# 2022 Special Commission of Inquiry into LGBTIQ hate crimes 

Before: The Commissioner, The Honourable Justice John Sackar

At Leve1 2, 121 Macquarie Street, Sydney, New South Wales

On Monday, 12 December 2022 at 10.00am
(Day 15)

Mr Peter Gray SC (Senior Counsel Assisting)
Ms Meg O’Brien (Counsel Assisting)
Ms Claire Palmer (Counsel Assisting)
Mr Enzo Camporeale (Director Legal)
Ms Caitlin Healey-Nash (Senior Solicitor)
A1so Present:
Mr Mark Tedeschi KC (for NSW Police)
Mr Anders Mykkeltvedt (for NSW Police)
Ms Amber Richards (for NSW Police)
Mr Ken Madden (for Sergeant Steer)

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you. Mr Crandell, would you come back into the witness box.
<ANTHONY CRANDELL, on former affirmation: [10.02am]
<EXAMINATION BY MR TEDESCHI:
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Assistant Commissioner, you were asked questions by Counsel Assisting the Commissioner about your appointment as the Corporate Sponsor of Sexuality and Gender Diversity. How did you come to be appointed to that position?
A. I was the Commander of Surry Hills Local Area Command at the time. Surry Hills Local Area Command has a large population of LGBTIQ people and historically, the commander of Surry Hills LAC would perform that function as Corporate Sponsor for Sexuality, and ultimately we changed that to Sexuality, Gender Diversity and Intersex.

My predecessor was Chief Superintendent Donna Adney. She had been transferred from command at Surry Hills and I replaced her and she moved into Communications Command, a decision was made to bring the sponsorship back to field operations and Surry Hills Local Area Command, and in August of 2013 I was appointed as the corporate sponsor.
Q. And how long did you hold that position for?
A. Six years.
Q. Now, during those six years, were you - that included the time that you were involved in Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. During the time that you were involved in Strike Force Parrabell, were you also the commander of the Surry Hills Loca1 Area Command?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. How many police were you in charge of as the commander of that district?
A. 260 including Highway Patrol.
Q. And during the time that you were involved in Strike Force Parrabel1, did you have any other duties apart from being commander of that district?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Tell us about those.
A. I was - I had a corporate project for strategic drug exhibits, because Surry Hills is the largest exhibit storage facility in NSW Police. That project ran for around about three years, involved in some legislation change. I was also project lead for search warrant reforms in the Police Force, and that was a project that spanned about six to eight years and continues today. And I also was appointed the Corporate Sponsor for Body Worn Video in 2016 - '16/'17, and I currently hold that portfolio today.
Q. During the time that you were involved in Strike Force Parrabell and the commander of the Surry Hills Local Area Command, can you give us an idea of, for example, how many emails a day you would receive?
A. The email load would be significant. I would say 50 to 100 emails a day.
Q. You were asked a number of questions by Counse1 Assisting about the setting up of Strike Force Parrabell. Whose idea was it to set up that strike force?
A. That was my idea to start the strike force, obviously building on Operation Parrabell.

MR TEDESCHI: I perceive I don't have the Commissioner's attention.

THE COMMISSIONER: I beg your pardon?
MR TEDESCHI: I perceive that I don't have your attention, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm making some notes, Mr Tedeschi, and if you --

MR TEDESCHI: My apologies, Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: We11, I regard that as gratuitous and unnecessary. I am taking particular notice of what you are asking this gentleman.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you, Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: So would you be kind enough to proceed. MR TEDESCHI: Yes, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. And I'm not interested in
any further gratuitous comment from you, thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Why did you make the decision that you wanted to have a strike force like that?
A. I - I had reviewed Operation Parrabell's parameters and there had also been some media reporting around hate crimes, particularly related to the 88 deaths. I was actually most interested in the families of the deceased people, particularly those families that I believed had been let down by the police in the past, and I also had regard to the community. I genuinely wanted to bring the community closer to the police.

There's always been a difficult relationship when people in the community want to report crime, particularly violent crime. From the research that I'd undertaken, I was satisfied that there was significant - significantly high reported violent crime throughout that entire marginalised community particularly towards gay men.
Q. That was unreported?
A. That was unreported, absolutely, and I drew - I drew finding - an understanding from the fact that ACON had given me information that 20 reports of violence against gay men per day were being reported to them and not the police, and when I asked for that explanation, it was because of fear of the police. So with all of that context, I wanted to do something from this point in time to be able to review those cases.
Q. Who did you think might benefit from the exercise of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. I thought that I could give peace of mind to family members, surviving family members. That wasn't always the case, but that was the intention. I thought that it would be good for the Police Force to be seen to have changed, in terms of a different era and a different period of time, and I thought that by making acknowledgments of truth, that that would bring both the police and the community, LGBTIQ community, closer together, and also increase that reporting standard.
Q. What do you say to the suggestion that the setting up of Strike Force Parrabell was a result of media attention to the issue of unreported violent crime against members of the LGBTI community?
A. Yes, so I was aware of those media reports,
absolutely, and I think those media reports created greater awareness in me and in our team at Surry Hills, to work out how I could use my standing as the Corporate Sponsor for Sexuality, Gender Diversity and Intersex to somehow bring closure to some families but in a broader sense to bring some trust in the community, with what the police were trying to achieve, and I knew that I couldn't achieve reinvestigation, but when $I$ sat down and spoke to some senior detectives, I thought that I could achieve something with a review.
Q. Why do you say that you didn't feel that you could achieve something by reinvestigation?
A. I just knew that the amount of resources and the time that would take to conduct reinvestigations - I also thought that it would be difficult to work out exactly which cases should be reinvestigated, based on the fact that many of the cases needed fresh information. So really, in conducting the reinvestigation, a media strategy was always part of it, simply to bring attention to the fact that the police were undertaking these reviews and trying to get some sort of transparency into the process of that.
Q. At the time that you set up Strike Force Parrabell, were you aware of any other similar exercise that had already been conducted of that nature, either in Australia or overseas?
A. No.
Q. Since then, have you become aware of any similar exercise that has been conducted to the one that Strike Force Parrabell conducted, either in Australia or overseas? A. No.
Q. Have you done any sort of search to see if there have been any similar exercises?
A. Yes, I've conducted a search over the internet, just a basic, a general search, but $I$ haven't been able to find anything where there's been a process of review to see if bias, gay-hate bias could be identified in crimes that have been committed.
Q. Have you also conducted a search as to any forms that have been used to categorise gay-hate crimes? A. Yes.
Q. What did you find?
A. No, I couldn't find any of those, either.
Q. When you took initial steps for setting up Strike Force Parrabe11, what sort of reaction did you get from your colleagues in the Police Force?
A. My colleagues were supportive, particularly those colleagues that provided staff. Commanders are never comfortable providing staff to other priorities, but from the - my colleagues that supplied staff, they were supportive because they could see the larger picture of what we were trying to achieve.

My Deputy Commissioner at the time was Nick Kaldas and Nick Kaldas had a strong affiliation with marginalised communities and he was really driving the case for bias crimes, I thought, forward. And so he had a deep understanding of that. My Commissioner was Scipione Mr Scipione. I didn't really have a sense of what his thoughts were when Strike Force Parrabe11 was commenced, but he did authorise and draft an apology to the - to the 78ers, which is part of the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras, and the way the police conducted themselves in 1978, and he actually crafted that apology, so I would say that he was also in support.
Q. When was that apology issued?
A. I delivered that apology in March, early March of 2016.
Q. So that was during the course of Strike Force Parrabe11?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Prior to setting up Strike Force Parrabe11, had you received some information from a woman by the name of Sue Thompson?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us who she was, what role she had and what information you got from her about suspected gay-hate deaths?
A. So Sue Thompson was one of the very first Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officers for the NSW Police Force.
Q. Was she an officer, a police officer?
A. Not a police officer, no, an unsworn person, and it
was at a time where NSW Police really wanted to start making inroads into the relationship with the LGBTIQ communities. So she played, to my mind, a really important role at that time. She is also a researcher and she developed the list from a number of sources, but $I$ believe also internal police sources as well. I'm not sure of the extent of her research but she provided, at the very beginning, at least, the basis of the 88 list, and then, as I understand, it she confirmed that list to the Unsolved Homicide Squad some time later.
Q. And to your knowledge, did she have any input from the LGBTIQ communities about the scope of those 88 deaths?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. So from your point of view, Operation Parrabell, the scope of it, had been influenced by the LGBTI communities through her?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Was it your intention from the beginning to produce a report that was going to be made public?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And why was that important to you?
A. Because I wanted to show the LGBTI communities what we were doing and that we were - and that the whole purpose of Parrabell was to bring us closer together, to encourage trust and to build stronger relationships.
Q. At the time that you set it up, did you have in mind the possibility of, if you found an appropriate matter that warranted reinvestigation, that something might be done in that regard?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. So what did you have in mind in relation to the possibility of reinvestigation of matters when you set it up?
A. Yes, so if there was any evidence that had been overlooked, or as part of the review had come to light, or fresh evidence had been brought about from members of the public, then that would require a referral to the Unsolved Homicide Team for reinvestigation, or for a consideration of reinvestigation.
Q. And in fact, was there one of the 88 matters that
eventually did get reinvestigated as a result of the activities of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. I think the activities of Strike Force Parrabell would have contributed to that, but whether it was the sole reason or not I'm uncertain, but definitely one reinvestigation - sorry, there's more than one reinvestigation, but definitely one charge arising from that reinvestigation.
Q. Partially as a result of the actions of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. I believe so, and the publicity that that was generating.
Q. And if the Commissioner wished to know which matter you're talking about, you could write that down on a piece of paper?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. Is it a matter that is currently before the courts?
A. Yes, it is.

THE COMMISSIONER: If it's currently before the courts then, isn't it a matter of public knowledge? Anyway, I won't detain you on it, but if a person has been charged, you have the opinion of Mr Crandell that it's partially as a result of his and his team's - Parrabell. Perhaps all that needs to be said.

MR TEDESCHI: I'm content to ask that, Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: Over to you. I thought you had, but if you want to ask it again, by all means, do.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. What's the name of the matter?
A. Raymond Keam.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. It is currently before the courts, isn't it?
A. It is, Commissioner.
Q. There was some publicity about somebody being extradited from Victoria?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you know what the current status of the matter is? Did it go to committal or did it go straight to trial
or is it going straight to trial?
A. I'm uncertain whether it's at committal or trial, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Prior to Strike Force Parrabell, had you had any previous experience in writing reports for public dissemination?
A. No.
Q. To your knowledge, did any other members of Strike Force Parrabel 1 have such experience?
A. No.
Q. Is the writing of reports for public consumption a common exercise within the police?
A. No.
Q. You've told the court that you had three senior officers who had a supervisory role in Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. That was Middleton, Grace and Bignell?
A. Yes.
Q. What was their attitude towards the tasks of Strike Force Parrabe11?
A. They were enthusiastic. Craig Middleton was a direct report to me as the Commander of Surry Hills LAC, and Paul Grace was a direct report to him; Cameron Bignell a direct report to Paul. But Cameron Bignell had had a deep passion for LGBTI community issues, as did both Craig Middleton and Paul Grace, even if only by their appointments to their positions at Surry Hills.
Q. What was Bignell's background that made him a particularly suitable candidate to be involved in Strike Force Parrabel1?
A. So Cameron is a detective senior constable. He was also a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer so he'd undertaken training in GLLO duties.
Q. How many years has he been a liaison officer?
A. I'm not sure, but it wasn't a recent thing that he became a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer, he'd been one for
some time, and obviously was interested in bias and in that particular community.
Q. And did he have any other attribute that you're free to disclose to the hearing?
A. I can disclose, simply because I've asked him, but he is a member also of the LGBTIQ community.
Q. And why did you think that it was important to have three officers who were designated detectives in those senior positions?
A. Because I know what training the detectives undertake. I know they have training in motive. I know they have specific expertise in investigations and I know that with the structures in place, they had a good deal of comfort in the way that they were going about their business. So I was comfortable with their training, I was comfortable with their capabilities, and their attitude was certainly most appropriate.
Q. Now, you were asked many questions by Counse1

Assisting about the categorisation of crimes as part of this exercise, and you gave evidence that if you don't know who the perpetrator of a crime is, in many cases it might be difficult to know whether or not it is a bias crime? A. Yes .
Q. How did you make the determination in relation to the cases that you looked at where there was no known perpetrator?
A. So it was an even more difficult task. I actually reviewed the unsolved cases and 17 of them were found to be insufficient information.
Q. $\quad 17$ insufficient evidence?
A. Yes, to make a determination. Three others were as a result of coronial findings, so a determination was made substantially in accordance with those coronial findings. There was - based on the circumstances of two matters, one was found to be not a bias crime and one was found to be a bias crime, and another - and there was one other that was classified as a suspected - no, it was classified as a bias crime because of a dying declaration.
Q. And were there two cases where there was no evidence of being a bias crime?
A. Yes.
Q. At that time?
A. Yes.
Q. You have described the process whereby there was discussion within Strike Force Parrabel1 in order to come to a conclusion initially whether or not each of these 88 matters were gay-hate crimes, and you were asked a lot of questions by Counse1 Assisting about your use of the 10 bias crime indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was suggested to you, or you were asked questions as to whether the 10 bias crime indicators had been used as a checklist?
A. Yes.
Q. You stated on a number of occasions that they were not used as a checklist, and I'd like to take you to the part of the report where the Flinders team review is contained, which is part of exhibit 1, tab 2, page 11, [SCOI.02632]? A. Sorry, what was that page, counsel, please?
Q. I've just got to find the right page. It's not page 11 of the report, pardon me. I'11 find that section for you and I'11 come back to it. Can you explain to the Commissioner how the bias crime indicators were used and why they were not used as a checklist?
A. We11, they were used as a guide to basically - so that I could understand whether or not different factors were or different material would show that those factors existed or otherwise. And it would allow me to see that investigators were taking into account what was corporately endorsed in policy as indicators of bias crime. Then there had to be discussions, in my opinion, to be able to determine whether or not that amounted to motivation for gay-hate crime.
Q. And you said on a number of occasions in evidence that there was no particular number of criteria that had to be met --
A. No.
Q. -- for a crime to be categorised as a bias hate or hate crime?
A. Yes, there was no - no science in that regard.
Q. And vice versa?
A. That's right.
Q. So ultimately, do you accept that there were
differences of opinion amongst the police during the course of that process?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Do you accept that the allocation of cases into the four categories was ultimately a matter of opinion in which different people might have different views?
A. Yes.
Q. When the academics came back with their views, you've told the hearing that there was a discussion between them and the police about differences of opinion?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think you said that Sergeant Steer was involved at some stage in that process?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you describe the process that was engaged in and whether it ended up in a resolution of agreement?
A. Yes, so there was a process of discussion amongst the police. Some of those discussions involved Sergeant Steer, others didn't. So that at least there could be some consensus of opinion as to whether or not a matter fell into a category or potentially - a potential number of other categories. There was also, as $I$ understand it, reading from the academic report - there was also discussion on the academic side to determine exactly the same matter.
Q. So they also had differences of opinion between the three of them?
A. Yes, absolutely. And then there was other meetings between police officers and academics to determine the thinking around why they had come to the different categorisations.
Q. During that process, did either team attempt to convince the other of their viewpoint?
A. Not - not in my opinion, because it was really about discussing the methodology as to how we came to a position and the academics did the same.
Q. And over what period of time did this consultation take place?
A. It was over several months - not continuously, but through meetings and other discussions with them.
Q. Were you content with that process?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. How do you feel about it now, looking back at it?
A. I'm still content with that process because I didn't see it as a scientific process; I saw it as a process of trying to work out opinions and trying to get the best outcome.
Q. Do you tell the Commissioner that in fact, it is still the case where, in relation to some of those cases, opinions may differ?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And is that especially the case where there's no known perpetrator?
A. Yes, certain1y.
Q. And an absence of solid evidence about motivation?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. Can you give us some examples of cases in which there was no perpetrator determined, where it was particularly difficult to make a determination one way or the other? A. Yes. Should I say the name of the case, Mr Tedeschi, or just describe the circumstances?

MR TEDESCHI: I'm in the Commissioner's hands on that.

THE COMMISSIONER: If it's going to be a meaningfu1 analysis, $I$ have to know what he's talking about, I don't know how I'd otherwise - I don't propose to have secret notes written and passed around the room. I mean, the names are all disclosed in the Parrabell report itself. Most of them - many of them are the subject of, I put it as high as common knowledge, but many of the cases have been discussed publicly over the years.

If Mr Crande11, however, feels that by reason of any current investigative process that's being undertaken, I would accord him the respect of indicating that, but otherwise, if he can choose examples where that isn't the
case, then I think it would be more helpful to me to understand what he's going to say.

THE WITNESS: So, sir, the case of Mr Slater, the death of Mr Slater, who was an older man, and he had urinary tract issues and needed to urinate frequently. He went to a public toilet which happened to be a beat.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. This is the man in Newcastle, is it?
A. Yes, I believe so, sir.
Q. Thank you.
A. And he was viciously attacked, and he's - he was robbed of $\$ 30$ by a perpetrator unknown. So the location is one aspect of it but to ascribe an intention or a motivation, I found that impossible, particularly on the basis that there was no perpetrator.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Can you give us another example?
A. Yes, there was a case of Mr Dempsey. I - Mr Dempsey was a difficult case because Mr Dempsey was murdered in cold blood. He was shot with an arrow in the chest at a beat by a perpetrator who had attempted to shoot arrows at other people at that same beat and he'd also been responsible for the murder of a taxi driver, I believe after the murder of Mr Dempsey.

That attracted a great deal of debate amongst the Parrabell team because there was a significant amount of interest placed upon the fact that it was a murder at a beat, at a known beat, and there was differences of opinion as to what the motivation - whether that crime was motivated by gay hate or whether that was simply murder for other reasons. Even though there was a perpetrator identified, there was some significant mental health issues involved and that person is still in prison.

