that Commander Willing would have had something to do with that selection. It may have involved Assistant Commissioner Jenkins, if in fact he referred the matter to him, but as I say, I don't know that.
Q. Commander Willing, of course, as we have seen, because we've read his issues paper, adopted and endorsed the very views that Mr Lehmann had expressed?
A. Yes.
Q. So it might be open to an observer to surmise that Commander Willing chose DCI Lehmann because he, DCI Willing, agreed very much with what Lehmann had said and thought that Lehmann might arrive at a certain result. A. Perhaps.
Q. Does the coincidence of personnel between Neiwand and Macnamir, involving in various ways DCI Young, DCI Lehmann, Detective Sergeant Morgan, Detective Senior Constable Rullo, Detective Senior Constable Chebl being in both of them --
A. Yes.
Q. -- does that suggest do you that they both may have had a similar objective?
A. Sorry, may?
Q. May have had a similar objective?
A. It's difficult for me to comment on another command.

I don't know what their situation was in relation to resourcing and I don't know the reasons for why they would put those people in those positions. I think it's very difficult for them to have objectivity, given their history. Obviously with the benefit - I have the benefit of hindsight, and I just can't comment on what was in their mind at the time.
Q. Well, Macnamir concerned one death at North Head, as we know; agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. And Taradale and later Neiwand concerned three deaths at Bondi?
A. Yes.
Q. And I don't think I would be giving away any state secrets if I suggested that basically, the likelihood was that different lines of inquiry would apply to the two?
A. Yes.
Q. They weren't connected in some investigative way, were they?
A. No, I don't believe so. No, I don't believe so.
Q. And yet the same people, or several of the same people, were put on both of them?
A. Yes. I suppose when there's a review of homicides, then the natural place to go is homicide. Whether there's a divergence from that or not, there'd have to be some reasons for that.
Q. Well, does the material that I've put in front of you --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and some of the answers that you have just have I candidly given, lead to the suggestion that one possibility is that the objective of someone was to support a contention that all four of those deaths - namely, the North Head death and the three Bondi deaths - were not or
may not have been gay-hate related?
A. That's a possibility. I suppose it's one thing to say that that might have been in an investigator's mind, but it's another thing to say that the investigator went out of their way not to show that, particularly when you're talking about homicide investigations. To my mind, that's probably one of our most important investigations, so I would be - I would expect that they would come to the Marks Park investigations with an open mind and some objectivity. That would be my expectation. For them not to do that would be unacceptable.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Can I ask this: in the face of coronial findings over a long - in a hearing that was conducted over a good deal of time, with counsel assisting and counsel for the police represented, what on earth would require a reinvestigation, absent, say, fresh material?
A. Commissioner, the only suggestion that $I$ can come up with is that we were, as an organisation, looking to solve those crimes.
Q. To solve them?
A. To solve them.
Q. I see. But --
A. Yes. Because questioning a coroner - sorry, sir questioning a coroner's finding $I$ don't think would be appropriate.

THE COMMISSIONER: Al1 right, thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. To question the coroner's finding you don't think would be appropriate?
A. No, I don't, unless - if the coroner left an open finding, then the coroner sometimes will refer the investigation to police to say, "Continue the investigation", and then it's appropriate for us to continue on that investigation. To my mind, if we were undertaking those investigations off our own instigation, then $I$ would expect that to be to find the perpetrator rather than question the coroner's finding.
Q. You, I think $I$ have understood this, haven't been in the Homicide Squad yourself?
A. Many, many years ago, Mr Gray.
Q. A long time ago?
A. Yes.
Q. But let's say in the last 20 years?
A. No.
Q. For Neiwand, at least in its latter iteration, the investigations coordinator was an officer called DCI Christopher 01en, and the officer in charge was, as I think I mentioned, DSC Michael Chebl. Are you familiar with either of those officers?
A. I've - I know Chris $01 e n$ but not well, simply to acknowledge and say hello to, and I don't know the other officer.
Q. It seems, from material that we've been given, that both of them - that is, DCI Olen and Detective Chebl - are no longer with the police?
A. I think that's right.
Q. Do you know when either of them left?
A. No, I don't. I can check.
Q. Do you know - I think you've said you don't know, really, about Chebl at all?
A. No.
Q. But in terms of 0len, do you know why he left?
A. No, I don't. I wasn't that close to Chris Olen.

