# 2022 Special Commission of Inquiry into LGBTIQ hate crimes 

Before: The Commissioner, The Honourable Justice John Sackar

At Leve1 2, 121 Macquarie Street, Sydney, New South Wales

On Thursday, 2 March 2023 at 10.30am
(Day 31)

Mr Peter Gray SC
(Senior Counse1 Assisting)
Ms Meg O'Brien
(Counsel Assisting)
Mr Enzo Camporeale
(Director Legal)
Ms Caitlin Healey-Nash
(Senior Solicitor)
A1so Present:
Mr Mark Tedeschi KC with Mr Anders Mykkeltvedt and Ms Amber Richards for NSW Police

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Dr Dalton, would you be kind enough to just come back into the witness box, thank you very much.
<DEREK DALTON, on former oath:
[10.34am]
<EXAMINATION BY MR TEDESCHI:
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Dr Dalton, you were asked a number of questions by Counsel Assisting concerning your work, together with Professor de Lint and Dr Tyson, in relation to the academic exercise that you engaged in as part of Strike Force Parrabell. Would you tell the Commissioner what you understood to have been Assistant Commissioner Crandell's overall objective in Strike Force Parrabell, as you understood it?
A. Sure. I think his objective was to take the 88 cases that there had been so much consternation and concern about by the gay community and the wider community, hold them to a level of scrutiny and review to try to determine how many of them were, indeed, gay hate bias crimes, and in doing so, if not recalibrate, but calibrate afresh, according to that information, just what the state of play was.

And to do so, I think he was trying to engage with all their concern and all that long and complicated history of sadness and concern and anguish that kind of cluster round deaths and homicides, which cause concern in society.
Q. And from your perspective, did that change at all during the course of your contact with the police strike force?
A. No, never, not at all.
Q. And to your view, the final report, both the police part and your part, did that address what his objectives had been during the course of that inquiry?
A. Yes, certainly, it did. I see that in producing the results that we did, which you'd have to say in some senses, you know, a certain amount of indeterminate cases, a certain amount found as bias, et cetera, they were different clearly to the number of 88 but it went a long way to producing perhaps a clearer or more accurate view of what the state of play had been in terms of the totality.
Q. Do you think he had a preconceived notion about how many of the 88 were genuine gay hate crimes or --
A. No, not at all. I recall in the broadest brush strokes some sort of conversation earlier where he sort of instilled in me - these weren't his terms but it was like the logic was "There is to be no fear or favour. You find what you find". There was no - I felt no sense of pressure from the outset of "It would be really good if you could kind of concord with us"; despite suggestions that were put to me yesterday, I felt no such pressure, no such inducement or encouragement.
Q. I will come afterwards to ask you about consensus and collaboration.
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. But before we get to that, you were asked a number of questions by Counsel Assisting about references in both the tender request and your tender document to independence your independence.
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Why did you think that was of importance and what did you have to add to that that perhaps others didn't have?
A. Yeah, I - I - I came up with the idea of independence fairly quickly. It was based on the logic that it seemed to me that, in the State of New South Wales, there was a long, complicated history, a history I only knew from afar, I didn't know intimately, of kind of distrust, animosity between the NSW Police and the "gay community", and perhaps even the wider community, and that different parties had criticised each other in various forums, and I saw that coming from South Australia, we were independent in the sense that we were from a different jurisdiction and we hadn't been embroiled in these kind of messy and nasty murky sort of histories that perhaps could have precluded a sense of independence or of fair mindedness.
Q. What about in terms of your background at that time, like, at the time that you were awarded the tender, was your academic background in the area of conflict between the police and the LGBTIQ community?
A. Absolutely. Certainly quite a few of my articles had explored - some, admittedly, from a historical point of view, so way back even in terms of the 1920s,'30s and '40s. I had explored in one article, for example, practices where NSW Police officers would entrap gay men at beats in plain clothes by masturbating at a public toilet, et cetera, trying to draw the attention of a homosexual man, then
pulling out a police badge and arresting them.
I had explored in terms of a social and legal studies article that - I call it Wolfenden, but it's kind of too grandiose a term for what we had in Australia but it was a version of the Wolfenden report, but I would have thought anyone scrutinising my back catalogue, if you would like to call it that, would have said that I was very critical of the police and of criminal justice institutions towards that I was, yeah, very critical of them. I would document their subtle and not so subtle acts of violence in terms of constructing gay men as perverted, deviant subjects who were requiring, both pre decriminalisation and post decriminalisation, very harsh treatment.
Q. So you think the objective observer would, if anything, have viewed you as being anti-police rather than anti-gay?
A. I would have thought so but - yeah .
Q. Assistant Commissioner Crandell was asked a number of questions about whether or not he wanted to include members of the LGBTIQ community in the team?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. What was your background in that regard?
A. Well, I'm - I'm a gay man. I - that was - it seemed to be well known at Flinders University, although some students used to say to me, "You don't look gay" and they would make sort of jokes about it, perhaps because I didn't fit some sort of stereotype.

I was a Gay and Lesbian Liaison Officer for a short period of time to assist those sort of gay and lesbian students at Flinders. I have had as a gay man much less contact with the lesbian community obviously but I'm very sympathetic to trans and lesbian concerns.

Perhaps the most - the second most offensive thing that has ever been put to me in my life was that line in Nicole Asquith's report, that I - something about trans violence, that I had neglected some discussion of trans violence.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Sorry, I just couldn't hear that because of the noise outside. What was the word that she put in her paper, was it, or something --
A. It was something about that we had - it was something about - I don't remember the precise terms.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. I think you said neglected trans violence?
A. Yeah, neglected trans violence. If I could elaborate ever so slightly, the problem of trans violence is a very serious problem and it's one that's very concerning and upsetting but there wasn't a lot of that in the Parrabell cases, for all sorts of complicated reasons, that was discernible.

It might have been - I'm ever so horrified that I might not have put in a little paragraph to acknowledge that, but to the extent that - I thought it was implicit, but to the extent I left it out, to have been subject to that sort of accusation - and you can go back, you've got the document yourself, you produced it.
Q. That's hurtful to you --
A. Sorry?
Q. That's hurtful to you, that sort of accusation --
A. Profoundly. Profoundly hurtful.
Q. Did Assistant --

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, I don't know whether
Dr Dalton had finished his answer to your question.
MR TEDESCHI: I'm sorry.
THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Please go on.
A. I think in essence I had. As I said, I can't - I now work for a different - I don't work for the university anymore, I work 40 hours a week, I have all sorts of other things to do. I didn't have time to read the report in any detail but when I did, around Christmas time, note that point, it kind of stopped me in my steps, I jarred and went, "Whoa, where's that coming from?" It just - it was so heavy handed.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. All right. Did then Superintendent Crandell ever ask you whether or not you were a member of the gay community?
A. I don't recall that he did, to be honest. I don't --
Q. Did it appear that it was irrelevant to him?
A. Yeah, it's so tricky, because, you know, with the presumption of heterosexuality that seems to dominate society, we all operate under that model, and some people who are gay in certain contexts will go out of their way to make it known or might presume that it gets known. It's one of those things that is hard to kind of get a read on. I certainly don't recall being asked. Did I volunteer anything to that effect? I can't remember.
Q. In your tender document, you included references to a lot of your previous articles about the gay community? A. Mmm-hmm, yes.
Q. So it would have been obvious to anybody reading your tender document.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm not quite sure whether that's a question or whether you are giving evidence from the Bar table.

MR TEDESCHI: I will withdraw it, sorry, you are quite right.

THE COMMISSIONER: It sounds a little bit like evidence from the Bar table.

MR TEDESCHI: You're quite right, I'11 rephrase.
MR TEDESCHI: Perhaps - if you would like me to swear you or affirm you, Mr Tedeschi, I can't wait, I can assure you. But unless and until that happens, maybe ask the odd question rather than make the odd speech or statement, thank you.

MR TEDESCHI: You're quite right. Thank you,
Commissioner.
Q. Dr Dalton, in your view, would it have been obvious to anybody reading your tender document that your previous academic experience and interests had been largely concerning the gay community?
A. I would have thought so, yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. What about your book on Nazi tourism, for example?
A. Well, academics have many different areas of
expertise.
Q. No, no, I'm sure they do, but the question was I thought, and I may have misheard it. If what was put to you, that some of your academic writings were in the field, then I perfectly understand that. But I am familiar with other of your writings including the book that you drew Commissioner Crandell's attention to, which was Nazi tourism sites, I think. So you obviously have interests outside the LGBTIQ community, clearly?
A. Yes, I do. That's very fair to say. As do lots of other academics.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. All right. Now, it was suggested to you by Counsel Assisting - right towards the end of your evidence yesterday, you were asked by him whether it would be reasonable to categorise you as an apologist for the NSW Police?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Now, you gave evidence that that had been suggested by Professor Asquith and that you found that offensive.

THE COMMISSIONER: Look, I don't want to be wasting time unnecessarily, but I don't think that's right, Mr Tedeschi. You may be absolutely right but I can't remember --

MR TEDESCHI: I will withdraw the question in that form. It has --

THE COMMISSIONER: Pardon me for interrupting you, I am sorry. Certainly Mr Gray suggested it, but I don't think he attributed to anybody but himself.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Mr Gray asked you whether, in fact, it would be fair to make that --

MR GRAY: With respect, I object to that. That wasn't the question either.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm happy - I'm absolutely happy to go to the transcript, not because I have, but I'm content if you wish to put accurately what it was that was put to Dr Dalton. I do recall the question but I don't recall the precise content of it.

