# 2022 Special Commission of Inquiry into LGBTIQ hate crimes 

Before: The Commissioner, The Honourable Justice John Sackar

## At Leve1 2, 121 Macquarie Street, Sydney, New South Wales

On Wednesday, 7 December 2022 at 10.00am
(Day 12)

Mr Peter Gray SC (Senior Counsel Assisting)
Ms Christine Melis (Counsel Assisting)
Mr William de Mars (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Kath1een Heath (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Gráinne Marsden (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Meg O’Brien (Counse1 Assisting)
Ms Claire Palmer (Counsel Assisting)
Mr Enzo Camporeale (Director Legal)
Ms Kate Lockery (Principal Solicitor)
Also Present:
Mr Mark Tedeschi KC (for NSW Police)
Mr Anders Mykkeltvedt (for NSW Police)
Mr Ken Madden (for Sergeant Steer)

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes?
MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, we have not yet received a transcript of yesterday's proceedings. I understand there is a reason why. I was just wondering if every attempt could be made, please, to provide us with a transcript in the evening of the day that it is heard because it does make it easier for us to keep up with the fairly fast pace of what's happening.

THE COMMISSIONER: There is no issue about that at all. Every step will be taken. I'm not currently familiar with the precise reason. I think it has something to do - well, I don't know, I won't speculate.

As soon as it is available - Mr Tedeschi, if at any time late delivery of transcript causes you a problem, then from my point of view, there will never be an issue about forcing you on in any situation where you would wish to reacquaint yourself with precisely what has been said. So it's not going to be an issue, it's only a timing point, but I will ensure that as soon as it is available, you and Mr Madden and others get it. But keep me posted if there is a problem, or tell Mr Gray, and if there is a problem, I will get to the bottom of what the problem is.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr Gray - Mr Crandell, would you be kind enough to come back into the witness box, thank you very much.
<ANTHONY CRANDELL, on former affirmation:
[10.02am]
<EXAMINATION BY MR GRAY:
MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, at the end of yesterday we had look at the Terms of Reference for Strike Force Parrabell which are extracted in the report itself?
A. Yes.
Q. I now want to turn to the investigation plan, which is in volume 1, tab 14, [SCOI.74385].
A. Yes.
Q. At this stage, I just want to ask you one or two general questions about this, and the first is, what is the
status of an investigation plan in a strike force such as this one?
A. So that plan is generally put out in a specific format, which indicates what the situation is and basically gives you a general overview and some guidance on why the investigation is here and how it should be conducted.
Q. And on page 3 - I will come back to some of the detail of this, but on page 3 - at the top, the plan says that investigators will commence a physical review of the files to determine if any bias crime indicators exist.
A. Yes.
Q. The footnote tells the reader that indicators 1 to 9 have been taken from an American document --
A. Yes.
Q. -- which we will come to later, and that indicator 10 had been developed by bias crimes in New South Wales. So that's nine from America and one developed locally; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says in the top paragraph on page 3 that the incident in question in each case will be filtered through the attached bias crime identification form. Now, the bias crime identification form is a reference, I think, to what is actually elsewhere called the Bias Crime Indicator Form; is that right?
A. Yes, it's the same document.
Q. It's the same initials but the word "indicator" is what is in fact on the form?
A. Yes.
Q. I will come back to that document because I need to go through it with you. Then if you turn over to the next tab, 15, [SCOI.75071], these are the coordinating instructions, which you will recall. And what is the status of something called "coordinating instructions" in a strike force such as this one?
A. My understanding of that is that it gives some guidance to investigators as to how they should behave and what they're actually looking for, in terms of the investigation behaviour.
Q. What is it doing differently from or over and above
the investigation plan? How do the two work together?
A. Yes, look, I think they're fairly similar documents. I notice that there's fairly similar information in both of them. It may well have been that one document was created prior to the other. I'm uncertain. I didn't create the documents but --
Q. I want to come back in a moment to who did create them, but the coordinating instructions, we can see starting on page 4, have embedded, or had embedded within them, the actual form which was to be used; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is the Bias Crime Indicator Form?
A. Yes.
Q. And it goes from page 4 to page 13 of the coordinating instructions.
A. Yes.
Q. And I asked you this yesterday and you answered, but just to confirm, this form that we're looking at at page 4 of the coordinating instructions is the form that was used in the Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. In your statement, and I will take you to it in a minute, but just for the moment, briefly, at paragraph 43 you refer to the three documents that were created, namely, the Terms of Reference, the investigation pl an and the coordinating instructions. The coordinating instructions, as we can see, have the Bias Crime Indicator Form contained within them, and what I wanted to ask is, may the Commissioner take it that the central and governing one of these documents was the coordinating instructions?
A. Mr Gray, I'm just uncertain of what the policy position is on these documents, as I think about what you're saying. It may well be that the coordinating instructions were information for investigators that were coming in to the strike force and that the plan, the investigation plan, may be a document that was not necessarily for the investigators but was for - as an overall document that would guide the investigation and the investigators. So I'm uncertain. There may well be something in the policy that dictates that. I'm just unaware of it.
Q. Do you mean by that that you don't remember or you're just not sure of what the policy is generally?
A. I'm not certain of the policy generally and I'm uncertain as to which document was for investigators and which document was probably more of a guiding - a set of guiding instructions for other people.
Q. I want to come to some of the detail of this, but before I do, I should perhaps have started with this. I understand that overnight you've checked your diary or other records on the question of meetings with or any meeting with Mick Willing in 2016 which had relevance to Neiwand?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you tell the Commissioner what it is that you were able to ascertain or check overnight?
A. Yes. So, Commissioner, I reviewed my diary back for 2016 just to have a look, searching for Neiwand or Willing. I found that I had two meetings in 2016 with Mick Willing. One was on 14 April. On that day I think - and I think I've given evidence in relation to that date - on that day I have documentation that says that we did discuss the review of the Taradale matters. There was one document that mentions Neiwand, but my memory did not allow me to link in Neiwand with the Taradale reinvestigations, and I fear that I misled you yesterday. The meeting on 17 May --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Pardon me interrupting, just for my benefit, to what extent do you think you misled me yesterday? I'm not suggesting anything untoward about it; quite the opposite. I just wanted to know what is the difference between what you might have said yesterday and what you're now saying today?
A. I said yesterday that I was unaware of Neiwand until recently.
Q. Yes.
A. Whereas the document attached to the 14th April meeting does say "Neiwand". So it seems to me that I probably was aware of that at the time, but I've told you that I wasn't. So I --
Q. I follow. So you now accept that - without necessarily any further independent recollection for the moment, you accept that the term "Neiwand" and the
existence of it was mentioned to you in April 2016 ?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Thank you.
A. And also I met with Michael Willing on 17 May, but that was at Parliament House for the purpose of briefing Alex Greenwich on progress of not only Parrabell but also Neiwand, although Neiwand's not mentioned but it does say the reinvestigation into the Taradale matters, incidents.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much.
MR GRAY: Q. I just want to ask you some questions about the bias crime indicators form itself.
A. Yes.
Q. You see it there starting on page 4 in the coordinating instructions at tab 15, [SCOI.75071]?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm sure you're quite familiar with this form, having conducted the inquiry or the strike force?
A. Fairly, yes.
Q. It sets out under 10 different - sorry, it sets out under 10 separate headings or indicators, the first one being "Differences" --
A. Yes.
Q. I'11 start again. It deals with 10 separate indicators, the first one being "Differences".
A. Yes.
Q. And nine of those 10 had been largely taken from a US curriculum document dated from 2000?
A. My understanding is that, yes, originally that's where they were brought from, and I think Sergeant Steer brought them to the NSW Police Force, and that those aspects were contained in policy at the time, and I understand that that was our corporate position, to look at those indicators as to whether or not there was bias involved in crimes.
Q. I will come to some of that, but thank you. But just for the moment, nine of the 10 had been derived from the US document?
A. Yes.
Q. And the tenth had been developed 10cally perhaps by Sergeant Steer --
A. I believe so.
Q. -- but certain1y by bias crimes?
A. Definitely, yes.
Q. At the top of page 4 of the coordinating instructions --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the following four findings are said to be available, bias crime; suspected bias crime; not a bias crime; insufficient information, with some detail provided as to what each of those notions was referring to.
A. Yes.
Q. And so the form itself, though, starting at the bottom of page 4, the tabulated form, as used by the strike force, you would agree, was not itself created as a form by the Bias Crimes Unit?
A. No.
Q. Or by Sergeant Steer?
A. My understanding is that the Parrabel 1 investigators created that form drawing upon Sergeant Steer's work in identifying the bias crime indicators..
Q. Yes. So the form itself was created by the Parrabel1 investigators?
A. That's my understanding, yes.
Q. And indeed, at page 3 of the coordinating instructions, in the bottom two paragraphs, that is exactly what it says - that the review would use a list of bias crime indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. And then explaining where they had come from?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the last paragraph, the reader is told that the persons who created the form, as distinct from the list of indicators, were the Parrabel1 investigators?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. Now, Sergeant Steer, in his statement - did you say
you had seen his statement?
A. I have.
Q. He says at paragraph 21 in the first paragraph:

The BCIRF --
meaning the form --
was created by Strike Force Parrabe1 7 ...
And you would agree with that?
A. I agree with that, yes.
Q. In your statement, which I would ask you to just turn
up - it is in volume 1, I think, tab 4, [SCOI.76961]?
A. Yes.
Q. At paragraph 59?
A. Yes.
Q. If you just read 59 and 60 to yourself?
A. Just 59 , did you say?
Q. We11, just read 59 for the moment, yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you would accept, I think, from what you've just been saying very frankly --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that 59 is not accurate?
A. Yes.
Q. In the sense that the Bias Crimes Unit did not possess the tool, being the form, and had not used the tool, being the form?
A. No. The form was drawn from the bias crime indicators.
Q. Now, stil1 in your statement, back at 43 - in fact, starting at 41, really --
A. Yes.
Q. -- this is talking about the early part or the first part of 2015, and you say you had planning meetings with various persons about what was to become Strike Force

Parrabe11?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say that those meetings concerned, among other things, the scope of the exercise and the development of appropriate Terms of Reference and the investigation plan?
A. Yes.
Q. You mention that the meetings were attended by Messrs Middleton and Grace and Bignell, and you give their positions?
A. Yes.
Q. Were there other people who were present at these initial planning meetings or was it just those three?
A. I think from - involving me, it was probably --
Q. Yes, involving you.
A. Probably those people. Whether there were other meetings, given the role that then Detective Inspector Middleton was to undertake - he was really taking a leadership role in these reinvestigations - I'm sure that he would have had other meetings with other people that I'm not aware of.
Q. But from your point of view, though, the planning meetings that you were having were with those three rather than with other people not mentioned here?
A. From my memory, yes.
Q. Now, in 43 you say that it was as a result of those planning meetings that the "below" documents were ultimately prepared - and you set them out: the Terms of Reference, the investigation plan - actually, not "agreement"; you agree it's actually an investigation plan --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and the coordinating instructions?
A. Yes.
Q. What I want to ask you is, when you say they were ultimately prepared, by whom were they prepared? Who wrote them? Who composed them?
A. The Terms of Reference $I$ think $I$ had some input into those. The body of them may well have been prepared for me and I may have well adjusted them. But the investigation
agreement, the coordinating instructions, were more likely to have been done by the senior detectives.
Q. Meaning?
A. Meaning Craig Middleton, Paul Grace and probably Cameron Bigne11 may well have had some input into that as well.
Q. If there's a difference as to the investigation agreement, if I were to ask you who composed it or drafted it, you'd say some combination of those three?
A. I would.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And would you say the same about the coordinating instructions?
A. Yes.
Q. Some combination of those three?
A. I would think so.
Q. And as to the form itself - some combination of those three?
A. I would say so. I don't know how that form was pulled together, but it certainly says in the document that the Parrabell investigators pulled that form together, so I would assume that they have spoken about how it should come together.
Q. As we observed yesterday, the investigation plan might have been - or it is perhaps not entirely certain but might have been - in existence as early as 25 May?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is a date appearing below Mr Grace's name?
A. Yes.
Q. Although that's perhaps not definitive and it may not have been in existence until some time later than that?
A. Yes.
Q. I think that's what you said yesterday?
A. Yes, I think Craig Middleton's was dated 3 August or something similar.
Q. That's right.
A. Yes, so --
Q. So it's not entirely clear exactly when the document in final form might have come to fruition?
A. Yes.
Q. And in terms of the coordinating instructions which are not dated, I think you said yesterday, but correct me if I'm wrong, that your belief, at least, is that it must have been in existence in final form by 30 August?
A. Yes.
Q. And would the same apply to the form, the actual form, which indeed forms part of the coordinating instructions?
A. Yes, I say that because that date was the start of the strike force, so you would have to have something in place to guide the investigation.
Q. Now, to your knowledge - well, I'll start with you. Did you, yourself, seek the views of the Bias Crimes Unit or Sergeant Steer as to the proposed methodology as outlined in the investigation plan and the coordinating instructions?
A. I don't remember speaking to Sergeant Steer but I did know that I wanted him involved in Parrabell, simply because he had started off Operation Parrabell and, as I said yesterday, that was definitely on the right track, and I was able to give it resources. So yes, I wanted his involvement. Whether or not I had a discussion with him, though, he would probably know about that better than me.
Q. Well, to your knowledge, did anyone send him any draft or indeed final version of either the investigation plan or the coordinating instructions?
A. Not to my knowledge.

MR GRAY: My friend Mr Tedeschi has just informed me that Sergeant Steer is in the courtroom, which is something I was not aware of, and he is suggesting to me that perhaps that's not appropriate. I just raise it because it has been raised with me.
the Commissioner: Well, is he here, Mr Madden?
MR MADDEN: I am sorry, I didn't quite hear --

THE COMMISSIONER: Is Sergeant Steer here in the courtroom?

MR MADDEN: He is, your Honour.
THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. I have given him leave to appear, and although he doesn't, in perhaps the traditional sense, Mr Tedeschi, have party status, he has filed a statement. I don't know that it is appropriate to make the usual order for witnesses in a commission of inquiry, but what's your problem - that he might hear something that might influence his decision? The matter is being live streamed. He could read the transcript. I couldn't prevent him from doing any of those things. The mere fact that he is actually hearing Mr Crandell in real time - he could be doing so sitting in his living room, and I wouldn't make an order that he should be prevented from doing that.

MR TEDESCHI: Yes, I take that point.
THE COMMISSIONER: You can make the comment if indeed, as often - not often but sometimes is the case where a witness says something, if I may speak for a moment in code, that you think has been contrived or put in a way as to be exculpatory or in some way goes to his credit - you will have every opportunity of putting that if you think, instinctively or otherwise, there has been some trigger. But it does seem to me, even if I hadn't given him leave to appear, I wouldn't know and you wouldn't know whether he was sitting at home watching the live streaming or somehow or other getting access to transcript.

MR TEDESCHI: That's true.
THE COMMISSIONER: I take your point, and you will have every available forensic strategy as you would otherwise have in the case where you think there has been some tailoring or accommodating of that sort, and we both know what we're talking about.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Thank you.
Sergeant Steer, I'm not going to direct that you leave the courtroom. And thank you for bringing it to my
attention, Mr Tedeschi.
MR GRAY: Q. I think the question I had asked - forgive me if you had already answered it - was did anyone, to your knowledge, send Mr Steer, Sergeant Steer, a draft or final version of either the investigation plan or the coordinating instructions?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Did anyone, to your knowledge, send him a draft of the bias crime indicators form?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Was there a reason why that wasn't done?
A. The - well, I'm speculating, I suppose. I've been told not to do that, but my understanding was that the bias crime indicators were available in policy. If that's the case, then I would presume that the investigators have probably drawn that from policy, had a look at those indicators and then said, "Well, these are the indicators".

The one thing I do remember about the bias crimes form was the statement that every indicator may be present and it may not be a bias crime or no indicators may be present and it still might be a bias crime. So to me, that spoke volumes about the document and about weight and how you would weight different characteristics on that form. So --
Q. And what - sorry, go on.
A. Sorry. So to shorten it up, I guess, I'm not aware of whether Sergeant Steer was involved or whether he was contacted, but if he wasn't, then I'm presuming that there's been some sort of guidance from policy to indicate where we should be.
Q. And what are you meaning when you say "policy" in those answers?
A. Standard Operating Procedures for bias crime, for bias crimes to - for bias crime indicators and the like.
Q. At the time, as at 2015?
A. Yes. I say that because I don't think we would have pulled the bias crime indicators out of the air. We would have had something to refer to.
Q. As the senior officer - I've forgotten what your title was for Parrabell - or commanding officer of Strike Force

Parrabe11 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- did you have to get approval from anybody else as to the content of the investigation plan or the coordinating instructions or was it up to you?
A. No, I think ultimately my decision, but I was very sure to take advice from investigators and --
Q. Wel1, presumably, tell me if this is right, drafts of those two documents, the investigation plan and the coordinating instructions, circulated at least among the Parrabel1 officers - that is, in particular, Middleton and Grace and --
A. Cameron Bignel 1 - I would think --
Q. And yourself, I assume; is that right?
A. Yes, I mean, they probably worked on drafts prior to coming to me and then would present me with something that I was comfortable with, although I notice in the earlier document that you indicated, there was a place for the signature of Craig Middleton and also Paul Grace. I can't remember whether there was a place for my signature.
Q. No, there wasn't.
A. Right. So it may wel 1 have been that they've decided that that was an appropriate document to publish without necessarily coming to me. That would be okay with me on the basis that they're very experienced detectives and they should know how to run such an inquiry.
Q. Right. Well - and again, I'm not saying this critically, Mr Crandell, that's not the object of this exercise --
A. Sure, yes.
Q. -- but in your statement, those paragraphs that

I mentioned before, which $I$ wil1 just turn up again, 59 and 60, I wil1 just take you to those again. At 59 you say in the statement - but you've accepted this morning that it's not quite accurate - that the Bias Crimes Unit already had the tool, being the form, and you've agreed that that's not quite how it was, that the form itself was developed by the Parrabe11 officers?
A. Yes.
Q. But then in 60 you say - and $I$ won't read it out, but
if you would read it to yourself - that you considered that the Bias Crime Indicator Form or tool was appropriate for various reasons. Take a moment to read through that. One of them is the one you just mentioned, that all indicators could be present and yet no bias crime, and conversely, no indicators could be present and yet there was a bias crime. A. Yes.
Q. And you make that point. But I'm raising 60 with you because I just want to try to get some clarity about how much awareness you had of the shape of the form that was going to be used. It sounds like you --
A. Yes.
Q. -- yourself must have given it some thought and approved of it?
A. Yes. No, I accept that the form and the indicators I was well aware of that. Whether I was involved in the coordinating instructions I can't say, but I do know that I understood the bias crime investigation tool because I understood that that's how I was going to be able to show that all of those factors had been considered and then how those factors were weighed to ultimately determine an intention or motivation of the offender.
Q. Now, in the course of the drafting process that evidently went on, did anyone, for example, Messrs Middleton or Grace or Bignell, or indeed anyone else, point out or suggest any limitations or problems with the proposed methodology?
A. Not to --
Q. Or possible problems?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. I think, though, at least in your mind, and perhaps you can tell us about whether there were any discussions about this, it was obvious to you that there would inevitably be some, or perhaps many, cases among the 88 where the documentary material available was scant or, indeed, in some cases, simply inadequate?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Did anyone, including you, raise that as a potential speed hump?
A. In terms of identifying the factors?
Q. In terms of the methodology. If the whole methodology was only to look at whatever was available in the historical files --
A. Yes.
Q. -- it was obvious that some, at least, of the historical files would just not have enough material there to really be any use to you?
A. Yes, I agree.
Q. You would agree with that?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. That's a shortcoming in the methodology, is it not perhaps an unavoidable one but a shortcoming?
A. Well, yes, I think it's very difficult to avoid that circumstance when, you know, we're talking about cases that go back to 1976, and you're right, there was very scant documentation in some of them and then there were others that had massive amounts of documentation. But really, the indicators should have been identified at a time when there was evidence to show them. If there wasn't, and they simply couldn't relate any of the indicators to any of the evidence that they had, then they would - they would not.
Q. When you say "the indicators should have been identified", you mean back in 1972 or whenever the incident occurred?
A. No. I'm saying the investigators would review that documentation and then determine whether or not the information would sit in an indicator to indicate that there was gay-hate bias.
Q. Let me just, because I need to do this formally, ask you to have a look at Sergeant Steer's statement, which is in that same volume, 1, at tab 6, I think, [SCOI.82080].
A. Yes.
Q. Could you just read paragraph 21 of his statement to yourself. It's quite long. I want to ask you about some aspects of it.
A. Yes, I've read that.
Q. I want to ask you about a few components of that.
A. Sure.
Q. In the second line, or first of all, starting at the
first line, we agree - you agree - that the form was created by the Parrabell officers?
A. Yes.
Q. He says in the next sentence:

There was no consultation with the Bias Crimes Coordinator --
ie, himself --
in relation to the creation of this form ...

Insofar as you know, that's correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Then a couple of lines below he says:

The [bias crime indicators] are utilised as an aide memoire within bias crimes investigations and not as a checklist as it appears to have been used by Strike Force Parrabel 1.

Now, first of all, did Sergeant Steer ever say something to that effect to you, either at the outset or at some point along the Strike Force Parrabell exercise?
A. He may have, I don't remember.
Q. Do you know whether he is correct in saying that the bias crime indicators were utilised as an aide-memoire within bias crime investigations and not as a checklist?
A. I would agree with that statement, but I don't agree that Strike Force Parrabell used them as a checklist.
Q. I see. I'11 come to that, thank you. Now, at the bottom of the page, still in paragraph 21 , he says:

The 10 indicators are designed to identify where deeper investigation is required during hate crime investigations ...