But it was very, very difficult, and I have a few regrets about that case, simply because his - Peter Rolfe is his partner, his surviving partner, and I had a I spoke to Peter about our classification of it not being a bias crime. Academics classified it as a bias crime, and he was deeply hurt by that.
Q. He was deeply hurt by the academics' approach or by the police approach?
A. No, by our approach of not classifying it as a bias crime, because he's firmly of the view that it is a bias crime and it was clear to be.
Q. Is that one of the cases where there was a difference of opinion between the police and the academics?
A. Yes. And I just use that case to show you the difficulty in having that classification; even when you have a perpetrator and it seems clear from one perspective; it's still very difficult to classify.
Q. And is there a third case you can tell us about as an example?
A. Yes, there was a case of - I think it was a case of Chudleigh, where Mr Chudleigh was killed by a person who he had molested for several years. Although the person was not convicted at court, he was charged but not convicted, trying to ascribe a bias to that person - was that gay hate? Was that anti-paedophile? Or was that simply interpersonal animosity?
Q. So you were seeking to distinguish between hatred of the man for what he had done to the man who did the kil1ing --
A. Yes.
Q. -- as opposed to gay hate because of the fact that the person was gay?
A. Yes. And did he simply hate gay people, or was it more of a paedophile animus, or was it just that he did not want this person to continue living given what had happened?
Q. And was that, again, one where there was a difference of opinion between the police and the academics?
A. The difference - well, the difference of opinion with the academics was that they had a separate category, a separate animus category of paedophile hate, so $I$ believe that they classified that as paedophile hate. I just can't remember what our classification was, but there was significant debate over what that category entailed.
Q. And you have explained to the Commissioner in your evidence in answer to questions from Mr Gray why you did not want to have a category relating to paedophilia? A. Yes. I didn't want a paedophilia category simply because $I$ felt that if a person misconceived that gay men
were paedophiles, then that would still result in gay hate. I could understand their distinction --
Q. So you didn't want to perpetrate or encourage any such further hatred?
A. No, and I didn't want to perpetuate the falsity of gay men being paedophiles, because it's completely wrong.
Q. During the course of your evidence you described how there were 12 matters that were the subject of a dip sample by Sergeant Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think that you gave evidence in answer to questions from Mr Gray that you thought that those 12 matters were matters where there was a difference of opinion between the police and the academics. Have you since had an opportunity to check on that?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And what have you found?
A. So after reviewing the cases, it is - it was actually a dip sample. So it was - some of the cases are consecutive in number, around about the 60 s and 70 s , but it seems to me that it was more of a random sample exercise. How they were selected I can't assist with, but --
Q. No, but do you know who selected them?
A. I don't. But I do know which ones were reviewed.
]Q. And do you know what instructions were given to Sergeant Steer about those 12?
A. No, only that he would conduct a review.
Q. What material was made available to him to conduct that dip sample?
A. I believe it was the Bias Crime Indicator Forms. And the reason I say that is because although Sergeant Steer had access to the e@gle.i material, it would be unrealistic for anybody to expect him to have gone through that amount of material, and so I believe he would have restricted his inquiries to the Bias Crime Indicator Forms, at least in the first instance.
Q. As a result of Sergeant Steer's review, did the police change any of their conclusions?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. Was that in support of conclusions that Sergeant Steer had come to or contrary to Sergeant Steer or both?
A. There was both. So there were some that were changed in support of Sergeant Steer's view and others that Sergeant Steer - I don't want to say he acquiesced but he changed - he didn't necessarily change his view, but he could understand where the categorisation was most appropriate.
Q. During the course of questioning by Mr Gray, the Commissioner asked you a question about whether this process was opaque or transparent. What do you say about that?
A. No, I understand the process to be transparent.
Q. Why is that?
A. We11, I say that for a number of reasons. One is because there was - it wasn't a scientific method that we were following. There wasn't - it was discussion, and that was with not only the investigative team but also the academic review team.

And I also say that because that's indicated in the final report, particularly from the academic team who actually outline exactly the process that was undertaken. And my view of that is that that process was accurate. So when I say it was transparent, that's what I was seeking. I was seeking transparency and I think we described that in a transparent fashion.
Q. So the fact that many of these matters were the subject of discussion and contrary views was disclosed in the report?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. The fact that there were differences between the police and the academics in some cases was disclosed in the report?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact that people had changed their minds from time to time as a result of the input of others - that was disclosed in the report?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you now think of any other way in which the
exercise could have been made more scientific?
A. I think it would be dangerous to move into - to try to make it a scientific process.
Q. Why is that?
A. Because I don't think - because then you get back to the tick-box exercise, I fear, and I think you would then be looking at some sort of a calculation to determine whether or not somebody had bias in their mind. I don't think that we could ever get to that position, simply because we're dealing with human motivation and human behaviour.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Tedeschi, I wonder if I could interrupt and ask a question.
Q. At page 992 of the transcript, Mr Crande11, I asked you about the process and at page 992, 1 ines 16 and following, I think I put to you there - if I didn't put it to you there, I did put it to you otherwise - that the police officer or officers concerned, when they read the files, prepared a narrative and often the forms are filled out - even as to the first question of immutable characteristic differences, forms are often filled out as a narrative, starting from the disclosure of the deceased and then, in many, many cases, a narrative, as it were, of what occurred in any investigative process that had taken place.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, the discussions you're talking about, do I take it almost without exception, they were based on the narrative or narratives as had been originally distilled by the person or persons who were looking at the source documents?
A. I would say so, Commissioner.
Q. So that the discussion between the police officers was not about the narrative originally prepared but the significance of one or more factors disclosed by the narrative?
A. Yes, I would say that's so.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Further to the Commissioner's question, what process was there to ensure that the narrative was

## accurate?

A. That's where that - the governance system came in play. So Detective Senior Constable Bignell would have input into that discussion, as would Detective Sergeant Grace, and then there would be weekly meetings to make sure that there was consistency across the different views and that there was open discussion about those points.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But the preparation of the narrative, although it was the subject of discussion by Detective Bignell and others, wasn't second-guessed, was it? In other words, he didn't go back and go over all of the files to determine whether he agreed or disagreed with the narrative originally prepared?
A. I don't believe he would have went over the files again, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right, thank you. Yes, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Did they all have access to those files if they wished to --
A. Yes.
Q. -- query the narrative?
A. Yes, every - every investigator had access to the e@gle.i file.
Q. Do you know whether, in fact, they did have access to those files in relation to the preparation of the narrative?
A. Yes.
Q. Can I ask you - I asked you about some examples of cases where it might have been difficult to determine motivation of a perpetrator. Can I suggest to you that there are two other cases that demonstrate those difficulties. I don't know if there is any difficulty about mentioning their names. The first one is a 1985 case of a female who was murdered in her home?
A. Oh - yes, that was Wendy Wayne, who was an openly transgender female woman. Wayne Brennan, I'm pretty sure, was the real name, birth name, I should say. So that was a case where - had an openly transgender female who was a drag queen, was very prominent in Kings Cross and surrounding areas, had been - her home had been broken into and she had been murdered by being shot in the head, back
of the head, twice. The crime scene was cleaned by the perpetrators and - and there was no forensic evidence to identify any perpetrator. So that's --
Q. And that remains unsolved to this day?
A. Remains unsolved. To ascribe a motivation to those sets of circumstances is impossible.
Q. And another case of a man in an antique store at Parramatta?
A. Yes. Mr Bedser, that was. Mr Bedser was a store owner in Parramatta. He was described by his friends as openly gay or bisexual. Two people entered his store and stabbed him.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. I'm sorry, would you just mind repeating what you just said?
A. Two people entered his store.
Q. Two people?
A. Yes.
Q. And where did you get that piece of information from, that there were two people?
A. From the case file. He was stabbed and died of his injuries. There was no known motivation for that, and I I would stand to be corrected but I don't even know that there was a robbery that had taken place.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. And again, it remains unresolved until today?
A. Yes, it does.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Can I just ask you this about that case? The Commission staff has reviewed that file and I'd be grateful, very grateful, if you could point to any information that you're aware of to suggest there were two people possibly entering the store and involved in his murder, and, secondly, that is a case, is it not, where the murder weapon has been lost? Are you aware of that?
A. I wasn't aware of that, no.
Q. Okay. Wel1, then, the Commission staff has been
informed that the murder weapon, thought to be a knife, has been lost either by - in relation - the police can't locate it.
A. Right.
Q. You're unaware of that?
A. I wasn't aware of that.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Yes, Mr Tedeschi.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Is location as a single indicator enough in your opinion to determine that a murder is a gay-hate crime?
A. No.
Q. Can you explain why?
A. Because I think that's one of many factors that would have to be taken into consideration, and that's why I thought the bias crime indicators were valuable as a tool.
Q. I'd like to read to you from page 69 of the Parrabell report [SCOI.02632]. That's a section that was written by the academics, about the middle of the page, there is a paragraph that begins "Although".
A. Yes.
Q.
Although each indicator was scored, the
summary conclusion or finding was not
determined by counting the number of "yes"
or "no" indicators of bias and referencing
that number to some sort of table that
accorded a finding of bias to a particular
threshold number (eg seven out of ten
indicators). Rather, the process was
described as intuitive and relied on
qualitative data in the form of contextual
information derived from analysing each
case. That is, having taken notice of the
requisite indicators of bias, the
detectives would also take into account the
"Summary of Findings" section - an amalgam
of the "general comments" section that
corresponded to all ten indicators. The
summary was often rich in detail and - when
viewed in concert with the relative
indicators - allowed a view of whether bias
was involved to emerge.
that paragraph accurately summarise the process, so

Does that paragraph accurately summarise the process, so
far as the police were concerned?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes, thank you. Could I take you now, please, to volume 4, tab 112, [SCOI.74554]. This is an email referred to by Counsel Assisting. Can I take you to tab 112, page 1. It's an email from Craig Middleton to Derek Dalton. In the second paragraph, about the fifth line, Detective Middleton says this:

> Additionally, as you are well aware, there is no definitive line between the categories, hence some of these matters can slip between categories quite easily (insufficient information/suspect bias etc). Even within the review team itself we had differences of opinion on cases and which category it was placed. In some respects, some of these matters could almost sit in 2 categories. But ultimately we had to make a choice, of which opinion played a part. If the truth be known [a lot] of these matters were placed in their category based on our "collective opinion". You already know this, hence why your results differ from ours. Essentially those differences are based on your opinion as opposed to our opinion. Whose opinion is right? I would suggest both are. So yes you are correct, publishing individual results runs the risk of people being able to scrutinise individual matters and challenge those individual matters based on their opinion of the information.
A. Yes.
Q. Assistant Commissioner, in your view, does that part of that paragraph describe accurately the way in which different people might have different opinions about which category any individual case might fit into?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. Is there anything more you would like to say about that?
A. No. I agree with the paragraph and I agree with Mr Middleton's comments.
Q. You were asked a number of questions by Counsel Assisting about the different descriptions that were given to the four categories at different times in different documents?
A. Yes.
Q. The coordinating instructions was one of those documents?
A. Yes.
Q. The BCI form that was eventually used - I think it was established that it had the four categories in the - using the same wording that was contained in the coordinating instructions?
A. Yes.
Q. Did all of the police officers who were conducting the review use the same BCI form?
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked a number of questions by Counse1 Assisting as to why ultimately the first category, the category of positive finding of "Bias Crime", contained within it the criminal standard of proof, and you gave evidence about the fact that that was a term that was readily understood by police officers because of their experience in charging people and perhaps being involved in trials as witnesses?
A. Yes, that's true.
Q. Did the category of "Suspected bias crime" require any particular standard of proof?
A. No. It required the suspicion that there was bias crime. To my mind, that indicated more likely - certainly more likely than not - that it would be a bias crime.
Q. From your point of view, if you were asked which categories are categories in which bias crimes have been committed, what would be your answer?
A. Sorry, could you repeat that question?
Q. If you were asked which of the categories are bias crimes, what would your answer be?
A. The number of crimes in the "Suspected Bias Crime" and the "Bias Crime" category.
Q. So the first two categories?
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked some questions by Counsel Assisting about the use of the word "findings" in the Parrabel1 report, and it was suggested to you that that could be misleading because it might create the impression of it being in the nature of a finding, a definitive finding, say, by a judicial officer?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you say of your use of the word "finding" or "findings".
A. It was never in my mind to push a finding to a judicial standard, and my limited understanding of public research, I believe that they used those terms and so I used a similar term in the publicly released report.
Q. By "findings", did you mean conclusions?
A. Yes, the outcomes of the reviews and the conclusions reached.
Q. You were also asked questions about the entry on page 21 of the Parrabe11 report, [SCOI.02632], where you referred to the single question, namely, "Is there evidence of a bias crime", and it was suggested to you that that was somehow misleading because it didn't refer to the four categories. Of course, elsewhere in the report, in a number of places, there are references to the four categories?
A. That's true.
Q. And the Bias Crime Indicator Form was an attachment --
A. Yes.
Q. -- to the report?
A. Yes.
Q. So anybody who wanted to find out about the categorisation could easily do so?
A. Yes, and they would understand that that's not the on1y question that was asked.
Q. Why did you condense the nature of the review into that one question at page 21 of the report?
A. Because I felt that that was a crucial question to ask and that's what we were seeking, that's what we were
looking for. It wasn't meant to be a definitive account of all the questions that the investigators asked; it was simply something that was very central to the way that I thought about what each investigator should be asking themselves.
Q. Was that your view of what was of interest to the LGBTIQ community?
A. Yes. I - yes, I think that the community wanted some validation of the true status of the 88 crimes, because there was no validation at all before that, because there was no reviews undertaken before that.
Q. It was suggested to you that the methodology of Strike Force Parrabell was deficient because there was no academic support in the literature for the use of the bias crime indicators that were used in the BCI form. You have told us that, to your knowledge, you don't know of another similar exercise that has been conducted either before or after Parrabell. Do you know if the academic review team were able to find other instances where such an exercise had been done?
A. My understanding is that they could not.
Q. Did you know that the American FBI criteria had been discredited?
A. No.
Q. What was your view during the work that was done on Strike Force Parrabell about the value or lack of value of those 10 criteria?
A. Well, I believe that the criteria were valuable on the basis that they were indicators of bias crimes, and I felt that it was appropriate to use that document and those indicators to be able to look into past investigations to find out what ultimately was the motivating factor for those crimes.
Q. You were also asked questions by Counsel Assisting about your use of the term "evidence/information", and in fact the Commissioner asked you some questions about that. If I remember your evidence correctly, you said that you used the two terms interchangeably. Did some of the background information in the police files - was that information that had been obtained anonymously from Crime Stoppers or by Crime Stoppers?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you categorise that as evidence or as information?
A. I would say that's information.
Q. What about police intelligence that has been recorded by the police intelligence unit? Would you categorise that as information or as evidence?
A. Well, that's information that has had some analysis added to it which then turns it into intelligence.
Q. What about a witness statement? Would you categorise that as information or evidence?
A. That would be evidence.
Q. And would you explain why you used both terms?
A. Because I wanted the investigators to start from a position, an open position, in relation to bias as a motivating factor. So I didn't want them to exclude anything early and I wanted them to start with ruling bias in before they ruled bias out. So I really wanted them to look at whatever material they had to come to that view.
Q. And that could include evidence that would be admissible in the event of a trial in a court?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. Evidence that would be inadmissible on anybody's assessment?
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked questions by Counsel Assisting about the fact that, on page 21 of the report, it said that a detailed report will be prepared and presented to prominent representatives of the LGBTIQ community and that that didn't happen for all 88 cases; it happened only for some cases. You gave evidence about a consultation with the community --
A. Yes.
Q. -- about some of the cases. Now, in your evidence, you said that you didn't pursue that because you were concerned about the confidentiality issue?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you concerned in particular about confidentiality in terms of producing a single document with case summaries
of al1 88 cases?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. What was your concern about that?
A. I felt that the summary document really indicated all the circumstances that the police were aware of for each case. Some of that - some of the reading was very difficult and $I$ felt that if $I$ take it from the perspective of the families of the victims, and $I$ think that in some cases they may well have been shocked with what had actually happened, and whether or not they knew all the circumstances as to what had actually happened and what holdings the police had in relation to that, I thought that the benefit of sending out that document was not outweighed by the hurt that it may we11 cause, and so the determination of mine was not to publish the case summaries document.
Q. Was your concern that if it had been issued even on a confidential basis to leaders of the community that it might have found its way into the public arena?
A. Yes, because I didn't have really any control over its distribution or further distribution and that was my general concern.
Q. Do you know of some cases where families would be deeply shocked by some of the information about their deceased relative?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Can you give us an example?
A. I think --
Q. Without mentioning names?
A. I just think the ferocity of some of the attacks, the sheer level of violence that the victims were subjected to, the significance of the violence was my most - the thing that was most in my mind, and the instances of violence that I've read and I've researched and I've written about in those case summaries was significant and extreme.
Q. Were there some families that refused to accept the sexual orientation of their deceased relative?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And would be shocked at some of the information in the case summaries about that?
A. Yes. Some feedback from family members was that the cases should not be on the 88 list, on the basis that their family member was not gay.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Does that mean, Mr Crandell, that in some cases information was withheld from family?
A. I don't know that the information was held [sic], Commissioner, but --
Q. Well, does that mean, though, that it was your belief that in some cases - you're being asked questions about the sensitivity of them and I accept that, but does that mean that in some cases you believe the police have withheld information from family members?
A. In those days I would say yes.
Q. All right. While I'm interrupting Mr Tedeschi, can I just ask you this: in the form or in the questions that were posed to detect bias crime or suspected bias crime, it seems that that was formulated to take into account both evidence and information - in other words, the dual combination is used in both of those questions?
A. Yes, sir.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Thank you. Yes?
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Did you have any concern about the possibility of future police investigations if those summaries were released in their entirety?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you explain that?
A. Well, there has been other information that has come to light as a result of Parrabell. Whether the information is significant or not is not necessarily going to rest with me, and so I'm always concerned about unsolved - and I mean I can get advice from Unsolved Homicide Team in relation to that, but once again, you don't know the significance of information that you put out publicly.
Q. Now, you were asked questions about the fact that you did not make use of the services of the Unsolved Homicide Team as a resource for Strike Force Parrabell. Could I take you, please, to volume 3, tab 60, [SCOI.74209], page 1? A. Yes.
Q. I'm sorry, page 2.
A. Yes.
Q. On page 2, a person by the name of Georgie Wells of the Police Media Unit sent this email to Ainslie Blackstone, a police officer, cc-ed to you. This is in May of 2016, and said this:

This is an independent review of the 88
cases which have been identified by the
community, and we are reviewing them on a bias-crime basis (to determine if any could have been motivated by bias crime).
Community members have indicated their concerns and we are responding to that. It's about confirming the facts once and for all (putting an end to speculation).

If we identify any deficiencies in any of the investigations, then we will liaise with homicide to determine if reinvestigation is required.

The review is being conducted from the Central Metropolitan Region under the command of Superintendent Tony Crandell in his role as the corporate sponsor for GLBTI (but the cases are not limited to the Central Metro Region. Included on the review team is a GLO --
that's a gay liaison officer?
A. Gay lesbian liaison - should be another L in there, that's okay.
Q.

The review is independent of Homicide but is being conducted with Homicide's full support.

Does that accurately set out the situation so far as the independence of Strike Force Parrabell from Homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. And why was it important to have that independence from Homicide?
A. Well, I think if it got to a point of referral,
whether that be to Homicide itself or the Unsolved Homicide Team, I felt that there should be a separation between what we put to them as to a review, given they may well have been involved in the original investigation.
Q. So in a sense, the cases that you were reviewing were cases most of which had been conducted by Homicide?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you feel that it was important that your review was independent of those who either may have been involved or may have known those who were involved?
A. Yes.
Q. It was suggested to you that instead of conducting this exercise over many months, a review of these 88 cases, that you could have, instead, chosen some of them and reinvestigated them. Why did you choose to go down the review path rather than the reinvestigation path?
A. I did not believe that I would get support, senior level support, for resources to conduct a reinvestigation. Certainly not of 88 cases. I felt that with a review of the 88 cases, restricted to looking for motivation of bias crime, that we could then cover all of the 88 cases and give comfort to many, many more people, many, many more victims, to at least understand that the police were having another look at those cases, and it was more achievable when I'm asking for resources, if I can say that we were reviewing those 88.