MR TEDESCHI: I will get the actual transcript.
THE COMMISSIONER: I have it here. I will see if I can find it for you. Yes. Mr Tedeschi, I think it is at page 2557, or thereabouts. If you read from the top of that page, you'll see the context in which it was put. And if you would like a hard copy, I can hand it down to you, if you would prefer that.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you. We don't have one.
THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Whether those on the other side can check - and if you want the witness to have the hard copy, I can obviously show him. But by all means, do that, whatever you wish to do.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. You were asked by Counsel Assisting:
Q. In your long answer at the close of the hearing yesterday, you said that you were "not a police apologist".
A. No, I'm not.
Q. Now, would you agree that in this article --
and I take it that Mr Gray was referring to the article by you and Professor de Lint --
as it is written, with you put forward as
one of its two authors, the authors would
appear to be, indeed, police apologists?
A. No, despite everything I've said,

I still wouldn't agree with that.
Now, in your view, what approach would a true police apologist have taken to the exercise that you were engaged in as part of the Flinders University team?
A. I guess the easiest thing a true apologist would have done would have been to endorse their instrument, told them "That's a spectacular thing. It's come from the FBI, they use it at Quantico. It's wonderful. Good stuff, it's from America, America always has the best stuff", correlate the results in close - in profound proximity to their results so that they almost matched identically, left out a whole lot of sentiment in the report about anti-police, this that
and the other, and written something that was much more favourable. I mean, it's - because I'm not a police apologist, I'm finding it hard to kind of imagine. But I imagine they're the things that they would have done, I guess.
Q. In your part of the report you basically stated that the BCI form was an inadequate basis to conduct that exercise?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you say about that and the question about whether or not you're a police apologist?
A. Sorry, can you put that to me again, sorry?
Q. In your report you strongly criticised the BCI form?
A. Yes.
Q. You said that it had no academic basis and you identified a number of serious problems with it, going to the very root of the exercise that the police had engaged in. What do you say about that approach by you and the suggestion that - the question whether you're a police apologist?
A. Yeah, I - the police apologist wouldn't have done that. It's just like they just would have - they wouldn't have - it's - they would have kind of papered over the cracks of the deficiency of that instrument and endorsed it and gone on their merry way and had a lot easier role in terms of doing the review.
Q. Now, you were asked a number of questions by Counse1 Assisting about collaboration --
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. -- that being a term that was in the tender document issued by the police and an issue also raised in your tender for the job. You were asked a lot of questions about that and also about consensus, about reaching consensus?
A. Yes, I recall.
Q. Could you tell us how you went about the exercise of collaboration and when you were able to reach consensus, what the exercise entailed from your point of view?
A. I have a pretty patchy memory of the details. But

I thought yesterday, when they were discussing it - well,

1et's forget about that, 1et's just - I'11 stick to what I seem to remember. My memory seems to be that when we did get together with the police in that final meeting, we went through the cases one by one. It took a long time. But the process was more about them saying, "We did this with our instrument. We took into account all these factors", blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, and then we would say, "With our instrument we took into account all these sort of complicated factors", blah, blah, blah, and then both parties, having listened to each other, would maybe make a change or feel more steadfast about what they had already done.

But it wasn't as though anyone was kind of chalking it was more that it was about the discussion and the tenor of the logic and the language and all the attributes, rather than any sort of discussion of crude agreement of because, of course, we had different categories.
Q. Did it appear to you that each side was learning from the other, bringing a different --
A. Yeah, absolutely. It was quite --
Q. -- foundation of knowledge and experience?
A. Yeah, it was quite fascinating. And much in the same way that in the earlier process when we'd done the concordance, the three of us, Professor de Lint, Dr Tyson and I, that was also fascinating because things that one might have overlooked would come to light or things that one thought was less or more important, appeared less or more important in the discussion, I guess this was all the more important often in the cases where there was a profound paucity of detail.
Q. So the more paucity of detail, the harder the task was?
A. Absolutely, for everybody.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. May I just ask this: what did you learn from the police?
A. Pardon, Commissioner?
Q. What did you learn from the police?
A. I don't - I don't recall. I remember thinking that I had gleaned an insight into some things.
Q. Gleaned an insight into something?
A. Into things, yeah, but I don't --

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you, Doctor.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Was that because they had investigative experience and you didn't?
A. I guess so. I mean, I never professed and, remember that - that I was an investigator or anyone who is a criminologist could bring that to the table. And that's why I remember when there was that early discussion, and it was just being put on the table as an idea, about trying to go through the murder - the cardboard boxes full of the murder material and adduce how well they had been scrutinised, et cetera. I immediately said, "No, no, no. I can't do this." Because (a) I'm not a detective, I don't have the experience, and of course, there was a nice phrase used yesterday, that just - that kind of struck a chord with me, you know, "by the standard of the day", and the standard of the day when we're doing Parrabell was different than, say, the standard in 1988, et cetera, when then there was less computers and less this, that and the other. So - because I remember saying to Assistant Commissioner Crande11, "Gee, if you wanted to do that, you'd have to go get a team of detectives from a different jurisdiction" --

MR TEDESCHI: Q. If you wanted to do what?
THE COMMISSIONER: No, no, let him finish. I don't think he had finished.
Q. Please go on, Dr Dalton.
A. I think --
Q. Sorry, just to refresh your recollection, because Mr Tedeschi and I - me, more than him - have interrupted you, but you said you said something to Mr Crandell about detectives from another jurisdiction. Take the theme up from there.
A. Yeah, the idea had been that maybe our Parrabell team would be able to scrutinise the original source material, the murder files full of all of that material, to determine how that material had been transposed from the boxes and collected and collated and then turned into the case summaries.

But it immediately became apparent that, one, we
didn't have the skill to do it; two, we didn't have the resources; three, we didn't have the time. We would have been completely out of our depth.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Whose idea was that?
A. I think - I think it was Assistant Commissioner Crandell's idea. But I think - it's funny the things you do or don't remember. I seem to recall that, as I started to explain that to him, he had this look on his face like "Of course, what was I thinking", and we moved past it pretty quickly.
Q. So he was exploring the idea with you that your team might be given, what, some random samples or a number of samples of the boxes for you to look at the --
A. Certainly he said - certainly he said --
Q. -- source material?
A. I don't think he used the word "sample" but certainly he said "some", some material. And I - when I saw the volume or they mentioned the volume fairly early on, of course, one would freak out, because it's like box upon box upon box, and it's sort of --
Q. So you immediately rejected it because you said you didn't have the skills and you didn't have the resources? A. Yes.
Q. I think you mentioned another reason in answer to questions by my learned friend, some - an analogy with process line of making cars?
A. Yeah, the analogy of the process line of cars came to me later, to be honest, when I reflected back on the task, and I thought I was a bit clear about that yesterday, but I guess to make the point again - and it had come to me at the time, but not with the analogy perhaps, but I - I saw it as - I saw that if the thing that you were trying to do a quality control check on was consistent, like a BMW car factory making one series of cars and they keep coming out one after the other, you grab a car randomly and go, "Have they screwed on the bolts properly? Did they do this, that and the other?"

But I immediately realised with these distinct murder cases or homicide - suspected homicide cases, they're all profoundly unique. So to go to one box that was from one period of time with different detectives, et cetera, and
work out whether that had been done well, and then to do another five randomly, there was no way known you could call it representative. It was - you just would have been standing in quicksand, sinking.
Q. And in terms of the tone of your meetings with the police in relation to collaboration and consensus, what can you tell us about that?
A. I guess, if I'm honest, I went in - it was sort of a weird dynamic because, as a gay man, I'd spent a lot of my life, if I'm honest, being somewhat scared or fearful of the police. It seems a weird thing to say, but that's the truth. It's hard to explain why that was the case, but I guess because for a long while I sort of thought the police were anti-gay and that my sexuality targeted me to get treated with a bit of hostility. So I was a little bit nervous, if I'm honest. But the nervousness dissipated --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Doctor, I'm sorry, stop for a moment. The noise level in this street is very high and it's not that you're not speaking at the right level, but I missed some of what you said. I do apologise. Would you mind going back and telling us again what you just said, if you can recall what you said? Thank you.
A. Yes, sure, and I can do it more succinctly having just - so I guess I approached the initial meetings with a bit of trepidation, because in the past, in terms of the research I'd done, just my own sort of psychological make-up, I was kind of a bit scared and intimidated by the police, had had a couple of just negative interactions with Victorian police officers years ago, just as a person.

And I thought - because often - it's hard to sort of I've got - I'm trying to be fulsome here. I tried to do some research with the South Australian Police years ago, and my colleague, Professor Mary Heath, had said, "You're wasting your time", I said, "Why?" She said, "Because they're so risk averse. You will go to the meetings, a lot of the police will want to help you do the research. You'll get months down the track and when the ethics application form hits a certain level at the police station, they're so - they don't want you discussing the sensitive stuff; they will go 'Eh, this is too hard'. They'11 kind of pull up stumps and you won't be doing it". Anyway, that's too much of a digression. So - sorry, the --

MR TEDESCHI: Q. The tone?
A. The tone. I was shocked because immediately they were so - I don't know why I should have been surprised, but they were polite, deferential, very kind, very respectful of me asking questions that - to try to understand all sorts of aspects of police process that are quite opaque to a person who is an outsider, even as a person who has a lofty title like criminologist. You know, one could try to gild the lily and go, "Oh, well, just because I'm a criminologist, $I$ know all this stuff". I don't think that's true at all. I think you're quite often ignorant of certain things and so it was important to ask a lot of questions.

They were - they just - I remember particularly, was it Detective or Sergeant, I can't remember his title, Paul Grace. He was just a really gentle, kind, sweet man. He was just really nice to deal with.
Q. Was there any attempt by them to apply any pressure to you and your team to reach a consensus?
A. I know I'm under oath so it's important people understand this, absolutely not. I - in fact, I recall at one stage, Assistant Commissioner Crandell said to me, and I'm - words to the effect of, and I'm not - I'm not saying I'm quoting him, but it was - the tenor of what he said was, "You are to - don't fear - don't fear any - any sort of pressure or inducement or whatever. You are to find as many cases in whatever category as you see fit." That was kind of what he conveyed to me, and he said it at least once and it felt genuine.
Q. Now, I know you've said that you don't remember any individual cases and you don't have your notes anymore, but do - is it your recollection that in fact, you ended up having different approaches to some of the cases?
A. Oh, definitely.
Q. Do you remember now how many of them?
A. I mean, no doubt - in a way, it's funny in that you write a report, you spend a year and a half on it, you're intimately involved in it, and then with the passage of time you read it, it's like you're an outsider to the thing you did yourself. But - I don't know. Eight or so? Maybe eight - eight or 10 maybe.
Q. What was the approach of the police in terms of their
tone and their attitude to having that number of matters where there was disagreement between the police and the academic team?
A. They didn't seem to care one iota. I mean, yesterday I was asked a lot about - was it consensus? Was that the term?
Q. Yes, consensus and collaboration you were asked about.
A. Yeah. And - and I've got to stress that - and, you know, I - I'm not - you have captured all this data and most of which I haven't seen for six years and it comes up on the screen, I've got one second to look at it and there's emails and there's stuff with - what was his name? Craig?
Q. Middleton.
A. Middleton, yeah. He was a little bit more intimidating than the others. He was - had a different personality, he - and I know that there's all that talk, but it wasn't about, "Oh, we've got to make sure we've got 20 'Insufficient Information' each and we've got to have about 16 of this category"; it was never about the numbers. It was about the tenor of the logic.
Q. Was there a genuine effort, on each side, to reach a genuine opinion about the cases?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Now, you were asked some questions about Sergeant Steer.
A. Yes.
Q. What was your perception of Sergeant Steer versus the other police?
A. Oh, wow. He was the first - apart from Jacqueline Braw, who I had the initial phone conversation with, when I first went to Sydney, he was the police officer who I spent the most time with, and I remember we were driving around between Surry Hills and I think the big Parramatta police complex.