Just pausing there, do you see that?
A. I'm sorry, I've just lost my place.
Q. The very bottom 1 ine on that page, where paragraph 21
appears, he says:
The 10 indicators are designed to identify where deeper investigation is required during hate crime investigations ...

Do you see that?
A. I'm sorry, am I still on page 8? I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I'm on the wrong page, sorry.
Q. It's the bottom line on page 8 and it just spills over to the top line on page 9 .
A. Yes, I can see that, yes.
Q. Now, the point that he's making, as I would read it, is that the indicators are for use during an investigation, rather than after one?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that something that he ever put to you or explained to you?
A. I don't believe so, but as I say, I just don't remember.
Q. In the matter that appears on the top of page 9 in that paragraph - I won't take you to the detail of it substantially, you and he are on much the same page in those few sentences, in that he is saying that the indicators --
A. Yes.
Q. -- are there to - it's possible to have all 10 and not a hate crime or have none and it is a hate crime. You agree with that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And he says the indicators are there to assist investigators in identifying hate motivation through thorough investigation practices, ie, while the investigation is under way; agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. Then further down that paragraph, about four or five lines from the bottom, he says:

The mere presence of 1 indicator or multiple indicators does not rule in or out
a hate motivation, it is the motivation of the offender that determines the finding.

Now, first of al1, is that your understanding as we11? A. Yes, it is.
Q. And was that something that he ever said to you or you to him?
A. Oh, we had a number of discussions and $I$ would say that we would have covered that topic, because I was trying to learn what he knew about bias crimes.
Q. And when were you having these discussions with him? In 2015 when Strike Force Parrabel 1 was being set up or at some earlier time, or when?
A. I don't recall it. It was - it may have been before or during, I don't recal1. I know - I know that Sergeant Steer was at meetings that $I$ attended also. There was also a discussion that we had as a group in relation to some of the findings and some of the outcomes, and an agreement was reached on what those findings ought to be, and I took particular notice because it wasn't that the strike force investigators had their way on all occasions either. Some of what Geoff had raised was - some of his information was taken on board.
Q. Now, just in the last couple of lines of that paragraph, 21, I just need to give you a chance to respond to this, he says:

The improper use of the indicators as a checklist or a review form severely jeopardises the integrity of hate crime investigations ...

What is your response to that?
A. Well, I agree that it shouldn't be used as
a checklist. The review team were not - were conducting a review of material. I don't know why I wouldn't use hate crime indicators systemically to - particularly on the basis of the information that you've gone through, to indicate whether there was or was not bias motivation. Because ultimately, and as I understood it, we needed to identify the motivation for the crime. The indicators, as I said, they may all be present and it still might not be a hate motivation; or none of them could be present. So to me, that's not a tick box. That was a - that's something
that was able to be categorised by the investigators to give me some comfort that they had considered these different aspects and then show whether or not those aspects contributed to the motivation of the offender.
Q. Did he, Sergeant Steer, tell you many times that the indicators were not a checklist? Did he make that point to you?
A. I don't recall, but I - but I agree with that position.
Q. Did he tell you multiple times that Strike Force Parrabell, in his opinion, was using the indicators incorrectly?
A. I don't recall that, no.
Q. Do you know if either Sergeant Steer or anyone else passed on to the Flinders academics Sergeant Steer's view about the indicators not to be used as a checklist?
A. He may have. I don't remember whether I - whether I was aware of any of that. I know Sergeant Steer did have conversations with the academic review team, which I was more than happy with.
Q. Right.
A. I don't know the content of those discussions, unless you can point me to a document.
Q. I'll just take you to a couple of emails to see if you are aware of them or if it triggers a memory.
A. Sure.
Q. In volume 10, if you would turn to tab 246 , [SCOI.79856], this, you can see, is an email from Dr Dalton of Flinders --
A. Yes, to Sergeant Steer.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, Mr Gray, what tab was it?
MR GRAY: 246, volume 10, [SCOI.79856].
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Sorry, mine is blacked out where it says who it is to, so if that is to Sergeant Steer - it says, "Hi Geoff" so I presume it is.

MR GRAY: Q. Well, it's his work email address, but you can take it from me that --
A. I accept that it is, yes
Q. -- it's an email from Dr Dalton to Sergeant Steer, and he starts off, "Hi Geoff?
A. Yes.
Q. It is 12 December 2016?
A. Yes.
Q. Which you will recall was a point where the Strike Force Parrabell officers had largely, perhaps not entirely but largely, completed their reviews, and the Flinders team had in the last month or two begun their work. Do you remember that period?
A. Yes, that - sorry, there still would have been some work to be done at that stage by Parrabell investigators.
Q. True, but they were getting towards the finish line?
A. Towards the end, yes.
Q. And Dr Dalton says to Sergeant Steer:

It was ... good to have your contribution
today. I must say that having the BIAS
CRIME TEAM make determinations about the
cases strikes me as really important ...
Now, pausing there, I'11 come back to this, but the bias crime team were not being utilised by Strike Force Parrabell to make determinations about the cases, were they?
A. The - no, I wouldn't agree with that. I think that the bias crimes team - and bearing in mind the bias crimes team was pretty much Geoff Steer --
Q. Yes.
A. -- I know of at least - at least a meeting that I went to where input was sought. It didn't mean that
Sergeant Steer's opinion was necessarily determinative of the outcome, but it was good to have that discussion, and I know that Craig Middleton was interested in Geoff Steer's views, and I know that Geoff also had access to the Strike Force Parrabell e@gle.i system, which allowed him to be able to review some of the material.

So I wouldn't say that he - that we weren't interested in his views. I saw it as a collaborative approach. That was my view. And I keep saying "we". To my mind, it wasn't an "us and them" scenario; it was we as an organisation needed to come together and find out whether there was bias crime related.
Q. I'll come back to that side of it in a moment, the extent to which Sergeant Steer was part of what Parrabell did. But I'm just looking, for the moment, at the second paragraph of this email, where Dr Dalton says to Sergeant Steer:

I really appreciate what you said about the
"tick sheet" approach and that the
suggestion that the Parrabell detectives
seem to have misused the instrument.
Now, did Dr Dalton tell you that Sergeant Steer's view was
that the Parrabell detectives were using the Bias Crime Indicator Form in the wrong way or a wrong way?
A. No, he did not.
Q. Did Sergeant Steer tell you that?
A. I don't - I don't remember that. The reason that I say that is because I would have wanted details in relation to that.
Q. We11, what about the email at 248, [SCOI.79391]? The email chain, I should say. If we start from the back of this one, that is the beginning of the chain, we're now at 28 February 2017, so a couple of months later?
A. Yes.
Q. And this is Dalton to Steer, copied to, among others, Jacqueline Braw of the police and Craig Middleton of the police. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do, yes.
Q. And Dr Dalton says, among other things, that he's asking Sergeant Steer for some more information about what he calls - do you see in the second paragraph - the "FBI 10 point instrument"?
A. Yes.
Q. That's obviously a reference to the Bias Crime Indicator Form that was being used?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And the request that $\operatorname{Dr}$ Dalton makes is this: We fully appreciate that the instrument is just used as a "tick sheet" or guide to identifying a range of BIAS CRIMES [which is fine], but we really need to know if you have any data or research findings (that you may have gleaned whilst on training in the USA, perhaps?) that speaks to the reliability and grounding that underpins its accuracy use as an instrument.

That's the question. Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do, yes.
Q. The answer that comes back from Sergeant Steer at the top of the page, which I won't read out in full, consists of Sergeant Steer spelling out to Dr Dalton that the indicators are not a definitive checklist or tick sheet "as you put it"?
A. Yes.
Q. And he goes on a few lines down:

As the indicators are a prompt for officers there is no research that I am aware of that assesses their effectiveness.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. He says in bold capitals:

IF THEY ARE USED AS A CHECKLIST THEY DO NOT WORK.
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

They are purely designed to help police identify situations where bias motivation may be a factor and to then ask further questions to explore it.

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, did Sergeant Steer, appreciating this email doesn't go to you, ever express those views to you?
A. I don't believe so, but I can't remember. The reason

I say I don't believe so is because, if that was the case, then I probably would have explored that more, but as I indicated before, I do not believe that Strike Force Parrabell used them as a checklist. It was not the case that they went through each factor and ticked them off and added them up and said, "Well, there's more in this category, therefore, it's a bias crime; there's more in the other category, therefore, it's not." So it wasn't used in that fashion. The suggestion that it was is wrong.
Q. In the reply that Dr Dalton sends back on the front page of this chain, to Sergeant Steer - and he copies in, among others, Jackie Braw of the police - he says in the first main paragraph:
... I completely appreciate that the indicators are not a definitive check list or tick sheet.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Dr Dalton says:

Mind you, the detectives did somewhat [partially] use them in this way as a tool to identifying a bias.

Pausing there, is that correct in your understanding?
A. They used them as a tool, as indicators of whether or not there was a presence of bias.
Q. No, the suggestion in the sentence is that the detectives did partially use them in this way - ie, as a checklist or tick sheet, if you put those two sentences together?
A. Well, I guess you'd have to define what checklist or tick sheet is, because if it's a tick sheet that says, "That's there, therefore it's bias", it was not used in that way.
Q. Dr Dalton goes on:

I understand and appreciate that you have some major reservations about what the Parrabel 7 detectives did.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So this goes to Jackie Braw but doesn't go to you.

Was this exchange or the substance of it or the substance of Sergeant Steer's views conveyed to you?
A. Did Sergeant Steer convey them to me?
Q. Did he or did anyone else, for example, Jackie Braw, or did anyone, convey the substance of what Steer was putting to Dalton, to you?
A. I don't believe so but, as I said, I would disagree with it in any event.
Q. I will come back to that one more time a little later, but for the moment, just on the subject of Sergeant Steer, can I ask you a couple more questions. He was, as we've established, the Bias Crime Coordinator as at this time and the head of the Bias Crimes Unit --
A. Yes.
Q. -- or team leader of the Bias Crime Unit? He was someone who had devoted years of study to the issue of bias crime --
A. Yes.
Q. -- including both training and experience in the United States?
A. Yes.
Q. He had experience, himself, in using the nine bias crime indicators that he had learned about in the United States?
A. I'm not aware of that.
Q. You're not aware of that?
A. No, but I presume so, given he brought them into our organisation, that he'd have some understanding of them. Whether or not he has experience using them, I don't know.
Q. You don't know whether he had any experience using
them?
A. No. In an investigation? No.
Q. He had himself developed and used the tenth indicator that had been added in New South Wales?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the central purpose and objective of Strike Force

Parrabell was to consider whether certain kinds of bias, relating to sexuality and gender and like matters, were identifiably present in the case of the 88 deaths; agreed?
A. Well, sorry, you said "certain kinds of bias". I'm not sure what you mean by that.
Q. I did say certain kinds of bias relating to sexuality or gender or related matters?
A. Well, it was pretty much gay-hate bias was what we were looking for.
Q. Al1 right. Let's use that term, then. I'11 put the question in that language. The central purpose of Parrabell was to consider whether gay-hate bias was identifiably present in the 88 cases?
A. Yes.
Q. And Sergeant Steer was the most knowledgeable and experienced officer in the Police Force in relation to bias crime generally, was he not?
A. Well, he - yes, he - in terms of bias crimes, yes. Investigations, not necessarily, but definitely the bias aspect of the investigation, yes.
Q. Now, in your statement, [SCOI.76961], and we'11 just go to it, at paragraph 48 and 49 , you tel1 us --
A. Sorry, did you say my statement?
Q. I did. At volume 1, thanks.
A. Yes.
Q. I just want to go through what you say in 48 and 49 about the involvement of Sergeant Steer.
A. Yes.
Q. In 48 you say that during the planning of the strike force, you approached and gained - sorry, obtained general advice from the Bias Crimes Unit through Sergeant Steer in relation to the assessment of bias crimes. Now, is that
accurate?
A. I believe so.
Q. And what was the general advice that you obtained from him?
A. I don't - I don't remember the specific advice but generally about bias, given he was the bias crimes coordinator, it would make sense that I would do that.

THE COMMISSIONER: $Q$. So you went to him because of your perception of his expertise?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. The next sentence tells us that he was not involved in the scope of Strike Force Parrabell. What does that mean? Do you mean by that not involved in the scoping - that is, the devising of Strike Force Parrabell - or do you mean not involved in the work of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. No, I don't mean not involved in the work of Strike Force Parrabell because I believe he was. It was more as to, you know, the fact that we were going to look at 88 gay-hate crimes, albeit he had indicated that in Operation Parrabell anyway.
Q. What does it mean to say he was not involved in the scope of the strike force?
A. I would say in relation to how we were going to go about bringing the investigators in and how we were going about investigating the different aspects of the crimes.
Q. And not involved - I think you may have said this already - in the formulation of either the investigation plan or the coordinating instructions?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Or the bias crime indicators form?
A. Well, as I say, he may not have been personally involved in that, but obviously that information has been drawn from records that have been corporately endorsed, and on that basis, I think were legitimate.
Q. On that basis, what?
A. I think they're legitimate, on that basis.
Q. I'm not asking you about whether they're legitimate. I'm asking you whether he was involved in the formulation of the form and I think your evidence is that he was not? A. Well, it's a qualified answer. So I'm saying - I'm saying that he may not have been involved personally in preparing that form, but the information in that form was drawn from information that he had brought into the organisation.
Q. Sure.
A. So on that basis, I would say yes, there is some involvement.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But, Mr Crande11, a cursory reading of the form, which I understand you would have undertaken at the very least, would expose the fact that it was clearly not a form devised solely to identify gay-hate bias?
A. That - the form was not?
Q. I'm putting to you that a cursory glance at the form would indicate that it was not a form solely devised to identify gay-hate bias?
A. I don't know if I agree with that, Commissioner.
Q. Don't you? Well, what has a burning cross got to do with gay-hate bias? There are many forms of words in the form that - would you not agree - make it clear that it was a generic form which was devised and which could capture religious, racial or other forms of bias?
A. It could capture different forms of bias, but --
Q. But what would a burning cross have to do with gay hate, for example?
A. Well, if that was a symbol that indicated --
Q. Gay hate?
A. -- membership of a particular organisation or a hate group, perhaps.
Q. And the organisation that that --

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, I would ask you to allow him to finish to answer your questions, please. He was attempting to answer your question.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr Tedeschi. Would you mind
taking your seat, thank you.
Q. Yes, go on, Mr Crande11.
A. I guess that would be relevant if it was indicative of a person's membership of an organisation or a hate group. To me, it was a form that would indicate different factors that may produce a gay-hate motivation.
Q. Amongst other discriminatory attitudes?
A. Potentially, but my understanding, Commissioner, was that that document was brought in specifically to give indications of whether or not gay-hate motivation existed.
Q. And did you understand anything about the terminology of the form, such that it was clearly also capable of identifying racial or ethnic discrimination?
A. I would have to review the form, Commissioner, but --
Q. We11, you would have reviewed it at the time, surely?
A. I would have reviewed the form at the time, absolute1y.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you. Yes, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Q. Just back to paragraph 48, you say:

> Although [he] was not involved in the scope of Strike Force Parrabel7, he was invited to the initial planning meetings that were held by the Strike Force ... investigation team ...

Now, I did ask you earlier whether anyone else was at the meetings that you were at besides Messrs Middleton, Grace and Bigne11, and you said not in meetings that you were present at. So was Sergeant Steer invited to any such meetings?
A. Yes. Sorry, that's very broad, what you're talking about there, because clearly I've been involved in meetings with Sergeant Steer and those other people that you've indicated, particularly on 1 December --
Q. 2015?
A. -- 2015, where we had a group meeting and we discussed with other members of the community exactly where we were in relation to Strike Force Parrabell. We also had at least another meeting or another meeting that I'm aware of
that I was present in with Sergeant Steer and those other officers to discuss the findings and the outcomes of some of the - of some of the crimes being investigated or reviewed.
Q. Let me just take you to 49 in your statement and see whether you say that it's correct. "Sergeant Steer", I'm quoting:
... was not included in Strike Force
Parrabel1 ...
That's correct, isn't it?
A. Well, that's probably not - not entirely correct, because I am aware that Sergeant Steer had access to the e@gle.i database for Strike Force Parrabel1, so to say that he's not involved is - sounds very exclusionary, but my understanding was that that's not necessarily the case and that he did have access to all material from Strike Force Parrabell if he chose to look at it.
Q. Well, is it right to say that Sergeant Steer was not included in Strike Force Parrabell - which you have said or is that wrong?
A. I don't say he was included in the Strike Force Parrabell investigation team, but I do say that as part of the overall operations of Strike Force Parrabell, he did have access to material and he was consulted.
Q. Well, what you actually say is he was "not included in Strike Force Parrabell" for a particular reason, namely, because he was not part of the review team of investigators. Now, indeed, he was not part of that review team of investigators, was he?
A. He wasn't part of the review team of investigators, but he did participate in particular reviews, and I know that because --
Q. Well, I'll come to that but when - sorry, go on.
A. Sorry, I know that because I was in meetings at that time with him.
Q. Well, I will come to that, but when you say he participated in relation to particular reviews, that's one meeting about 12 cases, isn't it?
A. No, well, that's one meeting that I've told you off the top of my head. I would have to go and check as to
what other involvement there was. But there was - I was eager to have Geoff Steer involved because of his position as the bias crimes coordinator, bearing in mind that he had a very, very broad remit and that Strike Force Parrabell was only one of many other responsibilities that he had at the time, and I was very much aware of that.
Q. Let's look at the second sentence of 49:

He advised on use and rationale regarding the bias/hate crime indicator tool...

Now, that is simply wrong, isn't it?
A. No, I don't - why would I say that's wrong?
Q. Well, I thought we had been through, this morning, several times, actually, that the bias crime indicator tool was created by the Parrabell detectives and not Sergeant Steer?
A. That doesn't necessarily then lead to the fact that he didn't advise on anything.
Q. But I have asked you several times whether he was consulted or not and several times you have said no.
A. He may well have --
Q. Do you now want to change that?
A. No, I don't - no, I don't think I need to change anything. What it says here is that he advised on the use and rationale. So it may well have been --
Q. Regarding the tool, ie, the form?
A. That's right. It may well have been that he said "Don't use it as a checklist", as he has indicated to Derek Dalton. I can't tell you specific instances of where that's occurred.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. So the term "advised" in your paragraph, could mean positively in favour of or negatively against?
A. Yes .
Q. But you can't remember either way?
A. I can't remember either way, Commissioner. However, if there was criticism of that tool, I can assure you I would have taken action to make sure that it would withstand criticism, given the enormity of the task that we
were going to undertake and the eagerness that $I$ had to make sure that all of the material was properly assessed and properly considered to determine whether or not bias was involved in any of these crimes.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right, thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Next, in the same sentence, you say:
... to my mind [he] commenced looking at the 88 gay hate crimes through Operation Parrabe 17 ...

Now, that's not correct either, is it?
A. No, that is correct.
Q. I asked you this yesterday.
A. Why is that not correct?
Q. I asked you this yesterday. I asked you yesterday whether he had prepared the North Head bias assessment in 2013, and we agreed that he had?
A. Yes.
Q. And he'd prepared the North Head Marks Park comparison in 2014, and you agreed that he had?
A. Yes.
Q. And that took us up to May 2014?
A. Yes.
Q. And I asked you whether, thereafter, he or Operation Parrabell did anything else in relation to the 88 cases, and you said no, your understanding was that he didn't? A. But clearly he would have --
Q. Now, is that right or is that not right?
A. No, clearly he would have been looking at the 88 gay hate crimes, because there was a document that was compiled and formed the basis of Operation Parrabe11. So to say that he wouldn't have commenced looking at those crimes would be incorrect.
Q. What does the expression "to my mind" mean?
A. To my mind, in my opinion.
Q. We11, either he commenced looking at them or he
didn't. It's not a matter of opinion, is it?
A. Well, if the 88 gay-hate crimes indicated that formed the basis of Operation Parrabell, then it would seem really reasonable to me that somebody would have at least looked at those, particularly the person who was the commander of Operation Parrabell, that being Sergeant Steer - he would have at least looked at those 88 crimes to see what they were. He wouldn't simply put 88 people in a Terms of Reference for an operation, I wouldn't think.
Q. So when you say "to my mind" he did it, you're saying that he would have done it, surely, he must have?
A. That would be my - a presumption that would naturally follow.
Q. You then say, however, this:
... aside from a brief advisory role, he
was not involved in Strike Force
Parrabell's daily operations.
Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And the brief advisory role was at the beginning of the Strike Force Parrabell exercise, I take it?
A. I can't say that with certainty, because he was definitely consulted, obviously, on 1 December, and probably - and must have been prior to that, because he'd come to a view.