I know his name.
Q. I just want to come to some dealings between Parrabell, your strike force, and Neiwand, and if you could turn to volume 6, please. The tab I'd like you to turn to is tab 164A, [SCOI.82054].
A. I have a blank page.
Q. You have a blank page?

MR GRAY: What has happened here, Commissioner,
is that - my oversight - some of these documents, this being one of them, by agreement, have been held back from the tender bundle pending the debate next week about some relevance questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: I see.
MR GRAY: I know one of the concerns in that regard is the
documents being made public, but subject to that - I can come back to it, of course, but I would prefer to do it now because we are on the train. I could put the document in front of him --

THE COMMISSIONER: Can I just suggest this. In order to assuage Mr Tedeschi's concern, and subject to hearing from him if he has an objection to what I propose, you can show - and provided Mr Tedeschi and others have it in front of them, you could put it in front of the witness but I would ask that the court operators not display it on the screen so that it isn't available to the public streaming. Would that suit you?

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
MR GRAY: That would certainly be sufficient for me.
THE COMMISSIONER: That preserves your position, Mr Tedeschi, except it means we don't have to get Mr Crandell back for one or two documents. If you are concerned at all about the process at any point, just let me know.
Q. What we are going to do is you will be given a document - and so will I because mine is blank as well and if I can ask those at the back of the room not to bring the particular document up on the screen, thank you.

MR GRAY: It seems, Commissioner - and I apologise for this, this is essentially my fault - we just have to have copies made.

THE COMMISSIONER: Why don't you do it this way - is it inconvenient to move to another topic?

MR GRAY: No, I can do that.
THE COMMISSIONER: Move to another topic, and then Mr Tedeschi and others - rather, tomorrow morning, Mr Crandell can be taken to this document when the copies are available, or if it becomes available shortly, then we can do it. But if it doesn't inconvenience you or the witness, let's go out of order and go to another matter, if that's convenient.

MR GRAY: Certain1y.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. So a change of topic, or partial change of topic. Back to the formation of Strike Force Parrabell in early to mid 2015.
A. Yes.
Q. We've looked at Mr Steer sending the email with his original Operation Parrabell documents, Mr Middleton's response?
A. Yes.
Q. You saying you agree with Middleton for the reasons you've explained?
A. Yes.
Q. If I can get you to go to volume 1 again, if that's the one you have open?
A. No.
Q. If you just turn to tab 11, [SCOI.75090] - I won't take time on this, but tab 11 evidently is the Terms of Reference for Operation Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And the Terms of Reference are three lines long, towards the front of the document, and they correspond, you would accept, more or less with the other documents that he had sent, which are at tab 10, [SCOI.75072], and tab 12, [SCOI.75056], name1y, the proposal and the suggested investigation agreement.
A. Yes .
Q. And we have established - and you have agreed - that for whatever reason, for Strike Force Parrabell, there doesn't seem to be, at least any more, an actual document comprising the Terms of Reference, although they're quoted in the report.
A. Yes. I'm not sure whether these are - the Terms of Reference are automatically generated. I'm not certain of that. But certain1y there would be one for Strike Force Parrabell. The on1y reason that there was a distinction between Operation Parrabell and strike force was simply because of the change of resourcing and the focus of it being purely a review, not a reinvestigation. So I kind of wanted to make that distinction.