And he took me to some of the infamous sites of some of the terrible crimes, not, I must stress, let's be careful here, not as some sort of visiting the scene, you know, the crime scenes to gather any data or any such nonsense but it was kind of a nice context to show me. And in the car we had long conversations and I was asking him
a11 sorts of questions about al1 sorts of stuff, and he was an incredibly passionate man. He seemed a very dedicated sort of person.

But he was telling me sort of stuff, and it was really difficult, I'd just got off the plane, I'm some academic and he's kind of telling me stories that seemed to run to the idea of in-house political sort of - "political" is not the right word but in-house sort of disgruntlement about the way bias crime was being handled, how many people were assigned to the team, whether the team existed, what it was doing.

He was quite - it seemed to me that he had already a11 of a sudden become on the outer and that he was very upset about it. I couldn't quite tell whether he deserved to be on the outer or whether he was maligned as a person, as people can be in an organisation, it was pretty hard to tel 1.
Q. So during your contact with him, did he appear to be upset or disgruntled or - or the like?
A. Yeah, and perhaps even angry, if that's the right term. But very - got to stress, very, very helpful to me, very - I was quite fond of the guy. I liked him.
Q. In your statement to this Inquiry, correct me if I'm wrong but $I$ think you said something like this, that you had spent eight times more time on this job than what you had actually quoted for?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Have I got that right?
A. Yeah, it was - I know everyone's probably sitting here thinking, "My God this guy's exaggerating", but I'm not exaggerating, it was easily that.
Q. So why were you so passionate about this job?
A. We11, I --

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, I'm sorry, it doesn't follow.
Q. Did you spend eight times more on the job, perhaps open-ended, because you were passionate or because you grossly underquoted, underestimated the amount of time that you thought it would take?
A. That's a fair question.
Q. Well, that's why I'm trying to put it to you, rather than putting the answer in your mouth. But why don't you answer the alternatives and then Mr Tedeschi can take up his theme?
A. Sure. I think it's a case of two things, and I think that's a fair way to put it. I - I think we were initially told crudely what the magic amount was that the tender would be, and interestingly, you know, that's all on record at the university, I remember having this discussion with Narmon Tulsi, and he got out some official --
Q. Sorry, who was that?
A. Narmon Tulsi was an employee at Flinders University employed to help people in my criminology department write tenders.
Q. Yes.
A. He got out this document that had official charge rates on it for time either on the hour or the day based on one's academic status, so Professor, Associate Professor, et cetera. And after we crunched all the numbers in terms of what the - following the tender process, he said to me made some joke and he said - I will never forget it because it was quite a weird statistic. He said, "You are charging yourself out at a 67 per cent discount." I said, "Oh, that seems a bit weird". He said, "Oh, that's just how it goes, you know, because the commercial reality is no-one will pay the rate." And I said, "Is the rate so grossly inflated?" He said, "No, not", dare I say it - this is what he did say - "not according to what some professionals like doctors or lawyers charge", and he meant medical doctors.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Could I bring you back to the question --

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I'm going to let him finish, Mr Tedeschi, because I know you want to stop him and go on --

MR TEDESCHI: No, I don't want to stop him --
THE COMMISSIONER: No, no, I'm no assuming that --
MR TEDESCHI: I want him to answer your question.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. I'm happy for him to continue in this dialogue. It's his evidence and his time.
Q. Please go on, Dr Dalton.
A. I said "Okay", so, sort of, be it. And so from the outset, that was sort of I guess a financial or a time parameter, but it's certainly true to say that once we got involved in the activity, it became apparent that to do a really thorough job, and I was really passionate about trying to do the best job humanly possible, that infinitely more time and resources would be required.

And certainly some of it, to be fair, would be because you're just having to read a lot more literature on a whole lot of stuff that you hadn't read before and be as thorough as you could, and sometimes once you dive into this stuff, like a PhD student finds doing their - you know, it's just a lot to read.

And so - and I remember even one colleague, Professor Mark Halsey, who had done many a tender, sort of, said to me, "Oh, well, you just - you let the money dictate what you do and then you kind of just bring it to an abrupt halt and cobble it together as best you can." And I sort of said to him words to the effect of "Can't do that here. It's just - can't do it."

So I then, as a result of that, I guess, found myself - because the tender activities for any person tendering at the university were meant to sit as an outlier to delivering lectures, marking essays, all the stuff I don't want to read out the list. It was meant to sort of sit as an outlier.

So the consequence of that - and I was a bit fortunate at the time because I had bought out of, I think, some teaching, and the teaching I was doing I'd done for a few years so I was familiar with it. So I'm not saying I didn't have enough time to do the task, by any stretch of the imagination, but the task became - and even I think the police acknowledged that. You know, these tender documents, initially, they're abstract concepts with bullets points and you do this and you do that and then there is the reality of the "doing". I don't - I think I have said enough and I'm saying too much.

THE COMMISSIONER: Over to you, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. The Commissioner's question was did you underquote or were you passionate or was it both?
A. Didn't - I didn't underquote because - well, the - but it was clear - it was made really apparent, "This is the amount of money and this is the thing that you've got to do for it." In good faith, with a lot of pressure, I think I must have thought initially, "Oh, the task is sort of doable for that", and when you look at it, on the face of it, too, but, you know, the way the money gets put out, et cetera, it is not a lot of money. But I think more what I'd really say was I was just really passionate about it. It became a passion project.
Q. What were you particularly passionate about? What drove you?
A. It's hard not to get emotional talking about it, but --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Doctor, would you like a break? A. No, no, I'm okay.
Q. All right.
A. The files - these were - these were just people who had met with terrible deaths, perhaps not necessarily homicide, but a death nevertheless in every case, often in horrific circumstances, with horrendous violence.

You can only imagine in some of the cases like Tonks, et cetera, that - the stuff you had to read, it's terrible. You never forget it. Extreme violence, extreme hatred and animosity. And so in reading this stuff, you're just wanting - it's not - you know, it's even different to my Holocaust research where, of course, you're trying to honour the dead in the Holocaust and they're not comparable, but you're just trying - with each case, you turn the folder and it's weird, you just turn the folder and there's another one.

And some of them they were short, but they were no less horrific for being short, and some of them were long, and every - I'm an atheist but every day I thank God that we didn't get the Scott Johnson stuff to read because it went off to the Coroner, because that would have been even worse, particularly because of the volume of information.

And so I felt the - I'm not saying it as some sort of
flippant throwaway line, $I$ felt the weight of the dead on my shoulders every day $I$ did this task. And, you know, I was just doing the best $I$ could with an imperfect instrument in a busy life with other academic activities. I don't quite understand the animosity of this process.
Q. Are you sure you wouldn't like a break?
A. It's okay.
Q. Doctor, are you sure you wouldn't like a break?
A. No, I'm okay. I'm okay.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. Yes, please go on, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Dr Dalton, you were asked some questions --

THE COMMISSIONER: Before you perhaps pick up the thread.
Q. Did I hear you a few moments ago, before you answered the last question or two - and correct me if I've misheard you - to say that you approached the task with some trepidation?
A. Yes.
Q. A11 right. Now, in your opening letter to Ms Braw of 28 July, in the middle of that letter, you said:

Professor Willem de Lint, Dr Danielle Tyson and $I$ are excited about the opportunity to assist you with a collaborative assessment.

I take it that was a candid and true statement on your part?
A. Yes.
Q. And that correctly formulates the view of - not only your own but, as best you understood it, Dr de Lint and Dr Tyson; you regarded this as an exciting academic opportunity?
A. Yeah, but you make "exciting" sound sort of pejorative.
Q. No, I'm not making it sound anything. I'm actually using your terminology.
A. Okay.
Q. And all I'm asking you is was that letter truthful or was it simply done to embellish the position so as to enhance your prospect in the tender? That's all I'm asking?
A. I don't know how to even answer it. I --
Q. Well, try answering it as best you can. Was it candid and truthful or was it part of the embellishment exercise to hopefully get the tender?
A. I can honestly say I don't know.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, that's fine, thank you.
Yes, Mr Tedeschi.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Did you have any excitement at getting the tender?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. I guess I thought it's going to be interesting to work with the police. And I saw the excitement as about
academic curiosity where you can actually get in, explore a phenomenon and hopefully shine some sort of light on it that might be helpful for everybody. I think I might have been naive, though, because as I said, once the homicide folders arrived - perhaps the sense of academic curiosity and excitement was replaced by the dread, some days, of having to turn the pages yet again and to revisit them yet again and to have the horrific contents.
Q. Did you also have trepidation about this job?
A. Yes.
Q. Why?
A. And I don't mind admitting it, because - well, I think there's two types of academics out there in the world, crudely speaking, those who kind of bang their fist on the table and go, "I'm wonderful, I'm the best thing since sliced bread and everything I do is spectacular and isn't it wonderful that the world has me in it." I'm more of a kind of reserved person. I remember even when I used to go for promotion at the university, and I got promoted several times which was from lecturer to senior lecturer from senior lecturer to associate professor - I'd have people scrutinising my promotion document and they'd say,
"Oh, you're not selling yourself well. You've got all of these amazing achievements and you're kind of really humble and you've got go, 'No, I'm this and I'm that'", and I found the task of putting those documents together quite difficult. And I've forgotten your question, sorry.