There was also another meeting that I'm aware of with him and the Strike Force Parrabell investigators, so there would have been some advice from Geoff at that stage. But to - it would be inappropriate to involve him in Parrabell's daily operations given the position that he held and the responsibilities that he had, in my opinion.
Q. Why?
A. Because he simply wouldn't have the time. He's one man. To then say to him, "I want you to be part of Strike Force Parrabell's operations" would be inappropriate.
Q. Even though he was the personification, in his own individual self, of the expertise available to the NSW Police about bias crime?
A. But that doesn't mean that I should have an expert
that runs through with an investigation team. That means I have a person who has a look at different cases and provides me advice, surely. I wouldn't have --
Q. But, Mr Crande11, Parrabe11 was not an investigation, was it?
A. It's an investigative review. So --
Q. Well, no, I'm sorry, I know that expression is used in the report, but the whole thrust of what the report repeatedly says is that it was not an investigation; it was a review?
A. No, you're mistaken.
Q. Isn't that right?
A. You're mistaken. It is not a reinvestigation. Okay, you still have to investigate to perform a review. That's my opinion.
Q. We11, just unpack that for us. What do you mean by that?
A. Well, I've said consistently that it's not
a reinvestigation. A reinvestigation means that you go
back out, you review locations, you look for witnesses, you re-interview people in order to determine who the perpetrator is for an offence. That was not what Strike Force Parrabel 1 was doing. They were conducting a review, which obviously requires skills of an investigator to have a look at evidence that has been obtained at some stage.
Q. Right. So you're using the word "investigative" there to apply to the intellectual exercise of looking at the evidence to form a view as to whether there was a bias factor or not?
A. To conduct a competent review, yes.
Q. You're calling that investigative?
A. Yes. I used investigators for that purpose dedicated investigators that - many of whom were designated detectives or had significant experience in investigations to do so.

THE COMMISSIONER: $Q . \quad$ And there was a directive, was there not, that none of the people doing this should speak to anyone who had been involved in the original investigation? Is that so?
A. That's correct.
Q. So that their entire activity, pretty much without exception, was to read whatever paper existed within your holdings, take the form in their left hand or right, fill it out for whatever purpose, and then form their own view at the end as to whether or not they thought there was a bias crime or not?
A. There was a little bit more in terms of governance for that. I don't think it was a case of just the investigators filling out a document.
Q. No, I'm not suggesting that's all they did. What I said to you was they read the files, whatever the files consisted of, they filled out the forms, by largely setting out a narrative of what they believed had occurred from the date of death or discovery of the deceased, and then formed a view, based upon that exercise, as to whether they thought there had been bias or no bias or evidence of or lack of it?
A. Yes, on that journey, Commissioner, they would report through on a weekly basis to the investigations manager, Detective Sergeant Grace. There would be --
Q. Yes, but I'm sorry to interrupt you, but I'm just trying to establish that prior to the reporting exercise, the exercise undertaken by each of the officers - and please correct me if I'm wrong - was that of the kind of which I have outlined: they read the files, they filled out the forms and they formed a view, obviously perhaps the subject of reporting or discussion, as to whether or not they thought at that stage there was or was not evidence of bias?
A. Yes. And those thoughts or those - the position that they came to would be under review by more senior detectives, so that was the governance that I had in place.
Q. Who were governed by the same source material?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Could you just turn to Sergeant Steer's statement in volume 1, tab 6 [SCOI. 82080], and find paragraph 40.
A. Yes .
Q. In fact, I will just start with 39 . According to

Sergeant Steer, after completing the North Head assessment and the Marks Park comparison, the archive briefs for the identified homicides - which I presume he means the 80 odd - were identified and sourced from State Archives to commence the initial review. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He says, however:
... at this stage the scale of the undertaking and the lack of resources became a deciding factor.

Do you see that?
A. Yes. Sorry, in context, I think he's talking about Operation Parrabell; is that right.
Q. He talking about Operation Parrabell, quite so. So we're on the same page. He's talking evidently about the point just after the Marks Park comparison, which is May 2014. Agreed? That's what he says:

After completing the North Head assessment --
which was October 2013 --
and the Marks Park comparison --
May 2014, he got the briefs of evidence, presumably for the 80, I take it, or for some of them, at least, from archives?
A. Yes, I doubt --
Q. That's what he says he did?
A. Yes, I doubt that he got the whole 88 from State

Archives. I doubt that very much.
Q. Well, he got something. He got something from State Archives. But in any event, what he says is - and this is what I'm asking about -
... at this stage the scale of the undertaking and the lack of resources became a deciding factor.

And he goes on to say, in effect, that the only resources
available to him were - to Operation Parrabell - were himself and Sergeant Kenworthy, and he says that:

On obtaining the archived material ... it was determined by ... Sergeant Kenworthy and myself that ... [it would take us] three years to [do it if that's all we did].

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And he says, if you read it all - by all means - there were offers of additional staff, including an offer from you, but that no additional resources were forthcoming. What do you say about that?
A. I don't - I don't have an independent recollection of asking for more staff, but Senior Sergeant Kenworthy, Jo Kenworthy, was a senior Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer. Not under my command, I stress that. But I don't think that the time frames are realistic at all.
Q. Perhaps not, but let's put that to one side; you may well be right.
A. Well, no, I think it's relevant because --
Q. Well you go on, then, okay.
A. Because if you're saying three years and five years, then I would have to ask for resources for a significant period of time.
Q. Sure.
A. And I would need something, I think more than a conversation, to say that those resources ought to be applied, particularly when we're talking about a reinvestigation, which would then involve detectives at the very least.
Q. Sure. That's not actually where I'm going with this, but thank you for that. But on the next page, still part of paragraph 39, about four lines down, he says, given the estimated time frames and competing priorities and so on:
... it was decided to suspend Operation Parrabell until additional resources could be obtained.

Now, he doesn't say who made that decision, but do you know who made that decision to suspend Operation Parrabell?
A. Well, I would presume it was Sergeant Steer, given he was the commander of Operation Parrabel1, but that would be a sensible decision in my view and I would have been comfortable with that decision.
Q. And he says, moving down to the bottom of that paragraph:

It was not until 2015 that a minimal staff allocation was received --
by which he means for Operation Parrabe11 - and he says --
... by that stage Strike Force Parrabe11 had taken over.

You may or may not know about those details. Do you know anything about that?
A. Sorry, where is that?
Q. The last few lines of that paragraph.
A. Oh, no, I don't - I don't know about staff being allocated to Operation Parrabell. It would depend when in 2015, but obviously by, I would say, June or July, Strike Force Parrabell would have been sourcing resources. I don't - and as I say, that's not resources just from one command.
Q. Would you agree, given what Sergeant Steer describes in the first half of that paragraph, that in fact, after doing the two assessments, the North Head and the comparison, he didn't actually do any work on the 88 as a project?
A. Well - well, he's - according to his statement, he's sourced some material from archives, so --
Q. That's right.
A. -- he's obviously gone some way to having a look at, as I indicated, those 88.
Q. Well, no, he says, doesn't he, that having got it from the archives, it was determined that it would take too long and it was decided to suspend the operation?
A. Yes.
Q. So he didn't actually do any work in relation to the 80?
A. But he has obviously had to identify the victims and the case files in order to get them from State Archives, so obviously, he has started to have a look at them. You don't just go to State Archives and say, "Give me what you've got."
Q. Well, he identified which ones he wanted from State Archives?
A. Yes.
Q. But having got them, he then suspended the operation?
A. Well --
Q. Isn't that what he --
A. Yes, but that supports what I'm saying in my statement, that he commenced looking at them. I don't think that $I$ would go - come back from that.
Q. If that's what you say, all right, I'11 move on. In paragraph 40, Sergeant Steer says that he had minimal involvement with respect to Strike Force Parrabe11. Would you agree with that?
A. No, I don't.
Q. He says at the original meeting he gave certain advice about the assessments and then he says:

I offered to assist the Strike Force and was advised that the Strike Force would seek assistance if required.

Do you agree with that?
A. Sorry, is that - are you reading from the paragraph --
Q. The fourth 1 ine of paragraph 40:

I offered to assist the Strike Force and was advised that the Strike Force would seek assistance if required.

Do you agree with that?
A. No, I - we11, I can't agree with that because I don't know that that occurred.
Q. We11, if he made such an offer, are you saying it
wasn't made to you?
A. We11, it wasn't made to me, necessarily, in those terms. But my understanding was that Geoff Steer was to be involved in Strike Force Parrabell in his capacity as the bias crimes coordinator.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Do you mean by that, I'm sorry, that the strike force were instructed or directed to check with him in relation to the assessments of each case?
A. Not of each case, Commissioner no.
Q. What, on an ad hoc basis, if and when they thought it was helpful?
A. If they thought it was helpful, then it would be - he would be a person that I would think they --
Q. All right. So it was left to the discretion of the individual member of Strike Force Parrabell whether he or she made any contact with Sergeant Steer about any particular case?
A. I don't think it's necessarily the discretion of the individual investigators, because each of those cases were reviewed by more senior investigators, whether that be Detective Sergeant Grace or Detective Inspector Middleton. So it may well have --
Q. All right. Let me reformulate it: then, was it left to the discretion of whoever the senior person was, including yourself as commanding officer, whether Sergeant Steer's views on any individual case were sought or not?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. In the same volume, tab 14, the investigation plan, [SCOI.74385], if you turn to page 4 of that in tab 14?
A. Yes.
Q. This is the investigation plan , and I'm at page 4 and there's a heading "Progress Meetings"; do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Under "Month1y Progress Meetings" it says that monthly progress meetings would include, among others, the Bias Crime Coordinator, meaning Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the Strike Force Parrabell work started in late August or early September 2015, and it went through to some time in 2017?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. So 18 months or so. Presumably, there were month1y meetings over those 18 months?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. But Sergeant Steer, the bias crimes coordinator, was at very few, if any, of those; is that right?
A. I don't know that.
Q. Did you not attend them yourself?
A. I wasn't at each of those meetings either.
Q. Was he at any of the ones that you were at?
A. I don't remember. I know - I know Detective Inspector

Craig Middleton conducted many of those meetings and that involved the investigators and Detective Sergeant Grace.
Q. Detective what, sorry?
A. Detective Sergeant Grace.
Q. Back to paragraph 40 of Sergeant Steer's statement, which is at tab 6 of the volume, [SCOI. 82080]?
A. Sorry, what was that paragraph?
Q. Paragraph 40, tab 6.
A. Yes.
Q. About five lines down, do you see he has a sentence beginning:

During the time frame ...
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

During the time frame that the Strike Force
Parrabell operated there was no consultation with the Bias Crimes
Coordinator ... with any of the cases.

Now, I want to ask you a question about that, but just so that we don't go off on a tangent, do you see a few lines down, three lines from the bottom of that page, he says:

After Strike Force Parrabell completed their assessments, and after raising concerns about the lack of consultation, $I$ was allowed to conduct a dip sample of 12 cases.
A. Sorry, where is that written? I've lost --
Q. Paragraph 40. I'11 go over it again. Five lines down paragraph 40, do you see a sentence beginning "During the time frame"?
A. Yes, no, I've read that one. You just read further on and I didn't know where.
Q. About five lines below that, three lines from the bottom of the page - the same page --

MR MADDEN: It's the next page.
THE WITNESS: It is the next page.
MR GRAY: Q. It's not on mine, I have different pagination, I'm sorry. Well, anyway, five lines below, do you see a sentence beginning:

After Strike Force Parrabel1 --
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

After Strike Force Parrabell completed
their assessments and after raising concerns ... I was allowed to conduct a dip sample of 12 cases.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So he is differentiating, rightly or wrongly, between the time that Strike Force Parrabell operated, when he says there was no consultation about any of the cases, and after the strike force had completed their assessments when he
said he was allowed to do a dip sample of 12. Do you follow what he is saying?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. The first question is prior to the dip sample of 12 , which we will come to and which is in 2017, do you agree that during the time frame that Strike Force Parrabell operated, there was no consultation with him about any of the cases?
A. No.
Q. Well, which cases was there consultation about?
A. I don't know, but I am aware that Sergeant Steer was involved in meetings about particular cases. So --
Q. How are you aware of that?
A. We11, 1 December, in 2015 --
Q. But was that about particular cases?
A. -- there was a meeting that - yes.
Q. Wasn't that a meeting of stakeholders --
A. Yes.
Q. -- with politicians and people from the gay community?
A. Yes, that was talking about the cases, and that - and

I think I said yesterday, the difficulty with that process was the confidentiality concerns that we had when we were discussing cases.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Yes, but you're suggesting, are you, that a meeting with, amongst other people, stakeholders at which the Sergeant Steer was present, complies with the definition of you or others in Parrabell consulting with him on cases? Do you say it comes within that definition, do you?
A. Well, I would say that there would be some information provided to Sergeant Steer in relation to the cases that we were discussing with members of the community.
Q. So, therefore, because some information was supplied to a meeting, which included members of the community or community groups, but at which Sergeant Steer was present, you include that in what you called "consultation process" with Sergeant Steer about particular cases?
A. I would say that's part of it, Commissioner. That's part of a consultation, because obviously if there was
concerns from the Bias Crime Coordinator, I would want to hear those if --
Q. All right, thank you. All right, that's fine. I just wanted to know whether you included it as part of the definition of "consultation". Thank you for that. A. Thank you. I think there was other - there was other instances where there was - where he was present during meetings.

MR GRAY: Q. With you?
A. I believe so.
Q. Discussing cases?
A. Yes - in fact, yes, because there was a meeting where - there was a discussion with Sergeant Steer and others, although that may have been the dip sampled ones I'm thinking of now --
Q. Well, just for the moment - although I will come to that --

MR TEDESCHI: I ask that he be able to finish his answer --

MR GRAY: Q. No, please. For the moment, although I will come to that, I'm just putting the dip sample meeting to one side.
A. Yes .
Q. So apart from that dip sample meeting --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and apart from the community meeting that you were just discussing with the Commissioner --
A. Yes.
Q. -- is there any other meeting that you say occurred where he was consulted about any particular case?
A. I don't have evidence of other meetings before me now.

Whether that was or was not the case I'm uncertain, but --
Q. You don't know?
A. No. But the other fact is that he also had access to Strike Force Parrabell and every piece of information that that strike force went through.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. And do you know, Mr Crande11, whether minutes of the, say, month1y meeting, were kept or not - you know, the monthly meeting that has been discussed where the investigators got together and consulted amongst themselves. Do you know whether minutes were kept of those meetings?
A. I'm uncertain, Commissioner. I could check to see whether there was some documentation.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, thank you. Are you going to go to another topic?

MR GRAY: I'm content to take the break.
THE COMMISSIONER: I will take the break now, thank you. I will adjourn shortly.

## SHORT ADJOURNMENT

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr Crande11.
Before you resume, Mr Gray, can I just ask if at some point, you, Mr Gray, Mr Madden, Mr Tedeschi, could talk to each other about timing so that whatever is going to happen - I'm indifferent as to when things happen, but if you can just talk to each other so as to accommodate each other as to whatever else you think is on your respective agenda.

MR GRAY: Certainly.
THE COMMISSIONER: Right, thank you. Yes.
MR GRAY: Q. I will just try to get to the end of this topic, if I can, Mr Crandell. Can we go back to your statement, volume 1, tab 4, [SCOI.76961], paragraphs 48 and 49. Now, we've been over them. I won't rehash the ground again. Just to pick up what you are saying there - I'm not suggesting this is everything you are saying, but the gist of it - you say, among other things:
... Sergeant Steer was not involved in the scope of Strike Force Parrabell ...

Correct?
A. Yes.
Q.