And as we know, I seriously underestimated the time frames that were involved; it went from three months to six months to 18 months. And just to put that into perspective, if that was a reinvestigation, that would have been one case, with the resources that I had.
Q. Just one?
A. Yes.
Q. By way of comparison, was there a reinvestigated matter conducted by a strike force by the name of Welsford? A. Yes, there was.
Q. Can you just tell us a very basic outline of what that was about?
A. Strike Force Welsford was put under my command by Commissioner Fuller as a reinvestigation into the Scott

Johnson matter. That reinvestigation comprised of a very senior detective chief inspector from the Child Abuse and Sex Crimes Squad; a detective sergeant and four to five detective senior constables.
Q. Who was the overall commander of that?
A. Myself.
Q. So you were in charge of the reinvestigation of the Scott Johnson murder?
A. Yes.
Q. Over what period of time?
A. From 2018 until present day.
Q. And at what period of time did - and how many detectives were there and how long did they work on the case before charges were 1aid?
A. So Detective Chief Inspector Peter Yeomans is the lead investigator, then you had a detective sergeant in support of him. And then over the period of time, four to six detectives, full time.
Q. For how long?
A. Since 2018 to - and, sorry, since 2018 for two years, with that strength, and then it reduced - it reduced some time after the latest charges were preferred.
Q. Now, we've heard that the three Taradale cases were reinvestigated?
A. Yes.
Q. What resources did that require?
A. So that was through the - that was through Homicide, as I understand it, reinvestigating the Taradale matters, but Taradale originally started with Steve Page, which was a reinvestigation - I'm not sure what resources he had and I'm not certain of the number of resources that were applied through Unsolved Homicide.
Q. You've mentioned the matter of Ray Keam?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that also reinvestigated?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. What sort of resources did that require?
A. Once again, that was through - I believe through Unsolved Homicide Squad, and that would be their internal resourcing probably with support from local detectives, but the actual numbers I'm uncertain.
Q. Now, you gave evidence that the primary approach by officers in Strike Force Parrabell was that where there had been a decision made by a coroner as to (a) whether it was a homicide and (b) whether it was a gay-hate murder or not, that ordinarily you would feel bound by that decision of the coroner, because the coroner had various resources that were not available to your strike force?
A. Yes.
Q. You have told us, though, that in relation to the three Taradale matters, that you adopted a different approach. Can you tell us why you adopted a different approach?
A. Well, it wasn't necessarily a different approach; it was an approach that I did not want the strike force officers, in terms of Parrabell, to simply follow what a coroner had said.
Q. Why?
A. Because I wanted them to - because I don't know whether the coroner was focused in on bias motivation or not, and it was their function to find what was motivating that crime and whether or not there was a bias crime component. So to me, it was a little bit - not lazy, but simple to just say, "Well, that's what the coroner said".
And often, some of the coroner's findings wouldn't necessarily address whether or not there was a motivation of gay-hate bias.
Q. So what conclusions did you come to in relation to Russell and Warren?
A. The conclusion for Russell and Warren was suspected bias - suspected gay-hate bias, which I'm - I'm comfortable with that, with that assessment.
Q. Yes. And Mattaini?
A. Gilles Mattaini was a more difficult case and whilst the coroner indicated there was a strong possibility that he met the same fate as the earlier two, there was other evidence that indicated potential for Mattaini's case to be misclassified, and I say that because Mattaini wasn't reported as missing for many years. It could be up to
eight years, but it was a significant period of time, and I believe there was some suggestion of suicidal thoughts of him. But in any event, the classification for that was insufficient information.
Q. And do you tell the Commissioner that although none of your team found enough material to warrant a recommendation for a reinvestigation, that the increased awareness that arose from Task Force Parrabell brought along new lines of inquiry in three cases?
A. Yes.
Q. And you'd prefer not to mention what those three cases are?
A. No, I can mention a case, but --
Q. That's the Keam case?
A. Yes, I can mention another.
Q. All right. And you can mention another one?
A. Yes, there was also a case of Crispen Dye, who was a talented musician who was murdered at Campbell Street in Surry Hills and there was some information that came forward - I know of that personally because the information was disseminated to me - and I had a group of detectives go and re - interview the source of that information.
Q. Was that reinvestigated by Unsolved Homicide Team?
A. No, that did not reach of level of reinvestigation.
Q. Sorry?
A. That did not reach of level of reinvestigation.

MR TEDESCHI: I'm moving to a different topic,
Commissioner. Do you want me to continue?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr Tedeschi, please do. On1y if it is convenient for you. Did you want to have a break?

MR TEDESCHI: I'm entirely in your hands.
THE COMMISSIONER: No, no, keep going, then, thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Moving now to the involvement of Sergeant Steer, you were asked a number of questions about Sergeant Steer and you gave evidence about his involvement at different stages of the review. In your evidence you
said at page 683 that you thought Geoff Steer - you said this, that you thought:
... Geoff Steer was on the right track. He wasn't essentially terribly wrong. It was just that he didn't have the resources or the standing or anything to really push that forward.

Do you recall giving that evidence?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. What did you mean by that "Geoff Steer was on the right track"?
A. I looked at the Terms of Reference for Operation Parrabell and really, what he was proposing to do, to my mind, was valid, with the exception of reinvestigation, because that was just a huge task for anybody - for any single person or even two people to undertake. But besides that, when you have a look at the - what he was trying to achieve in terms of looking at the 88 deaths, the list of people that had died, I think that was valid, and I - do you want me to go into the other part?
Q. Yes, please.
A. And what I meant was, standing - I mean, he was - he was and is a sergeant of police. To expect him to be able to draw resources from significantly more senior people sufficient to be able to make inroads into that 88 list I think was very unreasonable, and I mean even I found that challenging as a superintendent and a corporate sponsor. So for him to be attempting to do that as a sergeant I just thought was ambitious, but definitely beyond his level of influence. I think it needed a much higher level of influence in order to push the strike force forward. That's not his fault, by the way. That was the circumstances.
Q. It would be unrealistic to suspect at that level he could marshal the resources --
A. Yes.
Q. -- to do what he wanted to do?
A. Yes.
Q. We know from the long email that he sent you that he was very disgruntled --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that he was taken away from the Bias Crime Unit and not included in Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. You've described the different ways in which you used him as a resource for Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. You used his criteria, predominantly?
A. Yes.
Q. Nine out of the 10 were his criteria?
A. Sorry, what - were - the criteria that he brought into the organisation, so nine of 10 out of those he brought in --
Q. Yes, he brought --
A. -- and then the tenth was his own criteria?
Q. And you described how you used him as an advisory resource --
A. Yes.
Q. -- at various stages? You have described how, after the academics and the police had reviewed the cases, you brought him in to do the dip sample?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think you've described other ways in which he was involved as well?
A. Yes.
Q. But why was he not included as a member of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. I think that including him as a member would have been extremely unfair, and the reason I say that is because, whilst he had access to the material, because he actually gave access to the investigators because he had commenced the Operation Parrabell on e@gle.i, which is our central electronic repository for investigations, to make him a member of that strike force, to my mind, would be to overload him. He was a single person making applications for more resources, successfully but predominantly unsuccessfully, and his remit was far broader than just Parrabell or just gay-hate crime, motivated crime.
Q. When you were setting up Parrabel1 was he still the Bias Crime Coordinator?
A. Yes.
Q. So what kind of bias crimes was he responsible for looking after at that time?
A. Well, he was looking at bias crimes in all of the protected categories. So he's looking at race, he's looking at homelessness, he's looking at - LGBTI is only one component of many others.
Q. Bias against indigenous people?
A. Indigenous, yes.
Q. Bias against people with disability?
A. Yes.
Q. Bias against people based on their religion or their ethnic origin?
A. Yes.
Q. A11 of those categories and more, he was responsible for, and it was either him or him and one other person? A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. And that was the entire department within the Police Force looking at bias over all those different issues, was it?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. So are you saying that one of the reasons why you didn't include him as a member but only used him as a resource is because you didn't want to take him away from those onerous tasks?
A. Yes, I don't think he could possibly have managed it, to be honest.
Q. Was there another factor that he was not trained as a detective?
A. He wasn't trained as a detective, but he had obvious training in bias crime identification, so - but he's not designated, as far as I'm aware.
Q. Was that of any significance?
A. Not to me. I think it added to his weight as an adviser in a strike force that was predominantly populated by detectives.
Q. Could I take you, please, to tab 12, which is in volume 1, [SCOI.75056]. Could you just tell us again what this document is?
A. So - I think this is a document indicating what Operation Parrabel1 conducted, some assessments for the I believe for the Johnson case.
Q. So this is a document that related to Operation Parrabe11, conducted by Sergeant Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. As pointed out by Counsel Assisting, there's a position for his signature on this as well as yours. At the top of page 2, under "Bias Crime Indicators", does it say:

Each incident wil7 be filtered through the current ten bias crimes indicators.
A. Yes.
Q. Does that suggest that whatever it was that Sergeant Steer had in mind for Operation Parrabell, he was going to filter suspected hate crimes through the same 10 bias crime indicators that were used by Strike Force Parrabel1?
A. I believe so.
Q. So in that sentence, was Sergeant Steer effectively proposing that the bias crimes indicators be used in a similar way to the way that you used them?
A. Yes.
Q. Could I take you now, please, to volume 3, tab 83, [SCOI.74429]. Now, this document you have identified as the minutes of a meeting on 19 January 2017 which involved the people whose names are at the top of the first page?
A. Yes.
Q. And it included yourself and your three senior officers that were part of Strike Force Parrabe11, and Sergeant Steer?
A. Yes.
Q. And one or two other people?
A. Yes.
Q. On page 2 - sorry, page 3, the second dot point note,
does it say:
. At this point a useful discussion on terminology followed. "No evidence of bias", "not a bias crime", and "insufficient information". The Strikeforce just looked at available information. [Sergeant] Steer looked at the case reviews and asked: "If we were to investigate these cases now, how would we determine them?"
. [Acting Assistant] Commissioner Crandel1 suggested a change in category from "not bias crime", to "no evidence of a bias crime". Whilst there may be no evidence in a case, we cannot definitively say it was not a bias crime. New evidence may come to light and if we were to investigate the crime today, we would ask different questions.
. A11 agreed to change:

1. No Bias Crime to No evidence of a bias crime.
2. Bias Crime to Evidence of a bias crime.
A. Yes.
Q.
. [Acting Assistant] Commissioner Crande11 asked [Sergeant] Steer to write a section for the report on this issue explaining the approach of the Strikeforce and the difference between their determinations and how [NSW Police Force] might investigate such crimes today regarding evidence.

So does that - is that the point at which you made the decision to change the categorisation from "Not a Bias Crime" to "No evidence of bias crime", and "Bias Crime" to "Evidence of a bias crime"?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And you've explained to this Inquiry why that change was made. Were you of the view that that changed any of the categorisations in the 88 cases?
A. I'm not sure if it changed any of the categorisations, but I think it gave a little bit more guidance as to what we were actually trying to achieve.
Q. Did it result in any sort of review of the 88 cases, that change in terminology?
A. Oh, yes, I would say so.
Q. Now, can I take you, please, to volume 4, tab 126, [SCOI.74679]. This is a lengthy email from Sergeant Steer to yourself.
A. Sorry, did you say 126, Mr Tedeschi?
Q. Sorry, 126.
A. Thank you. Yes.
Q. This is the lengthy email from Sergeant Steer to yourself of 9 June 2018, which you were asked questions about, and you said that it caused you to have concern for Sergeant Steer's welfare?
A. Yes.
Q. And you actually contacted his supervisor about his welfare?
A. Yes, I spoke to his commander.
Q. Now, in that email, about maybe 10 lines from the top, on the first page, it says this:

The concerns that I have relate to the statements attributed to you where you are quoted as stating, "Our current bias assessment tools are not practical for everyday police officers on the frontline."
A. Yes.
Q.

I believe this statement is ill informed.
Now, was that a reference by Sergeant Steer to a newspaper article in which you had been quoted?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. And were you quoted as stating that view, that the current assessment tools were not practical for everyday police officers on the frontline?
A. Yes.
Q. You've been asked some questions about that view by Counsel Assisting. What do you mean by "everyday police officers on the frontline"? What kind of situations did you have in mind and why would such officers have difficulty with the 10 -point criteria?
A. I was thinking of situations that officers may be called to respond to, and that that might be any number of situations, and asking myself whether or not it was appropriate for us to say, "Go through those 10 bias crime indicators" at that time, or even thereafter.

Unless they had particular training in bias crimes and identifying bias crime motivation, I just think that the information that was put into the system would be ill informed. And so I thought that - to be frank, I thought that I was looking for a way to more quickly identify the possibility of bias motivation, that could then be recorded and reviewed at a later stage by people who were well versed in identifying bias crime motivation.

THE COMMISSIONER: $Q$. Wouldn't there be an advantage of the responding police officers on the spot making contemporaneous observations there and then?
A. Yes, they would.
Q. And why wouldn't that - doesn't it work on the basis that any relevant information is obviously helpful?
A. Yes.
Q. Were you concerned that these people in the frontline might be confused? What was your real concern?
A. No. I was concerned, Commissioner, that they would be required to go through 10 bias crime indicators to work out whether a matter could or could not be bias crime?
Q. But that wouldn't determine the issue; it would only be their --
A. No.
Q. It would only be their perspective?
A. Yes.
Q. And in many cases - not all perhaps but in many cases - the person responding, or very soon thereafter would be an experienced detective, wouldn't it? A. Not necessarily, Commissioner.
Q. I didn't say in every case; I said in some cases, perhaps, it would be, once a homicide is involved - local command may be the first responders in the sense that they are called to a scene, but once it's assessed as a likely or possible homicide, detectives are soon involved, aren't they?
A. For those more serious matters, yes. But I'm thinking about lower-level matters like malicious damage, for example.
Q. I see, I see. So what you have in mind is not homicide but --
A. Yes.
Q. -- perhaps break and enter, assault on the street, robbery, a whole series of unrelated - sorry, not
"unrelated", matters other than homicide, because a suspected homicide would, unsurprisingly, be treated very seriously as soon as possible?
A. Yes, absolutely.

THE COMMISSIONER: Is that a convenient point, Mr Tedeschi?

MR TEDESCHI: Yes, Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. I'11 take the break now, thank you.

## SHORT ADJOURNMENT

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr Tedeschi.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Assistant Commissioner, you were asked a number of questions by Counsel Assisting about the relocation of the Bias Crime Unit into a counter terrorism section of the Police Force?
A. Yes.
Q. Your attention was directed to an email from Sergeant Steer to Derek Dalton, if I could take you, please, to volume 10, tab 249, [SCOI.79872] on page 1, towards the
bottom of the page, Sergeant Steer has written to Derek Dalton, towards the end of the first line:

> As a result of the restructure the Bias Crimes Unit will effectively cease to exist. It has been merged with the newly created Fixated Person Investigations Unit and will no longer be doing bias crimes. From what we have been told is that the new role will not focus on bias crimes or the protected categories including sexual orientation and gender identity. Bias crimes will be left to the relevant corporate sponsors and the unit will focus on right wing, left wing and anti-government groups. The capability around bias crimes wil7 no longer exist. There will be no training and education capability, no monitoring and quality review capability and no expertise around identification, investigation and response to bias motivated crimes.

Now, those were fears that were expressed in May of 2017 by Sergeant Steer. Were those fears realised?
A. At the time, I didn't really turn my mind to what was happening with the Bias Crimes Unit. I know that there was a decision made by Commissioner Fuller that bias crimes would be transferred over into Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command. I wasn't aware of the movement. Structurally I could see the reasoning for that but I didn't take a particular view on whether it should sit there or otherwise.
Q. But what do you say to the suggestion that the move of the Bias Crimes Unit has resulted in - and its inclusion with the newly created Fixated Persons Investigation Unit has resulted in a lack of focus on bias crimes, that the unit will focus on right wing, left wing and anti-government groups and no training and educational capability, et cetera?
A. No, my understanding was that the transfer of all responsibilities went over to counter terrorism, and certainly in the Engagement and Hate Crimes Unit they've taken great steps forward in that regard.
Q. What sort of steps have they taken?
A. So there's mandatory education which was introduced I think last year for bias crimes. I think that's through Microlearn or something similar, which is an electronic learning package.
Q. For just detectives?
A. No, no, that's for all members of the organisation. Also, the Bias Crimes Standard Operating Procedures, taking into account some of the findings from Strike Force Parrabell and incorporating them into that - into the way that we now identify bias crimes and classify them, I guess.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Was last year the first time such training was made mandatory?
A. I don't - I'm not sure, Commissioner. Usually there's a mandatory training schedule that comes out each year but I do know that that was on the mandatory training schedule last year, I think it was.
Q. So you have no idea whether it was mandatory for the first time last year or just a repetition of previous policy announcements?
A. No, I - I know that it was in the mandatory training but I don't know exactly --
Q. But you don't know when, if ever, it was mandatory prior to that?
A. No.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. What do you say about the allocation of that unit to the fixated persons division?
A. Well, as I said, that went in to that particular area of counter terrorism. I could understand the reasoning for that on the basis that there is all elements of bias in the counter terrorism world, and also it was aligned with counter terrorism intelligence. So to me, that would be a fair intelligence function, and I used to get reports through, for my portfolio, on intelligence relating to suspected bias crime incidents across the state and I was still able to get that information.
Q. You were asked a number of questions about the selection of the academic review team, and you gave evidence, in answer to questions by Mr Gray, about the
considerations that you took into account in selecting the three members of the Flinders team. You were asked a number of questions about independence?
A. Yes.
Q. You gave evidence that independence was of particular importance to you.
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked questions about the other two unsuccessful teams?
A. Yes.
Q. The Sydney University team which included Professor Tomsen?
A. Yes.
Q. And another team which I think was associated with the University of Western Sydney, which had a Ms Asquith in it?
A. Yes.
Q. What can you tell us, firstly - well, was the team in which Ms Asquith was a member - were they invited to apply or to put in a tender for this job?
A. Yes, my understanding is that they were all invited, and that's - that was part of the procurement process; if we were inviting tenders, then we needed to have at least three.
Q. And what did you know about Ms Asquith and her connection or connections to the LGBTIQ communities?
A. I knew that she had some connection in New South Wales particularly, but possibly elsewhere, because I know she did some work in Tasmania and also Queensland. She had attended conferences at the Police Academy that we had run, so I knew of her and I knew of --
Q. Did you know or care one way or the other whether or not she was a member of any of those communities?
A. No.
Q. The team that included Professor Tomsen - you recall you were asked a number of questions by the Commissioner about Professor Tomsen and his eminence in the field?
A. Yes.
Q. Could I take you, please, to volume 2, tab 28 ,
[SCOI.77323], the first page. This is a three-page document. Each page has the same pro forma, with different wording in each and different numbers in each. You've explained that this was the form that was filled out in the decision-making process to decide which team to allocate this job to?
A. Yes.
Q. And on the first page, this "Murray et al", that
included Professor Tomsen?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. And you see on the first row, the criterion is
"Proposed solution meets requirement of RFQ"?
A. Yes.
Q. What does RFQ mean?
A. Request for quote - quotation.
Q. And the comment to the right of that is:

Application was threadbare ...
Do you know who filled out this particular form?
A. Yes, I understand it have been Shobha Sharma.
Q. And what was her connection to the Hate Crime Unit?
A. She's a manager in the Hate Crime - sorry, she was a manager in Operational Programs at the time. So Sergeant Steer would report to her.
Q. And what do you say about the suggestion in this form that the Sydney University application was threadbare?
A. My recollection was that the submission put together by Sydney University basically replicated a lot of information that was provided to them in the request for quotation and when compared to the other submissions and applications was seen to be 1 ight on detail.
Q. Is that one of the reasons why the Sydney University application was not successful?
A. Yes.
Q. You gave evidence in answer to questions by Mr Gray that independence from the Police Force was of critical importance because you perceived that if you used somebody who had had previous connections with the Police Force,
that when the report came out, there might be criticism?
A. Yes.
Q. If you had used either the Asquith team or the Sydney University team, in your view, was there a chance or a likelihood or a possibility of criticism from the LGBTIQ communities?
A. Yes, no doubt.
Q. What sort of criticism would you have anticipated?
A. I would say criticism on the basis that in the - in Nicole Asquith's case, that she had really gone out of her way for the Police Force, travelling to Goulburn, at least, for a conference. There may have been a perceived --
Q. Previous 1 y ?
A. Previousiy, yes. There may have been a perceived conflict, being too close to the police.
Q. Had she been in receipt of payment for services previously by the police?
A. I'm uncertain. I'm not sure whether she received payment or whether she did work for us out of her own research interest. And very similar scenario with Sydney University. I would - I was concerned that - independence was the main concern of mine.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But, Mr Crande11, Ms Asquith, prior to you being told there needed to be a procurement process, was your preferred candidate, wasn't she?
A. Yes, I thought she should be asked to quote, yes.
Q. We11, not on1y asked to quote; before you were told by Dr Devery or Shobha Sharma that a procurement process was necessary, your preferred candidate was Dr Asquith, wasn't it?
A. Well, I didn't know the other candidates at the time, Commissioner, so I can't say --
Q. Before you learned there had to be a procurement process, didn't you put forward Dr Asquith as your preferred choice?
A. No, I don't think that's accurate.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Did you put her team forward as
deserving of consideration?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that because of your knowledge of what she'd done in the past for the Police Force?
A. Yes.
Q. And she'd done a good job?
A. Yes, she had.
Q. And she knew about the field of gay-hate crime?
A. Absolutely.
Q. But when all three proposals were in front of the committee, was the committee unanimous in deciding to use the Flinders team?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And I think you said that your view was that one the great benefits of the Flinders team was that they came from interstate and so they wouldn't know anybody who as associated with either the investigations or the victims or the police or anybody like that?
A. Yes.
Q. Did it appear to you that that was a view that was held by all the members of the committee that decided to award this contract to the Flinders team?
A. Yes, that's my understanding.
Q. Did you consider that the team that was 1 ed by Professor Derek Dalton had sufficient expertise to do the job that was required?
A. Yes.
Q. Why was that?
A. Well, I thought that they had the qualifications to be able to conduct a fair review and certainly - certainly from an academic perspective, they had the qualification the and definitely an interest in the field, particularly in relation to policing and gay communities.
Q. In your view, did the three of them have an understanding of the marginalisation of LGBTIQ communities? A. Yes, they did.
Q. Did they have a knowledge about the history of the
difficult relationship between those communities and the police?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. The three - Flinders team, I mean?
A. Yes.
Q. And the panel that was involved in the selection of the Flinders team, I think that was Shobha Sharma, yourself, Ms Braw and Dr Chris Devery?
A. Devery, yes.
Q. Just tell me again what role did Dr Devery have?
A. So Dr Devery was a manager of the research unit of Education and Training Command. So he was the senior officer in charge of that unit and he - his - part of his role was to look at and assess candidates for research, for undertaking research in the Police Force.
Q. That was exactly the sort of thing that this committee was required to do?
A. Yes.
Q. Was he a police officer?
A. No. No, he's a --
Q. A civilian employed by the Police Force?
A. Yes. He's - he holds a doctorate.
Q. Once the decision had made been to use the Flinders team, was that communicated to any people in the LGBTIQ community?
A. Yes, ACON, as a representative of the community; senior politicians. I - definitely other - definitely other people that were in leadership positions within the LGBTIQ community, because I held regular meetings with those people on a monthly and bi-monthly basis to keep them informed, not only of Parrabell but also of developments within the community.
Q. And when it was made known that the Flinders team had been appointed, were there any criticisms or concerns expressed?
A. No.
Q. At any time, did anybody express any criticism or concern about the Flinders team as to their independence,
their objectivity or their ability and qualifications to do the job?
A. No, certainly not.
Q. Even after the report was produced, did you receive any criticisms along those lines?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Now, it was suggested to you by Counsel Assisting that it was somehow inappropriate for the Flinders team to adopt a collaborative approach with the strike force members; that, ideally, what should have been done is you should have presented your report and they conduct their own review, completely independently of the members of Strike Force Parrabell, without any discussion or consultation or collaboration?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, could I take you, please, to the final report, exhibit 1, page 56, [SCOI.02632]. I take you to page 56 which, of course, was written by the Flinders team.
A. Yes.
Q. I will take you to the bottom paragraph, second line, and if I could read to you what's contained there:

Consultation permitted the probing of classificatory decisions by [Strike Force Parrabell] and deliberation enabled the academic team to explore the classification system and moot disagreements in a manner that ultimately produced a more nuanced understanding of the most complex cases both in their own right and in the context of their totality. The academic team worked collaboratively with the [NSW Police Force] as findings were being finalised and experienced a strong spirit of cooperation in its interactions. This might strike some observers as irregular (in terms of the logic that a review must be conducted from a perspective of pure objectivity), but the academic team believed it was prudent to engage in open and productive discussions as the work of [Strike Force Parrabell] drew to a close, rather than face the possibility of working on
misapprehensions or misinterpretations of processes and methods.

Then it says:
Deliberation was a particularly important aspect of the process. In looking for and determining the existence of bias crime, differences in opinion emerged and had to be reconciled. Much in the same way that the [Strike Force Parrabell] detectives sought to rigorously review their findings, the academic team engaged in carefully measured debates about each individual case in the interests of being thorough, consistent and precise. This was vitally important because it allowed the academics to develop a more nuanced understanding of the logic that underpinned the categorisation decisions of [Strike Force Parrabell]. At the second Sydney meeting, a large police delegation discussed differences in opinion with regard to the cases under review. The police finalised their position on the cases and declared a cessation to their deliberations. At this point the academic team members were able to clarify various assumptions and move forward on the basis of these deliberations. From this point on the academic team could formally evaluate the operations and "findings" of SFP.

Those were the views expressed by the academics of Flinders. Do you agree with those views?
A. I agree with all of those views.
Q. What is your view about the collaborative process that had been engaged in prior to that process between the different police officers who were members of the strike force?
A. Well, there was significant discussion around particularly classifications and material reviewed and there was debate about where cases ought to be classified, and so it was unsurprising to me that the academic review team would need to go through the same process, whether with or without strike force investigators, they had to
come to their views as well.
Q. What's your view about the collaborative process that involved Sergeant Steer?
A. I think it was appropriate. It was appropriate on the basis of the dip sample approach; it was appropriate on the basis that he was used as a resource and as an advisory person.
Q. Now, you gave evidence that the Flinders academic team did not adopt the same methodology in assessing the cases as the police had. Did you discuss with them the different criteria that they used?
A. I didn't have detailed discussions with them on the different criteria, because it was always open to them to come up with a different criteria or adopt the criteria that Strike Force Parrabell had undertaken.
Q. And was there any attempt made to get them to switch from their own methodology to the methodology that the police had adopted?
A. No, absolutely not.
Q. And was it manifestly obvious in the Parrabell report that there had been these two different approaches by the two different teams?
A. Yes, it's very clear.
Q. Was that of any embarrassment to you?
A. No, certainly not. That's what I was after. If it wasn't the case that they turned the independence of their own minds to the classification of bias crimes, then I don't think they'd be doing their job.
Q. You were asked a number of questions --

THE COMMISSIONER: Just before you move on, Mr Tedeschi.
Q. Mr Crande11, do you have the Parrabel1 report
[SCOI.02632] in front of you, page 56?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Mr Tedeschi read to you a number of passages. Can I just ask you about a couple. If I just ask you to look you see where it says at the bottom, four lines up from the bottom:

The academic team worked collaboratively with the NSWPF as findings were being finalised ...

And then over the page, in fairness:
This might strike some observers as irregular --
et cetera:
but the academic team believed it was prudent to engage in open and direct discussions as the work of SFP drew to a close ...

And do both of those statements about "as the timings were being finalised" and "as the work of the SFP drew to a close" - from your vantage point, are they accurate observations?
A. I believe so.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Yes, Mr Tedeschi.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. You were asked a number of questions by couple assisting about the governance of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And you told us that you were the overall commander but you've also told us today about all the other jobs that you had at the same time. You gave evidence in answer to questions by Mr Gray about the weekly meetings and the month1y meetings?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that a standard procedure in such situations, for an overall commander, in the position that you were in, to go to monthly meetings and the other supervisors underneath that commander to go to weekly meetings?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. You were asked a number of questions by Counsel Assisting about Detective Chief Inspector Lehmann, who had written an issues paper in September 2013 expressing the view that the number of suggested gay-hate homicides was a gross exaggeration?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was brought to your attention by Counse1 Assisting that Detective Chief Inspector Lehmann became the supervising officer of Strike Force Neiwand?
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked some questions about whether you were aware of what the motivation was for the choice of Chief Inspector Lehmann as the supervising officer of Strike Force Neiwand, and you speculated that the then commander of the Homicide Squad, Mr Willing, may have had something to do with the choice?
A. Yes.
Q. You were asked whether Commander Willing may have chosen Chief Inspector Lehmann because Mr Wiliing agreed with what Chief Inspector Lehmann had said, and "thought that Lehmann might arrive at a certain result", and you replied "Perhaps"?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any actual knowledge about the reasons why Chief Inspector Lehmann was appointed to head Neiwand?
A. No, I do not.
Q. And what do you say about your knowledge of

Commander Willing and Detective Chief Inspector Lehmann and your knowledge of them as police officers?
A. We11, Commander Willing I've known for over 30 years, and now ex Deputy Commissioner Willing. He's a person with an extremely good reputation of competence throughout the Police Force. His integrity and ethics have never been in question, to my mind, and I think it's inappropriate for me to even speculate about his reasons. He will have reasons for the decisions that he has made, I am certain of that. But anything that $I$ say should never be taken as a criticism of former Deputy Commissioner Wiliing because I respect him and hold him in the highest regard.
Q. And Chief Inspector Lehmann?
A. Chief Inspector Lehmann has an extensive history in homicide investigation and criminal investigation. He's a career detective. He has an outstanding reputation of competence, particularly in leading detectives in unsolved homicide and other cases. His reputation is beyond reproach and $I$ respect him a great deal.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Does that mean that insofar as any statements you have previously made about Mr Wiliing or Mr Lehmann and which might be construed as criticisms, you now seek to withdraw?
A. Yes, Commissioner, that's true.
Q. And what has caused you to take that different view? A. Because I didn't have knowledge of reasons for them making decisions and it's inappropriate for me to comment on that in my view.
Q. So your evidence the other day was, what, accidental, was it?
A. It wasn't accidental but it was a speculation that I regret.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Thank you. Yes, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Could I take you back, please, to volume 3, tab 83, [SCOI.74429]. Can I take you, please, to page 1. Again, this is the meeting of the minutes on 19 January 2017 involving you, your three supervisors, Sergeant Steer and a couple of others.
A. Yes.
Q. On page 1, the fourth tab under the number 1,
"Introduction \& general discussion " --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the fourth dot point is:

Other outcomes include communication to the "community" regarding the realistic number of "gay hate" murders during this period and despite this number being less than the "88" reported by community activists and some media, an acknowledgment that there was elevated violence directed against the "gay" community during this period.

And the next dot point:
An important outcome is internal guidance and training for police regarding bias crime classification.

Now, this meeting took place on 19 January 2017, which is towards the end of the period that Strike Force Parrabel 1 was working?
A. Yes.
Q. Those two outcomes, were they, in your view, achieved by the publication of the report?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. What was the reaction of the LGBTIQ community to the report when it was issued?
A. The community representatives that $I$ spoke with were extremely happy with the acknowledgment of extreme and elevated violence and the distinction between the findings of gay-hate motivation not necessarily being a reflection on the degree of brutality and violence experienced by that community during this period of time.
Q. And in the report $I$ think you made 12 recommendations for internal changes?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. In the NSW Police Force?
A. Yes.
Q. How many of those 12 recommendations have been adopted?
A. A11 of them.
Q. And in your view as an Assistant Commissioner, has that resulted in any real changes in the NSW Police since the publication of the report?
A. Yes.
Q. What changes have you seen?
A. I've seen a greater commitment of education, particularly, throughout the organisation, in different areas of the organisation, particularly criminal investigative training and general training of police officers through investigators courses that now contain bias crime components; the gay and lesbian liaison course already had a bias crime component but that has now been boosted with more material. Now there is a soon to be adult sexual assault investigation course which will include a bias crimes component in that as well. So it is a far broader educative focus on bias crimes and
classifications and it also brings awareness to the frontline police officers that can turn their mind, having an open mind, ruling it out before they - sorry, ruling it in before they rule it out.
Q. And at one stage were you responsible for education and training?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. So you were in a unique position to be able to introduce and oversee and witness those changes?
A. Yes, I was in a very good position, organisationally, to be able to influence the educational landscape of the organisation.
Q. Was one of your concerns not only gay-hate crimes but domestic violence in the LGBTIQ communities?
A. Yes, certainly.
Q. What changes have there been there?
A. So there's been greater awareness and all LGBTIQ community members now address every recruit, every police recruit, down at the academy to express to them the perspective of other people in relation to police officers and their behaviour, particularly in relation to bias crime in marginalised communities. That's a significant step, but it also allows us to get a message in nice and early to those police officers and then, as it goes through the rest of the curriculum, through the rest of the educational curriculum, there will be follow-ups with further educational modules as we progress through a career.
Q. And you stated that one of your objectives in setting up the strike force was to create a better relationship between the LGBTIQ communities and the police. Do you know whether those relationships have improved since the report was published?
A. I believe so. Obviously I was close to the communities during my tenure and I know that work has now been carried on by Assistant Commissioner Gelina Talbot. There's still a strong community spirit. This is still a journey, though. We've still got a long way to go. To generate trust between an organisation that has historically been mistrusted is extremely difficult and it takes time. So one report is not going to do that. Strike Force Parrabell standing alone won't do that. But it does add to credibility when senior police officers are willing
to accept and acknowledge past errors and understand that it was a very dangerous period to be, if you were a gay man in particular; but when you look at the LGBTI community more broadly, they all suffered throughout that period of time. So to bring that community with a more trusting relationship to the police is never, ever going to happen overnight. It will be a longer-term, lengthy strategic process of trust building.
Q. Do you think there's more readiness on the part of those communities in general to report violent crime?
A. Yes. I mean, I - when you look at the reporting statistics of LGBTIQ domestic violence, it's an extremely low reporting rate, we estimate about 2 per cent. So 2 per cent for domestic violence in a marginalised community is never going to be acceptable. So a lot of people out there are still suffering violence at the hands of others and not trusting the police enough to at least report that violence. So there's a massive challenge in that space and it will take --
Q. Do you think there has been any improvement in the reporting of crime since the Parrabell report?
A. I do, but as I say, I think that's also an evolution. I can't say that that is as a result of the publication of Parrabell, but I can say that as time evolves and as milestones like Parrabell are reached, that that will bring the community closer together.
Q. And since the publication of the report, have there been various media campaigns to encourage the reporting of violence by members of those communities?
A. Yes, there is. There's significant media campaigns at least four times a year that the corporate sponsor engages in, that ranges from Mardi Gras and fair-day festivities through to the International Day Against Homophobia Transphobia and Biphobia, Wear It Purple Day, which is for LGBTIQ youth, which is particularly important and then Transgender Day of Remembrance in November of every year. It is very important for us to stay close to the transgender community because they are in an extremely dangerous position even in today's society.
Q. And finally, Assistant Commissioner, you gave evidence following the completion of Task Force Parrabell that the detectives training program is now more developed in relation to bias crimes. Can you tell us a bit more about

## that?

A. Yes. So there is an investigators course, which is a preliminary course to the detectives training, and then also another preliminary course and a detectives designation course. Throughout those areas of curriculum, there is now bias crime as a module, and there is a greater focus, as I understand it now, on bias crime, which I believe has come out of the recommendations from Parrabell. One of the 12 recommendations was to increase investigator training as well as improve training from recruit right through the career of a police officer.

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, would you pardon me for just a moment?

THE COMMISSIONER: Certainly. Yes, certainly.
MR TEDESCHI: Yes, thank you.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Crandell, thank you. I will take this course.

Mr Tedeschi, I'm going excuse Mr Crandell from further attendance, but I will make the following observation: on Friday of last week, the Commission received 800 new documents not previously made available. A number of those documents concerned Mr Crandell. The Commission staff has not had an opportunity yet to review those documents.

I would hope that if any of them are documents which relate to any term of reference, they may be the subject of documentary tender, however, if there is something that is, I hope in the near future, identified as something that may require some further questions, obviously copies of those documents, although they have come from you in the first place, will be shown to you again and if there's a need for Mr Crandell to return, I will make sure that occurs, but I think I can tell him pretty safely it won't be this year. By the time we end our hearings with other matters that I need to attend to, it will be early next year, and of course, we are cognisant of his commitments otherwise. So I just add that as a caveat.

So I will excuse you, Mr Crandell, for the moment.
THE WITNESS: Certainly.

THE COMMISSIONER: As you have heard me say, we need to review some documents. You are mentioned in dispatches, and so consequently, I need to look at that before I do otherwise. But in the circumstances, I think the fair thing is to excuse you from further attendance, and we will let you know if that position changes and give you and those assisting fair notice of what it is we need to talk to you about.

THE WITNESS: Thank you, Commissioner.
MR TEDESCHI: If the Commission pleases.
THE COMMISSIONER: So, thank you. You are free to go. Thank you, Mr Crandell.
<THE WITNESS WITHDREW
THE COMMISSIONER: Now, Mr Gray?
MR GRAY: Commissioner, the next witness would be Sergeant
Steer.
THE COMMISSIONER: I think what I will do is --
MR GRAY: If it is convenient to the Commission, I will cal1 Sergeant Steer.

THE COMMISSIONER: No - well, by all means, yes, all right.
<GEOFFREY ROBERT STEER, sworn:
[12.40pm]
<EXAMINATION BY MR GRAY:
MR GRAY: I wonder if Sergeant Steer could have his statement in front of him while I ask a few questions. [SCOI. 82080].

THE COMMISSIONER: Certainly.
MR GRAY: Q. Sergeant, in paragraph 3 you list some of your qualifications and credentials, starting from your Bachelor of Science degree back in 1994 and through to various courses you've done up to 2019. Do you see that? A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And you tell us in paragraphs 5 and 6 something of your experience and exposure to policing of hate crimes in the United States in 2015 and, indeed, earlier, from 2006 onwards?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, I wanted to ask you, first of a11, something about your knowledge of the background to the setting up of a bias crime capacity in the NSW Police Force prior to your involvement in that field. Could Mr Steer have volume 7, please. I'11 just take you to that in a second. In your paragraph 7 of your statement you refer to the Cronulla riots in 2005 and you say that following those riots, in 2006 you submitted a report proposing the creation of a hate crime capability for the NSW Police?
A. Yes.
Q. That, in due course, was accepted and there was a position created?
A. Yes.
Q. But before that, in that volume 7, if you turn to tab 187, [SCOI. 76960], this may or may not be something you know, Sergeant Steer, and if you don't know, that's fine. This was an earlier proposal for a Hate Crime Unit back in late 2001, which was not then, at that time, accepted or proceeded with. Were you aware of that?
A. I've a heard rumours of it but, yes, I don't know the details of it. It was mentioned when I started doing hate crimes by Operational Programs.
Q. Sorry?
A. It was mentioned to me by staff at Operational Programs that there was a previous report suggesting the creation of a hate crime capability, but $I$ know no details about it.
Q. So you haven't seen this document before?
A. No.
Q. Al1 right. Fine. I won't ask you any more about that for the moment, then, at least. But back to your paragraph 7, [SCOI.82080], you proposed a hate crime capability in 2006, and in 2007 the position of Hate Crime Coordinator was created, and you were the person who took up that position?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, your first stint in that position was from 2007 to 2009; is that right?
A. That's correct, yes.
Q. And then the position was de-established or disestablished for three years from 2009 to 2012?
A. Yes.
Q. I'11 come back to that, but in the two years that you did first fill that position, 2007 to 2009, what was the role? What were you doing in those two years?
A. So primarily the first - for 2007 , 2008, I was attached to the Community Contact Unit, Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command. That first 12 months was primarily assessing the current capabilities of the NSW Police, identifying where we had issues, what we were doing around it, establishing some of the processes and procedures that we would use.