THE COMMISSIONER: Let me interrupt, Mr Tedeschi, and ask another one.
Q. You said a moment ago you thought you might have been a little naive, but surely in advance of this project, you must plainly have understood that what you were going to be doing was looking into the homicides or potential homicides of a very large number of people?
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. And is that something you'd never done before?
A. No, I had never looked at - no, I hadn't. That would be fair to say.
Q. And more to the point, you'd never looked at, in the context of gay hate or possible gay hate homicides?
A. No, that - that would be fair to say.
Q. All right. And is that one of the reasons why you regarded yourself perhaps later, given your background and given your own sexuality, that you may have bitten off more than you could chew?
A. Well, biting off more than one can chew is an interesting phrase, and I think as an - well, I can only speak for myself, as an academic, who also had all those other tasks I've mentioned to do before, this task, because of its profound importance and the gravity of the material, et cetera, it wasn't so much that I had bitten off more than I could chew, but that the toll of doing it was personally pretty onerous.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. You were asked some questions by Counsel Assisting about where the money went to, and I think you said it went to a particular account or fund at the university?
A. Yeah, it was called a - what was the term they used? They - a research account or something like that. They had some strange nomenclature for it.
Q. Was that a fund that was available for purposes such as attendance at conferences, research work and the like?
A. Yeah, the chief categories, and certainly the categories I used, were - most people would have gone to conferences. I'm not mad on going to conferences. I spent many thousands of dollars paying a copy editor to copy edit my book. I bought some - it will sound rather strange, I bought a very expensive volume of comics, because I was teaching a popular culture topic and I wanted to explore the representation in this comic, it's kind of a new field. I think a lot of the money was sitting there - a lot --
Q. Was it used for academic purposes?
A. Absolutely, yeah. And I think sometimes they'd let me pay, maybe, for some teaching relief, but you could have also, if you so desired, bought things like laptop computers, I think, but I didn't want a laptop.
Q. A11 right. I have asked you some questions about consensus and collaboration. Counsel Assisting asked you a number of questions about the BCI form?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Firstly, he pointed out that there were two forms and you said you were unaware of that?
A. Yes.
Q. The other thing that he drew to your attention is that on the BCI form --

THE COMMISSIONER: Which one?
MR TEDESCHI: Q. On both of them, that the first category, "Establishment of a Bias Crime", had the words "beyond reasonable doubt".

MR GRAY: I object. That is precisely what I did not say.
THE COMMISSIONER: That is precisely erroneous, and the problem, Mr Tedeschi, is we've all been together now for a little while, but the point of the story, as I understand it - Mr Gray will correct me - is that the form or the questions posed were different pre and post June 2016.

MR TEDESCHI: I accept that.
THE COMMISSIONER: The first two categories of "beyond
reasonable doubt" were on1y inserted post June 2016.
MR TEDESCHI: I accept that.
THE COMMISSIONER: And Mr Crandell gave quite a bit of evidence about his knowledge or, may I say, his lack of knowledge of that, and if I may just go a step further --

MR TEDESCHI: My question was in error. I accept that.
THE COMMISSIONER: No, no. All right.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Dr Dalton, you were asked some questions about one of the BCI forms which contained, in the first category, the requirement for beyond a reasonable doubt. You describe in your report the tool that you and Professor de Lint and Dr Tyson used, which didn't have that term in it at all. You used instead a proactive/reactive category, and some other categories?
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. How were you able to come to any sort of consensus or collaboration if the police had "beyond a reasonable doubt" as one of their categories for inclusion of a crime as a bias crime, whereas yours didn't?
A. Yeah, it's hard to answer, but I suspect that - the weirdest thing is even though that phrase was in their tool, I - I can't help but wondering whether they steadfastly obsessed over "beyond reasonable doubt" in terms of assessing the cases. Because remember they did say they were assessing them, as well, in relation to the narratives in the case summaries as well, so - I guess one way, another way of looking at it would be that even though we had different instruments, the phrases - or "tools" might be a nicer phrase - that they were ostensibly doing a very similar thing, albeit I know we had - we - with the anti-paedophile - the sub-category of anti-paedophile bias, we were disaggregating a bit differently. That's about as best - I don't really know what else to say.
Q. Can I ask you this: did it appear to you, during your discussions with the police, that they were strictly adhering to a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, for inclusion in that first category?
A. I think no because I never - I don't recall that phrase ever coming up in the discussions right at the end. But it might have. I just --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. But the reality, Doctor, is if it never came up for discussion, you would have no way of knowing how or which form they applied to which case at which time; isn't that right?
A. Correct. Correct, yep.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. You've been asked lots of questions by Counsel Assisting about the different tools available at different times. In your report you pointed out that the BCI form was one of the few forms that had received any sort of academic attention or any sort of acceptance generally at that time; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You, of course - you express in your report your concerns about the BCI form. Are you aware now if there is any general consensus as to whether there is a form that is generally accepted around the world as being suitable or accurate or appropriate for the assessment of bias crimes? A. I'm not, and I have to qualify it by saying, you know, once Parrabell was over and the academic article came out, my attentions - my academic interests returned to trying to plan my dark tourism Holocaust research.

And so with Parrabell being over, I put that aside, as one does if one's got different research interests, I put it aside for a moment. And then with leaving the university and a new life, I haven't - and also, I don't have access to these rather rich wonderful database search engines anymore. I do have access to Google Scholar. The problem with Google Scholar is, you know, once you've found the thing you want, you press on the button and you sometimes hit a paywall. So I haven't had the time or the energy or indeed the inclination to check. But I also don't know of one just as a matter of course.
Q. You've been provided with the reports of Dr Asquith, Dr Lovegrove and Ms Coakley?
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. From your review of those reports, does it appear that there is a universally accepted tool?
A. I'll readily admit, as I think I have already said I have only cursorily read those reports, "skim-read" them
might be more accurate phrase. But even in doing that, it seemed - I just kept thinking, well, our instrument has been criticised, perhaps in a way for fairly good reasons. It was the best we could come up with. But I keep wondering, well, where is the wonderful magic robust reliable tested instrument? And I don't think it exists, to the best of my knowledge.
Q. In the field of criminology or social science generally, are approaches to most topics subjective rather than objective?
A. You'd have to say they're subjective. And the interesting thing is, of course, social scientists, criminologists, we invent instruments or tools. Because it's social science - you know, if it's a medical test often you run the medical test and there's the result and it's not really - there can be interpretation, of course, with medical data, but with social science, I think, irrespective of the instrument or the tool you're using, the subjectivity does come into play, absolutely. And I would challenge - I would say for their instruments and things as well.
Q. Going to Dr Asquith's report, she describes in her own words an objective approach and a subjective approach. She describes the objective approach being the approach of looking at all of the facts and circumstances in a particular case to determine whether a gay hate bias crime has been committed.

THE COMMISSIONER: Can I just interrupt you for one moment? Are you putting this by way of an assumption?

MR TEDESCHI: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: To a man who skim-read the report?
MR TEDESCHI: Yes, I would like to do that.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, if it is by way of assumption --
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Would you assume that that's what she describes as being the objective approach, and she describes a subjective approach as being to assess whether or not a gay hate crime has been committed by interrogating the victim?
A. Yeah, and certainly I did discuss the reports with

Professor de Lint and, yeah, I think that's - my recollection is that's pretty well it.
Q. In her report, correct me if I'm wrong, she prefers what she calls the subjective approach rather than the objective approach?
A. Yeah, which I gather from what I did take from it kind of segues to that English approach of asking the victim. And I can see in terms of the English approach, particularly for assaults and other, if we were to call them lower-level, less serious crimes, it's a good approach. And if you tether your instrument to that, I guess it's easily verifiable, if that's what - you ask the victim and - pretty easy. But it strikes me that it would lead to I guess what you would call inaccuracies, because you just - you're at the whim of what - asking the victim what they think. I wish I could say more but I --
Q. Is it appropriate for homicides?
A. I would have thought not.
Q. You don't have a victim to ask their view?
A. That's right.
Q. So it's not available at all in homicides, is it?
A. No, no at all, that's right.
Q. Some sections of an article by Professor Gruenewald were also brought to your attention?
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. Do you recal1 that yesterday - by Counsel Assisting?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Now, it would appear from the parts of the article that were drawn to your attention by Counsel Assisting that what Counsel Assisting was suggesting you would take from that article is that there is an objective, repeatable tool that can be used merely by assessing whether the victim is a member of the LGBTIQ community. Is that the way you understood the sections --

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't think that's an accurate portrayal but $I$ will allow it on the basis that it is his understanding. If that turns out to be a misunderstanding of the article, so be it, but certainly on the basis of
Dr Dalton's understanding $I$ will allow you to ask that.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. You haven't read the full article, have you?
A. No.
Q. You've only had an opportunity to briefly skim the parts that were put to you by Counsel Assisting?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that the way that you understood what Counsel Assisting was putting to you, that there is a simple, clear, repeatable objective --

THE COMMISSIONER: None of those words were used in order to describe what was put, Mr Tedeschi. You've got a witness who hasn't read the article and in the conference or conferences you've had with him since yesterday afternoon, presumably you haven't invited him to read it either, from the tone and the content of your questions. So may I ask the point of this?

MR TEDESCHI: Sorry, what the point is?

THE COMMISSIONER: The point of asking him, when he hasn't read the article, and you're asking him about an understanding using terminology which, as far as $I$ can recall, was not used by Counsel Assisting to characterise the article.

MR TEDESCHI: Might I rephrase the question.
THE COMMISSIONER: No, why don't you use the transcript. If the transcript is available to you - if it is not, of course - but if it's available, then maybe put the question that was put and ask Dr Dalton to refresh his recollection from what was actually said rather than yours or, for that matter, my recollection of what was or was not said.