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        ... he was invited to some initial planning
``` meetings.

Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Then in 49, "not included in Strike Force Parrabe11"?
A. Yes.
Q. He was not part of the review team investigators?
A. No, not - with the exception of the 14.
Q. Pardon?
A. With the exception of the 14 - I think there was 14
that was asked for his review.
Q. Oh, the \(12 ?\)
A. The 12, sorry, 12.
Q. The proposition you state is he was not part of the review team of investigators, and that's correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say in the last line of 49:
... aside from a brief advisory role, he was not involved in Strike Force Parrabel7's daily operations.

And that's right, isn't it?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. Now, before the break, we were talking about the question of how much consultation was involved between the strike force and Sergeant Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. And as \(I\) understood it, your suggestion was, in effect, twofold, that in the first place, the strike force material was on e@gle.i?
A. Yes.
Q. And so are you saying that he could have got on to the computer and looked up the thousands of documents that the Parrabell people had, in effect, duplicated what they were doing personally, if he'd wanted to?
A. Yes.
Q. That's not really what most people would think of as consultation, is it?
A. Oh, I'm not necessarily saying that was consultation. I'm just indicating that he did have that access. I was aware that he had that access. I'm not suggesting that that's a consultation - an element of consultation.
Q. Fine. And nor is it really a realistic possibility that one man could single handedly duplicate what 13 people were doing in a strike force?
A. No. He had a large job ahead of him, there is no doubt about that, and not just in this strike force.
Q. Quite. And then the other aspect of consultation you mentioned was that he was at, you say, at least a couple of meetings along the time frame, and you mentioned one, being the stakeholder meeting on 1 December 2015, where there were community representatives and politicians; that was one?
A. Yes.
Q. And another one was what he calls the dip --
A. The dip sample, 12, yep.
Q. The dip sample meeting which was in early 2017 ?
A. Yes.
Q. But apart from those two meetings you have no personal knowledge yourself of any other meetings that he was present at involving review of the cases?
A. No, not without me going and reviewing records or whatever. But I don't - I don't remember - they're the two that I remember.
Q. Okay.
A. But - no.
Q. If he was to have been consulted - that's hypothetically --
A. Yes.
Q. -- putting aside the possibility of looking at the entirety of what was available on e@gle.i, the way to do it, presumably, would have been to show him, had someone wanted to, some or all of the completed Bias Crime

Indicator Forms; correct?
A. Yes, I would think so - I'm not sure what he was shown in relation to the 12 , but whatever that was would be --
Q. Well, let's just keep the 12 to one side for the moment, but just in the broad, a way, realistically, in which he could have been consulted, would have been to send him the completed forms and seek his views?
A. Yes.
Q. That wasn't done, was it?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. No. And indeed, as late as December - sorry, November 2016, do you recall this - and you may or may not, it was an email into which you were copied and I'll show it to you - Shobha Sharma asked when the cases that had been worked on were going to be sent to the bias crimes team to have a look at; do you remember that?
A. If you say to me that's in the email, then obviously I was told that. I don't remember - have an independent recollection of that.
Q. Fair enough. Could I ask you to just turn up volume 3, please, and turn to tab 76, [SCOI.74377]. It's an email chain and just again, as usual, start from the back, or bottom. It's an email from Shobha Sharma on 10 November 2016 to Mr Middleton, with a copy to you. Do you see that? A. Yes. Yes, I do.
Q. November 2016 was a year and a bit into the strike force's work; agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. And although not quite finished, the strike force team was nearing the end of its work in reviewing the cases; you'd agree?
A. Yes.
Q. And Shobha Sharma says to Mr Middleton:

When will you send through the cases that the team have worked on for the Bias Crimes Team to look at?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can read the rest of it to yourself.

Mr Middleton replies, turning to the front of the page --
A. Yes.
Q. -- in the second paragraph, he says:
... we have commenced sending the review forms to Dr Dalton ... I was not privy to any agreement to send the Bias Crime Unit the review forms prior to sending them to Dr Dalton.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's pretty clear, and I think you've just agreed anyway yourself, that the bias crime forms had not been sent to the Bias Crimes Unit?
A. No, I don't think so.
Q. And Shobha Sharma responds at the top of the page, in the third - it's the second paragraph actually, that there had been an agreement that after the Parrabe11 team completed its work, the next step would be to send it across to bias crimes?
A. Yes.
Q. But evidently that had not happened; do you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Given that state of affairs, and given what you've said in paragraphs 48 and 49 - sorry, before I ask you that, there's one more question or one more context I should give you, which is the email that I showed you earlier but I'11 just show you again. It's in volume 10 at tab 246, [SCOI.79856].
A. Yes.
Q. So this is an email from Dalton to Steer a month later - a month after that little exchange between Sharma and Middleton?
A. Yes.
Q. So it's December 2016, and Da1ton is saying to Steer:

It was ... good to have your contribution today.

So Steer had evidently had some involvement that day, it seems?
A. Yes. With Mr Dalton, yes.
Q. With Dalton, that's right.
A. Yes.
Q. And Dalton says:

I must say that having the BIAS CRIME team make determinations about the cases strikes me as really important ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And although it struck Dalton as being important, it evidently hadn't struck you or the Strike Force Parrabell team; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. My question, I suppose, in the light of all that, is why didn't you utilise Sergeant Steer or the Bias Crimes Unit in relation to Strike Force Parrabell more than what, in your own words, was a brief advisory role? Why not? A. My view at the time was that the investigators are trained to identify motivation. Ultimately, at the end of all of our deliberations and all of our recordings, it came down to that question: what was the motivation of the perpetrator?

I felt that the team of detectives had sufficient ability to be able to look at the different factors of bias motivation and then make a determination as to whether or not a case was bias or hate-crime related.

There were some matters, though - and I think that's where the 12 cases come from - that - and there are a number of matters where the determination of that bias was extremely difficult, not only for the police but also for the academic team. And even in the case files, you'll see where there's polar opposites of whether or not there was gay-hate bias found. So to my view, I had a very senior level team of detectives in charge of a number of other detectives doing the reviews and I felt that they had sufficient experience and training to be able to identify
whether or not motivation fell into the bias category. So what I'm saying is in terms of - in my opinion, when we developed the system of looking at the bias crimes, the indicators, that gave me an ability to see the thinking of the investigators and to see how their - what factors come into play, but once we had that system in place and we knew that these are the factors that we look at and this is how it comes together to form the intention, then I felt that I had sufficient expertise in that investigative team to be able to come to that - to arrive at that finding or determination without necessarily going to the bias crimes coordinator on every occasion.

The other thing that I was mindful of was the bias crimes coordinator was really one person, so to me, he had a much broader remit than just LGBTI gay-hate bias.
Q. No doubt. What I want to ask you, I suppose, is this, though: did you choose not to utilise him more than you did because he might have expressed views or made assessments that you preferred not to receive?
A. No. Definitely not. I can elaborate on that if you wish.
Q. Do.
A. I would say definitely not, and the reason I say that is because I knew very early on that the identification of gay-hate bias was an extremely difficult task. So for Geoff or anybody in operational programs to have a different view, that would not be surprising to me, because there were so many factors, and then there was a weighting that had to be involved. It was not a simple process. So I don't believe that I would shy away from wanting to know contrary views, and I don't believe that that would have been a factor in me saying, "Please don't provide that material to the bias crimes coordinator."

At the time - I mean, I wasn't aware of the email from Shobha Sharma, but I have a very good working relationship with Shobha Sharma, and so to my mind, if there was a big concern over matters, I think she would - she would speak to me about that, she would raise that.
Q. Well, she did - oh, you mean spoken to you as distinct from emailed you?
A. Yes, but - I mean, I can't remember her emails to me, but if she said to me, "Look, I'm concerned about Geoff not
having enough involvement in reviews", then I would have certainly brought that into consideration.
Q. Isn't that what essentially she did say in that email of November?
A. Is that to me, though, is it?
Q. It's copied to you.
A. Okay.
Q. That's at tab 79 --
A. Yes, but I thought that Detective Inspector --
Q. 76, I'm sorry.
A. Sorry?
Q. I beg your pardon. It's tab 76, if you need to see it again.
A. Okay. Is that in a different volume?
Q. Tab 3 - sorry, volume 3, tab 76, [SCOI.74377], that's if you need it again?
A. I remember the general gist --
Q. I'm just observing that it was copied to you.
A. Yeah, but I thought Craig Middleton answered that.
Q. He did, also copied to you?
A. Yes. And I thought that Shobha Sharma accepted what Craig had said in the main. Am I --
Q. Well, she accepted, I think, that Middleton may not have known of the arrangement?
A. Yes.
Q. But she was confirming that, indeed, that was the arrangement, and that Steer should have, and perhaps inferentially should now, be given the forms.
A. Yes.
Q. And then if I can just move on from that, it seems that what then happened - tell me if this is your recollection - is that the next month, which was by then January 2017, there's what Mr Steer calls the dip sample exercise occurred --
A. Yes.
Q. -- where he, according to him, was given 12 to look at?
A. Yes.
Q. You recall that he says that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you indeed recall, I gather, something essentially to that effect?
A. Yes.
Q. He did look at 12 ?
A. Yes.
Q. And he expressed certain views about those 12 ?
A. Yes.
Q. Which in some respects were different from what the Parrabell officers had said?
A. Well, there were some differences and some similarities.
Q. Yes.
A. And then I think there was a collaborative effort to then come to an agreed position.
Q. Yes. And that - do you have volume 3 with you there? It is tab 83, [SCOI.74429]. It's volume 3, tab 83.
A. Yes.
Q. This is, it seems, in effect, minutes of a meeting on 19 January 2017?
A. Yes.
Q. Which you attended among others, including Sergeant Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. Item 2 is "Bias Crime Unit review of 12 cases"?
A. Yes.
Q. And there is a note of what the upshot was of this meeting in respect of all of those 12?
A. Yes.
Q. As far as you're aware, that's the only time Sergeant Steer was asked to give his views on any of the 88 cases?
A. Yes, look, I - I can't give evidence on that, but if Sergeant Steer says that, then I would accept that.
Q. Do you have an actual live recollection now of that meeting and what was --
A. Yes, I do. I saw something else in documents that gave a table. There were three tables in relation to the cases that were reviewed.
Q. Perhaps I should show you that. I think that is at tab 84, [SCOI.74430]. Is that the one you are recalining? A. Yes, yes.
Q. So the idea was, was it - tell me if this is right that Sergeant Steer's views would be discussed?
A. Yes.
Q. And the attempt would be made to reach what might be called a consensus?
A. Yes.
Q. And according to this document, at any rate, the consensus was what's under the heading "Combined Assessment" in the lower table?
A. Yes. Yes. That's what I recall the outcomes to be. I was quite happy with that approach. I can't tel 1 you why they were those 12. I don't know. There would have been reasons for why they were those 12. And I suspect that they may have been cases that the investigation team wanted to have some external input. When I say "external input", input from our bias crimes coordinator, obviously.
Q. A11 right, thank you. Now, moving away from Sergeant Steer, let me ask you some questions about the officers who were involved in Strike Force Parrabel1.
A. Yes.
Q. This is in your statement, which of course is in volume 1 at paragraph 64, [SCOI.76961], and following.
A. Yes.
Q. So you tell us - and I'm summarising this a little bit - in 64 and following, that the officers, who overall at various times numbered approximately 13 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- were from Central Metropolitan Region?
A. Yes.
Q. Including but not limited to the Surry Hills local area?
A. Yes.
Q. Three were chosen by you, namely, Messrs Middleton, Grace and Bignel1?
A. Yes.
Q. They were all detectives; that's correct?
A. Yes, that's correct, yes.
Q. But the rest, the other 10 in total, were chosen by somebody else, not you?
A. Yes.
Q. Were they chosen by Mr Fuller or were they chosen by someone else?
A. No. They would be chosen by the individual commanders from the different areas that they came. So basically, Assistant Commissioner Fuller, at the time, would have put out a staffing request. It would go to the commander and then the commander would make inquiries as to which of his team would be appropriate to come in, given the - outining the investigation requirements.
Q. And in paragraph 66 you say you yourself did not have any involvement in the particular selection of those officers?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say also that you're not aware whether any particular criteria were used for their selection?
A. That's true.
Q. Wouldn't the criteria have been of some interest to you, to know what their credentials, experience, qualifications were?
A. Yes, but I had some comfort on the basis that I had Detective Inspector Middleton, a career detective, senior detective; I had Detective Sergeant Grace, another career detective, and \(I\) also had Plain Clothes Senior Constable Cameron Bignel1, who very shortly thereafter became Detective Senior Constable Cameron Bignell, who was not only a designated detective but also a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer.

So I had - I had confidence in that upper echelon and I knew that they were reviewing not only the progress each week but then also each month to make sure that we were all on track. So whilst, yes, I was interested in their investigative qualifications, I was - nevertheless, if they had investigation experience and they were - they had some training in how to identify motivation, then I was comfortable that they would have appropriate supervision to be able to perform in the correct fashion.
Q. Would some knowledge of bias crime have been, in your mind, a useful or relevant criterion?
A. Well, yes, but also knowledge of the LGBTIQ community and particular sensitivities around that.
Q. And did these people, to your knowledge, have such qualities?
A. I can't tell you that, I don't - I don't recall.
Q. Was it really - again I'm not saying this critically just a matter of accepting whoever was presented to you as being available?
A. Look, I was happy to get the allocations of investigators and people that were in full-time investigative positions so, yes, I was happy to get them.

THE COMMISSIONER: \(Q\). So is the answer to that question "yes"? Do you want it posed again? I would like you to answer it.
A. Yes.

MR GRAY: Q. Was it really just a matter of accepting whoever was presented to you as available?
A. Yes. However, if there was something that was completely not compatible with the strike force, then I would expect that would have been worked out prior to their attachment to the strike force, if that makes sense.
Q. Of the 13 - and you list them in paragraph 68 - seven of them were detectives, as in they had the word "detective" in their rank?
A. Yes.
Q. And then two plain clothes senior constables?
A. Yes.
Q. And forgive my partial or total ignorance, but "plain clothes" designates someone with investigative or detective --
A. So, yes, if you're a --
Q. -- capacity?
A. Yes, if you get designated a plain clothes officer, that means you are undertaking the detectives education program, whatever that might look like, and you are in a full-time criminal investigative position.
Q. Right. So seven detectives, two plain clothes officers, as you have just explained --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and then four uniformed officers?
A. No, I don't think they would be uniformed officers. I think whilst they carry that designation, they may - they would have been from an investigative environment, is my understanding.
Q. And thus plain clothes or --
A. So they - the plain clothes designation, as

I understand it, is people that have commenced the course, commenced the detectives designation course, and are in a full-time position. So you could have, for example, a senior constable that's attached to a detectives office or a criminal investigators office, but has not necessarily started the course, and usually they could have up to 12 months criminal investigative experience but haven't actually started the course or are designated as plain clothes.
Q. None of them were from the Unsolved Homicide Team; correct?
A. I don't believe so, no. In fact, I can confirm that would not be the case, because the staffing order was for central metropolitan staff.
Q. Yes. So not from homicide and not from unsolved homicide?
A. No.
Q. And appreciating the point about staffing, was there a reason for not having any people from homicide or with homicide experience?
A. No. I felt - I actually felt that the people that
were leading the investigation team, first of all, they understood the LGBTI community given they were attached to Surry Hills, and I knew that they had significant investigative experience amongst them. So I didn't really consider homicide. To be frank, it's not a normal consideration, when you're putting together a strike force, to then go to some of the specialist areas, normally. It would just be from the regional resources. I mean, if I'd have done that, it would be an escalation, then, to a deputy commissioner to say, "Yes, we're prepared to supply those resources." I didn't think it was necessary at the time.
Q. Did any of the 13 have any training or experience in relation to bias crime or hate crime?
A. I can't tell you off the top of my head. I would suspect that Craig Middleton may have, just given his extensive experience as an investigator; Paul Grace, potentially; and yes for Cameron Bignell on the basis that he's a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer and I know that they teach bias. In fact, Sergeant Steer taught bias to the Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officers courses when he was the coordinator.
Q. Of which Mr Bignell was one?
A. Yes, yes, he was a designated Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer.
Q. In the coordinating instructions and in the investigation plan, there are numerous terms used including, for example, if I can just run through them, the word "bias", and the word "gay"?
A. Yes.
Q. And the word or the phrase "hate crime"?
A. Yes.
Q. And "bias crime", and "gay hate", among others?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, none of those terms is defined in any - in either the investigation plan or the coordinating instructions; you would agree? There is no definition given of those words?
A. Probably not.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. When you say "probably not"?
A. I don't know, Commissioner. I could check the document, but \(I\) would accept that if it's put to me that that isn't the case, then I would accept that.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right, thank you.

MR GRAY: Q. Perhaps maybe in the 1 unch break, if you check and see --
A. Sure.
Q. -- but my suggestion to you would be that none of those terms is the subject of a definition?
A. Okay.
Q. Just proceed on that footing for the moment.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. How were the strike force officers meant to know what meaning they should give to terms such as those?
A. You're looking at a document that has been provided to them. It's not just a document that's provided to those officers when they walk in and start the strike force. There would be a briefing conducted and the senior officers that were in charge of the strike force would conduct that briefing. Now, they would cover exactly what's required of them --

THE COMMISSIONER: \(Q\). Mr Crande11, you have used constantly the term "would have". Do I take it from what you are saying that you have no idea one way or the other whether there was a briefing as to the terms --
A. No.
Q. -- and the definition of those terms? You're assuming it probably took place?
A. Well, I would disagree with the term "no idea",

Commissioner.
Q. Are you telling me, though, that you assume that such a briefing probably took place?
A. No. No, Commissioner. A briefing absolutely took place.
Q. And the briefing included a discussion of what each of the officers were to interpret the terms to mean?
A. I can't tell you that, Commissioner.
Q. So does that mean on that point you have no idea either way whether, at the briefing which you believe did take place, the term or the definitions were discussed and some agreement or directive was given as to precisely, when all these papers were being reviewed, how each individual police officer should interpret the terms?
A. Correct.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Thank you for that. Can I suggest this to you: unless clear definitions were provided of terms such as the ones I just went through, the possibility must exist, mustn't it, that some Parrabell officers had different views or understandings from others as to what was to be regarded as the appropriate meaning of such words and phrases?
A. Yes. Well, I can't - as I said, I can't give evidence in relation to the briefings that were undertaken. When you said - you spoke earlier about training. There is training that is conducted in the detectives course in relation to bias. That's certainly in relation to motivation, that is a factor of the detectives course. So --
Q. I'm asking - sorry, go on.
A. Sorry. So when you say there is different understandings, I would say that would be the case with any group of people. But the briefing may well have focused their understanding.
Q. Things may well have happened or may well not have happened, but my question was: unless definitions were provided - and you are not in a position to say whether they were or they weren't - about terms such as the ones I mentioned, the possibility must exist that some officers had different understandings or views about what those terms meant from others?
A. As I say, I can't give evidence about what was in the briefings, so the question --
Q. Accepting that, that possibility must exist, mustn't it?
A. Well, the question is narrow, saying, "There must be a definition". I can't say what the conversation was in the briefing. It may well have covered that, it may well have covered many other heads of bias.
Q. Lots of things may well have happened, but I'm asking you the question, unless something did happen, namely, that they were told what meaning was to be attributed to words and phrases like the ones I mentioned - unless that actually happened - then the possibility inevitably existed that some had different interpretations of those terms than others?
A. Well, yes, I'd agree with that.
Q. Right. Now, in your statement, which is in volume 1, at paragraph 85, [SCOI.76961], you say some things about the general methodology.
A. Sorry, I've just dropped my glasses.
Q. Volume 1.
A. Sorry, I've got the wrong - yes.
Q. So you have your statement?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay, paragraph 85. You're talking about the general methodology employed by the strike force.
A. Yes.
Q. The bit that I wanted to just focus on is in about the fourth line, where you say that in relation to the 88 cases, the strike force would:
... allocate an examination of each case to one or more officers within the ... team ...
A. Yes.
Q. Now, how many cases, if you know, were allocated to one officer, and how many were allocated to more than one officer?
A. I can't tell you that. I don't know.
Q. How did you decide or how was it decided, if it wasn't by you, which cases would be reviewed by one and which cases would be reviewed by more than one?
A. That would have been a decision of Detective Inspector Middleton or Detective Sergeant Grace.
Q. In the cases reviewed by more than one, were some
cases reviewed by two and/or three and/or four? What was the system?
A. They may well have been, given the amount of material that related to different cases, because, as we established earlier, some cases had very little material, but others had hundreds of boxes of material.
Q. Quite. So perhaps, then, you think that in a case where there was a great deal of material, two or three or even more people may have been assigned to it?
A. Maybe.
Q. And in a sense, divided up the task?
A. Yes.
Q. In a case where it was two or more people assigned to it, what was the system, if there was one, where those two arrived at different views, as to the filling out of the form?
A. So the system was that the - there would be a weekly review conducted of the active investigations by Detective Sergeant Grace. There would then be a monthly review of all of the investigations that were active, by a team, being Detective Sergeant Grace, Detective Inspector Middleton, and then - and teams would be given guidance as they went through their task of identifying whether or not bias was a factor.
Q. Well, they'd be given guidance, and then if officer A had a view to one effect and officer B had a view to, let's say, opposite effect, hypothetically --
A. Yes.
Q. -- how would the guidance work? How would that be resolved?
A. Well, they would discuss the different reasons as to why those officers came to those views, and then apply their experience to whether or not that was appropriate. But that's presuming that they've even come to that outcome, because this is a lengthy period of time, obviously. So they may well be just identifying different factors of bias.
Q. My question is directed to where they had arrived at actually different views as to the correct answers on the file?
A. I don't know that that's a fact. I can't tell you
that, because I wasn't involved in that.
Q. My question is, if it did happen, how was it to be resolved?
A. Well, I have outlined the governance structures and there would be a discussion with senior investigators as to whether or not it was appropriate to assign that particular bias or not.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. So did the senior investigators, in effect, in your mind, have a power of veto? In other words, if they thought differently to the assessment done by the individual officers, then it would be up to the senior investigator's own view as to whether or not he or she thought bias was present or not?
A. Yes, I would say so, Commissioner. I suppose I would be relying on their experience to do that, and also their knowledge of the individual cases, because I couldn't expect them to be across them in as much detail as the investigators.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right, thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Now, turning to a different aspect of this for a moment, in terms of the Unsolved Homicide Team, you have established that there was nobody from unsolved homicide in the strike force?
A. No.
Q. Would it be fair to say that unsolved homicide put no resources or time or effort into the strike force?
A. No. I think that they were consulted and I think I saw some documentation in relation to that from Detective Inspector Middleton.
Q. Would it be fair to say that all that unsolved homicide did was to give the strike force access to some of its holdings?
A. Yes - well, they would have.
Q. But is that all they did?
A. Oh, I can't tell you that. I don't know the conversations that Mr Middleton would have had. But I know that he did have conversations with them and he did consult.
Q. Could we turn to volume 3 , \(\mathrm{please}, ~ I ' m\) sorry, and turn
to tab 93, [SCOI.74459]?
A. Yes.