In 2008, Counter Terrorism made the decision that the position didn't fit with Counter Terrorism due to - it didn't fit within their charter because they primarily looked at race and religion and counter terrorism around that are where I was looking at 9 protected categories, or eight at that stage, we added the ninth when $I$ returned. So it was then moved to Policy and Programs where I was seated with the policy officers for those different categories, so it was a better fit - not the best fit but it was a better fit than being at Counter Terrorism.

There we started looking at - more looking at incidents, starting to do data collection and analysis of data collection, starting doing education and training on low-leve1 - on a lower level, developing - continuing development of the position, effectively.
Q. And during these two years, you were single handed?
A. Yes.
Q. There was nobody else but you?
A. Yes.
Q. In the bias crime or hate crime role?
A. Yes.
Q. And your rank then was sergeant or --
A. Yes.
Q. And you speak about a two-tier model in your statement - that is, there would be a subject matter expertise which would reside with you, I presume; is that the idea?
A. Yes.
Q. And that the person with the expertise, namely, you, would exercise oversight in relation to hate crimes reported by officers generally?
A. Yes.
Q. And that seems like a rather large job for one person.
A. It certainly was. It was for the entire seven years that I did it. We adopted that model based on what I considered best international practice, which was - our view was in the UK. Most policing agencies adopt the two-tier model, because it allows that knowledge and expertise. Expecting frontiine police to get their hand their head around hate crimes is extremely hard. It's very - they are very complex to investigate and resolve, so having that subject matter expertise is why we adopted that mode1.
Q. In paragraph 19, if I could just jump ahead briefly, you were talking about the relationship between your role, Bias Crimes Coordinator, and the role that Sue Thompson had previously undertaken --
A. Yes.
Q. -- as Senior Policy Officer, as you call it, for Gender and Sexual Diversity?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, she had left - you say that the work with respect to tracking and monitoring hate crimes that had been undertaken by Sue Thompson was taken over by yourself; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you started doing this work in $2007 ?$
A. Yes.
Q. And she had left her position $I$ think about five years before that; is that right?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. So for that five years, from before 2007, nobody had been doing it?
A. As far as I was aware, I think they were still keeping when significant incidents were showing up, but as to a process of tracking, reviewing, assessing, all that, I don't think anyone was doing it.
Q. Right. Now, why was the hate crime position, Hate Crime Coordinator position, disestablished in 2009?
A. I'm trying to word this diplomatically. There was some internal politics involved; there were some issues between then deputy commissioners, and part of that role was - there was a decision - my then manager tried to get the position permanent as a sergeant's job. I was on a what's known as a section 66 , so temporarily appointed to the rank of sergeant for the role. That was knocked back for whatever reason - I don't know. I was on the promotion process, so I decided that I would take promotion. Sought some advice from colleagues who suggested that was the best thing to do. So I left and no-one ever filled the position again, and it effectively - it was never a substantive position within the organisation. It was a temporary position. It was an over-strength position. So there was no actual what's known as a SAP position for it.
Q. What does that mean?
A. It's how the organisation assigns officers. So it was an over-strength position; it wasn't an authorised position. So when I left in 2009, technically the position ceased to exist.
Q. And what did you do for the next three years?
A. So I was attached to Blacktown Local Area Command as a general duties supervisor.
Q. Right. And then the position evidently was re-established in 2012, the Hate Crime Coordinator position?
A. Yes.
Q. And why was that? What happened then?
A. So former Deputy Commissioner Kaldas returned from his stint with the United Nations, identified that the position was missing. Mr Kaldas was instrumental in the setting up of the hate crime position when he was the Commander of Counter Terrorism. He's the one who decided that, yes, we
need this position, supported it, set it up under the Community Contacts Unit. He then got promoted to deputy commissioner. So when he returned, he realised the position was no longer there. He saw value in it, re-established the position and contacted me and asked if I was - would be willing to come back and do the role again.
Q. So he had been instrumental in setting it up in '07?
A. Yes.
Q. And then was instrumental in re-establishing it in 2012?
A. Yes.
Q. I see. And somewhere along the line there was a change in terminology from "hate crimes", in 2007, to "bias crime", by the time 2012 came around. Do you know why that was?
A. Yes, my understanding is there were discussions had in regards to the terminology, that people found "hate crime" confusing, in that it's an extreme emotion and people might think, "I don't hate this person. Why is it a hate crime?" Where bias is more of a cognitive process. So it was deemed by referring to or renaming it as "bias crimes", it was easier to understand what the position actually was doing.
Q. Subsequently - and you may or may not know this - in more recent times the terminology seems to have changed back again to "hate crime". Do you know whether that's happened or - and why?
A. I know it's gone back to being "hate crime", but I don't know why.
Q. When the position was re-established in 2012 and you came back to the position, it was within the Operational Programs part of the police; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Ms Shobha Sharma was someone to whom you reported, or --
A. Yes, she was the manager of the unit. So the Bias Crimes Unit has always, or whilst my tenure, has always been a subunit of another unit. It's never been a stand-alone unit.
Q. Right. And as at 2012 , it was a subunit of Operational Programs?
A. Operational Programs was the command. It was the diversity team. So - and that covered cultural diversity, vulnerable communities, the LGBTI community, so it was put in that unit because of access to those other policy officers.
Q. I see, all right. Thank you. Now, just one second. I think during the course of the next three years, that is, between 2012 and - well, the next five years, between 2012 and 2017, you started off again being a sole operator; you were the only person originally?
A. In 2012 there was a policy officer who had that portfolio, but it was a joint portfolio, so they did vulnerable communities plus bias crimes, but $I$ was the only police officer.
Q. Right. And then did that, over the next few years, change? Was it gradually increased in staffing terms?
A. Yes, so in 2015 we managed to get two additional positions, being an intelligence officer, who was a civilian analyst, and we had a sworn project officer.
Q. Was that Senior Constable Corbett?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Now, in your statement at paragraph 16 you refer to numerous requests being submitted to establish a stand-alone unit with sufficient resources and staff, et cetera, but that that was not forthcoming. Who were you making those requests to, or what position?
A. So originally it was through the chain of command, so it was to my manager, saying, "I need help. I can't deal with the workload by myself." Mr Kaldas was one of my direct reports, so I've made the same comment to him. Eventually, I think it was 2014, we put a formal request up through HR Command requesting a phased build-up of the Hate Crime Unit and the capability, I think up to a maximum of 12 staff. That went through the chain of command but we never got a response.
Q. I see. And then in your paragraph 18 you talk about the role changing to a more intelligence-based focus in 2015 and directing to "increased activity by organised hate groups and increasing anti-Islamic activity". So in that period, 2015, was there a shift away from some areas of
bias crime to the areas of hate groups and anti-Islamic focus?
A. I don't think there was a shift, as such. Our focus changed. So we were still doing the normal work that we were doing, but we were more focused on the activities, during the Reclaim Australia rallies, of organised hate group activity and anti-Islamic activity as a result of those rallies.
Q. Now, in paragraph 20 you speak about the creation of the Bias Crimes Standard Operating Procedures, which was a process that you described in 2013 and 2014, and they were ultimately approved I think perhaps in 2015; is that right?
A. Yes, I think it was around 2015.
Q. Now, by this time, you had had considerable exposure to the ways in which hate crime was dealt with by police in the United States?
A. Yes.
Q. And you have spoken about that in summary, or referred to it in your statement. Now, is it right to say that there is a divergence of approaches to the identification and recording of hate crime as between the US and the UK, in broad terms?
A. Not as - in regards to the way that they are recorded. They are still recorded the same sort of way. It's how they identify it. So the UK system is more victim based. So if the victim says it's a hate crime, it's deemed to be a hate crime, where the US approach is more investigative, which is, "Yes, you have said it is a hate crime. We accept that, but a determination isn't made until the investigation is done."
Q. And the US mode1, is this right, in summary, or in the broad, focuses on the intent or the motivation of the offender?
A. Yes, primarily, that's what we're looking for, is the - because the crime is motivated by the offender, as to why he did it, that's what - the ultimate aim is to determine why he did it. So, generally, if the offender throws his hand up and says, "Yes, I did it because I didn't like a certain group", it is classified as a hate crime.
Q. Whereas, again in the broad, the UK model emphasises
the perception of the victim or of witnesses?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, because the US model requires evidence of the offender's subjective motivation, it will in general classify less cases as being hate crimes than the UK model; would you agree?
A. Yes, I do, and that was always what we had to weigh up. The issue that I looked at - and I admit that I had my own biases: I was trained by the US, so that is the system I understand better - the concerns I had about adopting the UK model was there is an overrepresentation, because you are going off what the victim says, where the US - and I agree - is an under-identification, because if you don't get that admission from the offender and you can't prove it, it may not be classified as a hate crime. So there is - there's pros and cons for both approaches. I thought if we actually investigated and found out what the offenders - it's easier to engage the community around their perceptions by saying, "Yes, these are the actual numbers", rather than letting their perception possibly create fear, because their numbers are higher based on their perceptions.
Q. Right. As you have just said, though, to summarise, the likelihood is that the US model, if anything, will be inclined to underestimate the number of hate crimes; whereas the UK model, if anything, is likely to overestimate the number?
A. Yes, that's correct.

MR GRAY: Is that a convenient time?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I will adjourn, thank you.
LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT.
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr Steer, come back into the witness box, thank you. Yes, Mr Gray.

MR GRAY: Q. Sergeant, when you were creating the SOPs, the Standard Operating Procedures, for what was by then the Bias Crime Unit in 2013, 2014, 2015, you essentially adopted the US model rather than the UK model; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I wonder if Sergeant Steer could have volume 9, please. I just want to check with you whether this is either the document or a document that you took those indicators from, if you go to tab 228 in volume 9 , [SCOI. 82087]?
A. Yes, that's the document.
Q. That's the document, "Responding to Hate Crime. A Multidisciplinary Curriculum", the Massachusetts document from 2000?
A. No, it's not from Massachusetts. That's just an example that they used around the definition of the - from the Department of Justice.
Q. Sure. The reason I say Massachusetts is just that that's where, apparently, it was based, if you look on the second page. But I accept that you're quite right; it's the Department of Justice?
A. Yes.
Q. But if we turn to page 15, and it goes through to page 18, or 17, are they the nine bias crime indicators that you adopted?
A. Yes.
Q. They are?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that document something that came to your notice in the course of the various training and education you were pursuing in the United States?
A. Yes.
Q. Right, thank you. So when you came back to Australia and you were looking to deploy bias crime indicators here, you simply utilised those?
A. Yeah, it wasn't so much about deploying bias crime indicators or anything like that, it was about trying to find a method that would allow frontline police to quickly identify if a job they've gone to might be a bias crime. And under the two-tier model, that's basically all they're designed to do, is, "Yes, I think this might be bias motivated", put some information in the report to say, "These are the reasons why we think it's bias motivated." It then jumps up to the next tier to actually make an assessment, a determination, and see where it goes from there.
Q. I'11 come to this in due course, but just since we're there, and you may or may not know this now, but as we speak, in 2022, is that still what happens, as far as you know, essentially?
A. Once again, trying to be diplomatic, I believe that that's the process that's supposed to be, but my understanding, especially from being a general duties team leader at the moment, is that a lot of police still don't understand bias crimes or what they are or how to identify them.
Q. I'11 come to what I understand to be the present expectations, the present guidelines. But just foreshadowing that, my understanding at the moment - and tell me if this is not right, if you can - is that while it may not be easy for police to do it, nevertheless, that is still the current expectation, that frontline police would have - do have - a list of indicators and they're meant to record them, if relevant, so that somebody else at the EHCU can form a view?
A. I believe that's still the formal process but as I said, from my experience as a general duties team leader, most of my troops, when I mention bias crimes indicators, their eyes roll and go blank, they don't know what I'm talking about.
Q. I wonder if the witness could now please have volume 7. We don't need number 9 anymore. In volume 7, Sergeant, if you could turn to tab 188, [SCOI.75057], these are, we understand, the 2015 Standard Operating Procedures for bias crime?
A. Yes.
Q. So these are the ones that you had developed and had had approved?
A. Yes.
Q. On page 12, there's a list of protected groups?
A. Yes.
Q. First one being "Race", and then various others, including, particularly relevant for present purposes, "Sexual Orientation", "Gender Identity", and "Sex/Gender"? A. Yes.
Q. Were those protected group definitions developed by
yourself or did you get those from somewhere else?
A. Basically, we've taken some of them from the US, so I believe previously that the question around immutability has been asked, and that's how we determined what went into a protected category, was it was designed to be an immutable characteristic, something that you can't change. We acknowledge that you can change your religion, we can acknowledge that you can change factors, but the cognitive dissonance that goes with that change makes it unlikely that a victim is going to change.

So the only one that really wasn't an immutable characteristic was homelessness, and that came out of research that was coming out of the US and the UK at the time, around bias-motivated attacks targeting the homeless, and we were trying to get ahead of the curve and trying to get some data here so we knew what was going on here.
Q. I wil1 come to "immutable" shortly, but since we're here, are you saying that your view is that all of those protected groups, apart from homelessness, are groups where the relevant status is immutable?
A. I would argue that, on the strict definition, no, but in the general definition of it, because changing your religion, because of cultural, et cetera, and so forth, all those ties creates a form of cognitive dissonance which creates a lot of internal turmoil for the person, so changing is very hard, and there's consequences to those changes.

So although, yes, technically you can change your religion, you can change your gender, you can do all that sort of stuff, the psychological baggage that goes with that makes it unlikely that people will just willy-nilly. The example I use is, when $I$ first took over the bias crimes role, there was a category called "political prejudice". Now, we dropped that, and that's not in here, because you can change your politics. You can choose one party or another, it comes, it goes, it's easy to do. These characteristics aren't that easy to change. You can change, but it's not an easy process and there is a lot of psychological baggage that goes with it.
Q. All right. I might come back to that a little bit when we get to that word. Then on pages 14 and 15 , we have the 10 bias crime indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. And they are nine from the United States document?
A. Yes.
Q. P1us number 10 , being "Level of violence"?
A. Yes.
Q. Which you have added yourself?
A. Yes.
Q. And where did you get that idea from?
A. So level of violence - a lot of the research that I was looking at at that time was showing that bias crimes victims suffer a higher level of violence. I think - it's been a while since I've looked at the research but $I$ think it was seven times more likely they would end up being hospitalised than a non-bias crimes victim. What we were seeing when we were doing the monthly download of the stats reviewing all the events that had been flagged was similar sort of stuff. The level of violence was high.
Q. In relation to bias crimes generally --
A. Yes.
Q. $\quad-\quad$ not just LGBTIQ?
A. No. No, across the board. Generally the level of violence was higher. So I formed the opinion that - once again, the indicators are there as a cue to investigating police that this might be a bias crime. They're not locked in, they're not permanent, they're not, "We've got to tick every box". It's something that can trigger, "Might this be a bias crime? And now I think it might be a bias crime, this is where my investigation has to go." I have to ask those questions to determine one way or another.
Q. I wanted to ask you that, and you have in fact more or less, I think, addressed what $I$ was going to ask. At the head of that page, page 14, before "(a) racial, ethnic, gender, religious \& cultural differences", you were addressing the state of play, which is at the crime scene that is, the very beginning of what will become an investigation --
A. Yes.
Q. -- is that right? So that these - the use or the resort to these indicators you're putting forward, as I understand it, as something to be done during the
investigation?
A. Yes.
Q. In fact at its early stages?
A. At the early stages, once you get there. And I think the Commissioner mentioned earlier in one of his questions to Mr Crandell, it's not the high level of crime, it's across all crime types, so broken down - "mal dam", whatever - is we hope that police will have these in their mind. They might tick "Location", they might tick "Organised hate group", there might be something which then triggers, "Well, this might be a bias crime, I now need to explore that."
Q. So you need to tailor, in part, the rest of the investigation with that in mind.
A. Yes.
Q. You have a note in red on page 15, essentially to that effect?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, one of the things you say in the note in red is that:

The indicators are a guide on7y and not a legal certainty. [They are just] designed to act as a cue for [further] questioning and investigation.

Then when we get over to page 41, which is talking about the position that you had, Bias Crimes Coordinator, that position is described as being the police's "subject matter and source expert"?
A. Yes.
Q. And under 12.1, the Standard Operating Procedures had in mind that the person holding that position would review a11 incidents that had been flagged as a suspected bias crime, and that means, does it, whenever, at the scene, an officer does, in effect, tick the box in that sense by saying one of these indicators seems to be present and needs to be thought about, that would come to you?
A. That was what was supposed to happen. So once they form the opinion that it's a suspected bias crime - so we weren't putting the onus on them to make the determination whether it was or it wasn't. We just think it is - it then
gets passed up to me, who then looks at everything. And what we were asking officers to do was to put as much information as possible in their COPS narrative outlining how they got there. So, "I believe this is a suspected bias crime because it was a gay beat", that there was a level of violence, weapons of opportunity were used whatever. That will then come to me. I then look at the event, all that, make a decision, "Yes, I agree we're going in the right direction with this." Then I would reach out to the command and say, "Right, where are you going with this? Do you need assistance? Can we be of assistance? Have you got it?" Et cetera and so forth.
Q. And what would then happen? Supposing you thought this does look like a bias crime, what would be then your contribution or your involvement?
A. Generally I would either contact the officer directly if it was a low-level thing, so something that general duties would generally investigate, or common assault or something like that, send them an email, go, "Look, this is what you've done. Do you need any assistance? Is there anything that we as the unit can do to assist?" And then we would track it, the progress, through to see where it ended up. If it was high level, we would generally contact the crime manager and basically do the same thing, "We're aware of this. Do you need any assistance? Is there anything we can do to help?"
Q. And what would be the finish line of that process from the bias crime point of view?
A. So basically, once the investigation was completed, we would then manipulate - well, not "manipulate", change the stats. So if we said it was a suspected bias crime, it's now been determined to be a bias crime, we would change it to say it was a bias crime. We would make certain recommendations, if you had an offender, they'd been charged, we would recommend the application of section 21A(h) of the Crime (Sentencing Procedures) Act, and guide them to the right prosecutorial advice in regards to how they can apply that.
Q. And if the crime was unsolved in the sense that a perpetrator hadn't been identified?
A. So we would then look at what the classification was. What you've got to understand about the indicators and what the process is, if we don't have an admission from the offender, which is what we want, it becomes
a circumstantial brief. So we would then look at all the circumstances and go, "Yes, we believe this is a bias crime. We think we can hit that level based on all the circumstances"; or "No," and it would be a suspected bias crime, or it might not be one at all.
Q. Okay. If you turn over to page 42, at 12.4 , the Standard Operating Procedures say that, at the completion of the investigation, a classification is to be made, and incidents are to be classified as one of the following four kinds, which are there listed. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So one is "Bias Crime", two is "Suspected Bias Crime", three is "Bias Incident", and four is "Not a Bias Crime", in this document.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in looking at the "Bias Crime" one, there are then some words following the classification title, "Bias Crime", and the words are:

> Sufficient evidence exists to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the offenders actions were motivated either wholly or partially by bias.