MR TEDESCHI: I wil1 ask a more general question, if I may.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. What did you understand that Counse1 Assisting was putting to you through the medium of that article?
A. I don't - it was bewildering to be honest, because it
was just such a long thing and they were scroling down and - it's - it sort of strikes me as unfair to sort of just conjure up articles on the screen after a report has been written and --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. I'm so sorry, you regard it as what, Dr Dalton?
A. Pardon?
Q. Did you say you regarded what was happening yesterday as unfair?
A. Yeah, with the - with the part where you popped the where the article was put and up and the scrolling it up and down --

MR TEDESCHI: Q. What did you understand was being put to you, or suggested to you?
A. I struggled - I sort of struggled to - I think they were trying to put to me that this article contained some magnificent wisdom that $I$ should have discovered and should have used.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Did you ask anybody to have access to the article to read it fully?
A. No, because I don't think that I'm - it's not a criminal trial where $I$ bear such a burden.
Q. Dr Dalton, I'm not asking you to tell me whether you think this is or is not a criminal trial. But in any event, you haven't seen the article, nor have you had access to it in full?
A. No. And might I say politely, I think it's grossiy unfair to conjure things up and go, "Now you are beholden", six years later, "to read this thing and respond to it".
Q. A11 right. Thank you.
A. It's outrageous.
Q. And was part of the problem you had yesterday that it was outside your area of expertise, for example?
A. No. No.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right, thank you.
Yes, Mr Tedeschi.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Dr Dalton, what do you say to a tool
that would include as gay hate crimes, crimes against victims who happened to be members of the LGBTIQ community but that that was not known to the perpetrator?
A. Well, if it's not - if it's not known to the perpetrator, how on earth are you to adduce - yes, they're a GLBTIQ person, but then if the thing is not known to the perpetrator and it doesn't motivate their behaviour, in a way it's not a gay hate crime, that the person who happens to end up dead just happens to be GLBTIQ, which is still terrible, but I don't think we'd sort of say - it might sound like a nonsense, but you can't say if some heterosexual person ends up dead it's some - using similar logic, it just doesn't make a lot of sense.
Q. And what do you say to a tool that identifies a crime as not being a gay hate crime where the perpetrator thought that the victim was a member of the LGBTIQ community but, in fact, they were not?
A. Yeah, well - and it's the - it runs to the idea, it's interesting yesterday, because I know that every time you talk about paedophilia, you're stepping into a minefield, which terrifies me, but the - in disaggregating these anti-paedophile types of gay hate from just, I'd say, the more generic type of gay hate or gay bias --
Q. Can I take you back to my question, sorry?
A. Sorry, my apologies.
Q. What do you say about a tool that does not include as a gay hate crime a crime that is committed against a person who is not a member of the LGBTIQ community, but whom the perpetrator thinks is a member of that community?
A. I know you've put it to me twice already but --
Q. Do you want me to say it again?
A. Yeah, the problem is when you have --
Q. What do you say about a tool that does not identify a crime as a gay hate crime where the perpetrator thinks that the person, say, is a gay man, but it turns out that it's not a gay man; it's just a person that happened to be going perhaps past a gay beat?
A. Well, it's not a - it's not a good tool.
Q. I would finally like to come to two categories that you placed a lot of emphasis on in your report and that were the subject of a lot of questions by Counsel Assisting
and some criticism in the reports obtained by the Inquiry.
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. The first one is you placed importance on the difference between proactive crimes and reactive crimes; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You defined in your report - and in your evidence proactive crimes as being those crimes where a perpetrator or perpetrators go out actively seeking victims?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, correct me if I'm wrong, you identified reactive crimes as being those crimes where the perpetrator hasn't gone out seeking to commit an offence, but the offence has occurred, as it were, almost on the spur of the moment?
A. Sure.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Now, you were asked a number of questions by Counsel Assisting, and indeed some questions by the Commissioner, about why proactive crimes are more of a threat to society than reactive crimes?
A. Yeah, and I --
Q. Could you tell us your rationale for that reasoning?
A. Yeah, I felt as you - as one does in this process yesterday, it's hard to often collect your thoughts, but I guess with - with reactive, and it runs to - proactive, rather, it runs to this idea, certainly some of the Taradale matters, et cetera, about gangs or organised people or more than one person, and I guess the problem is, as we've seen with a lot of these cliff deaths, et cetera, if there are, loosely speaking, gangs or people who are affiliated involved, they can do it more frequently or regularly, if that's the term; they can get organised, and the threat sort of endures.

Whereas in the reactive, and, you know, there are so many famous cases or examples of this, typically, of
course, the one person ends up dead but the circumstance isn't likely to be repeated.
Q. So, likely or unlikely?
A. Unlikely to be repeated because the event is over.

Well, I guess, un1ess --
Q. What's the classic example?
A. You can indulge the idea if they're not caught and then they end up in a similar circumstance, it might happen again, but --
Q. What's the classic situation you're thinking of.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, the underlying assumption is there is one, Mr Tedeschi. I really am not finding this very helpful because it's just questions which may have been provoked by conferring but are not helpful by putting words into this man's mouth. But please go on.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Please continue.
THE COMMISSIONER: Q. So the assumption is, Dr Dalton, there is a classic situation. Do you agree with that proposition or not?
A. Yeah, I'm not sure there's a classic situation, but in some of the cases, and certainly I was aware of it just from all the famous case law and the discussions, there are these often younger men who might find themselves in a circumstance where - I mean, Gillies or whatever. I mean, we do talk about classic, and sometimes - I remember the Gillies case because, well, it was particularly weird because he said the touch of the gay man triggered the memory of his father's incestuous touch or something. I remember thinking, "God, that's a bizarre sort of thing." But certainly where something happens and then the stable psychic sexual identity of the typically younger man becomes threatened and they just - you'd almost need a psychiatrist to explain it better. They react with hostility against the thing that they say so hate about themselves that might be latent, which is homosexual desire. And that could happen in - there were - I wish I had the - my - the files even to refresh my memory. But that's about as much as I can say, perhaps.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. The Commissioner asked you quite a few questions about why proactive crimes are more --

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think I did. I think your recollection, Mr Tedeschi, sadly, is not accurate. I did not ask - my recollection is not one question - about this. It was asked a lot by Counsel Assisting. You've got a junior there with a transcript on the screen. If you would like to go to a question I asked or questions I've asked, by all means do so. But my recollection - and it may not be right - is that $I$ never asked one question about this. Not one.

MR TEDESCHI: I'm sorry, Commissioner. My memory is --
THE COMMISSIONER: No, please, don't let my undoubted powers of persuasion, Mr Tedeschi, cause you to doubt your own position. But I just don't remember.

MR TEDESCHI: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: I'm not stopping you asking about it, clearly.

MR TEDESCHI: I don't want to delay the proceedings.
THE COMMISSIONER: And I'm never one to refuse attribution, $I$ can assure you.

MR TEDESCHI: $Q$. You were asked some questions by someone --
A. Okay, yes.
Q. -- yesterday about why it's more of a threat to society and why it's important to distinguish proactive crimes from reactive crimes. Can you explain why it's more of a threat to society?
A. Yeah, I just think when it's - obviously the end result of the dead body is the same result. But when it's proactive, and it's planned and they go out of their way, it's one thing to end up in a circumstance in a living room with someone late at night where some sort of human personal interaction occurs and a psychic reaction is triggered and someone is dead, but to be proactive and going out to beats or clifftops or areas with one or a second person, hunting or looking for targets as - you know, in the high-water mark of some of these cases, what was going on. Thankfully, it's all in the past.

I mean, the one thing that is good, at least we can all perhaps agree on, is that we live in an era now where this sort of stuff is in the rear view mirror. It's not really happening anymore.
Q. In terms of numbers, is one more significant than another?
A. Pardon?
Q. In terms of the numbers of perpetrators, is one more significant than another? See, I'm trying to identify the factors that make proactive crime more of a serious threat to society than reactive crime. Is the numbers of perpetrators, one of the factors?
A. Well, it could be, because if you've got more than one perpetrator you can potentially have more than one victim --
Q. It's repetitive?
A. -- and recurrent victims, a victim one month later and a few months after that.
Q. So the repetition of the offences --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- is more of a threat to society?
A. I honestly think so. Which is not to say - how would I put it - that the reactive version, which can occur somewhat spontaneously in various contexts, is no more lethal or terrible.
Q. In individual cases?
A. In individual cases, yeah.
Q. All right. Finally, the other area where you distinguished certain types of gay hate crimes and the police did not, and for which there was some criticism in some of the other reports, was that you treated separately, to some degree, gay hate crimes and anti-paedophile crimes?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Now, firstly, it was unclear to me from your evidence when you calculated the number of gay hate crimes, were you including those that were also anti-paedophile crimes or were they - were they discounted as being gay hate crimes? A. No, they - they were counted but they were counted as this separate sub-category.
Q. So they were counted at gay hate crimes but a sub-category of that?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you explain to the Commissioner, why did you think that it was important to categorise them as a sub-category of gay hate crimes?
A. Okay. It's complicated but to me, the phenomenon of this anti - of the animus, the nuance is really worth capturing, insofar as you can split it or make it sort of a bit more nuanced. And, gee, it's complicated, because certainly back in the era, you could say, well, you know, one person's homosexual was another person's rock spider was another person's paedo, or whatever the term was. Just to complicate it even more further, for some other perhaps perpetrators, they would preserve some sort of crude distinction and a paedo was way worse than a homosexual, and that makes it even more confusing.

But certainly - and I - I did so poorly trying to explain it yesterday but the thing that - the thing that sort of worries me, and it's kind of like the existence of the judgment of that famous Green case. If a heterosexual man is murdered [sic] in some context where he can later tell a concocted story about an advance made by a bisexual or a gay man, it can be mitigated against his violence.

It's interesting, we seem to be in an era now of obviously greater tolerance of homosexuality, which is a wonderful thing, but gee, God help any man on the planet, or in Australia, if they're ever perceived, "perceived" being the right word, to be a paedophile and therefore subject to lethal violence. In fact, I sort of think this is the - this is the danger or the bias category that endures the most, because there seems - I mean, there are still people who don't like gays and will assault them, et cetera, but paedophilia certainly doesn't seem to have had an awful lot more acceptance in the modern era.
Q. And you are in no sense seeking to excuse paedophilia? A. No. No, please. No.
Q. Do I understand you correctly in saying that even people who commit vile offences are entitled not to be assaulted and murdered?
A. Absolutely. And I don't shy away from that. I think
in the - sorry. I think in the report, I said something about Professor Gail Mason's comment about the paedophile being undeserving of the category of victim. I hope I didn't quote poor Gail out of context. She's a nice person. But, as I read that, I sort of thought, that really - that really disturbs me, because paedophile offences are horrific, they cause terrible trauma and that they are to be identified and prosecuted.