Q. There's an email at the bottom of that page from Mr Middleton to you on 9 March 2017?
A. Yes.
Q. It's concerning Taradale and some matters relating to that that I'll come to, but over the page, if I could just ask you to turn over the page and look at the second-bottom paragraph, the one beginning:

I am still a little perplexed ...
Do you see that paragraph?
A. Yes.
Q. He, Mr Middleton, says at the end of that first line of that paragraph:

As we discussed earlier Homicide have put no resources, money, equipment, time or effort into this review. All they did was agree to give us access to some of their holdings.

Do you agree that that's the case?
A. Certainly if Craig Middleton is saying that, I would agree.
Q. Well, your response to him, which is at the top of the next page, didn't suggest otherwise.
A. Yes. I'm saying asking now for any further assistance.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. So the context, it seems, for Mr Middleton's email to you is that Mr Willing, around about this time, presumably - March 2017 - had asked your strike force to look at the three Taradale cases?
A. To, sorry?
Q. To review the three Taradale cases?
A. Right.
Q. Do you see, if you look at the beginning of his email, which is at the bottom of the first page of this tab --
A. Yes.
Q. -- he says:

Hi Boss
I have been doing some thinking and digging on the Taradale issue. I am a bit concerned as to [Mr Willing's] request to now review these matters.
A. Yes.
Q. So what had happened, I understand - tell me if this is right - was that up to this point, around about March 2017, the arrangement with unsolved homicide had been that they would look at the three or were looking at the three Taradale cases?
A. Yes.
Q. And that, in effect, as a consequence, you would not; is that right?
A. Yes, look, I would think that would be correct, and the reason I say that is because they were conducting the reinvestigation of those three cases, so they would be in a far better position to determine - well, a far better position to look at any new evidence that might come in, but not necessarily to identify bias crime motivation.
Q. No. And so Mr Middleton is saying to you that he's a bit, in effect, concerned about that, because that would be a big job for Parrabell to do, because Taradale was such a large exercise?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm paraphrasing, but you can see that's what he is saying?
A. Yes.
Q. In the second-last paragraph of Mr Middleton's email, where he says the unsolved homicide - sorry, I beg your pardon, I take that back. He says "homicide have put no resources into Parrabell", and so on; do you see that? That's the bit I took you to originally.
A. Sorry, could you just indicate what --
Q. Yes, the paragraph beginning: I am still a little perplexed ...
A. Yes.
Q. In the second line of that he talks about homicide not having put any resources in your strike force?
A. Yes.
Q. Keeping that in mind, I just want to ask you about a few other documents touching on the connections between Parrabell and unsolved homicide. And before I do, when Mr Middleton talks in that email about unsolved homicide having hitherto been the ones looking at the Taradale cases, that was, of course, we now all know, Neiwand?
A. Yes.
Q. By this point, March 2017, did you know that it was Neiwand that was doing that or just that it was unsolved homicide?
A. I would have known it was unsolved homicide. But for some reason, Neiwand didn't mean a lot to me at the time. I know that now.
Q. Okay. So at tab - in the same volume that you have there, tab 60A, [SCOI.74210], there's an issues paper of your own dated November 2015. Do you see that?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And at the foot of the first page, you say about Parrabel1 - you actually call it "Operation Parrabell", but it is what we now know as the strike force?
A. Yes.
Q. You say:
[It] is being conducted with assistance from the Unsolved Homicide Squad, members of which have already contributed to processes of review.

Now, that seems to be not correct, doesn't it, given what Mr Middleton said and you agreed with?
A. Well, no, Mr Middleton is talking about resources being applied. My understanding was that we had discussed
matters with the unsolved homicide squad, given they had reviewed 30 of the cases. So my understanding was that they had contributed. Whether or not that's in a resource sense or in an advice sense, but \(I\) would still say that that's correct.
Q. When you say they had reviewed 30 of the cases, are you talking about Mr Lehmann's --
A. Yes.
Q. -- exercise of a couple of years earlier?
A. Yes, but I'm - and I'm almost certain that

Detective Inspector Middleton spoke to Detective Inspector Lehmann about that, or somebody from unsolved homicide, in relation to their findings, and also obtained - I think that's where the list came from, the 88 , the original list.
Q. It did, but that was in September 2013, though, long before Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. So what was the contribution to Parrabell's processes of review that you are referring to there?
A. No, I think that Detective Inspector Middleton -

I don't want to speak on his behalf, but my understanding was that he was consulting the Unsolved Homicide Team in relation to these matters. Particularly when you are looking at unsolved homicides, it would be highly unusual, for me, if he didn't do that.
Q. Well, his account, Mr Middleton's account, which I took you to, was that homicide had put no resources, money, equipment, time or effort into the Parrabell review. That doesn't sound like they were giving him much assistance?
A. No. But that - I know that's what he said in an email, but whether or not that's the reality of providing advice to us is what I'm questioning.
Q. So when you say in this one at 60A, [SCOI.74210], that members of the unsolved homicide had contributed to processes of review, are you referring to --
A. Sorry, could you just indicate --
Q. The bottom couple of lines in tab 60A?
A. Yes.
Q. When you say that, unsolved homicide had contributed to processes of review for your strike force --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you mean by that that you think Mr Middleton would have had some discussions with unsolved homicide about some of these cases?
A. Yes, Middleton, but it could have been any other member of the strike force, because if they are investigating unsolved homicides, it would seem to me reasonable that they would contact - or essential that they would contact the Unsolved Homicide Team, given they are responsible for those unsolved cases. So I have obviously had some material somewhere that's contributed to that sentence. I must have known somehow that unsolved homicide have made some contribution, otherwise, I wouldn't report that through to my commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. There was nothing, though, in the operating instructions or anything else, was there - just remind me - that suggested that members of Strike Force Parrabell should from time to time, if they needed to, consult with unsolved homicide?
A. I don't believe so, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. If we turn to tab 60, which is the one before, [SCOI.74209], this is an email from you on 7 May 2016 to various people. I think Ainslie Blackstone and Georgina Wells are media-related people in the police; is that right?
A. Media, yes, police media unit.
Q. And Michael Willing, of course we know who Michael Willing was?
A. Yes.
Q. You say that you attach a brief summary of Operation Parrabell, which I suggest is the one we just looked at, the issues paper behind tab 60A, [SCOI.74210]?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree that that seems to be the case?
A. Sorry, could you just repeat that question?
Q. Well, your email starts off:

> I have attached a fairly brief summary of Operation Parrabel 1 drawn from an earlier report submitted.
A. Yes.
Q. And \(I\) am suggesting that that attachment is the one at 60A, ie, your issues paper that we just looked at?
A. I would say so. Can I just check that? 17 November. Yes, I would - I assume so.
Q. Yes. In 60A, the sentence that \(I\) am focusing on is the one that \(I\) have asked you about --
A. Yes.
Q. -- where you said that unsolved homicide had already contributed to processes of review?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, in this email you say:

I included a reference to Unsolved Homicide assistance which consisted of information regarding earlier review activities which remain on Parrabell's list.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So that looks like it's a reference to Mr Lehmann's 2013 exercise, doesn't it, or is it a reference to something else?
A. Well, it could - I'm not whether it is those 30 or whether there was further inquiries undertaken into those 30. I can't say that was from that list in a report from Lehmann, when my understanding would be that we would 1 iaise with unsolved homicide and they would contribute.
Q. We11, except that what you tell Mr Willing and others in this one is that the unsolved homicide assistance consisted of information regarding earlier review activities?
A. Yes.
Q. But you think that you may have meant by that, information provided to Mr Middleton in discussions?
A. Absolutely.
Q. I see, all right. And then at tab 61, [SCOI.74221], you are adapting or editing a draft statement that had been prepared by Ainsiie Blackstone from the media unit. Can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. If you acquaint yourself with that?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. And so you have changed something in red, by the look of it, in the proposed statement?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Above the words in red, about four paragraphs above, the statement includes the words:
... the operation is being conducted with
the support of the Homicide Squad's
Unsolved Homicide Team.
A. Sorry, could you just - when you say "four sentences up" --
Q. Well, I took you to the words in red --
A. Yes.
Q. -- which I think were your editing?
A. Yes, my amendments, yes.
Q. And about four paragraphs above that, there is
a statement which you haven't changed, which says:
... the operation --
meaning your operation --
is being conducted with the support of the ... Unsolved Homicide Team.
A. Yes.
Q. What did that mean "with the support of"?
A. That would be information that they have provided us
or any - any guidance that they have provided us throughout the course of the investigation.
Q. I see. Then I will just ask you about one more, which is at tab 70, [SCOI.74338].
A. Yes.
Q. You write to Mr Willing in October 2016, you tell him that Dr Dalton has been contracted. You say:

Given the connection between Parrabell and
the Unsolved Homicide Team, would you
[Mr Willing] like to meet with him?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you mean by "the connection between Parrabel1 and the Unsolved Homicide Team?
A. Well, the Unsolved Homicide Team are responsible for unsolved homicides, so there is a connection between Parrabell and the Unsolved Homicide Team, and so really, in my view, Commander Willing should have been involved in processes of review to understand - particularly in unsolved matters, to understand whether there was any progress or not.
Q. Sorry?
A. Sorry, to understand whether there was any progress or otherwise.
Q. How would he --
A. But my understanding was, as I said - is that there was a collaboration --
Q. Between?
A. -- between us and unsolved homicide. That's my understanding.
Q. On the Parrabel1 review?
A. Yes.
Q. In connection with finding out whether there were bias indicators?
A. No, well, having a look at - because you can imagine they would have material that would relate to unsolved cases. So there may be - there may be information that we would want to get from them in relation to those matters.

So that's what I'm saying. To say that we simply had nothing to do with unsolved homicide I think is wrong.
Q. Well, I haven't said that to you, but I thought the whole thrust of what you have said in your statement and in your evidence is that the Parrabell exercise was the documentary review of holdings available to Parrabell? A. Yes .
Q. But are you now saying that, actually, it was a documentary review flavoured by what unsolved homicide might say?
A. No, no. I'm - no. When I say it is a documentary review, I'm talking about in the context of not going and reinterviewing witnesses or revisiting locations or reconstructing crime scenes or - everything that might happen in an ordinary reinvestigation. It was a paper review on the basis of the holdings that we had.

The Unsolved Homicide Team, though, may well have been able to give us some insight into what occurred in an investigation, so I don't see why we wouldn't use them --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But, Mr Crandell, you can't point, can you, to any example - and I take it from your own knowledge you are not aware of any - where anybody from unsolved homicide was asked about any particular case and the classification of any particular case?
A. No, I can't give that evidence, Commissioner, you are correct.
Q. Well, that's because, as you sit there today, although you believe there must be some collaboration, your belief really goes no further, does it not, than the belief that it may well be that unsolved homicide provided what additional holdings or paper or material that they might have had, as opposed to the deployment of resources - that is, members of the team, Unsolved Homicide Team - to comment on any particular analysis that your Parrabell strike force came to?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Sorry, Commissioner, can I just say that the reason I come to that view is that I don't understand why I would be corresponding with the commander of homicide,
who is also responsible for unsolved homicide, to say, "We need to do collaborative media", if that wasn't the case.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Mr Crande11, when you say you don't understand, is that a way of saying you wouldn't have done so unless there was some relevance in it?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. But the relevance might be no more than a matter of courtesy, may it not, or to facilitate the provision of any additional paper which unsolved homicide might have over and above the holdings you could access? A. That's true. The only thing that I'm looking at is also that I'm saying to the commander of unsolved homicide that this is a collaborative effort, or words to that effect, in my correspondence to him.
Q. But, Mr Crandell, let's go back to where we were a moment or two ago. First of all, it was not part of the operating instructions, was it, that your classification or Strike Force Parrabell's classification be looked at, checked, monitored, commented upon by unsolved homicide? A. No.
Q. As far as you are aware as you sit there today, you can't point to one case where unsolved homicide was asked for a particular view one way or the other as to whether they agreed with Strike Force Parrabell's classification of the case?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. You are assuming that there must have been some collaboration because you are obviously communicating with Mr Willing?
A. Yes.
Q. But at the moment, that's as far as it goes?
A. Absolutely.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Just on unsolved homicide, we looked yesterday, and you took us to it again this morning, that you had a meeting with Mr Willing and others in April 2016 in which Parrabell and what we now know to have been Neiwand were talking to each other; correct?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And another meeting you've mentioned today in May 2016?
A. On 17 May, yes.
Q. At that point - and I can show these documents to you if you need them - and indeed beyond that point, the investigation coordinator for Neiwand was Mr Lehmann?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know that? Was he one of the people you spoke to in these meetings?
A. I'm uncertain, but he may have been with

Commander Willing when I met on 4 April. There was somebody else with Commander Willing. It wasn't just me and him.
Q. Yes. And Commander Willing, of course, was commander of the Homicide Squad?
A. Yes.
Q. And so he was, in that sense, the overall officer supervising Neiwand ultimately?
A. Yes.
Q. Just back to that email of Mr Middleton at tab 93 [SCOI.74459] - I won't linger on this but I would like you to help us understand it - in his last paragraph, and this is tab 93, Mr Middleton's emai1 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- or the second-1ast paragraph, actually, the one beginning, "I am still a little perplexed" --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the request that Mr Willing had made was for Parrabel1 to look at the three Taradale cases which, hitherto, Parrabel 1 was not going to do?
A. Yes.
Q. And Mr Middleton says - read the whole paragraph to yourself, but he finishes up saying:

I am not critical of Mr Willings request but \(I\) am suspicious of his motives and his bad timing.

What was he getting at there, as you understood it.
MR TEDESCHI: I object.
THE COMMISSIONER: The cross-examiner can ask, or the examiner can ask, what his understanding is?

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, he can be asked whether he knew anything --

THE COMMISSIONER: No, he can ask what his understanding is of that because it is an email directed to him. He may have had information in his head which puts that into context.

MR TEDESCHI: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: And you can ask him in due course, "Did you have the faintest idea what Mr Middleton was talking about", and he will either have given an answer by then or you will get from him, "No, I have no idea what he is talking about".

MR TEDESCHI: He can be asked what his understanding might have been.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's all I'm just saying to you, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: But he can't be asked what was in Mr Middleton's mind.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think that's the question.
I think he is being asked what did he understand that to be a reference to, and on that basis, I would allow that. Equally, when you get your opportunity, if there is something to clarify that, of course, you will bring it to my attention.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Maybe ask it again, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Yes. I think my question actually included that concept, but I will ask it again.
Q. What was Mr Middleton saying, as you understood it,
when he said he was suspicious of Mr Willing's motives and his bad timing?
A. I really don't know. I would be happy to read the rest of the document. I don't - I'm not sure why he's saying that.
Q. By all means, do. I don't want to put you at a disadvantage. By all means, read the whole thing. A. I mean --

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Crandell, I'm not going to interrupt the flow of thought, only to say this, it is a matter I think, or potentially, of some importance. I'm happy to take the luncheon break now and give you a slightly longer opportunity to collect your thoughts, because it is a long email and I appreciate, as you do, what you are being asked. So, in fairness, rather than you feeling as if you have to rush the answer, I will adjourn now, and by all means, Mr Gray, there can be no difficulty in Mr Crandell having access to these over lunch?

MR GRAY: Not at all.
THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Then either the copy that you have got there or somehow or other, just have an uninterrupted session in your own head as to what you thought was going on. I appreciate it is a long time ago, but it may be a matter of some importance. All right. I will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

\section*{LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT}

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Tedeschi and Mr Crande11, the solicitors who are assisting have decided that the "do it yourself" component for the witness having to grab their own folder is becoming a bit burdensome, so we're going to have somebody at the Bar table and when a volume is needed, Mr Crandell and any other witness won't need to look after themselves. I am sorry if it has been any inconvenience to date.

THE WITNESS: Not at all.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, yes.
MR GRAY: Q. Mr Crandell, we were on the email at tab 93, [SCOI.74459], and I was asking you what did you
understand Mr Middleton to be referring to when he said that he was suspicious of Mr Willing's motives and his bad timing.
A. So I know that there would have been feeling in that email, because Parrabell would have been finished --
Q. Yes.
A. -- but for the request of Commander Willing to continue with the Taradale matters. I don't know why Craig Middleton would say that he's suspicious of his motives. I don't want to speculate about that. But I simply offer the observation that there would have been some feeling in it because not only did Parrabell then need to continue, according to my response, but he also had to go out and source more investigators, preferably from the original Parrabel1 team.
Q. All right. Then five days later, if we go to the next tab, 94, [SCOI.74466], on 14 March, Mr Middleton writes to you, emails you, and in the third paragraph picks up this topic about the three Taradale matters?
A. Yes.
Q. And he says this in March 2017:
... I have spoken to DInsp Chris O1en at UHT who tells me that they are presently re-opening those matters [the three Taradale matters] for re-investigation under a new [Strike Force]?? ... he estimates there is about 50 boxes of [them] ...

Pausing there --
A. Yes.
Q. -- as you now know, that's the reference - the "new strike force" is a reference to what you now know to be Neiwand; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you knew yourself, because we went through this yesterday and you've expanded on it slightly this morning, that from April 2016, when you had a meeting with Mr Willing and perhaps Mr Lehmann - that is, a year earlier --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that the strike force, which in fact bore the name of Neiwand, whether you knew the name or not, was already under way back in April 2016?
A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that Superintendent Willing was involved in overseeing it?
A. Yes.
Q. And you knew that back in April. And if you remember this, good, if you don't remember, I will put it in front of you again - the document we looked at yesterday that recorded the fact that you had had that meeting in April also recorded that Neiwand had, by then - that is, April 2016 - received 42 boxes of Taradale material. Do you remember seeing that?
A. I remember a large number of boxes, yes.
Q. And clearly, from that document that we looked at yesterday which was dated July '16 but included reference to your April meeting --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the work of what we now know to be Neiwand was well under way?
A. Yes.
Q. By July '16, and it seems that they had, according to that document, already 42 boxes?
A. Yes.
Q. But it seems that, looking at this one at 94, [SCOI.74466], this email at tab 94, that Detective Inspector Olen tells Mr Middleton that unsolved homicide are presently reopening those matters, and he tells Mr Middleton, apparently, that there's about 50 boxes of files. Now, Mr Middleton, perhaps, was not aware - as you were - that, in fact, Neiwand had been going for a year or more, so it seems from his email that he simply accepts what Detective Inspector 0len tells him, but he tells you that, in this email to you, and you must have known that that wasn't right when you got that?
A. No, that's right.
Q. You're agreeing with me?
A. I do.
Q. Well, did you explain to Middleton that what Mr 01en was telling him wasn't right?
A. I can't recall a conversation with Craig Middleton, but I was actually happier that Parrabell was going to review the Taradale cases, so whilst Detective Inspector Middleton had questions about reviewing them, I wanted him to review them.
Q. I understand that, but what did you make of the fact, if it was the fact - it looks like it on the page - that what Olen was telling Middleton wasn't right?
A. I can't say at the time, I don't remember.
Q. Now, Mr Middleton tells you in this email, in the next sentence or so, that his suspicions about the timeliness of the Taradale matters now being reviewed were growing. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Again, did you know what he was referring to, and whatever they were, did you share those suspicions?
A. I would have had a conversation with him, there's no doubt about that. But the nature of that, the content of that conversation, I can't recall.
Q. Well, I have to put this, Mr Crandell. Is the explanation that you knew more about what Neiwand was doing and why than Mr Middleton did, and so you didn't tell Mr Middleton everything you knew?
A. Oh, I would disagree, on the basis that I didn't have any secrets from Craig Middleton. Anything that I knew, I would want him to know. I wouldn't ever try to hold anything back from him knowingly, particularly given his central role in Parrabell and the fact that Taradale matters were important to the Parrabell reviews.
Q. What I want to come to is this - and tell me if you knew this: by the end of that year, that is, by the end of 2017, Neiwand had reached conclusions that
Coroner Milledge's 2005 findings about the three Bondi deaths should essentially be disregarded. You know that now, I take it?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you find that out?
A. I don't believe that I took a great interest in

Neiwand at all. I was more focused on Parrabell. Whilst I understand the nexus, I understand the connections, I was still most interested in our original brief and making sure that we followed that through.
Q. Fine, but my question, though, is, when did you find out that Neiwand had reached the conclusions that Coroner Milledge's findings should be disregarded? A. I can't tell you. I would think when they were published, but I can't tell you.
Q. Well, the point is they weren't published.
A. Oh.
Q. So how did you find out?
A. I would say in --.

THE COMMISSIONER: I am sorry, Mr Gray.
Q. Or were they published?
A. Oh, I don't know, Commissioner. I can't tell you.

Whether it was made known to me because of the closeness of the two strike forces, I don't know. But I believe that I've - I've read those in this - in these bundles.

MR GRAY: Q. Right.
A. And I'm surprised with the findings, because as I've said before --
Q. Sorry, I just didn't hear that?
A. I'm surprised by the findings.
Q. The Neiwand findings?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.
A. Because to my mind - to my mind, I would wonder why they would go down that path of questioning a coroner's finding, on the basis that the coroner gets to see all the evidence, and that was something in Parrabell that we considered early on, that we should not do that.
Q. Well, as you can probably tell from some of my questions, we are also struggling to understand it, and are you saying that you can't help us with understanding it? A. I wish I could.
Q. Well, when you said a minute ago, and the Commissioner was prompted to ask a question, that you probably learnt about Neiwand's findings when they were published, what might you have meant by that when you said that spontaneously?
A. I - well, my presumption was that they were - they had been published similar to what Parrabell findings had been published, but that may not be the case. And then the only other way I would have found out about that is if I had been provided with something from Neiwand, but I don't have any recollection of that.
Q. Or someone told you?
A. Or somebody would have - somebody told me perhaps from unsolved homicide, but once again, I don't have recollection of that.
Q. So no recollection, for example, of Mr Willing telling you that?
A. No.
Q. Or Mr Lehmann telling you that?
A. No. As I say, whilst I've - I've known Commander Willing for a long, long time, I didn't have regular contact with him necessarily, and my contact with him wasn't regular.
Q. By that time - that is, the end of 2017 - when the Neiwand exercise had arrived at the documents that you have seen, which are, in effect, conclusions --
A. Yes.
Q. -- Neiwand was also asserting, wasn't it, that the work of Detective Sergeant Page in Taradale, to which Coroner Milledge had given considerable praise --
A. Yes.
Q. -- was actually open to very serious criticism?
A. Yes.
Q. You agree?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, again, when did you first become aware that that's what Neiwand was saying and that that's what Neiwand had been directing itself to?
A. I don't believe that \(I\) knew about that until I read
that in the bundle.
Q. In this bundle in this Special Commission?
A. Yes. I don't think - I don't remember turning my mind to those findings at that time.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But Mr Crandell, in the course of preparing to give your evidence in this matter, surely you would have made inquiries as to whether, if at all, Neiwand was ever published? I'm just going back to the statement you made a little while ago suggesting to me that it might have been, and your inquiries would have detected that there was no such publication except perhaps within the small group of people in the Police Force - or have you come across some information to suggest that Neiwand's findings were widely published within the force?