Where did that language come from? What was the source of the language?
A. Basically what we were looking at is the legislation around bias crimes is minimal in New South Wales. So we were trying to classify our incidents to certain categories. So the reason we selected "beyond a reasonable doubt" is we wanted to see how many we could get which would meet that legal standard of proof, which would then assist us in making application to change the legislation or, if we had cases, actually try them before the courts and see how the courts responded to them and that would then inform our future direction of where we go around legislation.
Q. And when you're using the word "we" there, in terms of "we" drafting these things, that's you and who else?
A. My policy officer at the time.
Q. Who was?
A. I believe it was Amy Mouafi at the time.
Q. With you - no disrespect to her - you taking the leading role, I presume?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. So the words "sufficient evidence" were an idea of yours?
A. Yes.
Q. And the words "beyond a reasonable doubt" were an idea of yours?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were introducing those words here at the conclusion of the investigation; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. After the investigation had completed?
A. Yes.
Q. And then for "Suspected Bias Crime", you had not the obverse, but a contrast - that is to say, insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt?
A. Yes.
Q. So still with the same ideas of sufficiency of evidence and the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt?
A. So what we did there was the reason we brought in "Suspected Bias Crimes" as a category was we understood that we might not always hit that level of proof for a bias crime, but that doesn't diminish the victim's side of things and the impact on the community. So what we were basically trying to convey to communities was, "Yes, we haven't hit this level of proof, but we still take it seriously, we're still recording it, we're still using it for our intelligence side of things and all that sort of stuff. It's still here. We haven't ignored it completely. We haven't said, 'Because we haven't hit this proof it never happened to you'."

So the reason we had that insufficient evidence was we weren't at that level for that legal standpoint but we still wanted that evidence. So it might have just been language. Language is extremely deceptive in regards to bias crimes, so language alone might not prove motivation.
Q. And who was going to make this classification in 12.4 - yourself?
A. Yes, the coordinator, yes.
Q. Pardon?
A. The coordinator, so whoever was sitting in my role.
Q. Whoever was sitting in your role --
A. Yes.
Q. -- was going to make the cal1 based on whatever facts and information had come from the investigators?
A. Yes.
Q. As to whether "sufficient evidence exists to prove [something] beyond a reasonable doubt"?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was - if I'm understanding you correctly with a view to (a) getting a sense of how many bias crime contenders met that standard with a view to considering whether amendments to legislation were desirable?
A. Yes, so basically, at the end of the day the dream at the end of this was that we'd be able to prosecute successfully crimes that were motivated by bias. So we were trying to get a sense of (a) what's the capability of NSW Police to capture this information to a sufficient standard; then identify cases that we could put forward to the court as test cases; and then, from that, determine whether there needed any legislative changes or anything like that.
Q. Now, in the time that you were in the role from 2012 wel1, from the time these SOPs came in in 2015 until you finished in the role in 2017, are you able to give the Commissioner any indication either in numbers or in proportions, which - how many cases in your time came within these four?
A. Oh, that's going to be hard to say. So what we did was each month, we'd download the statistics, I would review them and classify them and then we'd have a report that went out to whoever it was relevant to. We used to average maybe 120 to 170 events a month that were flagged. Out of that, I would say roughly I think, from memory, we had roughly about a 50 per cent failure rate where police would misidentify bias crimes. So what does that drop us down to? About 60 or 70 . Then out of that, insufficient -

I would say maybe 10 to 15 per cent were insufficient information. And then - bias crime, because of the high level, were always going to be less than suspected bias crimes, so I would say maybe 20 would be bias crimes and the remainder would be suspected, but that's just rough numbers.
Q. Okay. Because obviously enough, introducing the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is a high --
A. Yes.
Q. $\quad--$ hurdle to jump?
A. Yes.
Q. So unsurprisingly, perhaps, not very many would meet that standard?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes. And that's what we were trying to ascertain, is what is the quality of information that police are recording? How easy - so if you compare it to the US and I look at the NYPD Hate Crime Task Force, they've got a higher number because their processes are in place, police know what they have to do, there's processes in place, et cetera and so forth. We were in the beginning stages of this, so our numbers are going to be less because we're still trying to educate police about what they need to do and how to do it.
Q. I'11 just ask you this general1y, I'11 come to it later a bit more specifically on one of the documents, but in your statement and some of your other emails and so on, you've said - and I'm summarising - that the way the 10 indicators were used by Strike Force Parrabe11 was, in your opinion, inappropriate, being used as a checklist?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recal 1 saying that - things to that effect?

But I wanted to ask you this: in your view, what was the right way, the appropriate way, to use these indicators? A. So the way we used it was - it depends on the role, so if you're talking about frontine police, it was just that trigger. For me, it was the assessment stage. So my assessments would sit there and if I was doing a formal assessment - so when I was doing the statistics, most of this was being done in my head. I knew the indicators off
by heart, I could just run through it manually through my head. If we were asked for a formal assessment we might sit there and say, "Yes, we determine this or assess this to be a bias crime because of the following", then we would go: location, it's a known gay beat, there has been 15 assaults in the last two years in this location, within certain time frames, within certain MOs, and signatures were found, et cetera and so forth. There's been evidence of organised hate group activity in the area, et cetera and so forth. There's been language that was used during the attack, et cetera and so forth.

So as I said previously, if we didn't have the admissions from an offender, we're looking at that circumstantial case, and so when we look at the whole picture, based on all the information that we've recorded, we would then make our determination.
Q. So two stages, then, in your approach to it. The indicators would be used by the frontline people attending the scene as cues for things that might perhaps need to be looked at?
A. Yes.
Q. And then at the conclusion of the investigation, in a different context, they would be - the bias crime indicators and the classification categories would be used by you personally for the statistical --
A. Yes.
Q. -- objectives that you've mentioned?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, the next thing that seems to have happened, at least for the purposes of what we're looking at in terms of the development of the documentation after this Standard Operating Procedures in 2015, was a presentation that you gave in 2016 in June, and you will need volume 3 for this. The presentation that I'm referring you to is at tab 64A, [SCOI.77319]. That, as we understand it, is a presentation that you gave at least in June 2016 - you may have given it at other times as well.
A. No, it was designed specifically for Parrabell.
Q. That's what I was coming to.
A. Yes.
Q. It was designed specifically for Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. And it's because - at your initiative or because someone asked you?
A. Because we were asked.
Q. Who asked you?
A. I don't know whether it was Mr Crandell or Jackie Braw. It was one of those two, in that portfolio.
Q. What was the - sorry, beg your pardon?
A. It was just because it was their portfolio.
Q. And what were you asked to do?
A. Basically go through what hate crimes were, what the indicators were, some work that we've done and some ideas around hate crimes and the investigation side of things.
Q. Okay. And if we - just in terms of timing, if you look at tab 64 - no, in fact, I'11 come to it - anyway, look at tab 64, [SCOI.74246]. You'11 see that down the bottom of the first page - in fact, if you go to the second page, you will see that what has happened is that Detective Bignell has asked you for some additional information on the bias crime classifications that you covered in your presentation, which has obviously just happened --
A. Yes.
Q. -- at that time, and you give him a bit more information, you give him a copy - you email him the presentation?
A. Yes.
Q. So I'11 come to those emails, but just in the presentation itself, [SCOI.77319], there are some smal1 page numbers on the top right?
A. Yes.
Q. If you turn to page 10, you start talking about the 10 indicators.
A. Yes.
Q. And you say that they're only a guide, they don't mean that there is a legal certainty, and so on. And then under the first indicator, "Differences" on page 11 , the word "immutable" has been introduced - it is a siight change to
the wording that came from the American document?
A. Yes.
Q. You agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Just talk us through that. Why did you introduce that word?
A. I think it was an error on my part. Usually, that would be in my notes on the presentation, not on the actual slide, because what we were trying to explain to them is when we talk about differences, we were talking about the protected categories. So this is how we got to the protected categories. We use that immutable characteristic to identify our nine protected categories, and that's what we were talking about with differences. So we're talking about if we use race as an example, your victim might be black and your offender might be white. So there's your difference on that immutable characteristic.
Q. We11, I don't mean to focus too much on this word but the word "immutable" is not in the Standard Operating Procedures --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you agree?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. But it is in this presentation?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you said it might have been a mistake, do you mean it shouldn't perhaps have been in the presentation --
A. It shouldn't have been in the presentation, yes.
Q. It should have been a commentary only?
A. Yes. So usually I put the notes - in the "Notes" section on the presentation, which I would see as a presenter, and as I said, we've always used immutable, that's how we came up with our nine protected categories, so it was designed to explain to the staff we were giving the presentation to, "These are the protected categories, this is how we got here, this is what we're talking about when we say characteristics." We're not talking about that one had a red hat and one had a blue hat, we're talking about these protected categories.
Q. All right. And in the email at tab 64 [SCOI.74246], when you send to Mr Bignell the presentation - do you see that at the bottom of the first page?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you said:

Re: classifications, the definitions are below.

And then you give five definitions. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So in the SOPs, there are four - we've just looked at them - whereas here there are five?
A. Yes.
Q. And not only is there a fifth one, but the language applicable to each of the five --
A. Has changed.
Q. -- titles has changed?
A. Yes.
Q. So why five not four, first of all?
A. We added "Insufficient Information" from doing the stats, from reviewing the cases. There was a large number that there just wasn't information being recorded in the COPS event that would allow us to make a determination. So instead of ruling them out and ignoring them, we classified that as "Insufficient Information", so when we went back to our corporate sponsors, whenever we were doing training, et cetera and so forth, we had that data to sit there and say, "X amount isn't meeting the criteria. This is what we're finding. We need to tighten up how we're actually recording stuff to make sure things are recorded properly."
Q. And is that a development or a change that happened after the Standard Operating Procedures had been under way for a while and you were getting some data from which you could derive that view?
A. I think if my memory serves me right, "Insufficient Information" was always a category I used, but we weren't getting the numbers that we were getting.
Q. But it wasn't in the SOPs is all I'm saying?
A. No, that's what I'm saying, we weren't getting the
numbers, so it was sort of an internal process for me. So when we were doing the SOPs, it wasn't deemed to be a factor because we weren't getting the numbers. Then as the SOPs rolled out, we were doing education around and training and all that sort of stuff, we saw an increase in the number of events that were being classified as "Insufficient Information", so it's become a more formalised thing, the SOPs just weren't updated with it.
Q. So in the presentation at 64A, [SCOI. 77319], if you go to page 25 --
A. What page was that, sorry?
Q. In tab 64A at page 25, do you see the five classifications are listed there?
A. Yes.
Q. But without any, as it were, commentary?
A. Yes.
Q. With no words explaining them?
A. Yes.
Q. So that's the presentation, just on page 25 , just with the five --
A. Yes.
Q. -- bare categories. But when you send the email to

Mr Bignel1, you give him the definitions for the classifications?
A. Yes.
Q. This is in tab 64, [SCOI.74246]?
A. Yes.
Q. And as you have just agreed, the language for the five definitions is different from the language in the SOPs?
A. Yes.
Q. So, next question: where did this different language come from that we see in tab 64, in that email?
A. So what happened was, as I've already said, we had that high standard of proof. We were trying to ascertain what was going on organisationally, so what we were finding is there were occasions when there might be intelligence, there might be information from sources, et cetera and so forth, which wouldn't possibly be admissible in court but
still would help us make that determination in regards to whether it was a bias crime or not. It shows motive of the offender or it shows a history or something like that. So by a change - or adding information, we were capturing that broader aspect of information.

Then, if we decided that we want to try this before the courts, we would seek advice in regards to whether that information would be admissible and if the result was no, it's not, then that might have downgraded its ability to be prosecuted, but it wouldn't change the fact that it might have been a bias motivated crime.
Q. Did you, in the presentation, explain to the listeners or the participants the two stages at which the indicators were to be used - stage 1 being at the investigation stage by the frontline officer as a cue or prompt, and stage 2 being at the classification stage by you at the end? A. I don't believe so. I think it was just about the indicators for Parrabell, because we were asked to talk about the indicators, so my mind-set would have been we were talking to the investigators of Parrabell, that was the focus, not explaining how they're used or supposed to be used in a day-to-day.
Q. Well, what information, if any, were you given as to what Parrabell had in mind for its methodology?
A. Not a lot.
Q. At that point?
A. I remember three meetings from Parrabell. The first one was where Assistant Commissioner Crandell told us that he was starting the strike force.
Q. And do you know - I don't want to get you off your train of thought, but do you know when that was?
A. No, I can't give you a date. It would have probably been in 2015, it would have been prior to their starting it, because we had - I gave him some advice in regards to potential outcomes.
Q. So that was - sorry, I don't want to take you off your train of thought but you mentioned three meetings. This is the first one, and it was with Superintendent Crandell --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and others?

MR TEDESCHI: I object. He didn't say it was the first one.

MR GRAY: He did say it was the first one, I think.
Q. Did you not?

THE COMMISSIONER: Hang on, I understand the objection. Mr Gray, ask it again just to clarify so that there is no misunderstanding.

MR GRAY: Q. I thought you said that you referred to the first meeting?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Yes, thank you. And that was with Mr Crandel1 and some others?
A. I believe Shobha Sharma was there, I believe Jackie was there, and possibly Detective Inspector Middleton might have been there and maybe Detective Sergeant Grace.
Q. And where was this?
A. It was at Surry Hills.
Q. Right. And the subject was what?
A. Basically, Mr Crandell was just advising us that they were going to look at Parrabell, pick it up, run with it. He was outlining what their plans were. From memory, he wanted some input from us in regards to what we thought. We gave him some certain advice.
Q. $\quad$ We" being you and?
A. We11, when I say "me", I mean the unit. So it was effectively me, but Shobha was there as well as my manager.
Q. Right. Okay. So that's the first meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. And then there were two more you had in mind?
A. The second meeting was when I did the presentation.
Q. This one in June 2016?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes?
A. And then the final one was when we looked at the dip
sample.
Q. Which was in --
A. When we looked at my analysis.
Q. Which was in January 2017?
A. Yes.
Q. We'11 come to that.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you say three meetings, are you saying that, to your recollection, those are the three times you had involvement in Parrabel1, or are you saying something else?
A. We11, I'm - they're the three - they're the three meetings I recal1. I've looked at my calendar and there were other meetings around Parrabel1, but whether Mr Crandell was present during those, what they related to, I don't know. But they're the three meetings that stand out in my mind in regards to Parrabell.
Q. Al1 right. So when you send this email to

Mr Middleton - sorry, to Mr Bigne11, on 29 June with those five definitions, that was pursuant to the second of the meetings --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that is the June 2016 meeting. And was there any other discussion or explanation that you recall orally or in a meeting or in a phone call about how those five classifications and definitions were to be used?
A. No.
Q. Were you asked for any such explanation?
A. No.
Q. Now, just for the sake of completeness, could Mr Steer have volume 7, please. And just look at tab 200,
[SCOI.75055], which is the very last tab. It's headed "Bias Crimes Identification Guidelines". Do you see that? A. Yes.
Q. Under the heading "Indicators" and the first heading "Differences", the word "immutable" is to be found?
A. Yes.
Q. It's not dated, and I'm just wondering whether you can
help us with when this document came into existence?
A. I'm not 100 per cent certain, but I'm going to suggest it was one of the first documents I did back in 2007/2008.
Q. Even with the word "immutable" in it?
A. Yes, because, as I said, the categories were based on that immutable characteristic. Back then $I$ was still getting my head around everything so I probably would have stuck it in there to remind myself, and then as it's developed, we've dropped it, to everything else. As I said, with the Parrabel 1 presentation, it's probably an error on my part because generally I would stick it in the "Notes" section of the presentation, not on the actual slide.
Q. A11 right, thank you. So would this document be likely to have been a document that was just created by you for you and --
A. Yes.
Q. -- not disseminated?
A. No, no. It was for my - I might have, when we did training later on, used some of that information in siides and presentations, but, yes, it was basically developed for me.
Q. Okay. Now, if I can just now turn to Operation Parrabe11--
A. Yes.
Q. -- Operation Parrabe11, and your statement on that topic. You deal with it at about paragraph 34, [SCOI.82080]. Have you got your statement there?
A. Yes.
Q. So Operation Parrabel 1 was established by you persona11y?
A. Yes.
Q. And it followed and flowed from, is this right, the extensive media coverage of homicides believed to be hate crimes targeting gay males?
A. Yes.
Q. And in particular, in around - that sort of coverage in 2013?
A. Yes.
Q. You then describe what the proposed purpose was. You say it would be comprehensive, it would involve interviewing offenders and witnesses. There would be community consultation, and so forth.
A. Yes.
Q. You have described all of that. In developing the concept, you consulted with the Senior Policy Officer for Gender and Sexual Diversity - that's --
A. Jackie Braw.
Q. Jackie Braw. And you completed a report for approval - I'm getting on to the top of the next page now and you say:

From memory the concept was approved with the proviso that the focus was on a hate crime assessment on7y, and no review of the criminal component (homicide) was to be undertaken.
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, your idea was there would be a hate crime assessment of the 80 -plus cases?
A. Yes.
Q. You would interview offenders and you would interview witnesses?
A. Yes.
Q. You would consult the community throughout?
A. Yes.
Q. Then could Mr Steer have volume 1, please, of the tender bundle. And if you turn to tab 12, [SCOI.75056], this was a document called "Bias Crimes Investigation Agreement" that you prepared at the outset of what would have been Operation Parrabell?
A. Yes.
Q. Under the heading "Mission", you were going to focus the bias crime assessment on suicides and suspicious deaths in two particular areas, namely, the Northern Beaches and the Central Metropolitan Region. Was there a reason for confining it to those two areas?
A. I think it was just - although we didn't have a full grasp of how much work was going to be involved, we knew that if we had to travel around New South Wales, it just wasn't feasible.
Q. Okay.
A. So it was easy for us to access those areas from where I was based.
Q. Okay. And then on the second page, there's a heading "Bias Crime Indicators", and your intention was that:

Each incident will be filtered through the current ten bias crimes indicators. The purpose of this is to identify potential deaths that may have a bias motivation. The indicators do not mean that an incident was in fact bias motivated, but suggest a possibility of a bias motivation.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when you recorded that as the intention - namely, to filter each incident through the 10 bias crimes indicators, what was the filtering that you were going to do? What was the process you had in mind?
A. Basically using the indicators, so doing that formalised assessment where we look at those 10 indicators, and I have to clarify, yes, there's 10 indicators, but other things might come up through the questioning which might not be in those 10 indicators that we would still look at. So basically look at those 10 indicators, use them as our basis for assessment, so we look at those categories and gather as much information as we could in those areas and then give our assessment.
Q. And when you're using "we" and "our", it's you and Sergeant Jo Kenworthy?
A. Yes.
Q. And you being the lead operative in the exercise?
A. Yes.
Q. So again, just keeping in mind what later was your criticism, as I understand it, of how Strike Force Parrabell used the indicators, what is the difference in your mind between how you intended to use them and how you
understand the strike force used them?
A. So ours is a more free-flowing approach. It's not in a formalised document. That comes later in the assessment where we might use those headings and sit there and go, "Location". We drill down on them, so we would be looking at intelligence for those areas, geographic profiling, all that sort of stuff.

So for location, we might say, "Yes, it was a known gay beat. There's been a certain number of attacks in that area. MO is similar", et cetera and so forth, and reason out our assessment. So anyone can look at that document and basically say, "This is how they've got there." If we've missed things, people can hopefully easily pick them up and say, "Well, you didn't consider this or consider that", because we would cover off on all those.

The concerns I had with the way that Strike Force Parrabell did it is they did it on a form. Not a big fan of forms because it limits thinking. Because most people, when they look at a form, think, "That's all I've got to worry about, what's on that form."