But paedophiles as human beings are often probably people who are the - who are the product of horrific sexual neglect and abuse themselves when kids, and that perhaps explains their offending, and I just from a human rights perspective - and I used to help teach Dr Marmo (?) - help Dr Marmo teach some of her lectures. I just don't like to think of any category of human who is not deserving of the status of victimhood under certain contexts. It's just not a good thing.
Q. Sorry, there is one further topic that I omitted to ask you at the time. Your article that you wrote with Professor de Lint - can I take you to volume 8, tab 205. [SCOI.82022_0001]?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. Could I take you, please, to --
A. I'm happy to look on the screen, yeah.
Q. -- page 731. It's page 9 of the document. Thank you. And at the bottom of the second full paragraph, you were asked some questions by Counsel Assisting about your reference there to the BCIRF?
A. Yes.
Q. The BCI form?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was suggested to you that in this article, it was misleading, because you had not disclosed to your reader the fact that, in fact, you had discarded the BCI form as a tool for varying reasons?
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. Could I take you, please, to page 14 of the article, page 736 of the journal, down the bottom of the page, footnote 11. Does that footnote read as follows:

As is clear in the research, and recalling the point made by Mason ... that some groups do not merit inclusion as a vulnerable group, it is a perverse consequence if the instrument counts bias against paedophiles as --

MR GRAY: Commissioner, I don't believe such a proposition was put yesterday. A different proposition altogether was put - what appears at the top of page 736.

THE COMMISSIONER: What was put quite clearly, Mr Tedeschi, which, if I may say so, footnote 11 doesn't address, is that the express reason given as to why the methodology adopted by Flinders was different were the reasons put at the top of the article.

MR TEDESCHI: Yes.
THE COMMISSIONER: Now, the mere fact that there is a criticism implied or otherwise in the 10-point indicator form in, if I may say so, fairly nuanced and in express terms in footnote 11, does not change or, rather, it was put yesterday that the express assertion at the top of the page, I will be reminded in a moment of the page --

MR GRAY: 736.
THE COMMISSIONER: -- 736 :
... the academic team developed its own assessment tool because ...

So unfortunately for the authors, on one view, they, in text, assert the reason, because they adopt the tool, and then to suggest as yesterday or today, rather, that footnote 11 should be some form of counterbalance, on one view of it, might be a bit of a tall order, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: I have taken the witness to the wrong part of that footnote, if $I$ could take him to the part that is relevant.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
MR TEDESCHI: Q. Midway through that footnote there are these words:

> In addition, we deemed that the ten-point Bias Indicator Review Form did not offer a straightforward relationship between the factors and the designation of bias. Instead, the team used a simple three-point assessment relying on the expression, intentionality, and denunciatory communication of a proactive or associative animus connected to the criminal deed.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but your problem, Mr Tedeschi, is this. I'm looking at that footnote and I'm looking at what is said there, and it is quite different to what is said at the top of 736. Indeed, what might be said in relation to this part of the footnote is that it is further misleading, because it does not confront the full force and effect of footnote 20 in the report in Parrabel1, and the evidence that this witness has given up, in sitting iistening to Mr Crandel 1 and Dr Dalton - no doubt Dr de Lint may be asked the odd question about it - they didn't use the tool for the reasons explained, that it was simply not fit for purpose. This here serves to underplay by simply saying it offered not a straightforward relationship.

Now, on one view, you juxtapose footnote 11 against what is the top of 736 , and if you want to talk about misleading, then, on one view of it, it doesn't really help. In fact, it's worse, because it does not candidly address footnote 20 in the Parrabel 1 report itself.

So I frankly don't see how in - I won't stop you putting it. No doubt you've had an opportunity to talk to Dr Dalton about this. But my problem is that $I$ don't think it improves the situation, tentatively though that view is expressed.

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, what the footnote discloses is that, in effect, they did not use the BCI form - they rejected it - and they adopted their own instead.

THE COMMISSIONER: That is not accurate, Mr Tedeschi, because at the top of 736 --

MR TEDESCHI: I agree that what it says at the top of the page is --

THE COMMISSIONER: But the problem is that if they had gone on to say something more direct at 736, but they're giving the reader - as you would know, as Dr Dalton would know, not everyone is fixated on footnotes, and so if one reads the text of the article, the academic team developed its own assessment tool, not because the BCI form did not provide a straightforward answer, but because it needed to differentiate.

Now, that's the substantial reason why they adverted to something other than the form. The mere fact that in footnote 11, many pages later, they say, "We deemed the 10-point form as not offering a straightforward relationship", doesn't mean it didn't offer a relationship, and so it is not a cogent reason why the form was rejected. The cogent reasons are those which are stated at 736 top of the page.

Now, by all means, ask the question. Dr Dalton has heard the exchange and no doubt he will say what he wishes to say about it. But quite frankly, tentative view only, this is hardly a disclosure of what is in footnote 20.

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner --
THE COMMISSIONER: For example, they didn't go on to say "We rejected it because we asked the police was there any academic or empirical material supporting the form, and couldn't find it". So if they had repeated footnote 20 per se, no-one could complain, but there is quite a distinction between what is said - tentative view only. Go on, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: Thank you, Commissioner.
Q. Dr Dalton, you have heard what the Commissioner has said. You have accepted in answer to questions from Counsel Assisting that what is at the top of page 736 is potentially misleading, is that right, or it doesn't disclose the real reasons why you rejected the BCI form? A. I honestly don't know what to say. I just don't know what to say. It's just bewildering. I just --
Q. Do you accept that it is inaccurate to state:
... the academic team developed its own assessment tool ...

> for the reason that:
A. No, it is not inaccurate.
Q. --
the target of bias --
A. It doesn't seem to be inaccurate to me.
Q. What the Commissioner is suggesting is that the real reason for rejecting the $B C I$ as a tool was not because you wanted to differentiate the different kinds of bias, but because you found the BCI tool to be inadequate.
A. Well, we certainly did find the BCI tool to be inadequate.
Q. Yes. But what the Commissioner has pointed out is that in that, at the top of page 736, that is not what you have said.

THE COMMISSIONER: $Q$. To put it more express $1 y$, Dr Dalton, what you say at the top of 736 is not what you said in footnote 20 to your section of Parrabel 1.
A. Perhaps it's not.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. You don't disclose in the top of that paragraph at the top of page 736 that the reason why you rejected the BCI form was because you found it to be inadequate to the task?

MR GRAY: Commissioner, I interrupt with some hesitation but this is really an attempt to get the witness to say the opposite of what he said in plain terms yesterday.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I know that's what Mr Tedeschi is trying to do, but as he seems to be regarding $\operatorname{Dr}$ Dalton as his witness, I understand forensically what he is doing.

I won't stop you, Mr Tedeschi. It will be a matter in the end for me to weigh up all the various answers and if you want to put direct questions to him as if you were cross-examining him, but quite frankly, you have conferred with him and - or you told me were you going to, I won't
presume you did, but you told me you were going to confer with him, and so ultimately his status qua the NSW Police Force will be something I will take into account given the loaded nature of the questions you are now posing. It is evidence-in-chief. You wouldn't be able to ask those questions in chief, and I'm not going to stop you because, as I have said before, this is not adversarial litigation, but it will be a question ultimately of me weighing up Dr Dalton's evidence on this point and I will hear from both of you in due course. But I won't stop you. You go on.

MR TEDESCHI: Q. Dr Dalton, have you read what's at the top of page 736? Yes or no, have you read it?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you read what's in the latter half of footnote 11? Could you read that, please. The words "In addition"; do you see that?
A. Yes, "do not offer a straightforward" - yes.
Q. Do you recall footnote 20 in your report identified --
A. Not well. Not well. I'm sorry.
Q. In your report, you identified the inadequacies --
A. Yes, we did.
Q. -- of the BCI form?
A. Yes.
Q. And you explained why you didn't use that form?
A. Yes.
Q. Because it was an inadequate tool?
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. And you developed your own tool instead?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree that at the top of page 736 you don't refer to that reason why you rejected the BCI form?
A. Yes, it appears that we don't.
Q. What do you say about what you've written in footnote 11?
A. I don't - I don't recall whether I wrote the footnote or Professor de Lint wrote it. With the passage of time,

I've got - when I --
Q. What do you say about the content of it and the real reason why you rejected the BCI form?
A. Well, the - surely it's become apparent now that the real reason we - irrespective of whether it's here, there, or everywhere in this document, the real reason we rejected the BCI form was because it was a terrible instrument and it wasn't fit for purpose. We couldn't use it.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. You could have said that quite candidly in this article, couldn't you?
A. Yes. I don't - yes.
Q. Instead, what you said in the footnote was that it did not offer a straightforward relationship. Now, that's only a half truth, isn't it?
A. No, I - no, I reject that, actually.
Q. When you say it was not fit for purpose, it wasn't a question of offering only a straightforward or other relationship; it simply wasn't fit for purpose?
A. Someone said before that --
Q. No, please.
A. No, no, no.
Q. No, Doctor?
A. No.
Q. No, Doctor, please. Would you agree with me that your evidence --
A. No, no, I can't agree with you.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can't, all right. Would you please conclude, Mr Tedeschi.

MR TEDESCHI: Yes, I have concluded, Commissioner.
THE COMMISSIONER: You have? All right.
Dr Dalton, you have excused from further attendance, so you may leave, and return, if you wish, to South
Australia.
<THE WITNESS WITHDREW

MR GRAY: Commissioner, I see the time. I am happy to begin with the next witness.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I will take the break. I think Dr de Lint has been here most of the morning, and so he has heard what has gone on, and I think I will take the break now so that $\operatorname{Dr}$ Dalton can leave or perhaps remain - his choice - and then Dr de Lint can get himself settled for perhaps the afternoon. So I will take the break now, thank you.

## SHORT ADJOURNMENT

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Commissioner, the next witness is Dr Willem de Lint. I call Dr de Lint.

THE COMMISSIONER: Doctor, would you please come forward, thank you.
<WILLEM DE LINT, sworn:
<EXAMINATION BY MR GRAY:
MR GRAY: Q. Dr de Lint, you participated in the academic review of Strike Force Parrabell?
A. Yes .
Q. Can I ask you to have a look at volume 2
[SCOI.76961.00007_0001], tab 23.
A. Yes .
Q. Can you find tab 23?
A. Yes, that's a large tab. Which page?
Q. It shouldn't be a large tab. It's just the request for tender, or request for quotation?
A. Oh, yeah, yeah.
Q. On page 7, there is a page with a heading "Terms of Reference".
A. Yep.
Q. Now, were you, and/or are you, familiar with this?