A. Well, Commissioner, I didn't have a great deal of I don't want to say "interest", but --
Q. No, Mr Crande11, I didn't ask you whether you had occasion to worry about it or not. I'm accepting unequivocally what you have already told me about your state of knowledge.
A. Yes.
Q. I'm not disagreeing with that for the moment.
A. Yes.
Q. I'm just asking you, in the course of preparing to give your evidence in this case or in this Commission, it must have come across or come to your attention that the findings of Neiwand were not widely published - or, were they - and if they were, to whom?
A. No, I did not know that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, all right.
MR GRAY: Q. In the cases of both Ross Warren and John Russell, Coroner Milledge had made express findings of homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. You know that? And she had said that the evidence "strongly supported the probability" that those homicides were gay-hate related?
A. Yes.
Q. You're aware of that?
A. I do.
Q. And you'd been aware of that basically since the time Coroner Milledge's findings had been published?
A. Yes.
Q. And you know, at least now, that Neiwand's conclusions
by late 2017 were to the effect that in the case of
Mr Mattaini, it was probably suicide and not homicide; you are aware of that?
A. I'm aware of that, yes.
Q. And that in the case of Ross Warren, misadventure or suicide were just as likely as homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the case of John Russell, misadventure was just as likely as homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, when did you become aware of that, that that's what Neiwand's conclusions were about those three cases?
A. I believe at the same time that I read the bundle.
Q. ie, when you were preparing for this hearing in the last month or two?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you aware at any time in 2017 or earlier that the Neiwand strike force was going down that path of arriving at or looking at arriving at findings contrary to Milledge?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware that Neiwand was directing itself to criticisms of Detective Page?
A. No.
Q. You see - and you've just made this point yourself a moment ago - your evidence is that a coroner has more information and evidence than the police do, and that a coroner considers that evidence objectively. You have made those points yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said yesterday, and I'm not quoting you, but
you gave evidence to this general effect, that for your part, your view was, and is, that where a coroner has made a finding, it's not for the police subsequently to challenge or seek to contradict that finding.
A. Yes, that's what I've said.
Q. So for the Parrabel1 exercise, your exercise, in the cases of Ross Warren and John Russell, the obvious classification would have been that there is evidence of bias crime, wouldn't it?
A. I think those cases were classified as suspected bias crime.
Q. They were?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's really what I'm coming to.
A. Yes.
Q. The coroner has found what she found - I won't go over it again.
A. Yes.
Q. Wouldn't the more obvious classification in the Parrabell taxonomy be that there is evidence of bias crime? A. Yes.
Q. But in fact, as you say, Parrabell classified those two cases not as cases where there was evidence of gay-hate bias, but only as cases where gay-hate bias could be suspected?
A. Yes, suspected bias.
Q. Was that classification affected in any way by the approach or conclusions that the Neiwand exercise was engaged in?
A. I don't know. Certainly the investigation team would know, but \(I\) can't tell you that.

THE COMMISSIONER: \(Q . \quad\) It would have been a simple matter in those two cases to have said, "Well, we've looked at them," - "we" being Parrabe11 - "we don't propose to say any more than what Coroner Milledge has said. We simply repeat her findings"?
A. And that was open to us, Commissioner, however, I did want them to go through the process that had been undertaken for the rest of the investigations.

THE COMMISSIONER: We11 - all right.
MR GRAY: Q. I want to turn back to the investigation plan now, which is in volume 1, tab 14, [SCOI.74385].

Now, I may as well ask you this now - I was going to ask you later, but I will ask you now. Is it your evidence that the investigation plan was provided to all the Parrabell officers, or is it your evidence that it was only known to or provided to yourself and Messrs Middleton, Grace and Bignell?
A. I would think it more likely that the coordinating instructions would have been provided to the investigators.
Q. Yes.
A. Whether or not this --
Q. I think there's no doubt from what you said this morning that at least the coordinating instructions were?
A. Yes.
Q. That's, I think, your evidence, isn't it, that at least that was clear?
A. Yes.
Q. But I'm just asking whether the investigation plan was provided to everyone as well or only to those few?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Well, I'm going to draw your attention to some apparent differences between them. That's why I am seeking to set this up. In the investigation plan, tab 14, page 2, there is a heading "Mission"; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. The language used here is that the mission is - and I'm not reading every word of it - to determine if there is any evidence of sexuality or gender bias involvement which may have contributed to the death. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. To determine if there is any evidence of that possibility?
A. Yes.
Q. But a few lines later, in the same paragraph, it says:

> The purpose of the review is to determine if any sexuality or gender bias was involved ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, they're two different things, aren't they? One is, was there any evidence; and the other is, was it a fact? Was the bias in fact involved? They're not the same, are they?
A. The words are different, yes.
Q. We11, the concepts are different, aren't they? The first concept is, is there any evidence of it at all? And the second is, has it been established?
A. Yes.
Q. It's a determination.
A. That's right. But the evidence could lead to that determination.
Q. Evidence could lead to that, but I'm just - you don't agree that they're two different concepts?
A. Well, they're different words, they're different sentences, I understand that.
Q. That's not my point, though. They certainly are different sentences, but aren't they different concepts?
A. I think they're related concepts.
Q. But they're different, maybe related but different?
A. They're essentially looking for evidence of bias crime.
Q. But the last sentence says that the purpose is to determine if bias crime - sorry, gender bias was involved, not to look at whether there was evidence suggesting that, but whether it was so?
A. Yes.
Q. Two different things.
A. No, I disagree.
Q. I see. A11 right. Then under the heading
"Execution", and the subheading "Strategy", it's put
differently again. This time it says that the purpose is:
... to determine if a sexuality or gender bias was a contributing factor.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. That is more like the first of those two sentences in the "Mission" paragraph than the second, isn't it?
A. Well, that could involve either sentence.
Q. Pardon?
A. That could involve either of those earlier sentences, I would have thought.
Q. Perhaps so, but it is a third different way of expressing whatever it is that Parrabell was attempting to do, isn't it? Three separate sentences addressing apparently the same idea but in three different ways?
A. Al1 connected to determining whether bias was
a factor, really.
Q. Then we have the heading "Tactical". In fact, before I do that - oh, no, I'11 do that. Then we have the heading "Tactical" and the first sentence of that is that:

Investigators wil1 ... review the ... holdings to identify existing evidence indicative of any ...crime.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is a fourth way of putting that?
A. Well, no, it's not. You're talking about individual words, the tenet of what we're talking about is consistent.
Q. You don't accept that they are four different ways of describing what it is that Parrabel1 was doing?
A. No.
Q. Then Parrabe11 investigators, of course, or Parrabel1 officers, were only going to have regard to the historical documentary record, as we have established - agreed - and review of the original papers?
A. Yes.
Q. So the effectiveness of the exercise depended entirely on the nature and quality of whatever old written records were available?
A. "Oral or written", did you say?
Q. Whatever old written records were available?
A. Yes.
Q. And the Parrabell officers had to form a view, derived only from whatever material of a documentary kind was available to them, as to whether a sexuality or gender bias was present. Some question like that was what they were asked to do?
A. Whether the crime - if in fact it was a crime - was motivated by bias.
Q. Is that the question, or is the question whether there was evidence indicative of that?
A. Well, I need to --
Q. That's a serious question, I want you to take that seriously, because under the heading "Tactical" --
A. I'm taking every question you give me seriously, I assure you.
Q. Good. Under the heading "Tactical", the question is said to be identifying evidence indicative of bias crime which is, I'm suggesting to you, different from what you have just said, which was "determine whether there was bias crime"?
A. Yes, but you're talking about a process here. So the investigators need to gather evidence and gather information and bring that all together and then determine, ultimately, whether or not there is a motivation with bias. So regardless of those words, the process, which is being outlined, is still followed and we still follow that same outcome as to the motivation of bias.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Mr Crandell, the problem with that response, if I may say so, is that if the question was simply "yes or no", that may well be a tenable proposition, but you well know that on the next page there were shades and grades of likelihood and possibility. So the persons concerned who were answering the questionnaire, as it were, or the problem, were asked in various shades and grades, "Was there evidence", "Did it appear likely" "appears
unlikely", or "no evidence". So the actual definition of these terms was of some considerable importance because the police officer concerned had to deal with four separate theoretical outcomes. So it wasn't just, "Do you find it", or "Do you think it's there or not?" So it wasn't just a case of assessing the materials and sitting down and saying, "Well, there's only one question here: do I think it's present or not"; the questions purported to break themselves into four components, each of which would have a different consequence as we know. Isn't that right? So it wasn't just a "yes or no" question.
A. No, but, Commissioner, what I'm saying is that they had to go through a process in order to get --
Q. No, I know that, I'm not disagreeing with you at all. Of course they had to go through a process. What I'm saying though is Mr Gray is putting to you that there are differences - Mr Tedeschi may take a different view, you are taking a different view - as I understand you at the moment, correct me if I'm wrong, each of the phrases that Mr Gray has referred to you on this page are, in your mind, synonyms?
A. Yes .
Q. Okay. And so on that basis, they then were asked to answer the four separate questions, but each of those concepts they should or were intended to understand as being identical?
A. No, I don't - I don't think they needed to understand them as identical.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well - okay. Over to you, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Q. Let's have a look at the top of page 3 , where this topic is continued. At the top of page 3, the first bullet point - this is still under the heading "Tactical" - is:

Investigators will commence a physical review of these files to determine --
and I quote --
if any bias crime indicators exist.
Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the second bullet point, where there is reference to the bias crimes - it says "identification form" but it is actually indicators form, the second bullet point says:

This form will assist investigators in determining, based on the available evidence, whether bias crime indicators exist.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, those two sentences, the one \(I\) just read out from the second bullet point and the first sentence from the first bullet point, are indeed saying virtually the same thing, aren't they - the question is: do bias crime indicators exist, according to those two sentences?
A. Yes.
Q. But in the second sentence in the first bullet point, it is said that the aim of using the bias crime form is not to determine if indicators existed, it was to determine if bias was involved. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I put to you again, that's a very different thing, isn't it?
A. I don't - I don't believe so. As an investigator, I don't think there would be confusion over exactly what was required of them.
Q. On page 5, under the heading "Follow up Enquiries"
another form of words is used. It says:
... [the] focus wi 71 be in determining whether any of the identified deaths were in fact motivated by a sexuality or gender bias ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. ie, not in determining whether there were indicators of bias and not in determining whether there was evidence of bias, but determining whether, as a matter of fact, the
deaths were motivated by bias. You don't agree that they're different propositions?
A. No.
Q. On page 3, there is a heading "Investigative Outcomes". Do you see that there, the reader is told that at the end of the review, the completed forms will be attached to an overall standard report summarising the entire review and making the following findings - do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And the four possible findings in this document are expressed in language where they begin - I won't read them al1 out but the first one is:

There is evidence that sexuality or other bias was involved ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. The second one:

It appears 7ike7y ...
Et cetera. The third one:

It appears unlikely ...
Et cetera. The fourth one:

There is no evidence that ...
A. Yes.
Q. Now, whatever else might be said about that language in those four bullet points in the investigation plan, what I want to draw your attention to at the moment is simply this: that language, in setting out the four possible findings that we're just looking at in the investigation plan, is not the language that we find in relation to the four possible findings in the coordinating instructions, is it?
A. Yes.
Q. You are agreeing with me?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. Because if we turn to tab 15, which is the coordinating instructions, [SCOI.75071] and we go to page 4 , the reader is told that for each indicator, the following four findings are available, and they're set out there. They're in quite different terms from the terms in the investigation plan, aren't they?
A. Yes.
Q. If we go to the Bias Crime Indicator Form, which appears at pages 4 and following of the coordinating instructions --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the four possible findings are set out, aren't they, under the heading "Indicators"?
A. Yes.
Q. Ten times over, for the ten different indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are in the language that appears on page 4 of the coordinating instructions?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, given that it is at least possible, on your evidence, that the Parrabell officers were given both the investigation plan and the coordinating instructions, was some explanation given to them about why the two documents had completely different possible findings?
A. As I said, I can't answer that.
Q. Weren't you in charge of this operation?
A. Yes, but \(I\) don't induct investigators into the team. That's something that would have been done by the senior investigators and there would have been ample explanation as to exactly what they wanted those investigators to do. To simply rely on a document and say, "Well, there are inconsistencies in it" is inappropriate, in my opinion.
Q. We11, you may be reversing the problem, I suspect.

Can I suggest to you that the problem is that if they were given two documents, both of which supposedly set out the task they were obliged to undertake, and one said you do it this way and the other said you do it in this quite different way, they would be entitled to be puzzled,
wouldn't they?
A. Yes.
Q. And unless someone explained to them that you should follow one and not the other, they wouldn't know what they were to do, would they?
A. To my mind, it would be clear that they would follow the coordinating instructions.
Q. Why would that be clear?
A. Because - clear because it indicates the bias crimes indicator tool and it indicates exactly those categories that are indicated in the coordinating instructions.
Q. So you think that they would have understood that they should just ignore the investigation plan, at least in this respect?
A. No, I think they would have listened to the induction that was given to them --
Q. No, not my question?
A. -- and that they --
Q. Well, perhaps it is, really. Perhaps it is, sorry.
A. And I think that they would have been given some very clear direction on what exactly was required of them.
Q. You think they would have been?
A. Yes.
Q. Why do you think those who drafted this - and I think you have told us that it was some combination of Messrs Middleton, Grace and Bignell - provided these two completely different sets of possible findings?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you accept that at least this is correct, that the presence of the two very different formulations of what the possible findings were may have been a source of confusion for the Parrabell officers?
A. Yes, if they were given both of those documents, yes.
Q. And it may have been a source of uncertainty as to what approach they should take?
A. Yes, which would have been corrected in any instructions that were given to them.
Q. Well, would you accept, though, that one consequence is that it is now, as we discuss these matters today, impossible to know how the Parrabell officers actually went about their task?

MR TEDESCHI: I object.
THE COMMISSIONER: Why?
MR TEDESCHI: He has given evidence extensively that the exercise conducted by the actual officers was to fill out that form, which is in the instructions.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Well, that's his evidence, then.
MR TEDESCHI: That the exercise involved a discussion after the form had been filled out. So for my learned friend to say that police officers would have been confused when they were doing the exercise, when the very exercise itself involved the criteria that are in the instructions, is misleading.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, thank you. I will allow the question and Mr Crandell can handle it. Repeat it, though, in fairness, Mr Gray.

MR GRAY: Q. Would you accept that one consequence of these two documents having these two different sets of possible findings is that it is now impossible to know how the Parrabell officers actually went about their task?
A. No, I don't accept that.
Q. Because one possibility - perhaps among many - is that even though they ultimately filled out the form as it appears in the coordinating instructions, in their right hand, they also had in their left hand another document which says, in effect, "The way to do it is this way", which is different. Mustn't that have formed part of their thinking?
A. No, you - the presumption is that they did get both those documents, and I can't --
Q. Well, that's because you have said they may well have done?
A. They may well have done, exactly.
Q. Yes, that's my question, based on that --
A. So that's not - that's not a certainty, at a11.
Q. It's an uncertainty that you can't help us with.
A. And in any event - in any event - if they are provided with those documents and they have questions about those documents, whether that be on day 1 or day 365 , I am certain that they would have been given clear guidance on exactly what is required of them and the objectives of this particular operation. I am certain of that.
Q. We11, that's good, but supposing they had the uncertainty but didn't ask a question and just proceeded down what they thought was okay?
A. There was plenty of guidance for them in terms of the governance process that had been set up, particularly oversight by Detective Senior Constable Bignell and Detective Sergeant Grace and Detective Inspector Middieton.
Q. Could you have a look at volume 2 - keep that one open, perhaps as we've now got assistance, you can put that one aside and pick up volume 2, and turn to tab 59, [SCOI.77317].
A. Yes.
Q. Now, this document is called "Strike Force Parrabel 1 Induction Package".
A. Yes.
Q. Was that another document that the Parrabel 1 officers were given?
A. I would think so.
Q. Well, who composed this one?
A. I can't tell you definitively. It would have been something that the investigation team produced.
Q. The same three people?
A. I would say so.
Q. We11, in terms of the date of it, although it's not dated, on page 3 at the top of the page, the first paragraph begins:

In August 2015, Investigators commenced a systematic review ...

Et cetera. That might seem to indicate that perhaps this
document came a little later than the other two, do you think, or not?
A. I'm uncertain.

THE COMMISSIONER: It has a date on the front page, hasn't it?

MR GRAY: Oh, I am sorry.

THE COMMISSIONER: There is a date. It says "Published 2016".

MR GRAY: That does add clarity to the situation.

THE COMMISSIONER: It doesn't mean there wasn't a predecessor, but at page 1 it seems to say Apri1 2016.

MR GRAY: I'm grateful to you, Commissioner.
Q. That is of course right. Does that assist you, though, Mr Crande11?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. How does it assist you?
A. Well, if that's the date that it was published, that would be the date that the document was completed, I would have thought.
Q. Except that to be fair to you, as the Commissioner pointed out, it may have been that there was some earlier iteration?
A. Yes.
Q. And you don't know?
A. No. I mean, there may have been some earlier iteration. I would say very likely, on the basis that Parrabe11 started on 30 August 2015.
Q. At any rate, what \(I\) wanted to draw to your attention again is the words at the bottom of page 3 , where again we have the four possible findings listed - do you see that? A. Yes.
Q. And they're expressed in the language of the investigation plan, contrary to the language of the coordinating instructions, aren't they?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. So it seems, then, that it's at least possible that the Parrabell officers had three documents, two of which said that these were the four findings they should be looking at, and one of which said differently; correct? A. Yes. I think - yes.
Q. Do you accept that the possibility of confusion that I referred to earlier is only highlighted by that state of affairs?
A. I don't believe there was confusion.
Q. Well, have a look at the bias crime indicators form that's embedded within the induction package. Do you see that in this version of the bias crime indicators form, under the heading "Indicators" in each case, rather than there being four indicators, as there are in the form actually used, there are only three, and they're in terms similar to three of the four so-called findings that are available in the induction package and the investigation plan?
A. Yes, with the exception of "insufficient information."
Q. That's right. So what were the investigators to make of this fourth document?
A. Well, I think that the indicators are extremely close and that the general tenet of what we wanted them to do would have been very clear to those officers. We're not talking about people that are simply robots. If they weren't certain, they would raise those matters. They're professional people and I would expect that. And I would expect then the senior leadership team to show them the way.
Q. Well, would you accept in the first instance that the senior leadership team should have got it right and had a consistent set of documents rather than completely inconsistent sets of documents?
A. Yes - yes, with the exception of any changes that may well have needed to have been made. I mean, it would be a simple process to work out which documents were used, because they would be the documents that the Parrabell operatives completed for the final report.
Q. I will come to that, and just to fast-forward for the moment - I will deal with the point you are driving at and correct me if you think this is not correct, but the
completed forms, with the one exemption that I will come to, adopt the language of the form as it appears in the coordinating instructions?
A. Yes.
Q. That's your understanding too, I think.
A. I know that.
Q. Yes. So whatever it is that the investigators were to make of this quite different so-called bias crime indicators form, you can't help us with?
A. I don't agree that it's quite different.
Q. Pardon?
A. I don't agree that it's quite different.
Q. Well, the indicators --
A. In terms of the indicators.
Q. -- are three rather than four, and all three of those three are in different terms from any of the four; correct?
A. The tenet of each of the indicators is consistent.
Q. Of three of them?
A. Yes, and one is "insufficient evidence", which an investigator would come to that view, if in fact there wasn't any evidence, or insufficient evidence, I would think.
Q. Just picking you up on that suggestion, if it's possible for you to have open tab 15 from volume 1 , [SCOI.75071], which is the one that was in fact used and the one in the induction package, and we just need to look at it once, because it's repeated 10 times over --
A. So, sorry, what volume am I looking at?
Q. I want you to compare volume 1, tab 15 [SCOI.75071] --
A. Yes, which I'm looking at, yes.
Q. -- page 5 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- on the one hand, with volume 2 , tab 59 , page 4 , [SCOI.77317]?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay? Now, in the induction package, the first
indicator is:
There is evidence that sexuality or other bias was involved in the death.

Isn't it?
A. This is under "Indicators"?
Q. Yes. That's the first one in the induction package version of the form?
A. Yes.
Q. But in the actual form, as used, the indicator is "Sufficient information exists". Straightaway there is a difference, isn't there? One says, "There is evidence"; the other says, "There is sufficient evidence"?
A. Well, it goes on to --
Q. Yes, I know it goes on, but straightaway there's a difference, isn't there?
A. Well, I think you need to read the entire sentence.
Q. I'm going to read the entire sentence, don't worry.

But first of all, the first one in the induction package doesn't mention sufficiency at all?
A. They are different words, I agree.
Q. It doesn't mention sufficiency at all, does it; it just says, "There is evidence"?
A. Yes.
Q. And in the real form, if I might call it that, the one in the coordinating instructions, what is said to be required on the first finding is "sufficient evidence/information", so it brings in some sort of alternative of information rather than evidence - that's a difference, isn't it?
A. Well, yes.
Q. Isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. It must be intended to mean something, mustn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And then it says "sufficient evidence/information exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt", something?
A. Yes.
Q. Nothing about that in the induction package version, is there?
A. No.
Q. Quite different, in fact.
A. Well, it talks about evidence as to whether sexuality or other bias was involved.
Q. The existence of evidence?
A. Yes.
Q. In the induction package?
A. Yes.
Q. But in the real form, "sufficient evidence to prove something beyond a reasonable doubt". Don't you accept that they are two different concepts?
A. No - I understand that there's conceptual differences, but the tenet of what we want them to do is consistent.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Yes, but what you want them to do is answer a precise question, don't you? And doesn't it, therefore, matter what the term of that question is?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Well, therefore, on the one hand, you are asking "There is evidence", namely, a little bit of evidence or a lot of evidence - it could mean either end of that spectrum. The next question, though, is, "There is sufficient evidence", and whoever drafted this draws the distinction, whatever it might be, between evidence and information; it's then added the criminal onus, as it were, "exists beyond reasonable doubt"?
A. Yes.
Q. And it goes on to talk about wholly or partially?
A. Yes.
Q. It's a very different question, it is more complex and it has many more components to it than the simple version which is here. Do you agree with that?