What confused me, and the samples that I sent to the NYPD Hate Crime Task Force to dip sample my work to make sure that I was on the money, was the fact that under each indicator they would then make a determination whether it was a bias crime or not. So there were occasions where it might say, "Not determined", then it might say, "Suspected bias crime", then it might say - so throughout their process, it was confusing.
Q. They were, as you - are you talking about the strike force and the use of the form now?
A. Yes.
Q. But you're saying that in the forms that you saw, the 12 or so, which we'11 come to, they were recording bias crime or not --
A. Under each indicator.
Q. -- item by item?
A. Yeah, under each indicator. And then they would come up with their final determination. But there was very little to understand how they got there, where the way that we would do it would be we would reason out what we were doing so it was clear, "We've come to this determination
based on all of this information."
Q. And when you say you would do that, do you mean you would do that in a written form?
A. Yes.
Q. But it's not a - not in the form of a form?
A. Not a form. It would basically - probably the best example would be the bias crimes assessment we did on North Head, that document. It would be basically that document where we would spell everything out.
Q. For each case?
A. Yes.
Q. I see. All right. Now, with your statement in mind, if you have that there, [SCOI.82080] at 36 - I'11 just 1et you familiarise yourself with this again - 36 through to 39 you talk about what you were able to do as Operation Parrabell, apart from the North Head bias crime assessment and apart from the comparison between Marks Park and North Head. You talk there in 36 to 39 about what you began to do or began to get ready to do in connection with the 80 ; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But what I wanted to ask you is how far did you actually get with the work on the 80 ?
A. Not very.
Q. Did you get to the point of doing any actual reviews of those 80 cases?
A. We started - and I can't remember which one it was, we got the briefs from State Archives or a number of briefs from State Archives and we started looking at the statements. Jo advised me, or Jo Kenworthy advised me that her secondment was ending and so we stopped. We just didn't have the resources to do it.
Q. And in 39, you say, about seven or eight lines down 39, you say:

On obtaining the archived material an assessment was completed it was determined by Senior Sergeant Kenworthy and [yourself] that with the current resources, it was estimate to take 3 years --
even if that was all you did; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And then at the top of the next page, after you mention that additional resources were requested but not forthcoming, you say four lines down:

It was decided to suspend Operation Parrabe 17 ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Who made that decision? Do you mean you did?
A. I did.
Q. And was that in about mid 2014 after the second of those two assessments, or 1ate 2014?
A. Yeah, it would have been - it would have been shortly after that second assessment.
Q. And when you say a few 1 ines down again, "It was envisioned that sufficient resources would be given and that if that happened Operation Parrabell would be reactivated", do you mean it was envisioned by you or by someone else?
A. By me.
Q. But it didn't happen?
A. No.
Q. Now, coming to Strike Force Parrabel 1 and turning to paragraph 40 of your statement, now, in the first sentence you say:

The Bias Crimes Coordinator [ie, yourself]
had minimal involvement with respect to Strike Force Parrabel 7.

Is that stil1 your position?
A. Yes.
Q. You refer there then to the original meeting, and that's the first of three that you described a few minutes ago?
A. Yes.
Q. You say you offered to assist the strike force and were advised that the strike force would seek assistance if required?
A. Yes.
Q. Who said that?
A. I believe it was Detective Inspector Middleton.
Q. And was assistance ever sought from you?
A. No.
Q. You were asked to give the presentation, of course, that you've mentioned, in June 2016?
A. Yes.
Q. I've dealt with that. And we'11 come to the dip sample. But apart from the presentation and the dip sample, were you ever asked to assist Strike Force Parrabell in any other way that you can recall?
A. No.
Q. Now, for Strike Force Parrabel1 there were a number of constituent documents. Do you still have volume 1 on the table? You may not.
A. I don't believe so.
Q. I need you to have volume 1.
A. Oh, yes, I do, sorry.
Q. If you turn to tab 14, [SCOI.74385] this is a document called "Investigation Plan for Strike Force Parrabe11".
Now, this has two dates on it on the fifth page. Beneath Sergeant Grace's name is the date 25 May 2015 and beneath Detective Inspector Middleton's name is the date 3 August 2015. As best you recal1, were you ever shown this document?
A. No.
Q. When was the first time you saw it?
A. Today.
Q. On the third page, you'11 see there's a heading "Investigative Outcomes", towards the bottom?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says that Bias Crime Identification Forms will
be attached to a report, making the following findings, and then there are four bullet points. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And "There is evidence that sexuality or other bias was involved", and then "It appears likely", "It appears unlikely", "There is no evidence". Is that language that you had ever played a part in drafting?
A. No.
Q. Then at tab 15 in the same volume, [SCOI.75071], there's the coordinating instructions for Strike Force Parrabe11. Now, were you provided with them or a draft of them at any stage?
A. No.
Q. When was the first time you saw these coordinating instructions?
A. Today.
Q. Have a look at the language at the bottom of page 3the second-bottom paragraph on page 3 begins:

The review wil7 use a 7 ist of Bias Crime
Indicators ...
et cetera?
A. Yes.
Q. It says that the indicators were published by the US Department of Justice, and the footnote tells us where they came from?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the next paragraph down says:

Investigators have created a "Bias Crimes
Indicators Review Form".

And over the page it says:

For each indicator, the following 4
findings are available ...
And then we have, "Bias Crime", "Suspected Bias Crime", "Not a Bias Crime", and "Insufficient Information" on page 4. Can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can recognise, I'm sure, that the titles of the indicators and then the definitions attached to the indicators are the language from your email?
A. Yes.
Q. Nonetheless, you have not seen these coordinating instructions until today?
A. No.
Q. Is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, starting at the bottom of page 4 and going over for 10 pages or so thereafter is the document titled "Bias Crime Indicator Form"?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, when did you first see a Bias Crime Indicator

Form in those terms?
A. When they were sent to me for the dip sample.
Q. So that's December 2016 or January 2017?
A. Around then, yes.
Q. Prior to that, you'd never seen the form?
A. No.
Q. Had any draft of the form or version of the form ever been provided to you for your comment?
A. No.
Q. Did you know they were using a form --
A. No.
Q. $\quad-$ prior to December or so $2016 ?$
A. No, I didn't.
Q. How did you understand that they were proceeding with the strike force? What was their methodology as you understood it?
A. I don't know.
Q. You didn't know?
A. I - yeah, as I said, I had minimal involvement with Parrabell, so I don't know how they planned to do it. We gave them the information around the indicators that we used but, yeah, we never got any information about how they planned to use it.
Q. There's another document, which I perhaps probably should show you for completeness. It's in volume 2 at tab 59, [SCOI.77317]. It's the very last tab in that volume, and it's called "Strike Force Parrabell Induction Package"; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you just turn the pages over at a gentle pace so you can see what it looks like, could you then tell us whether you've ever seen that document before?
A. No, I haven't.
Q. Wel1, just looking at it now, do you see that it also has a Bias Crimes Indicators Form built into it?
A. Yes.
Q. And looking at page 4, do you see that the indicators are only three in number and they're in different language from the form that we just looked at --
A. Yes.
Q. -- a moment ago? Do you know where that language came from?
A. No idea.
Q. Al1 right. Thank you, I think that can be returned. In your statement at paragraph 21, [SCOI. 82080] you talk about the form, the Bias Crimes Indicator Form?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say it was created by Strike Force Parrabe11, which seems to be accepted, and you say:
... and appears to be based on the Bias
Crimes Indicators ... that was used by ...
you?
A. Yes.
Q. You say there was no consultation with you in relation
to the creation of this form; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you say:
... the basis of the form appears to be based on an incorrect understanding of what the indicators are and how to use them.

Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Again, could you just tell us what you believe to be the incorrect understanding of what they are and how to use them?
A. I can't remember the - which document you have shown me.
Q. Do you need the form? It's in volume 1.
A. Oh, I can speak without seeing it. They mention, as an example in there, organised hate groups, that if anyone had associations on COPS, that that would be deemed to be an organised hate group. That's not how we defined it. So their understanding about what that category is, in my opinion, was incorrect. As I said, they've done it, in my opinion, as a checklist with those bias crime - after each indicator saying whether it was a bias crime or not. That's, as I said, confusing. Other experts in the field had the same issues I did. So, yeah, that's why I say it wasn't the way that we did it.
Q. You say in paragraph 21 that the bias crime indicators - on the fifth line - are utilised as an aide-memoire within bias crimes investigations?
A. Yes.
Q. You are directing attention there to the fact that the indicators are used as cues during the investigation?
A. Yes .
Q. Is that right?
A. It - in fairness, they can be used in - for Parrabell, but it's the way it's been done is what causes me concern, using that form and the way that they've classified it after each indicator instead of looking at it as a holistic approach.
Q. Thank you. Then back to paragraph 40 of your statement, you see about five lines down, you say:

During the time frame that Strike Force Parrabell operated there was no consultation [with you] with any of the cases.

That's still your position?
A. Yes.
Q. And we'll come to the dip sample, which you obviously did participate in?
A. Yes.
Q. So apart from the dip sample, you say you were not consulted about any of the cases?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Right. Now, a couple of lines below there, you say:

The lack of consultation raised serious concerns as the role of the Bias Crimes Unit, under the two-tier model, was to have the final say as to if incidents were hate motivated, due to the expertise held within the unit.

And you say:
These concerns were raised through the direct chain of command and the Bias Crimes Corporate Sponsor.

What does that mean? Who were these concerns raise with?
A. So I raised them with my manager, Shobha Sharma, and my corporate sponsor, who was Superintendent Danny Sullivan.
Q. He was the bias crimes --
A. Yes, and I do believe I even raised it with former Deputy Commissioner Kaldas.
Q. And what was the response from any or all of those three?
A. So at the original meeting that we had in regards to Parrabell, an agreement was made that we would make the
final determination. As Parrabe11 progressed, we were seeing none of - nothing. So that's when we started raising concerns, as Parrabell was doing more and more cases, the concerns I held were workload for me. I believe the 12 that I dip sampled took me about a month to do them, and that was generally on overtime. So we weren't seeing the cases, there was minimal communication between us and the strike force, so we didn't know what they were doing, how they were doing things, and I generally had a concern that they may be doing things different to how they're supposed to be done, and that might impact on the results.
Q. Now, could Mr Steer have volume 3, please. I just want to get your response to something contained in an email. It's not an email that went to you, it's at tab 82 , [SCOI.74420]. I'm sorry, it was an email that was copied to you. It's an email from Craig Middleton to various people - well, to Jackie Braw and copied to various people, one of whom is yourself, on 18 January 2017. And it concerns or is sparked by, among other things, the dip sample exercise that was then under way. What I wanted to ask you about is what Mr Middleton says in the second paragraph. Just read that to yourself and I'11 high1ight the bit I want to ask you about.
A. Yes.
Q. I should really, to give you the context for this, take you to the email that this is responding to. It's on the second page. It's responding to this email from Jackie Braw, in which Jackie Braw tells Craig Middleton that you and Jackie Braw met with the person who was then acting in Shobha Sharma's role in connection with the meeting that was going to take place the next day, which was the dip sample meeting. And I'11 let you read that to yourself as well to remind yourself of what was happening.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, Jackie Braw seems to have had in mind that one objective was for you on the one hand and Strike Force Parrabel1 on the other hand to come to a consensus on at least some cases if possible. That's what she seems to be saying?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that something that was conveyed to you?
A. It wasn't conveyed around consensus. The position that we always took was, under the original agreement, we
would make the final determination because that was our area of expertise. So Parrabell would do their findings. So if we look at it from the process, that would be the first responder's investigation, then it moves up to the next tier and we would look at the case and go, "Yes, we agree", or "No, we don't, this is what we're going to classify it as."
Q. And was it in your mind that your say would be determinative?
A. Yes.
Q. As it were, overruling the strike force's view if necessary?
A. As per the SOPs.
Q. As per the Standard Operating Procedures?
A. As per the SOPs.
Q. I see. Now, what Mr Middleton says, and what I wanted to ask you about in particular, in the second paragraph of his email, just about halfway through that paragraph, he says:

It has always been the case Geoff and the Bias Crime Unit have had complete access to the [Strike Force] Parrabell e@gle.i system from the commencement of the [strike force]. I am happy for Geoff (and indeed welcome his input) or for that matter any other member of the Bias Crime team to access eegle.i and conduct a review of any or all of the completed review forms.
I have always left that up to the Bias Crime Unit to decide how best to conduct their review and how many of the forms they wish to review.

Now, what is your response to that?
A. We did have access. I looked at it from a workload management perspective. There's no way I could go through Parrabell every day, see which forms are completed, which isn't completed. The expectation that I had, and always had, and was expressed, was that as the forms got completed, that they would be - I would be either notified "We've completed this one. Go and have a look at it on e@gle.i", or they would send us the documents and we would
look at it, and that never happened.
Q. When you say "the documents", do you mean the historical files?
A. Not so much the historical files, because we had access to them on e@gle.i, but the completed Bias Crimes Indicator Form that they were using, and I think when they sent me the 12 that I dip sampled, it was on an Excel spreadsheet as well.
Q. Now, on the dip sample exercise, you mentioned - you talk about this again in paragraph 40 of your statement, [SCOI.82080], perhaps a bit before halfway through the paragraph, you say:

After Strike Force Parrabe11 completed their assessments, and after raising concerns about the lack of consultation, I was allowed to conduct a dip sample of 12 cases.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So how did that come about? How did it come about that not having had any cases provided to you for review, you were then provided with 12? What happened?
A. Basically, it was me raising with my manager on a regular basis that we hadn't seen anything from
Parrabell. "I've got concerns. It's very quiet and we haven't seen anything." From memory, we were told originally they were going to send us the cases and they sent 12 to begin with, so I reviewed those.
Q. Who was it who sent you the 12 ?
A. I want to say Detective Inspector Middleton but I could be wrong.
Q. And what, so far as you know, was the basis on which those 12 were chosen?
A. I have no idea. They were just 12 cases that were sent to me. I've got no idea how they chose them. I just assumed that they were the completed ones. I could be wrong, but my understanding was Parrabell wasn't necessarily doing it in numerical order. So as they got completed, they might have been the first 12 that they completed and --
Q. So when these 12 were sent to you, which seems to have been perhaps in December 2016, had you previously seen either a blank Bias Crime Indicator Form or a completed form?
A. No.
Q. You had never seen the blank form till then?
A. No.
Q. So the first time you saw the form was in the completed state with these 12 ?
A. Yes, once I did the dip sample.
Q. So that was the first time you realised that was the methodology they were using?
A. Yes.
Q. And when you did see that, did you immediately have concerns about that?
A. Yes.
Q. You saw, when you got the forms, that what the strike force was doing was going through the 10 indicators and coming to a view and entering a result as to bias crime, not bias crime --
A. Yes.
Q. -- insufficient or suspected?
A. Yes.
Q. And your work at that point, doing the dip sample, was to, in effect, accept that way of going about it and see what you thought?
A. Yeah, so basically the dip sample was to look at their findings and see whether we agreed with their findings. So the first point of contention I had with it was the way they were using the indicators, and then the - some of their findings we varied, we disagreed on.
Q. Thank you. I'11 come to that. But what I want to try to ask you is, for the sake of your exercise, your dip sample exercise, did you adopt their methodology, even though you didn't think it was right, or did you adopt a different methodology?
A. I'll go yes and no. So what we got sent was an Excel spreadsheet, and I don't know whether you've seen that

Excel spreadsheet. So there was an Excel spreadsheet where they had their indicators and a summary of their findings on the indicators. So what I did was then create another column next to their findings for that indicator and put my comments based on that indicator. And then while they were still going, "This indicator is a bias crime", "This indicator isn't a bias crime", I didn't do that. At the end of it, I assessed the whole based on all the information I had access to, and made a determination based on everything.
Q. Right. Now, do you have - is that volume 3 that you have there, because it is volume 3 that I need to take you to?
A. Yes.
Q. If you could turn to, first of all, tab 83, [SCOI. 74229 ], these are said to be minutes of the meeting on 19 January 2017 where you were present with Mr Crandell, Mr Middleton, Mr Grace, Mr Bigne11 and Jackie Braw and another person.
A. Yes.
Q. You recall this meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you seen these minutes before?
A. I may have, but they don't stick in my mind.
Q. Now, item 2 is headed "Bias Crimes Unit review of 12 cases", and it says that you tabled a summary of 12 cases you reviewed and provided your rationale for determinations, and then various cases are summarised?
A. Yes.
Q. When we get to case number 64 - you will see that, Webster?
A. Yes.
Q. You highlighted particular matters. And the minutes say:

A11 agreed with Sergeant Steer's rationale (and therefore suggesting "Insufficient Information") but decided to leave the determination as "Suspected Bias Crime" ...
that being the strike force's designation --
and maintain flexibility to amend once Flinders University Team have provided their advice.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. If you look about four bullets down for the Dempsey case - do you see that one, case number 67, Dempsey?
A. Yes.
Q. Towards the end of the discussion there:

All agreed for these reasons on
"Insufficient Information" and seek advice from Flinders University Team".
A. Yes.
Q. Similarly in case number 68, "Meek", do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q.