This was the request for tender, the quotation, that came from the police, which you and Dr Dalton and Dr Tyson
answered by submitting a tender?
A. I don't recall it. No doubt - I guess I saw it but I don't recal1 it, yeah.
Q. We11, I wanted to ask you about one thing on1y I suppose two. The first bullet point is "A collaborative approach" was what the police wanted?
A. Yes.
Q. And the fourth one is this:

Access and review original source materials as required.
A. Okay.
Q. You see that?
A. Yep.
Q. Now, did you understand that you could have or should have accessed the original source materials or what was your understanding?
A. My understanding - we11, my understanding was that is that there was - must have been some discussion between at some point - and I don't know when - between Derek and Assistant Commissioner Crande11 with respect to that access, and I think that Derek had deemed or they had deemed together that they - that the original source materials weren't going to be reviewed by us.
Q. So your understanding, perhaps from that basis, was that you, the academic team, were not going to be looking at the original source materials?
A. Yes. That was my understanding.
Q. Okay. And in fact, I think this is common ground, what the academics, including yourself, actually had was the completed Bias Crime Indicator Forms --
A. Yes.
Q. -- for the 85 or so cases?
A. Yes, that formed two large binders, I think, or three large binders.
Q. And that's it? That's what you, the academics, had?
A. Yes, in our possession. There would have - there would have been other materials that we - that was made
reference to, perhaps - I'm not sure how much of that would have been shown to Derek in meetings with - actually on location meetings with the police. I don't know.
Q. Well, apart from that possibility, so far as you're aware, all that you had, first of all, personally, was the completed --
A. Yes.
Q. -- Bias Crime Indicator Forms?
A. Yes.
Q. And how many meetings were there face to face that you recal 1 where --
A. With the police?
Q. Where Dr Dalton was with the police in person?
A. I think there were three or four in person. This is just vague. You know, $I$ can't be absolutely certain1y. With the police. And then, of course, myself and Dr Dalton and Dr Tyson had quite a few.
Q. You remember that recently - that is, this year - you submitted a response document to the Commission --
A. Yes.
Q. -- responding to the expert reports?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. And I could take you to it if you needed it --
A. Okay.
Q. -- but one of the things you said was that the Terms of Reference by the time of your involvement were limited in some ways and one was that they did not permit an examination of all the original case files?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Now, I've taken you to what the Terms of Reference actual1y say.
A. Okay.
Q. But in any event, your understanding was that you were not able to look at those files?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Now, the completed bias crime forms that you did have
in the two or three folders were written --
A. These were binders, not folders.
Q. Okay, binders - were written by the Parrabel 1 police officers, filled in by the Parrabel1 police officers; correct?
A. Yes - now, I wish I had a binder in front of me, because it's been - and I don't - but whether there were quotations or remarks by other people, witnesses, statements included in addition to that, of course, there I think there would have been.
Q. We may be siightly at cross-purposes.
A. Okay.
Q. The form itself, the Bias Crime Indicators Form, blank, is an appendix to your report, isn't it?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. To the Parrabe11 report?
A. Yes.
Q. And the blanks, when you got the two or three binders, had been filled in in each of the 85 -odd cases?
A. Yeah, no, there's - I believe there's more to it than that. I wish I had a binder on me to demonstrate, but each of these cases ran a number of pages. I think altogether it was maybe sixteen, seventeen, eighteen hundred pages or something.
Q. Yes.
A. So if what you're saying is that there would have been only a couple of lines of text in each of them.
Q. No, no, no, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that however many 1 ines of text there were --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- you had the completed forms, with all the text inserted, however 1 ong that was, for the 85 odd cases?
A. Yeah. Were they completed? There was a process of them being completed in terms of scoring by the Strike Force Parrabel1. So they were in a process of completing their evaluation of each of these cases, as --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Dr de Lint, the form itself, which is an appendix as Mr Gray suggested, to your Parrabel 1
report --
A. Yes, I understand.
Q. -- runs for approximately 20 -odd pages.
A. Okay.
Q. Okay. And if you got three lever arch volumes and several hundreds of pages, what he's asking you is if you can recall - if you can't, so be it - that for each and every case that you were asked to review, whether it was 85,83 or 88 doesn't matter, you had a completed 20-page document, rough1y, for each and every case. That's what he's asking you.
A. Yes.
Q. If you don't recall either way, that's fine.
A. Well, I'm just - I'm struggling over the term "completed".
Q. "Completed" in the sense of filled out. In other words, you didn't get 85 times 20 pages blank. What he's putting to you is that you got, in the materials that you got, you got the police's summary in the form of the Parrabell bias crime form, the completed summary in each and every case, completed by the police, as to the answers they gave to the various questions in the 20 pages of text. A. Okay. Yes.

MR GRAY: Q. Let me show you an example.
A. That's fine. The answer is yes.
Q. I don't want there to be a foundational confusion.

Could Dr de Lint have volume 13, and would you turn, please, to tab 266C [NPL.0129.0001.0001_0001]?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you see that's a Bias Crime Indicators Review Form for a Mr Dutfield?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, it runs, this particular one, for 19 pages?
A. Yes.
Q. And you can see that the parts which are blank in the
template attached to your Parrabell report have been filled in - that is, populated with text - throughout, haven't they?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's what you got, is it not?
A. Yes.
Q. With respect to all the 85 or so cases; is that right?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Now, back to where I was. Those completed forms, completed in that sense --
A. Yes.
Q. -- were written by the Parrabell officers following their review of whatever historic paper holdings there were for a particular case?
A. Yes.
Q. And so the text of the completed forms, as in the example we just saw, was entirely dependent on, firstly, the nature and extent and quality of whatever there was in existence in the historic paper holdings?
A. Yes.
Q. And, secondly, dependent on the degree of reliability and skill brought to the task of reviewing that material by the particular officer or officers who had worked on a particular case?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, as we've established, you never saw the original paper holdings yourself?
A. No.
Q. Did it occur to you that in order to review the quality of the work that the police had done, you would have needed to scrutinise the paper holdings that they had looked at to see what sort of a fist they had made of it? A. Yes. It certainly did.
Q. Because without doing that, you couldn't really know how good or bad their review work had been?
A. No, we were dependent on the quality of the text, the accuracy of the text that was in front of us, yep.
Q. Yes, and just to put the question slightly differently, you were dependent on the quality of the text in the completed forms, but to review how good that quality was, you would have had to go and check the original material, wouldn't you?
A. Yep. If - you know, if the material that was in that form, you know, was - was very, very different or substantially different or somewhat different from - well, let me backtrack a little bit and say that $I$ would guess that - that different officers would fill those forms out to varying standards, as individuals will do any job to varying standards, and if you backtrack, I think you can find that you're going to backtrack towards varying standards, you know, throughout the chain of materials that spring from an event.
Q. Quite. So you've accepted, a question or two ago, that unless you yourself, or you yourselves, went back and looked at the original materials that they had looked at, you couldn't know how well or badly they had performed their task of filling out the form?
A. No.
Q. Now, you obviously never did that. I'm not saying that critically --
A. No.
Q. -- but you didn't do that?
A. No.
Q. Looking back on it now, should you have?
A. I would have liked to do that, yes. I don't think it was in my role to do that, and so, yes, but I would have liked to do that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. And more to the point, neither you nor Dr Dalton had quoted to do that?
A. We what?
Q. You hadn't quoted, your fee wasn't --
A. Well, I'm - yeah, I don't know.
Q. When you say you don't know, what do you mean, you don't know? Are you meaning to suggest that you're not sure what $\operatorname{Dr}$ Dalton had in his mind as to the fee being offered to the university as to precisely how much work you would have to do?
A. Yes. In other words, I don't know what it would have entailed in terms of, you know, calculating the time it takes against an allocation of funds.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right.
MR GRAY: Q. Well, although you didn't see the original source materials, you presumably became aware from the amount of work that the police were having to do --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that it was very voluminous?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you had had to do it yourselves, input it yourselves, in the way that I've just been suggesting to you --
A. Yes.
Q. -- it would have taken you a great deal longer --
A. Yes.
Q. -- than the academic review in fact took?
A. Yep. Yep.
Q. Now, just coming to the form itself, your team - you and $\operatorname{Dr}$ Dalton and $\operatorname{Dr}$ Tyson - came to the view, as we see in the report, that the form as an instrument for the Strike Force Parrabell paper review exercise was not fit for purpose?
A. I wouldn't say - I wouldn't go that far and say it wasn't fit for purpose. I would say that we struggled to overlay our evaluation using the parameters of the form. That's how I would put it. So - I think "fit for purpose" is very strong. But, you know, it - it provided us - if the purpose was to - for our - to provide us with information in order to see what relevant material, organised in some way, there was in order to make - in order to begin to make an evaluation, then, of course, it was fit for purpose.
Q. Well, let's go to what you said about it in the report. If Dr de Lint could have exhibit 1, tab 2, [SCOI.02632_0001] this is the actual Parrabell report itself.
A. Oh, okay.
Q. Tab 2?
A. Yep.
Q. As you recal1, the first 46 or so pages are the police part of the report?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the balance, starting at page 47 , is the academic part?
A. Yep.
Q. If we turn to page 67 --
A. Yep.
Q. -- you refer to the form there towards the bottom of that page?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that?
A. Yep.
Q. Just while I'm on that page, you see the heading there is "Scoring the cases"?
A. Yep.
Q. And in the first two 1 ines of this section, it says:

A team of detectives ... reviewed and scored each case.

Do you see that in the first two 1 ines?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you mean by "scored"?
A. We11, they provided an assessment of whether it was one of the categories that ended up being - yep.
Q. So they provided the form, filled out as per the example that $I$ showed you a while ago?
A. Yep.
Q. With answers to the various questions, "Yes", "No", and various things filled in. But it's not a scoring in a sense of a numerical ranking?
A. No.
Q. Now, towards the bottom of that page you say the
investigators used the form, and you say it comprised 10 bias indicators, which you have set out.
A. Mmm.
Q. Now, tel1 me what you know in this respect. The form, of course, contained the 10 indicators?
A. Yes.
Q. But not on1y the 10 indicators, you are aware of that --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- there was more to the form than just the 10 indicators?
A. Well, the one you just showed me.
Q. Let's look at the example annexed to your report.