The simple thing to do would have been to change the name, but the reason I didn't want to do that is because I thought Geoff Steer was on the right track. He wasn't essentially terribly wrong. It was just that he didn't have the resources or the standing or anything to really push that forward. So that's why I - I went with that distinction as at 30 August, and I acknowledge also that I've referred to Operation Parrabell after that date, by the way, but for the purposes of consistency, that's how it all unfolded.
Q. Now, what I want to do - I will eliminate some of the material I was going to use because I don't think it's needed - I'll get you to just keep that folder nearby because we will come back to it, but just to look at your Terms of Reference, Strike Force Parrabell's Terms of Reference, we need the Parrabell report in order to do that, and that's exhibit 1 , which might still be on the top of your - I think it's the top left. I think it's that. A. That's volume 8.
Q. No, that's not the one. So in that exhibit 1, it's tab 2, [SCOI.02632]
A. Yes.
Q. And we find the Terms of Reference quoted at pages 20 to 21?
A. Yes.
Q. So I just wanted to run through the language with you. The first word is "Assess"?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that have any particular significance or meaning in the world of strike forces or the police?
A. Not necessarily, but to me, starting with "assess" doesn't say "investigation", so it's a review, an assessment and a review.
Q. Now, I particularly wanted to ask you about the parts of the Terms of Reference on page 21. I should, in fairness, observe that the third paragraph is consistent with what you just said - namely, if, during the assessment, suspects are identified, it should be sent off to the unsolved homicide team?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was the structure of things that you had in mind?
A. Yes.
Q. Then on the top of the next page, it says:

After each assessment --
that is, of each case, I presume --
a detailed report outlining the bias
classification of each incident and
justifying material will be prepared and
presented to prominent representatives of
the [LGBTIQ] community.
A. Yes.
Q. In a nutshell, that didn't happen, I don't think?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. After each assessment of all the 88 cases?
A. No, so we commenced them, we were doing them I think quarterly, the very first one was on 1 December. I remember that one.
Q. Yes.
A. In 2015.
Q. Yes.
A. The difficulty with that was matters of confidentiality, because we were - we had invited not only members of parliament, Alex Greenwich and Jenny Leong, but also academics from Sydney University, ACON and some of the other - some of our other key partners, and it became very awkward to discuss matters, particularly when we were always thinking about confidentiality. So kind of --
Q. And as a consequence, you didn't persevere with the objective as set out here on the top of this page?
A. No, my recollection is no. I think we might have done one, maybe two, and I personally met with some of the parliamentarians and briefed them. But even then, I was concerned about confidentiality on some of the details that I was providing. But don't get me wrong, they gave me some great guidance in relation to the report and
recommendations and expectations, but in terms of actual case reviews, I don't know if there was one or two that we actually held. But it wasn't for all of them, you're correct.
Q. And then the next paragraph of the Terms of Reference says:

Each incident wi 77 be filtered through the [police] 10 bias crime indicators ...

And that did happen in ways that we'11 come to, no doubt about that?
A. Yes.
Q. But the words then used that that wil1 happen:

As a general guide to identify direct or circumstantial evidence of bias motivation.
A. Yes.
Q. That is to say, do you agree, that the objective was -
is this right - to identify from the historic materials,
the holdings, whether or not there was material in the holdings that amounted to evidence of bias?
A. Yes - bias motivation, intention, gay hate.
Q. And then the last paragraph:

Examine and report upon evidence capable of identifying suspected bias of the original police investigator.