A. I think they are different, yes, but what I'm saying, Commissioner, is that I believe we are asking them whether or not there's evidence of a bias crime.

THE COMMISSIONER: Al1 right. Okay.
MR GRAY: All right.
THE COMMISSIONER: Q. And so the terms of the question were immaterial, were they?
A. No, I'm not saying that, Commissioner. I'm not saying that's immaterial. I'm simply saying that there is a general tenet of what we're asking them to do.
Q. No, I understand the general tenet and I understand the overall objective.
A. Yes.
Q. But at the end of the day there was a particular question put, as opposed to others?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Al1 right. Okay.
MR GRAY: Q. I'11 just run through the others more briefly, but in the case of the second indicator in the induction package, it is expressed as, "It appears likely that sexuality or other bias was involved" - "It appears likely"?
A. Yes.
Q. In the case of the real form, under the title "Suspected Bias Crime", what appears is:
- ... Evidence/Information exists that the incident may have been motivated by bias but the incident cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it was either wholly or partially motivated by bias ...
A. Yes.
Q. That is a rather different, related may be but quite different way of formulating the question, isn't it? A. Yes, and I think that indicator gives more context as to what we were after.
Q. It may do, but - I'm putting this hypothetically - if an investigator had the impression that the way it was put in the induction package was another way of putting the same thing, which is largely what you are saying, that the
tenet was the same, the investigator would have had a wrong impression, wouldn't he, or she?
A. Yes, I understand what you're saying, but I do not believe that an investigator would simply go off a document that wasn't the document that was ultimately completed --
Q. But what if --
A. -- to get a completely different understanding of what was required of them.
Q. But what if the investigator - I beg your pardon.

Sorry, say that again. I cut across you.
A. I'm just saying that \(I\) don't believe that an
investigator would go off the induction package document when they are filling out a different requirement in the indicators and then say that they are confused. I don't believe that to be the case.
Q. But what if they weren't confused or didn't think they were, but thought that the two questions were the same that to answer the question "it appears likely", was effectively to answer the actual question? Supposing they thought that?
A. I believe that they would have been guided by the ultimate document that they were required to complete.
Q. Did you yourself ever have a conversation with any of the investigators about these divergences among all the various documents?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Did you ever hear anyone else, eg, Messrs Middleton, Grace or Bignell, have any such conversation with any of them?
A. No - well, as I said, they - instructions would have been given, no doubt. What was said in those instructions I cannot tell you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. And who would have given those instructions, do you think?
A. I believe one of those three officers.
Q. One of those three, all right?
A. If not all of them, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Al1 right.

MR GRAY: Q. How is it possible now for an objective observer to be sure, today, that each Parrabell officer carried out the review process in the same way?
A. It's entirely possible --
Q. How?
A. -- because all you need to do is have a look at the finalised documents that are completed by the Parrabell team --
Q. But how would that answer that question?
A. -- and have a look - I must have misunderstood your question. Could you repeat that, please?
Q. Perhaps so. Perhaps I will put it again. Given that what I'm calling the discrepancies or at least the differences among these various documents and formulations, how is it possible to be sure now, whatever may have been written down on the completed forms, that the mental processes engaged by this or that of the Parrabell officers were the same?
A. Because of the governance structures that were put in place and the review mechanism.
Q. Namely?
A. Namely, you had the commander of the operation, being myself, you had a very experienced detective inspector in charge and in charge of reviewing on a monthly basis; you had a very experienced detective sergeant who was reviewing on a weekly basis; and you had a detective senior constable who was also a member of the Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officers group, having a look on a daily basis as to exactly what was happening, and what understandings, what misunderstandings there were, how documents were to be filled out, and I believe that you could tell from the completion of those final documents whether or not there was any confusion.
Q. We11, for the moment, before I move on to the form itself more fully, let me ask you this: it is a more overall question involving several aspects of what we have been talking about yesterday and today. You would agree that it's clear from many of the documents that we have looked at over the course of the last day and a half that the driving reason, perhaps the main driving reason but certainly one driving reason, for the establishment of Strike Force Parrabell was the perceived need for the
police to be seen to be responding to the 1 ist of the 88 deaths?
A. Yes.
Q. And to be responding to al1 the publicity relating to the list?
A. Yes, and respond to those community calls.
Q. And to be seen to be responding to the suggestion that the police had not done enough to solve cases where LGBTIQ people were the victims?
A. Yes.
Q. And the response that you decided upon, as we know, was the Strike Force Parrabell style of response?
A. Yes.
Q. And as we know, that was a review on the papers of al 1 88 cases, both solved and unsolved; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Again, going over ground that has been covered - not a reinvestigation of any of them, even the unsolved ones?
A. Yes.
Q. And, rather, instead, the forming of a view based on the old papers, such as they were available, as to whether a sexuality or gender bias was involved?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. Now, another approach that you could have taken, no doubt among several other possibilities, would have been this, wouldn't it: you could have said, "We11, look, as to those of the 88 that are solved", which even the media articles were acknowledging was around the 60 mark or so - there is little to be gained by going over them again now, but as to the unsolved ones - which the media were saying, rightly or wrongly, were about 30 - "the police will commit to actually reinvestigating those." That's something you could have done?
A. Yes.
Q. And why --
A. Sorry, with the resources that I had, though?
Q. Well, it's something the police could have done?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Why wasn't that done?
A. To my - well, I didn't consider that at the time. The reason that \(I\) would not have gone down a reinvestigation is that not necessarily all of the unsolved cases would warrant reinvestigation. So there would - and there would then have to be some explanation as to why. For example, matters that were unsolved but a person had been acquitted on the grounds of self-defence, or where it had been no-billed or otherwise discontinued, I would say that that needs to remain as unsolved.

The resources and time frames, in my opinion, would have been far greater, had we decided to do reinvestigations, and also I would have to start somewhere in relation to that.
Q. Sorry, you would have to start somewhere?
A. I would have to start with which investigation.
Q. Oh, you would have to have a priority, as it were, an order?
A. I would think so, if I was going to use the same team to do the reinvestigations. But the - I mean, that's why we have an Unsolved Homicide Team because of the extent of inquiry that's required and the resources that are required for that. So I would be - I would have been very hesitant to go down a complete reinvestigation path.

The other thing is I think even though the solved matters were reviewed, I still thought there was benefit in that because there was - yes, there was a great deal of media, we all can agree on that, but I think it's helpful from a social policy perspective to have a look at the amount of gay hatred at that time, and certainly from the community's perspective, it was almost cathartic for the community to say that their - that a lot of not only the deaths of the time but also the serious assaults of the time, of gay men in particular, were a reality and not necessarily something that didn't have facts and investigation behind it.
Q. As to that last point, although it is mentioned in the final report, I acknowledge, that's not what the review process was looking at, was it?
A. Sorry --
Q. The extent of violence generally is not what the review was looking at?
A. No, no. It wasn't. It was only to do with the 88 list, on the basis that that list had been compiled predominantly, to my mind, from an ex-employee of NSW Police Force, that being Sue Thompson, and I think in order to identify those sorts of cases, it would be very difficult.
Q. Identify which sorts --
A. Cases of gay hate, gay-hate death, or potential gay-hate death.
Q. Over and above the 88 , do you mean?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you, because that leads to my next question, which was going to be, and now is, another different approach that you could have taken would have been to say, "Not only will we look again at the unsolved cases from among the 88 , or indeed all the cases from among the 88 that Sue Thompson and Stephen Tomsen had put together, but we'll also conduct a thorough search of all our unsolved homicides in the relevant period and we'll also investigate any additional cases that we find, ourselves, from among that group, which might be gay-hate related or LGBTIQ bias related"; you could have done that?
A. I could not have done that with the resources that I was - that were committed to me from my assistant commissioner. I don't believe that I could have done that.
Q. Well, the police could have done that?
A. Oh, the police generally, yes. But in my circumstances, I don't believe that I - I think that would have had to have been a larger strike force than what we had.
Q. Perhaps so. But I think in your statement you very fairly say that you didn't take any steps to research whether there might have been more than 88 ?
A. No.
Q. But all I'm putting to you is that that step could have been taken, perhaps not by you but by unsolved homicide or whoever - could have been done?
A. Yes, it could have.
Q. Just on the point about the exercise that you did choose, the paper-based review --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you would agree, wouldn't you, that throughout almost the whole of the period in question, that's 1976 to 2000, there was no requirement in that period for the possibility of sexuality or gender bias to be thought about or recorded by those investigating crimes?
A. Yes - oh, well, with the exception of the gay advance defence. So there was --
Q. With that exception, certain1y?
A. Yes. So there was some cases that the police actively sought to refute that defence.
Q. Cases of that kind?
A. Yes.
Q. But with that exception, which I understand, there was no requirement in the procedures for the possibility of sexuality bias or gay-hate bias to be considered or recorded?
A. In the --
Q. From 1976 to 2000. There was no system whereby that was to happen?
A. In terms of - no. So we don't - we still don't record sexuality unless it's offered.
Q. No, sexuality bias?
A. Oh.
Q. The possibility of sexuality bias?
A. No, that's correct.
Q. Or gay-hate bias?
A. Yes. That's correct, yes. Sorry, just so I can be clear. There is capability now within our current systems to identify forms of bias. But not - certain1y not throughout the period that we looked.
Q. No, quite so. That's what I'm getting to?
A. Yes.
Q. And the electronic COPS system, computerised operational policing system --
A. Policing system, yes.
Q. -- was not introduced unti1 about 1994?
A. That's correct.
Q. And even it did not originally contain any provision or option for the recording of such a possibility?
A. Yes, correct.
Q. And when it was altered - that is, COPS was altered in about 1999 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- so as to allow for the possibility of recording such a factor under I think a heading called "Associated Factor" --
A. Yes.
Q. -- it was stil1 only an option, wasn't it? It wasn't mandatory?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Is it mandatory as we speak?
A. To turn their mind to --
Q. Yes, to turn their mind --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and to record it in the COPS system?
A. If an officer believes there is evidence of bias motivation, then they are required to record that into the COPS system and then that goes for further review to the Engagement and Hate Crimes Unit.
Q. I think I will come to this, but that's a pretty recent development, isn't it?
A. That was as a result of one of the 12 recommendations from Strike Force Parrabe11.
Q. So post 2018?
A. So post 2018, yes.
Q. I'11 come to that. Now, in terms of the state of play, 1976 to 2000, in that regard as just discussed, didn't those realities tell you that the prospect of meaningful results from a review of the old papers, all of them predating those changes, were very remote?
A. No, I - no, I don't think so. Are you saying because they weren't flagged as such on the system?
Q. Yes, yes. Well, not just flagged in the system, but there was no obligation or expectation in the 70 s and 80 s and 90 for someone - for an officer investigating a homicide, let's say, to think about whether a gay-hate bias was involved or to record it? There was no obligation for that to be done?
A. No, that's true.
Q. So if an officer either didn't think of it, didn't cross his or her mind, well, that would be that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if an officer did think of it, did cross his or her mind but chose not to write it down, well, that would also be that?
A. Yes.
Q. From the point of view of the Parrabel1 exercise there would be nothing there?
A. No. No, I - I don't think that's quite right. I hope

I'm on the same page as you here, but if - to my mind, the cases were able to be reviewed regardless of a categorisation in COPS, because that was on1y one small part of a much larger body of evidence, if that makes sense.
Q. Sure. And let's iron this out. I don't mean to confine these questions to COPS, because COPS only came in in the 90s?
A. Yes.
Q. So put COPS to one side. I'm speaking about record-keeping generally?
A. Yes.
Q. In your Parrabell exercise, it's essentially paper records?
A. Yes.
Q. Right? Now, if no obligation existed for any such thing to be thought about or written down in the period in question, and all you are reviewing is what was written down --
A. Yes.
Q. -- your prospects of identifying the existence of bias are low, aren't they?
A. No, I don't think so.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Mr Crandell, the problem was this, wasn't it? For example, if the sexual orientation of the deceased was not the subject of thought at the time and the investigating person in Parrabell was not to go and ask any questions of anybody, you would have to just have a stab at the sexual orientation from whatever was on file?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes - yes.
Q. And, for example, there may be disagreements on other factual issues which may mean that there would be a whole series of questions which could not really be answered, given the fact that you were working on historical records? A. Yes. Yes, the distinct possibility, Commissioner, that there was insufficient information contained in the records, and that's reflected in the findings.
Q. Yes. But I think Mr Gray is putting to you that whatever was in the records, you were driven entirely by that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you were, or if an investigating officer was to, let's say, opine on motive, that would be such inferences that may or may not be able to be drawn on the records as they existed?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR GRAY: Q. Now, would you agree with this, that the paper review process necessarily meant, as well, that the classification of cases as involving bias or not involving bias, based only on the old records, having the drawbacks that they necessarily had, was inevitably going to come down to the subjective individual reactions or thoughts of the various Parrabell officers?
A. No. No, I don't think that's right, because they're looking for the evidence, they're looking through a great deal of material to find whether or not an indicator exists
and then why they think that indicator does exist, and then ultimately putting all that together to determine a motivation, so they're looking at a motivation.
Q. I understand that that's what they are hoping to arrive at?
A. Yes.
Q. That's the end game or the goal?
A. Yes.
Q. But to get there, according to the very processes that you have just described, they are making subjective assessments along the way, aren't they, as to their view as to whether something amounts to something worth considering or not?
A. Yes.
Q. I'll go through some of the other emails in more detail later, but could you just have a look at volume 4, tab 112, [SCOI.74554]. Now, this is an email chain --
A. Yes.
Q. I only need to ask you about part of this, but it is an email chain between mainly Mr Middleton and Dr Dalton, and it is in mid 2017. So it's well after the Parrabell officers have essentially completed their work, and it's while the academics are doing their work.
A. Yes, I'm not sure whether there were some Parrabell officers, though, working on those Taradale cases at the time.
Q. Maybe so, but I'm just orienting you in terms of where we are in the time frame?
A. Yes.
Q. So on the second page, Dr Dalton asks Mr Middleton about the question of publishing the actual classifications arrived at of the 88 cases.
A. Sorry, is this in Dr Dalton's original email?
Q. Are you at tab 112?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. It's on the second page of the chain. It is page numbered 0002 at the top.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And where he says:

Hey - for what it's worth Craig --

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I can see that.
Q. So he is raising the topic of whether the actual classifications of the 88 cases, as bias or not bias, et cetera, should be published?
A. Yes.
Q. That's the topic?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr Middleton on the front page of the chain discusses that topic, the pros and cons of doing that. And do you see about halfway down in the first paragraph of Mr Middleton, the paragraph that begins with "I agree", on the front page --
A. Yes.
Q. -- about halfway down that paragraph, he says this, if you can find it, roughly in the middle of that paragraph:

Even within the review team itself we had differences of opinion on cases and which category it was placed.
A. Yes.
Q. And no doubt you would accept that that's so?
A. I do.
Q.

In some respects, some of these matters could almost sit in 2 categories. But ultimately we had to make a choice, of which opinion played a part.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

If the truth be known a lot of these
matters were placed in their category based on our "collective opinion".

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q.

You already know this --
he says to Dr Dalton --
hence why your results differ from ours, essentially those differences are based on your opinion as opposed to our opinion.

Agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. He says:

Whose opinion is right? I would suggest both are.
A. Yes.
Q. Doesn't that suggest to you that, in Mr Middleton's mind, which I'm not criticising, ultimately, these questions were questions of opinion?
A. Yes, they are - it's very difficult to identify the animus. I accept that.
Q. And the choices made by the officers necessarily were opinions and necessarily were subjective. Again, I'm not criticising that; it's just the reality, isn't it?
A. Yes, it is, but it's not necessarily the individual officers that are making those final determinations. So --
Q. Well, it's the individual officers first along the process --
A. Yes.
Q. -- who make calls or judgments based on their own opinions, and then there is the process of review that you have described --
A. Yes.
Q. -- where there is a kind of collective opinion arrived
at?
A. Yes.
Q. But stil1 opinion, and thus stil1 subjective, don't you agree?
A. Yes. Well, there must be subjectivity in it. You cannot be completely objective, I don't believe.
Q. Indeed.
A. It was a difficult process.
Q. Yes. And indeed, when the academics produced their final report as part of the Parrabell report itself I will just show you that, it's in exhibit 1, that's tab 2, [SCOI.02632]?
A. Sorry, you said tab 2?
Q. Yes, it's the Parrabel 1 report itself, and I would just 1 ike you to turn to page 69, if you would. Maybe start at 68. I will take you to 68 first. The academics are describing, summarising, the way the Parrabel1 detectives went about their task?
A. Yes.
Q. And they set out the possible findings?
A. Yes.
Q. They say on page 69 that they scored each case using the indicators, et cetera?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the paragraph I wanted to take you to is the one below that, beginning:

Although each indicator was scored --

Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. The academics say that the summary or finding was not determined by counting the number of yes or nos, et cetera?
A. Yes.
Q. And they say this:

Rather, the process --
            meaning the police process --
                    was described as intuitive and relied on
                                    qualitative data in the form of contextual
                                    information derived from analysing each
                                    case.
A. Yes.
Q. And they go on to say that the detectives would take into account the "Summary of findings" section, which they say was often rich in detail, and they say that:
.. allowed a view of whether bias was
involved to emerge.

Now, the word I wanted to focus on was "intuitive". That tells us it's subjective and personal to the people doing it, doesn't it? It's not objective; it's not determined by a system; it's, according to this analysis, intuitive. A. Yes, but I don't know that that's intuitive to each individual investigator. That's - that could well be an intuition from the experienced investigators that come to that finding. So --
Q. Wel1, the academics - and I'm not holding you to this because you didn't write this, although you, as we will see later, were involved to some extent in its drafting, but they say the process itself was described as intuitive. Would you accept that?
A. Well, to an extent, yes. They need to apply their intuition to the facts and circumstances and evidence that they had a look at.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. It would be an extreme case, as it was, where, for example, there was only a person of interest about whom you were not going to make any inquiries beyond that which was in the papers?
A. Yes.
Q. Or alternatively where there was no person of interest?
A. Yes.
Q. And so in the absence of a person of interest or even with limited material about the person of interest, the question of how you would ever come to terms rationally
with what that person's motivation might have been at the time would be an extremely difficult one?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And about which reasonable minds may differ?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR GRAY: Q. Could I just ask you again, isn't it the reality that the paper review process that Parrabell consisted of meant that the classification of cases as involving bias or not involving bias did come down to subjective opinions of the individual officers and then of a kind of collective of the officers?
A. Well, I think it's more about intuition on the basis of the facts and evidence that they have had a look at. So there may well be circumstances that surround a person's intention, and there may not be. It's a matter for them to bring that material together and then come to a view on whether or not the crime was motivated by gay hate.
Q. And you would accept, as you just did, that the word "instinctive" --
A. "Intuitive".
Q. I'm sorry, "intuitive", beg your pardon - covers that?
A. Yes, you have to apply intuition to those facts,

I would have thought.
Q. Can I just take you to the coordinating instructions in a little bit more detail, that's volume 1, tab 15, [SCOI.75071].
A. Yes.
Q. I'11 pass over page 1 and just move to page 2 , which has the heading "Mission" at the top. As with the investigation plan, I'm going to suggest to you that there are some variations in the way the task is described.
Under the heading "Mission", the reader is told that the purpose of the review is to determine if an anti-gay bias was involved.
A. Sorry, I'm on page 3. You said under "Mission".
Q. Under the heading "Mission" at the top of the page?
A. Yes. Yes, that's correct.
Q. It says:

The purpose of the review is to determine if an anti-gay bias was involved in any of the deaths.
A. Yes.
Q. That is, not to determine if there was evidence, but to determine if the bias was there; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. The next paragraph, the first one, under the heading "Execution", says that the objective is to identify if there is evidence indicative of bias crime.
A. Under "Execution"?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Which is, I'm suggesting to you, and perhaps your answer is the same, a different question from determining whether bias was in fact involved?

MR TEDESCHI: I object. It's been asked and answered many times.

THE COMMISSIONER: That's all right. The answer is there, I will allow it. Yes, go on.

MR GRAY: Q. Do you agree with that? This is the first time I have asked you about this document in this respect? A. No, well, I would refer to my earlier answer and I don't - I think that, yes, if they want to identify if anti-gay bias is involved in any of the deaths, then they would take into account the evidence that would indicate that.
Q. We11, in the fourth paragraph under the heading "Execution", after saying that the strike force was not going to be reinvestigating, the reader is told that the primary focus:
... will be in determining whether any of the identified deaths were in fact motivated by an anti-gay bias ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So is that the proposition you adopt as being the main objective of this strike force - to determine whether in fact anti-gay bias motivated a death?
A. Yes - well, as that sentence continues, though, in context, it also says "rather than identifying and prosecuting offenders."
Q. Sure.
A. So that indicates to the investigator that you are not necessarily here to identify offenders or prosecute offenders; you are here for a review to determine motivation and what that motive is.
Q. Well, accepting that, the objective, according to this sentence, was to make a determination as to whether the deaths were in fact motivated by the bias?
A. That's what --
Q. That's what it says. Rather than an objective of identifying whether there were indicators indicative of bias or indicators which might suggest the possibility of bias; correct.
A. No. So this is a process. We're talking about a process here. It's a process of gathering the evidence to determine whether there is a motivation of bias.
Q. Okay. Now, the second paragraph under the heading of
"Execution" contains a definition of "Bias Crime Indicators", and it says that it comes from the Massachusetts mode1. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. I'11 take you to that mode1 in a minute. In fact, I'11 take you to that model now. You need to have volume 9 for this, and it's tab 228, [SCOI.82087]?
A. Yes.
Q. This is the Massachusetts document in question. Have you seen this document before?
A. No.
Q. You've never seen it?
A. No, not to my memory, no.
Q. That will enable me to be pretty quick, in that case, if you haven't seen it. If we turn to page 15 - the pages are numbered in black boxes down at the bottom --
A. Yes.
Q. -- we have in a box at the top of that page the definition of "bias crime indicator", which is the one found in your document, and then starting about halfway down the page there's a list of bias crime indicators. The first one, do you see, being racial, ethnic, gender and/or cultural differences?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And then in the bullet points, the various sort of factors that feed into that topic of difference?
A. Yes.
Q. Then they're not numbered, but there are, in all, if you care to count them, nine of those indicators in that box. It may be common ground - it seems clear enough that that's where the nine indicators came from?
A. Oh, okay.