Sergeant Steer outlined rationale for "Insufficient Information" and all agreed to amend to this determination and await Flinders University advice.
A. Yes.
Q. And similarly - well, it's said again at the end of that same case:

All agreed to move to "Insufficient Information" and seek Flinders University advice.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, was somebody saying - you or someone else - that the final landing or decision of the strike force as to which classification would be adopted would follow upon advice from Flinders University?
A. I'm not aware of those conversations.
Q. Was that said in this meeting as the minutes appear to record?
A. Oh, I don't recal1. I remember the meeting was a little bit tense in regards to my findings and my rationales for it. Someone may have made the comment whether it was, "Wait for advice from Flinders University", or whether it was, "We'll see what their finding is", and whatever, but, yeah, it was a tense meeting.
Q. Right. Well, now, on the third page, the second bullet point begins:

At this point a useful discussion on terminology followed.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And could you just read to yourself that bullet point and the three bullet points that follow it?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, do you have a recollection of this topic being discussed, about changing the classification of "Bias Crime" to the classification, "Evidence of a bias crime"? A. I do.
Q. And the suggestion of changing "Not Bias Crime" to "No evidence of a bias crime"?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was your view about that suggested change?
A. I maintain from our perspective, from the unit's perspective, that we should keep the definitions as we had them. It was Parrabell's exercise. If they decide to change them, that was their call. But I still argued that we shouldn't. However, I did see their logic in it and I left the final decision up to them.
Q. And their logic being what, as you saw it?
A. The point about - by clarifying or by classifying it as "Not a bias crime" might be - not - "extreme" is not the right word, but too final, where, as investigations progressed, especially with the unsolved ones, more information might come in which might warrant changing the classification at another stage.
Q. Now, the bullet point below that beginning, "Acting Assistant Commissioner Crandell asked Sergeant Steer to write a section for the report on this issue explaining the approach of the strike force and the difference between their determinations and how [NSW Police] might investigate such crimes today regarding evidence", do you recall being asked to write part of the report?
A. I do and I don't. I don't remember that specific conversation, but I did find some emails where, after I had left, Jackie Braw sent me an email asking if I would review the report, but I don't specifically remember being asked to write anything.
Q. This meeting is January 2017.
A. Yes.
Q. It would appear from the material that the Commission has that the report, the police part of the report, seems to have been written at least a year later, in the first part of 2018. Whether that makes a difference to your answer I don't know --
A. Yeah, I don't specifically remember that conversation, being asked. I'm not disputing what's in the minutes, if that's what they said happened, it happened, but I don't recall.
Q. Well, apart from this meeting, was there ever any other communication with you where you were asked, either orally or in writing, to write part of the report?
A. Yeah - well, not write the report, but 2018 Jackie Braw sent me an email asking if I would review the report, and Mr Crandell wanted some feedback from me. By then, I was out of the unit, it was then with Fixated Persons, so I said "Well, you are going to have to contact Fixated Persons because that's not my role anymore", to which there was a response, Mr Crandell said, "If you don't do it, then no-one else will", and I never saw the report. So --
Q. It wasn't - the draft wasn't sent to you?
A. No.
Q. Right, thank you. Now, if you'd turn to tab 84, [SCOI. 74430 ], I just want to go through this list, which is said to be the 12. I don't know if you remember the names or -A. No.
Q. -- whether these were the 12 you recall looking at? A. I would say that'd be the 12 people I did, but I don't remember, looking at it.
Q. Well, the way this document is set out is in the top table, the number and the name of the victim are set out and then two columns, the strike force's assessment first and then your assessment second. Do you see that --
A. Yes.
Q. -- for each case. And then the lower table is a, what is said to be, combined assessment, of the upshot of the discussion on that meeting in January.
A. Yes.
Q. I just want to go through what that tells us. If we look at the lower column, the first one, number 50 , "Combined Assessment", "Insufficient Information". We can tell, can't we, from looking at the top table, that that was a case where your view was already the same as the strike force's view?
A. Yes.
Q. With the second one, number 55, your view was different from the strike force - we can see up top? A. Yes.
Q. And what's described as the "Combined Assessment" was the adoption of the strike force's view over - in preference to yours?
A. Yes.
Q. And the same applies to number 57?
A. Yes.
Q. Adopting the strike force's view rather than yours?
A. Yes.
Q. The next two, 62 and 63 , are two that you and the strike force were already in agreement on?
A. Yes.
Q. And then 64 and 65 are two more where the strike force's view was the one which prevailed rather than yours, where there had been a disagreement.
A. Yes.
Q. Number 66 is a case, the fourth case where the two views, the strike force's view and your view, were already the same?
A. Yes.
Q. Then the next two, 67 and 68, are the only two, as this form would suggest, where your view has prevailed over the strike force's view, where there was a disagreement. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And in each case, the strike force had said, "Not a bias crime" - that is, not a bias crime at all - and your view was that there was insufficient information?
A. Yes.
Q. And in those two cases, 67 and 68 , according to this document, your view had been accepted. And then in the last two, 71 and 72 , again, where there had been disagreement, again, it was the strike force's view which, according to this document, prevailed?
A. Yes.
Q. So of the 12, you and the strike force were in agreement about four to begin with?
A. Yes.
Q. And in disagreement about eight, and of those eight, six had been resolved in favour of the strike force and two in favour of your view, according to this document?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in your statement - well, first of all, had you seen that document we just looked at?
A. No.
Q. Ever before today?
A. I may have seen it at the time but I don't recall.
Q. All right. When you were preparing your statement, did you have it available to you?
A. No.
Q. In your statement, [SCOI.82080], dealing with this you say - following the sentence I took you to before where it says, "I was allowed to conduct a dip sample of 12 cases", you said:

Out of the 12 cases dip sampled I disagreed with the findings of 9 ...

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. It seems on the face of that document that was 8 rather than 9 ?
A. Yes.
Q. And you describe some of the disagreements. And then towards the end or nearly at the end of that paragraph you say:

There was a meeting held where the dip
sample results were reviewed and from memory no consensus was met. I do not know if they changed any of their findings.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, does looking at that table we just looked at alter that account, or does it not?
A. Yes and no. As I said, it was a tense meeting. There was robust discussion on a number of cases that I disagreed with, and on a number of occasions I said, "We're just going to have to agree to disagree", and what they did with their results I don't know. But I know there was a number that I said, "Well, we're just going to have to agree to disagree", because I don't agree with their points.
Q. Were you sent any document, either the ones we've just been looking at or any other document after that meeting to record what had happened?
A. No. Not that I'm aware of, no.
Q. So that's January 2017. Did you have any further involvement in the work of the strike force after that?
A. No.
Q. And did anyone ever ask you to have any involvement in it after that?
A. I suppose, to clarify it, we did have involvement because I spoke to the academics on a number of occasions, I think after that date.
Q. Yes.
A. But, yeah, that was it.
Q. Now, on the academics, let me ask you a few things. As at the period that the strike force was under way, that
is 2015 into 2018, were you familiar with the work of
Australian academics in the area of hate crime or bias crime?
A. Yes.
Q. And who were the most prominent or well-regarded academics working in that field, as you understood it?
A. The two that I worked with the most was Professor Gai1 Mason and Dr Nicole Asquith.
Q. And had you heard of Professor Stephen Tomsen?
A. Yes.
Q. What was your understanding of the regard in which he was held?
A. I really can't comment because - I was aware of him and I know that he published a lot of articles around gay-hate crime but $I$ hadn't read them so - and I hadn't heard anything bad or good for him.
Q. Right. And in the case of Dr Asquith?
A. I worked with Nicole on a couple of things; in fact, I think 2017 Nicole and $I$ were working on a risk management project for hate crimes based on her research.
Q. And you were aware of Professor Gai1 Mason?
A. Yes. I worked closely with Professor Mason as well.
Q. Now, had you ever heard in this period, until they were chosen as the academic reviewers, of Dr Derek Dalton?
A. No.
Q. Or Dr Willem de Lint?
A. No.
Q. Or Dr Danielle Tyson?
A. No.
Q. Were you asked by anybody involved in the strike force for your thoughts on who might be a suitable academic to
consider for the whole of academic reviewer?
A. No.
Q. If you had been asked, what might you have said?
A. I probably would have suggested either Dr Asquith or Professor Mason.
Q. All right. Now, I think finally - second to finally -
in March 2017 Dr Dalton sent you an email, which I can show you if you don't remember it, asking you whether you had any data or academic support for the bias crime indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You sent him a response saying, in effect, no, you didn't?
A. Yes.
Q. And you explained why that was. Perhaps I had better show it to you. It is in volume 10 at 248, [SCOI.79391]?
A. Yes.
Q. You can see starting from the back of the email chain that Dr Dalton emails you on 28 February --
A. Yes.
Q. -- about the form that was being used by the strike force. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And he says to you:

We fully appreciate that the instrument is just used as a "tick sheet" or guide to identifying a range of BIAS crimes ...
A. Yes.
Q.
... but we really need to know if you have any data or research findings ...
that speak to the reliability and grounding that underpins its accuracy and use as an instrument.
A. Yes.
Q. That was his question. And you wrote back, next email up the chain, spelling out that the indicators were not a definitive checklist or tick sheet. You made that point? A. Yes.
Q. And you explained that the indicators were designed to prompt officers to explore bias motivation. If any of the indicators were present, officers should ask questions to explore that possibility further.
A. Yes.
Q. And then you say that because they are a prompt for officers, there is no research that you are aware of that assesses their effectiveness. You see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say that as, an operational cop, you could tell him, from 21 years of policing and 16 years studying and dealing with bias crimes, that these work when used as they are designed to be used, and is that still your view? A. Yes.
Q. And you spe11 out this:

If they are used as a checklist they do not work.

And you go on to elaborate that point. Now, that's an exchange in March 2017. There had also been - and you may recall this - in December 2016 a discussion, which seems to have been on either the telephone or perhaps on Zoom or something, but not in person, in which you were involved in and Dr Dalton was involved; do you remember that?
A. I think it might have been in person, because I remember they brought him up and he wanted to look at Marks Park, and I know we had in-depth conversations about the indicators and all that during that --
Q. That was in October 2016?
A. Yes.
Q. You were present when he came up that time?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And had some discussions then?
A. Yes.
Q. And at that point, did you know that the Bias Crime Indicators Form was how the strike force had gone about things?
A. No, because that was prior to me assessing. So the first time I knew that they were using a form was when I got sent it.
Q. Right. So you had some interaction with $\operatorname{Dr}$ Dalton at that meeting in October, and there does seem to have been another discussion in December?
A. Yes.
Q. And I will just turn that up. It's on 12 December. Mr Dalton refers to having had a fruitful discussion with Jackie Braw, Superintendent Crande11, Shobha Sharma and yourself. You may or may not recall that?
A. Yes, I don't recall that specific meeting, no.
Q. We11, apart from those two or three or three or four occasions where you had some interaction with Dr Dalton, was that the extent of the balance of your involvement? A. Yes. As I said, I remember meeting him when he came up. I remember one phone call with him, which was once again about the indicators. And - yeah, and if I was involved in that meeting, then that meeting.
Q. All right. Now, could you please have volume 7, and turn to tab 190, [SCOI.77469]. Do you see that's a document called "Bias Crimes Unit Handover"?
A. Yes.
Q. And it has a date on the last page, which is 15 June 2018?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says it's created by Sergeant Nathan Corbett?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was the acting team leader of the Bias Crimes Unit at that point?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, you had departed the Bias Crimes Unit the year before?
A. About June/July, 2017.
Q. Yes. Now, have you seen this document before?
A. No.
Q. Have a look at page 1, where Sergeant Corbett gives a history of the unit. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. In the first paragraph he talks about its creation in 2006/7?
A. Yes.
Q. And then he says that in 2009 the position was de-established, for three years?
A. Yes.
Q. Then in the second paragraph he talks about the position being created again in 2012, and he talks about the staffing arrangements over the next couple of years.
A. Yes.
Q. Then in the fourth paragraph he says that in July 2017, the Bias Crimes Unit was affected by a police organisational restructure and was realigned in the way that is described there. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. He describes that as happening in an overnight fashion, which caused 75 per cent of the staff, including the team leader - being yourself - to leave the Bias Crimes Unit within two weeks of being restructured. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that accord with your recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. The team at that point had four people, I think, including you?
A. Yes. So there was myself, Senior Constable Corbett, there was our intel analyst and there was the policy officer.
Q. And he says 75 per cent left. So that was you and two of the other three?
A. Yes. Nathan was the only one who remained.
Q. Right. So according to this document in the next
paragraph, the unit some time later that year was again realigned within the Counter Terrorism Command from the Fixated Persons Investigation Unit to the Engagement Intervention Unit. Now, was that something that you knew at the time?
A. I knew it happened, because Nathan told me.
Q. You had left?
A. I had left but Nathan had a conversation with me.
Q. Why did you leave? Was your position abolished or what happened?
A. Once again, trying to be as diplomatic as possible, internal politics. So as Nathan points out in there, I walked in to work one day, was told by my commander to come and see him and he told me that we had just been transferred to counter terrorism. There was no consultation with us. Effective immediately we were attached to the Fixated Persons Investigation Unit.

From memory, a couple of days later we had a meeting with the then Acting Commander and - I can't - I want to say Coordinator, Response Group and Counter Terrorism, but I could be wrong - where he basically told us that we were attached to Fixated Persons, we weren't doing hate crimes anymore, we were to do what we were told and shut up, at which point I politely pointed out to him that I would be transferring out of the unit.
Q. Where did you go?
A. I went to general duties at Hawkesbury.
Q. Was that your choice?
A. It was my choice. I could have remained, but I had several long conversations with some colleagues in the States in regards to what had happened. I'd been given certain information from a number of reliable sources both within the NSW Police and the New South Wales Government that I was not popular anymore doing hate crimes and that the intent was to get rid of me. So I didn't see the point in remaining in a unit where my work would be undervalued.
Q. Now, in the paragraph below that, Sergeant Corbett says that through November/December 2017, the NSW Police effectively had no Bias Crimes Unit; do you see that? A. Yes.
Q. Is that your understanding?
A. Yes, as I said - and I think an email was shown earlier today, to Dr Dalton, we were effectively told that we weren't doing hate crimes anymore; that none of our roles were going to continue, we would be looking at left-wing, right wing and anti-government movements. We were not to do hate crimes, we were not to train, we were not to do anything. Hence, why I left.
Q. According to the next paragraph in this document I won't go through the detail of it - the gist of it seems to be that for some time in 2018 there was only one person in the team, and for some period that year there were two people in the team, and in the last paragraph, the expectation of Sergeant Corbett, writing in June 2018, was that by some time soon, in mid 2018, there would be no Bias Crime Unit within the NSW Police. Was that your understanding?
A. My understanding was effectively once we transferred to counter terrorism, that that was the end of the unit. What happened after that, as I said, we were told in no uncertain terms we will not be doing hate crime. So when I left, my understanding was that the function and role that we performed had ceased to exist.

Nathan hung around for a little while longer. I know I had a couple of conversations with Nathan in regards to questions he had about things that we did, so I only assume from that that they were back doing hate crimes again under the intervention and engagement unit. But what happened once he left, I don't know.
Q. Could Mr Steer have volume 4, please, and if you would turn to tab 126, [SCOI.74679], now, this is your email to Mr Crandell of 9 June 2018, after you saw --
A. Yes.
Q. -- an article in The Australian newspaper?
A. Yes.
Q. In a few places, including in the first couple of
lines, but you reiterate it in one or two other places, you were "forced out of the Bias Crimes Unit"?
A. Yes.
Q. When you used that expression in the email, are you referring to what you have just explained?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, in that first paragraph - no, sorry, in the last paragraph of the email on page 3, beginning, "Sir",
paragraph 11, in effect?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see about four or five lines in you say:

My experience with hate crimes in the [NSW Police Force] fully supports the concept of organisational cognitive dissonance. If the information supplied differs from the core belief then all information, no matter how relevant or accurate will be disregarded to avoid conflict with core belief systems. As the [NSW Police Force] clearly has fought every attempt to integrate a hate crimes response into every day policing, I am not surprised by the way it has ended.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Firstly, your description of "organisational cognitive dissonance", what are you getting at there?
A. Basically, what we were doing did not gel with what the NSW Police wanted.
Q. In what sense?
A. Trying to think of how to word this. So from the outset, the unit was not popular because there is a belief that we're a multicultural society and everything works well. The fact that we have a unit that says that people don't get on, that there are issues, was always at odds with that belief system. So there was always tension between what we did, because we were identifying issues that people would prefer not get raised.

Through seven years, I probably spent half that time defending everything I did. I sought guidance on multiple occasion from senior officers as to what direction the NSW Police wanted to take. I was told consistently, "You're the expert, you do what you want to do", but in the same breath I would get attacked.
Q. You would get attacked?
A. Get attacked. Get told that, "No, we're not doing that. This is wrong", et cetera and so forth. So every time we tried to take a step forward, we would end up taking two steps back. It was seven years of trying to convince an organisation that wasn't interested in hate crimes to take it seriously, that there are positive outcomes when you do take hate crime seriously, but - yeah. So that's what I mean, it was basically what we were promoting wasn't what the NSW Police wanted to hear.
Q. Now, on a slightly different topic, in this email at the paragraph numbered 4 you talk about the two models, the UK and the US, and you then refer to the 10 indicators, and you stress again that they are not a checkiist and never have been a checklist?
A. Yes.
Q. And is the point you were making there essentially the points that you have made this afternoon on that front, about the checklist, or is it a slightly different point? A. It is probably a slightly different point. I think this email came out of pure frustration. So after all the work that $I$ had done in regards to this area, I was being assessed on what Parrabell did, and Parrabell did not do what I did. They didn't follow my processes. And so the work that we had done, which we understood, which was well adopted around the world, was being attacked based on a misunderstanding of or execution by Parrabel1, and that was my point, is that the indicators - 1 ike Mr Crandel 1 submitted a review of all this; I still technically argue that was outside his purview because he wasn't doing bias crimes, he was sexuality and gender diversity, but he outranks me, it's his call - is they were attacking the method that we did without understanding the method. And that was our biggest issue, is everyone jumped to conclusions about what we did but nobody ever tried to understand what we did or ask us, even ask us what we did. They just had their own opinion, and that's what they ran with.
Q. On that same point, see the paragraph numbered 9 ?
A. Yes.
Q. In the last couple of 1 ines you say that he - that is, Mr Crandell - was told on multiple occasions that the indicators were not a check1ist and that Parrabe11 used
them incorrectly. Do you stand by that?
A. I do. When we started this, I gave them the warning, if it wasn't done properly there would be a negative backlash. I remember when I started looking at the dip samples, I spoke to my manager on several occasions saying, "This isn't what's supposed to be happening, they are not using it right", et cetera and so forth. So, yeah, I stand by that.
Q. Did you say that to him, though, to Mr Crandell?
A. Probably not directly, but through the chain of command I raised my concerns, both through my corporate sponsor, both through my manager, that I had serious concerns with what they were doing and how they were doing it.
Q. Right. Now, one other thing in that email. Just a couple of lines above that, you say:

I ... hope that you recall the
conversations that I had with you, that you
recall changing the definition so that it
fitted with the investigation outcomes ...
What are you referring to there?
A. That would be that discussion that we had when we were doing the dip sample where they changed it from "Not Bias Crime" to "No evidence of bias crime".
Q. And why do you describe that as "a change to fit with the investigation outcomes"?
A. As I said previously, my position was that it should stand the way that we do it. That's - was adopted NSW Police Force practice. We should maintain that for organisational integrity. As I said, I understand why they changed it, I do understand that point, and it was Mr Crandell's call. It was - he was running the strike force, I had no authority in it. I gave my opinion. He listened to my opinion. He made the decision.
Q. The last thing, Mr Steer. You need volume 7 for this, if you turn to tab 195, [SCOI.77445]. These are, as we understand it, the current Hate Crime Guidelines as at Apri1 2022. On the page numbered 3 down the bottom, you will see that there is a publication date?
A. Yes.
Q. 13 Apri1 2022?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you aware of these?
A. No.
Q. Have they not reached you in Hawkesbury?
A. I'm unaware that there were Hate Crime Guidelines.
Q. On the assumption that these are the current guidelines, if you turn to page 16 , do you see there is a heading "Procedures", and then "Procedure Overview"? A. Yes.
Q. And you will see that the investigating officer is supposed to note hate crime indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. And then under the second kind of flagged section, the investigating officer is to enter details in COPS - do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And then under the third section, the incident is to be assessed and classified by the EHCU - that's the Engagement and Hate Crime Unit?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, next, that unit - sorry, the HIRC, Hate Incident Review Committee, assesses the incident and makes recommendations. And then finally, if the incident is classified as a hate crime, the investigating officer is to identify that in the facts sheet?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, do you know if such a procedure is under way or in force at the moment?
A. I haven't seen anything come out in regards to it. I'm not aware of one, as a general duty supervisor.
Q. On the next page, page 17 , there is a heading "Hate Crime Indicators", and you can see that although they are not numbered, if you just take a moment to glance through them, there are nine of them.
A. Yes.
Q. And although they are not in the same language,
verbatim, as the nine that you brought from the United States, and although the indicator number 1 from the United States, namely, "Differences", seems to be not there, the nine otherwise are the same as your 10, are they not --
A. Pretty much so.
Q. Pretty much?
A. Yes.
Q. So does that indicate to you that the officer at the front line, the officer attending the incident or crime, whatever it is, if this is the relevant guideline, is essentially expected to do more or less what was expected under the SOPs that you devised?
A. Yes.

MR GRAY: Yes, those are the questions that I have.
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Madden, do you have any questions?
MR MADDEN: Sorry, Commissioner, no, I've got no questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. It is five to, Mr Tedeschi, do you want to start in the morning?

MR TEDESCHI: I would prefer to start in the morning, Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's fine. Al1 right. We will adjourn until 10 tomorrow morning. Yes, thank you. All right. I will adjourn.

AT 3.55PM THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY WAS ADJOURNED TO TUESDAY, 13 DECEMBER 2022 AT 10AM
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