We've covered that and you've said that for reasons you explained, that really fell away?
A. Yes. Oh, I wouldn't say "fell away". I think that we stil1 looked at that, at that aspect, but it was very difficult to come to a position on whether or not an investigator was motivated by gay hate or any other bias for that matter.
Q. We11, instead of the expression "fell away", which I won't hold on to, that task proved to be almost always effectively impossible?
A. That's what I would say, that Coroner Milledge's comments ring in my ears, because she did find that in her
findings. So - but I guess the difference is that Coroner Milledge had the advantage of talking to people and also looking at witnesses, whereas we were doing a - simply doing a review.
Q. That's right, as you very fairly pointed out to the parliamentary committee which we looked at this morning? A. Yes.
Q. A coroner, just in the nature of things, has more available to her or him --
A. Yes.
Q. -- than you would have had in the exercise you were doing?
A. Yes .
Q. And that would apply to any of the cases?
A. Well, I say so, and I - my view on Parrabell was that if a coroner made a finding, that we should be bound by that finding on that basis.
Q. You should what, sorry?
A. We should be bound by that finding. There would have to be good reasons for us going against a coroner's finding, I would have thought.

MR GRAY: I might, just because it would be a suitable use - are we going to stop at 4 o'clock, Commissioner?

THE COMMISSIONER: Pardon me?
MR GRAY: Will we be rising at 4 o'clock?
THE COMMISSIONER: What suits you?
MR GRAY: I'm in the Commissioner's hands.
THE COMMISSIONER: We will rise at 4 o'clock, then. Do you want to go back to those documents?

MR GRAY: I will just go back to those documents .
THE COMMISSIONER: As a discrete topic?
MR GRAY: As a discrete topic.

THE COMMISSIONER: I think if we just put the tab in wherever it is meant to go.

MR GRAY: The tab which is blank, and where this would otherwise go, is 164A, [SCOI.82054].

THE COMMISSIONER: Of volume, what, 6?
MR GRAY: Of volume 6.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, you can see that this is a progress report.
A. Yes.
Q. From the front page?
A. Yes.
Q. And on the top right it says "Progress report number 1"?
A. Yes.
Q. For a period ending 12 July 2016 - top right?
A. Yes, thank you, yes.
Q. And it's a progress report for Strike Force Neiwand?
A. Yes.
Q. On the second and third pages, which I don't need to ask you about, you will see that there's a summary of what it is that they're doing?
A. Yes.
Q. And it concerns the three Bondi deaths, Mattaini, Warren and Russell?
A. Yes.
Q. In each case, towards the end of each item about those three, there is a reference to what the findings of Coroner Milledge had been?
A. Yes.
Q. And then on page 4, there is a heading "Status" first of all, there is "Terms of Reference", and the Terms of Reference are to reinvestigate those three deaths. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. And from what you have told us before, you didn't know that that was what they were doing, either until today or, if not today, quite recently?
A. Yes, I believe so, yes.
Q. Now, in the first bullet point under "Status of Investigation", it's said that Neiwand had:

Reviewed and submitted voluminous archived case file items (42 boxes) from Strike Force Taradale ...
A. Yes.
Q. In the second bullet point the reader is told that a number of products, predominantly statements from Taradale, are being submitted into Neiwand for review. Then what I wanted to ask you is about the fourth bullet point, which says that on 14 April 2016, DCI O1en and Superintendent Willing met with you to discuss Strike Force Parrabell and any relevance to UHT investigations. Now, what was that meeting and what was it about?
A. Oh, I don't have an independent recollection of that meeting. I don't recall speaking to them about Neiwand, but that doesn't mean that I may not have spoken to them about potential gay-hate motivated crimes, given I was well and truly involved in Strike Force Parrabell at that time.
Q. Well, what might it have been, do you think, that you would have been discussing with those running Neiwand?
A. I would presume that it's - that it related to the three deaths that Neiwand is looking after, and I suppose whether or not there's any evidence of other deaths in and around those areas, potentially, but I - unfortunately I just don't have an independent recollection. I don't know whether I would have made notes about that conversation. I do keep notes of conversations I have, which I'm happy to check.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Can I ask you this: is it possible that they had a general conversation - that is, Detective Superintendent Willing and Chief Inspector 01en about investigation generally and did not tell you that Neiwand was existing as a separate entity?
A. It's possible, Commissioner.
Q. Well, does that seem to accord with your recollection? Because as I understood your evidence today, in the past, and certainly as $I$ apprehend what you said, you were - as you sit here today, you certainly don't appear to have been aware of Neiwand as an exercise as such in $2016 ?$
A. Yes, that's right.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Well, then, the last bullet point on that page may result in a similar answer from you, but I'11 just ask, it says on 27 May that year, 2016, Strike Force Parrabell detectives attended police headquarters, I assume --
A. Yes.
Q. -- to hand over documents relating to investigations conducted under Strike Force Neiwand. Now, we know at least now that Neiwand was looking at the three Bondi deaths and indeed was reinvestigating them, according to this document.
A. Yes.
Q. So does that tell us, that last bullet point, that somebody at Strike Force Parrabel1, whether it was you or not - and it may not tell us this, I'm only reading the document --
A. Yes.
Q. -- is it telling us that Parrabell knew what investigations Neiwand were carrying out?
A. I would say so. Parrabel1, though - Parrabell investigators, that could have been any number of investigators on Strike Force Parrabell. Certainly it wasn't me, but it could have been Detective Inspector Middleton, it could have been a number of others, I'm not sure. But it would make sense, if that is the case, for Neiwand and - Parrabell and Neiwand to talk. I just don't have any independent recollection of Neiwand.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But is it something you'd forget? I mean, if you were doing Parrabell and there was another strike force which was looking at a number of the cases -A. Yes.
Q. -- that were you going to look at, is it really
something you think you'd forget?
A. I don't think so, Commissioner.
Q. So it's more - your recollection at the moment is, whatever went on back in 2016, you are of the view that you weren't aware of Neiwand, but you certainly don't deny that you may have had a meeting with these people about something?
A. Yes. I may have had that meeting and I - I would agree that the - that Parrabell did talk to Neiwand, but whether or not I'm aware of that is another question.

THE COMMISSIONER: Al1 right.
MR GRAY: Q. Did you know that whatever UHT were doing about these three deaths was called Neiwand?
A. I don't have an independent recollection of that. That's not to say that Detective Inspector Middleton wasn't aware of that, given he was doing a great deal of oversight in relation to those investigations, so I would expect that he would have some idea as to what was happening there, but from my perspective - and I understand that may seem weak as a commander, but to my recollection, I don't recall that nexus.
Q. I will come to at least one other aspect of this when we get to another email tomorrow involving Mr Middleton's knowledge of things, but --
A. Yes.
Q. -- it can wait until tomorrow.
A. All right.

MR GRAY: If that's a convenient time.
THE COMMISSIONER: That's a convenient time. 10 o'clock. Thank you. I will adjourn until 10 o'clock.

MR TEDESCHI: Before you adjourn, Commissioner --
MR GRAY: I mentioned to my friend, Commissioner, I hope this was in order, that it may be that on Thursday, the Commission would not be sitting in the morning.

THE COMMISSIONER: I am sorry, I should have indicated as a courtesy, Mr Tedeschi. I won't be able to sit on Thursday morning, so I'11 - at the moment I wouldn't be
able to sit before 2 o'clock on Thursday. We've got next week allocated, so we'll get rid of the evidence insofar as we lose time.

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, I am available on Monday and Tuesday of next week but after that Mr Mykkeltveldt will be appearing.

THE COMMISSIONER: Can I just say this: I'm happy for you to accommodate Mr Gray and he to accommodate you. If there's any argument or any matter that your presence in your client's view might be assisted by, without any disrespect intended to your enthusiastic and knowledgeable junior, can you just see whether, if you want to progress some argument - if it doesn't work, it doesn't work otherwise, we can carry on in your absence if that has to happen. Al1 right?

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: I'11 adjourn, then, until 10 in the morning, thank you.

AT 3.58PM THE COMMISSION WAS ADJOURNED TO WEDNESDAY, 7 DECEMBER 2022 AT 10AM

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