Q. The footnotes to your document, to your report, say that they came from that document, and that's where they seem to be, but since you haven't seen it, I won't trouble you with it further. Go back to the coordinating instructions, and go to page 4 - this is at tab 15, [SCOI.75071] and here are the four possible findings set out. Now, first of all, may \(I\) ask you, what was then or is now, if there is any difference, your understanding of the word "finding"?
A. In a sentence here or just generally?
Q. Well, generally, and if need be, if there's some special meaning that you would give it in this sentence? A. Look, I suppose a finding is after reviewing all the facts and circumstances, to come to an outcome that would be supported by the material that has been reviewed.
Q. That has been --
A. Supported by the material that has been reviewed.
Q. You are an experienced police officer, to put it mildiy, and I notice that you have a legal qualification as wel1?
A. I don't use that.
Q. Nonetheless, it's been achieved?
A. It's there, yes.
Q. Is your understanding that, in a legal sense, in court contexts, a finding - a finding of fact - is in the nature of a definitive decision or arrival at a view that is definitive, rather than a possibility or indicative; it is a finding that something is indeed the case?
A. Yes, I guess in a court of law, yes, I would agree.
Q. And is that the sense that the word was being used here?
A. I don't believe so, because if I'm saying for an investigator to make a finding, that would mean that I mean, I wouldn't question the Commissioner's or a judge's finding, so no, it would be something - and obviously we've had discussions on outcomes and where we should allocate different bias crimes. So I would not say that that's a definitive outcome at the investigator level.
Q. Well, what were the investigators - sorry, the Parrabell officers - told about what they were to make of the word "findings" there?
A. I can't tell you.
Q. We11, they appear, the four findings listed on page 4, 10 times over throughout the form, don't they --
A. Yes.
Q. -- under the heading "Indicator", so that what are called on page 4 "Findings" appear each time in the form under the heading "Indicators"?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the first possible finding or, in the form, indicator, is "Bias Crime"; agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. And the pointer, if that's an appropriate expression to use, is that the matter which would mean that the officer would come to the view that there was a bias crime, was:
- Sufficient evidence/information exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the incident was either wholly or partially
motivated by bias towards one of the protected categories and constitutes a criminal offence.
A. Yes.
Q. What were the protected categories?
A. I can't tell you that.
Q. Well, might it be that the language there reflects the reality that these indicators were generic, in the sense that they weren't peculiar to LGBTIQ type bias but other types of bias as well?
A. That's possible. I think that the term of "finding", though, is used in a different context to that of a courtroom.
Q. Sorry?
A. Sorry. I think the term "finding" is used in a different context to that which it's known to be in a courtroom.
Q. But what is that --

THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry - I'm sorry, I'm interrupting --
MR GRAY: Q. What is that different context and why do you think it is a different context?
A. Well, because for a police officer to find something is different from a judge, and I don't think that we would be saying, "Well, the investigator's made a finding, therefore we're bound by that finding". I think that would be not right, in the right context.
Q. Well, all right, what about the expression "evidence/information" - what is the distinction being made there?
A. I think that would probably be an all-encompassing term, if it is evidence or information.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But why draw the distinction?
A. Well, it may be that there is information in the file that does not amount to evidence. It might simply --
Q. So that would be enough, would it?
A. Well, if, in combination with other factors --
Q. Well, it doesn't say "in combination". Is the stroke meant to be an alternative, namely, you could either have sufficient information or you could have - I am sorry, information or sufficient evidence, you could have one or the other, or have you got to have both?
A. I believe so, Commissioner, if the information --
Q. When you say you believe so, does that mean that the person filling out the form would be satisfied either if there was, in their view - whatever this means - sufficient evidence, or alternatively, also information, whatever that means?
A. Yes, to prove --
Q. I understand what it is meant to do --
A. -- beyond a reasonable doubt.
Q. -- but I'm trying to understand qualitatively what the officer filling out this form was intended to understand the term "sufficient evidence" as opposed to "information", to mean?
A. Sorry, your question, Commissioner?
Q. I'm sorry, as the commanding officer, I'm assuming that before this form went out finally and was given to the various people, you must have spent a good deal of time, given the importance you placed upon this exercise, in trying to understand the terminology used in the questions that were going to be posed of the various experienced investigators you talk about --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and who were going to fill out the form? Do I take it from your answers that you did not, in fairness to you, or did you, give consideration to whether there was a distinction to be drawn between the term "sufficient evidence" as an alternative, so it seems, to "information", or did you not give any consideration to that? Did you regard them as synonyms, if so, why did you choose to have alternatives?
A. I did regard them as synonyms.
Q. I'm so sorry?
A. I do regard them as synonyms, because --
Q. But why have them, though?
A. Why have them?
Q. Why have an alternative if they're meant to be synonyms?
A. Because of the later part of that instruction that says "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt", so that would --
Q. But that's an onus point. Why would that affect the question of evidence as opposed to information - the mere fact that the criminal standard was being imported?
A. Well, I was giving general guidance, I saw that as general guidance to the officers, it's not a --
Q. So it's only guidance?
A. Sorry?
Q. It's only guidance, then?
A. It's - yes.
Q. And again, Mr Gray has asked you the question, and I would like to know, what were the protected categories? Is that defined in the document?
A. I don't - looking at the document, I can't tell you what the protected categories are, but I'm happy to go and research that.
Q. No, it's not a question of researching it. If the person who was filling this form out, as you have, I think, intimated on a number of occasions, you have been taken to variations of the form, but if this was the ultimate form, I'm just asking, is there somewhere in the document that tells the person filling it out what are the protected categories?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Right. So - okay. So there is no definition of that term.
A. I --
Q. So what was the person filling out the form, from your point of view or understanding, meant to construe by the term "protected categories"?
A. Well, I think if they were uncertain about the protected categories, that they should then seek guidance from the senior investigators --
Q. No, no, it is not a question of seek, it is not a question of need to know. This is a form that presumably
has gone through some changes --
A. Yes.
Q. -- in the coordinating instructions and various other things, and it's an exercise which I understand and accept entirely that you thought was both useful and necessary?
A. Yes.
Q. But am I understanding you now to tell me that first you did give thought to the notion and that you thought that sufficient evidence should be interpreted by the officer as synonymous with each other, so --
A. Sorry, Commissioner, I don't think I actually sat down and gave thought to those particular words and the differences between them.
Q. We11, isn't that what this is all about? If you didn't give any thought to this individual terminology, what on earth were you asking these people to do by allocating all these resources? Weren't the words important? And weren't you intending each officer to take seriously the task of sitting down, reviewing either small amounts of material or vast volumes of material, and then sitting down to answer the questions?
A. Well, I wanted it to be broadly understood, because I don't want officers to necessarily look at things and then say, "Well, that's not evidence, that's information, therefore \(I\) disregard it". So \(I\) want them to take into account and regard everything: whether that be evidence or information, does that show that there is a bias crime?
That's what I want them to understand.
Q. But - I'm sorry to have to come back to it. In the first question, Mr Gray will come to others, you can't help me at the moment in terms of understanding what "protected categories" meant?
A. I don't know what that refers to.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right, thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Let me ask you about another phrase that appears in this formulation. What the investigator sorry, what the officer needs to find in order to say "yes" to the "Bias Crime" possible finding is sufficient evidence/information existing to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either whole or partial motivation of bias?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" is the criminal standard of proof?
A. Yes.
Q. To be contrasted with the lower standard of proof applicable in a civil case, namely, balance of probabilities?
A. Yes.
Q. You would be well aware of that, of course?
A. Yes.
Q. And the beyond reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases is deliberately set very high --
A. Yes.
Q. -- isn't it? It's a very difficult and demanding standard to meet?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the very serious consequences of a guilty verdict in a criminal case?
A. Yes.
Q. Including, sometimes, loss of liberty.
A. (Witness nods).
Q. Do you think now, or did you think then, that that very high and difficult standard, beyond reasonable doubt, was appropriate for considering whether, in a review exercise on the papers, known to be likely to be incomplete or imperfect - whether the incident was wholly or partially motivated by bias? Was it appropriate that they had to reach that determination, if at al1, on1y beyond
a reasonable doubt?
A. I think yes for the first category.
Q. Why?
A. Because that showed an almost certainty that bias was involved in that crime, and that's what \(I\) was looking for.
Q. Well, obviously you can look at this again if you need to, but \(I\) don't want to keep asking you to get folders in and out. You wil1 recal1 that in the Parrabe11 report, when you published it, you said - this is at page 21 - that the Parrabe11 investigators had to answer a simple
question - your words - "is there evidence of a bias crime"? Now, actually, the question, not simple at al1, was not that question but, just on the first possible finding, it was whether something had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether evidence existed; agreed? A. Yes.
Q. So why did you say that in the report?
A. What I meant by saying "was there evidence" was that, first of all, was there a bias crime or was there not a bias crime? That was the pure distinction that \(I\) wanted to work out. Whether --
Q. And you thought that you would communicate that by saying that the simple question, singular, simple, one question, that they had to answer, was, "Is there evidence of bias crime", did you?
A. That was a start, yes.
Q. We11, you don't say in the report that it was a start; you said that's what they had to do?
A. This is a report after the fact --
Q. It is.
A. -- of the investigations, and my view was that that was a question that was relevant.
Q. Wel1, I wil1 read the sentence:

To be clear --
you said in the report --

NSW Police ... investigators assigned to Strike Force Parrabel 1 applied a general tenet to case classification by answering a simple question:
"Is there evidence of a bias crime."

Now, looking at page 4 of the coordinating instructions, that's just not true, is it?
A. Well, the final report wasn't meant to go down every path and examine every word that is said. The final report was just that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But it was intended, surely
accurately, to tell the public precisely the question that was posed, wasn't it - or not?
A. Yes, Commissioner, because I wanted to understand whether there was a bias crime or whether there wasn't.
Q. No, but you were publishing to the world at large, because you were telling the public, "We've done our investigation and this is what we've come up with, and we've got Flinders who are running their own study on this." All Mr Gray is putting to you, I think, is that the publication of the ultimate question doesn't reflect the exercise that the officers undertook.

MR TEDESCHI: Your Honour, I rise to voice my concern that the question is somewhat misleading - not your question, Commissioner, but the overall question from my learned friend - because four pages later, he divides it into the four categories.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, fair enough.
MR TEDESCHI: So it is misleading to suggest that he has just presented this one question and provided an answer to it.

THE COMMISSIONER: Al1 right, fair enough. Mr Gray, you will accommodate that.

MR GRAY: Yes, I will. I just observe that my friend is mistaken. Four pages later in the report, there is no such thing.

MR TEDESCHI: Page 24:
Of the [88] cases that were reviewed --
and it lists the four categories.
MR GRAY: Well, I won't make submissions about it now. Page 24 says what it says and my friend can make submissions about that no doubt.

MR TEDESCHI: Your Honour, it is not a question for submissions, it is a question to be fair to the witness.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, Mr Tedeschi, I have read page 24 and that doesn't say what you say it says at all.

MR TEDESCHI: The top of the page describes the four different categories --

THE COMMISSIONER: Where is that?
MR TEDESCHI: On my copy, the very top of page 24 , above a circular diagram. It says:

Of the 86 cases that were reviewed --

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MR TEDESCHI: Then it divides them into different categories. So \(I\) submit it is an unfair question to suggest --

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't agree with you, Mr Tedeschi. What the top of page 24 does is to say, if I may say so, on the face of it, that there were different categories, all right? If elsewhere in this document it says that the officers answered four different questions, that's one thing. If it is said earlier on that there was a question, simple question, posed, and if the analysis, for whatever reason explained or unexplained, breaks them up into four different categories, that does not indicate that the questions that the officers answered were four in number.

So I do not agree with you that at the moment, on the basis of what I'm looking at - it's true that at the top of page 24 the report does say they were reviewed and in certain cases there was evidence found of suspected bias crimes or so on. It does not say, unless it is elsewhere in the report, that officers were invited to address four different questions.

Now, what is said earlier is there was a simple question posed. Now, if that's right, then you are right, there is a juxtaposition between what is at the top of 24 and what is earlier said, but it doesn't follow that the report itself is explicit, namely, that there was more than one simple question asked, because another reading of the top of page 24 is that the officers, on the basis of whatever answers they got or whatever material they analysed, were able to find "Bias Crime" in a certain percentage and "No Bias Crime" in others. It doesn't
follow that the four questions were asked at all.
MR TEDESCHI: But it necessarily implies, Commissioner --
THE COMMISSIONER: No, it doesn't, Mr Tedeschi, please. It is open to the cross-examiner, on the basis of this document - you are right, you can ask whether this witness intended, when this document was drafted and published to the world, to indicate that there were four questions asked. You may be able to ask that question. His intention, though, may not have manifested itself in the text of the report as it went public. That will be a matter for me if it becomes relevant in due course.

MR TEDESCHI: If the Commissioner pleases.
THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Let me, Mr Crandell, try to deal with the point that Mr Tedeschi has been making this way, in the time remaining - do you have the report in front of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Page 21.
A. Yes.
Q. This is the point that I was putting to you.
A. Yes.
Q. You say, or the report says:

To be clear, ... investigators assigned to Strike Force Parrabell applied a general tenet to case classification by answering a simple question:
"Is there evidence of a bias crime?"
A. Yes.
Q. I have suggested to you that that's not accurate.

I have put that to you and you have begun to answer it. Now, the point that Mr Tedeschi is directing attention to is at the top of page 24 , but can I just start with page 23 , do you see that it's got a heading "Findings"? A. Yes.
Q. That wasn't unintentional, I take it; the public was being told that Strike Force Parrabell had arrived at findings; correct?
A. Yes, I don't think that's unusual for reports of this nature to have findings or outcomes.
Q. I don't suggest that it is unusual, but I thought you were intending to say earlier that the use of the word "findings" in the coordinating instructions was not to be taken in some definitive sense but in some lesser sense? A. Yes, well, these are the findings of a process of Parrabell, not an internal document. So - I - I'm not meaning "findings" in the legal sense here.
Q. Okay. On page 24, which is the page that my learned friend was pointing to, there is a pie chart and a graph. And the line at the top, or the few lines at the top, say:

Of the 88 cases that were reviewed - 8
cases --
sorry --
... 86 cases that were reviewed - 8 cases
(9\%) found evidence of bias crime ...
Do you agree?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And then different numbers for other classifications.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the point that I'm getting at is this: that both the assertion on 21 that there was just one simple question, "Is there evidence of a bias crime", and the statement on the top of page 24, "8 cases found evidence of bias crime", do not correspond with the question that the officers actually had to answer, namely, the question on the top of page 4 of the coordinating instructions, because the question was not, "Is there evidence of bias crime", was it?
A. Yes, but --
Q. No, please - it was not, "Is there evidence of bias crime", was it?
A. In the coordinating instructions, are you talking about?
Q. On page 4, the first bullet point, the question is not, "Is there evidence of bias crime", is it?
A. No, it talks about sufficient evidence or information.
Q. Correct. And on page 24 of the report, where it says, "8 cases found evidence of bias crime" --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that also does not reflect the question that they were actually answering, does it? The question they were actually answering was not, "Is there evidence of bias crime"; it was, "Is there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there might have been bias crime?"
A. Yes, I --
Q. Quite a different thing, isn't it?
A. No, I disagree.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Is there any reason why you couldn't have set out verbatim on page 21 the actual question asked, if there was only one question asked? A. No.
Q. And is there any reason why you couldn't have set out in verbatim terms all of the questions that were asked?
A. No. Commissioner, it was a general tenet, is what I said. A general tenet. It wasn't a specific question. It was in generality.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Okay.
MR GRAY: I will just cover off, if there is time, Commissioner, the four of these, if that's convenient - it will take another few minutes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MR GRAY: Q. The second bullet point on page 4 of the coordinating instructions, the second available finding, was called "Suspected Bias Crime"; agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. And that, according to the guidance provided by the coordinating instructions, being the same guidance found in the form, was:
- Evidence/Information exists that the incident may have been motivated by bias but the incident cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it was either wholly or partially motivated by bias ...

Agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. So again, there is the opaque, if I may say so, inclusion of the phrase "evidence/information", with whatever shades of meaning might be thought by somebody to be involved there?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, there is the criminal standard of proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt", imported into the question?
A. Yes.
Q. Then we have not "Not a Bias Crime", where the guidance given to the officer is:
- The incident has been determined as
either not being motivated by bias towards
a protected group or although bias
motivation is in evidence it does not relate to a protected group.

Agreed?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, first of al1, this one doesn't have within it any standard of proof, does it? Not beyond reasonable doubt, not on the balance of probabilities, not anything else?
A. Yes.
Q. So what standard of proof were the officers to use for that one?
A. We11, I don't know that they needed to apply a standard of proof to that.
Q. Didn't they?
A. Given there's - well, no.
Q. We11, they were making a determination either that there wasn't any bias or that although there was some bias,
it didn't relate to the protected group. They were determining that as a fact - by what standard?
A. Well, I don't necessarily think that you can say it's determined as a fact.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. No, but they were expressing their own personal view?
A. Yes.
Q. Weren't they? And they were to determine, or together with others there was to be a determination which would lead to that conclusion?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR GRAY: Q. Why didn't there need to be some standard of proof? What was the criterion? What was the litmus test?
A. The criterion is whether it is or is not a bias crime.
Q. No, "motivated by bias towards a protected group",
wel1 --
A. Well, obviously --
Q. How are they to determine that one way or the other?
A. Well, obviously it would be towards the victim, I would think, so I don't think there is too much uncertainty about a protected group when we are talking about a homicide.
Q. A11 right. We11, what does "protected group" mean?
A. "Protected group", in my opinion, would mean a marginalised community.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. A what, sorry?
A. As in LGBTIQ - a marginalised community like LGBTIQ people.

MR GRAY: Q. And if "Bias Crime", first bullet point that is, the existence of bias crime - had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt - I will start that again. If, under the heading "Bias Crime", first finding, there needed to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of sufficient evidence, for "Not a Bias Crime", what needed to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COMMISSIONER: If anything?
MR GRAY: Q. If anything?
A. Well, the fact that it wasn't bias related, and that would be from a review of the material.
Q. And was it to be determined beyond reasonable doubt or not?
A. Well, it doesn't say that in the --
Q. No, it doesn't, and hence my question. What standard were they to apply?
A. Well, I would imagine the standard from "Bias Crime", but in any event these --
Q. Sorry, the --
A. The standard of the "Bias Crime".
Q. Which is?
A. Well, which is sufficient evidence or information exists beyond a reasonable doubt.
Q. You think beyond a reasonable doubt came into the third one as well, the third bullet --
A. It is not said in there is what I'm saying, so I can't --
Q. I know it is not said, but I thought your answer just then was that you would assume that they would have needed to --
A. It may be the case. I can't tell you that.
Q. You don't know?
A. No. But as I said, we're looking at not necessarily evidence, not necessarily - we're looking at all of the facts and circumstances to determine whether or not bias is involved as a motivating factor to create that victim [sic].
Q. All right. Just finally for the moment, for today, anyway, the fourth one is "Insufficient Information". I won't need to go on to read the whole of what then appears, but it begins with "Insufficient Information". What was the meaning of "Insufficient", as against
"Sufficient", in this context?
A. Well, it's not sufficient to come to a finding - to come to a view or come to a finding as to whether or not
bias was involved in the offence.
THE COMMISSIONER: Q. So in other words, it was again up to the individual police officer's appreciation whether he or she thought there was or was not sufficient information? A. Subject to the governance structures and reviews that were put in place.
Q. When you say "subject to the governance structures", none of these terms, "sufficient evidence" or "insufficient evidence" are the subject of definition?
A. Right. Yes.
Q. Were they the subject of tutorials of the group of investigating police officers or strike force persons so as to get some uniformity amongst the group as to how each should regard the notion of sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence?
A. I can't tell you whether there was tutorials or such, Commissioner. I can tell --
Q. Well, would anyone have been skilled, amongst those who were the senior persons, to give tutorials or give lectures or give guidance to the persons filling out the form as to what they should regard as sufficient or insufficient, leaving aside "protected group", "beyond reasonable doubt", and otherwise?
A. Yes.
Q. And did they?
A. I can't tell you that, Commissioner, but I would be surprised if not, because that was the purpose of the weekly meetings and the monthly reviews, and that was part of the governance that I was speaking of.
Q. All right. And so somebody with, what, legal qualifications or otherwise or best guess as to what they, from their own experience, thought might be sufficient or insufficient?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, thank you.
MR GRAY: Is that a convenient time, Commissioner?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, 10 o'clock - oh, I am sorry, I won't be able to resume until 2 tomorrow, as I indicated
previously. I will at the moment say no more. If counsel want to talk about accommodating each other on whatever else needs to be done, then, again, the invitation is offered by me, but otherwise, I will resume at 2 tomorrow. Thank you.

AT 4.05PM THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WAS ADJOURNED TO THURSDAY, 8 DECEMBER 2022 AT 2PM


799:41
2022 [3]-692:9, 692:25, 827:8
21 [9]-699:4, 707:39, 708:38, 708:47, 710:28, 816:46, 820:24, 821:34, 822:22
228 [1] - 809:38 23 [1] - 820:45 24 [12]-818:33, 818:40, 818:46, 819:7, 819:20, 819:32, 819:40, 819:44, 820:44, 821:15, 821:36, 822:6
246 [3]-711:33, 711:40, 740:36
248[1]-713:29 \(25[1]-701: 34\) 28[1]-713:32
2PM [1] - 827:8
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\hline \(\mathbf{3}[17]-694: 8,694: 9\), \\
\(694: 24,698: 33\), \\
\(701: 45,739: 25\), \\
\(743: 21,744: 27\), \\
\(744: 28,754: 47\), \\
\(780: 34,780: 35\), \\
\(782: 5,786: 41\), \\
\(787: 40,807: 43\) \\
\(30[7]-702: 11,758: 2\), \\
\(758: 7,760: 36\), \\
\(760: 38,787: 37\), \\
\(795: 38\) \\
\(365[1]-786: 6\) \\
\(39[2]-726: 47,728: 41\)
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4 \text { [23] - 695:10, 695:17, } \\
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\text { 698:8, 698:19, } \\
699: 16,731: 37, \\
731: 41,736: 36, \\
765: 14,783: 5, \\
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811: 32,817: 41, \\
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822: 40 \\
4.05 P M \text { [1] - 827:7 } \\
40[7]-726: 44, \\
730: 22,730: 37, \\
732: 27,732: 31, \\
733: 13,733: 14
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42 [2] - 769:16, 769:30
43 [3] - 695:28,
699:41, 700:31
48 [6] - 717:34, 717:40, 717:44, 720:25, 736:36, 740:32
49 [8]-717:34,
717:40, 721:6, 722:8, 736:37, 737:8, 737:25,
740:32
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\(50[2]-768: 31,769: 37\) \\
\(59[9]-699: 19\)
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59 [9]-699:19,
699:22, 699:23,
699:25, 699:32
705:38, 705:39,
786:21, 789:43
\(\frac{6}{6[4]-707: 36,726: 43,}\)

732:28, 732:31
60 [6]-699:22,
705:39, 705:47,
706:9, 759:28,
795:35
60А [6] - 757:28,
758:40, 758:45,
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61 [1] - 761:5
64 [2] - 745:39, 745:43
66 [1] - 746:28
68 [3] - 747:40, 805:20
69 [2] - 805:19, 805:28
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