It's in the document you're looking at, if you turn to page 121?
A. Yep. Yep.
Q. Do you see that's the form that you have understood that the police were using?
A. Yep.
Q. And there are 10 indicators in it, the first one being "Differences", on the front page?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the second one is "Comments, written statements, gestures"?
A. Yep.
Q. And then the third, "Drawings, markings, symbols, graffiti" and al1 the way through to $10 ?$
A. Yep.
Q. They're the 10 indicators; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Right. But the form, as we can immediately see, has much more in it than just the 10 indicators. It has a series of prompts in respect of each indicator?
A. Yes.
Q. And, although perhaps a little unhelpfully under the heading "Indicators", it then has four categories that can be chosen --
A. Yes.
Q. -- with a "Yes/No", namely, "Evidence of Bias Crime"; "Suspected Bias Crime; "No Evidence of Bias Crime"; and "Insufficient Information"?
A. Yes.
Q. Just while I'm here, in the case of "Evidence of Bias Crime", you see that the requirement for a "Yes" answer is:
... sufficient evidence/information exists
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt --
A. Yes.
Q. --
that the incident was either wholly or partially motivated by bias ...
A. Yes.
Q. And you know that the beyond a reasonable doubt criminal standard is a high standard?
A. Yes.
Q. So I want to make clear, so that when $I$ get to some later questions, we know what we're talking about, that the form is more than and different from just the indicators, isn't it?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Now, at page 68 of the report, towards the top of the page, you say that indicators 1 to 9 are derived from a United States document?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say that indicator 10 had been developed by the New South Wales Bias Crime Unit?
A. Yep.
Q. Now, in the middle of that paragraph, after referring to the indicators having been derived from the United

States, there's a footnote 20 , which we then see at the bottom of the page?
A. Yes.
Q. If you read that to yourself --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you say in the footnote, about the middle of the footnote:
... the academic team are reluctant to endorse these indicators ...
A. Yep.
Q. That's right, isn't it?
A. Yep.
Q. And then at page 70 , one page or two on, at the bottom of the page, you say that:

As academics, we commenced our assessment
of the [Parrabell] review with a query concerning the authorities cited by the police to support the use of the BCIRF instrument ...

In other words, the form?
A. Yes.
Q. And you go on to say, by all means read it to yourself, in the next paragraph - sorry, the same paragraph, on the next page but part of this paragraph:

While we most often agreed on the result, we were less enthused about the means.
A. Yep.
Q. And the upshot was that you yourselves simply did not use the form in your exercise; you constructed a different --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- structure within which to carry out your work?
A. Yeah, I suppose in one sense we reconstructed some parts of the indicators, because, as is described there,

I mean, there are elements of it which were confusing to us - absence of motive is one indicator; motive is another indicator. This ended up being too confusing for us and so that's - that's why we, you know, wanted to get behind what was being done with it, with that tool, and provide another --
Q. Well, in the response document that you submitted to this Inquiry a month or two ago --
A. Yes.
Q. -- I had better put that in front of you, it is volume 12, tab 258 [SCOI.82365_0001]. At page 3 of your document --
A. Yes.
Q. -- there is a heading halfway down called, "What is the purpose of the BCIF"?
A. Yes.
Q. And you make various observations about that, some of which I'11 come back to.
A. Yes.
Q. Then a bit further on, "What is its applicability?"?
A. Yep.
Q. And then a bit further on again, "How are indicators or factors weighed or scored?"
A. Yep.
Q. In that section, which goes for a page and a half, you set out at least some of the problems that you identified with the form?
A. Yes. Some of them, to the best of my recollection, yep.
Q. Yes, so you identify a few and then you point out, or you observe, that Professor Lovegrove had identified some more?
A. Yep.
Q. And then in the paragraph below that beginning, "As he observes" - have you got that paragraph?
A. Yes.
Q. Which is Professor Lovegrove - so you seem to be
agreeing with what he is saying - and you add:
As he very helpfully suggests, since they describe circumstances in very gross dimensions that may just as easily describe non-bias homicides this leaves a great deal open to subjective interpretation concerning the attribution of hate crime in the particular case.
A. Yep.
Q. You are agreeing with Lovegrove in that regard?
A. Yeah, basically, well - yeah.
Q. Just while I'm on that, in the very next paragraph you suggest that perhaps Professor Lovegrove's opinion is not shared by Ms Coakley or Professor Asquith, but you then say:
... it is worth repeating that whilst the instrument may be adopted widely, that wide adoption is not evidence of its fitness for purpose.
A. Right.
Q. Why do you say that the instrument - if you are saying - had been adopted widely?
A. Well --
Q. The instrument, not the indicators but the instrument?
A. Well, I'm talking - yes, I'm talking - well, not this form that the NSW Police developed, but the underlying --
Q. That's the point of my question. That's what I want to make sure you're understanding.
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. You say the instrument has been adopted widely, being the form. But that's not so, is it?
A. No, not this instrument - not this instrument, no, no, that's right.
Q. No. In fact, could I suggest to you that it has never been used before or since, to your knowledge?
A. Yeah. The nine indicators, you know, are part of -
are drawn from the instrument that I'm --
Q. Well, they're drawn from a curriculum in the United States --
A. Yes.
Q. -- which is a teaching curriculum?
A. Yes.
Q. Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that right? So they're drawn from a document, but one would hardly call it an instrument?
A. Right, yep. Well, I think we're - I think I'm trying to - what we're talking about, I think - I'm not sure we are - are the specific indicators and whether they - and the values as wel1, so if - so Levin and McDevitt developed a paper, developed a set of - a taxonomy, and that taxonomy generated into a form, McLaugh1in et al, you know.
Q. We11, a list of indicators?
A. Developed a 1 ist of indicators out of that. I think that the difficulty - and so we can talk about the difficulty of that genesis.
Q. Sure. I don't - this is not purely nitpicking --
A. No, I understand.
Q. -- I just want to make sure you understand the distinction I'm going to draw --
A. Okay.
Q. -- between the 10 indicators, on the one hand --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- and the form or instrument, on the other hand, which has much more in it than just the 10 indicators.
A. Yes, yes.
Q. So you are following what I'm putting?
A. Mmm.
Q. Al1 right.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Is the answer to that question, yes, you are following what he is putting?
A. I think so.
Q. He is drawing a distinction between the verbiage which, in part, are indicators, burning crosses, et cetera, et cetera --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and the precise form which was used by the police in this case, which, as I think - I think you have acknowledged, has much more information contained in it and many more questions than indeed the indicators themselves? A. Right. Sure, yes.
Q. So he's drawing the distinction between the text of the indicators, as it were, and the indicators in the context of the additional questions in the form used by the police.
A. Yes.
Q. He's describing the latter as an instrument. Are we on the same page or not? Are you going to say, "I think so", are you?
A. So sometimes I get a bit of a mental fog, sorry.
Q. Let's get rid of the fog and I will let Mr Gray ask you again. But he is drawing the distinctions as I have tried to, perhaps badly, point out, between the term of the indicators identifying areas of possible discrimination and bias, as opposed to those independent indicators embedded in the particular form used by the police with the additional words and questions and prompts used?
A. Sure, sure, okay.
Q. That's the instrument, the latter, the corpus of what I have just described is the instrument he is talking about?
A. The latter is the instrument.
Q. Yes.
A. Okay.

MR GRAY: Q. In other words, the instrument is the form, being the form attached as an appendix to your report.
That's the instrument. Do you follow?
A. Okay, yeah.
Q. Now, did you tell the police that the form or the way
it was being used by the police had all these flaws that you have identified in both the report and in your response document?
A. This? Not that I - not that I'm - I do recall some conversations with the police with respect to the difficulty of following - you know, filling the form in the way that they were - in the way that they were suggesting. Yes.
Q. Well, wasn't it your view - tell me if I've misunderstood - that because of all these flaws in the police methodology, their overall approach was at least to some extent misconceived in embarking on this task?
A. I think "misconceived" is a strong word. You know, having looked at some of the criticisms of the Levin and McDevitt, and McDevitt et al, research with respect to this, the elements of their form, I think it may be a very difficult task to develop a form which has the requisite the kind of requirements that, for instance, Austin Lovegrove would prefer to set it at. I think that's that's - that's why I'm a little bit hesitant now, currently --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Doctor, I'm so sorry, you're not being asked about theoretical questions.
A. Okay .
Q. You're being asked about the precise instrument?
A. Yes.
Q. And the precise instrument - leave aside whether it would be in your view unattainable --
A. Yes.
Q. -- namely, Professor Lovegrove's ambition being unattainable, leave that to one side?
A. Okay.
Q. You're being asked about this form. So could you just focus on this form for the moment.

Mr Gray?
MR GRAY: Q. The question I'm putting really is wasn't it your view that because of these various flaws in the form and in the way the police were using the form, that their methodology was compromised from the start, the
methodology was not capable of delivering the outcome that was needed?
A. I don't know that - did we say that? I don't --
Q. I'm putting - I'm asking you if that was your view?
A. I don't remember saying that.
Q. No, I'm asking if that was your view?
A. No, that would be too strong.
Q. Well, tell us what your view was in relation to the form, the instrument, in the light of your having recognised all these flaws or problems or shortcomings with it?
A. Mmm-hmm. That in trying to review the material that we were reviewing, we found it very difficult to follow along with the - in the - with the constraints of that form, to come up with a - with a determination.

Now, we were - at the time, we were fixated on this question of, "Well, when did the scales tip, and is the form helping us to establish when the scales tip so that we have a bias crime?" And we didn't feel that the form was helping us, you know, to determine where the scales tip and now we can say, "Tick, there's a bias crime".

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Why not? Why not?
A. Well, because - and this is in somewhat retrospect, I don't know at the time that $I$ was thinking this, I can't say for sure, but it's - there may be one item which is sufficient to tip the scales in a context, and that item in a different context will not tip the scales. The configuration of a context or the factors and the significant experimental item are so various and so multitudinous in their arrangement that I now think it's very difficult to develop an instrument, but I'm going too much --
Q. I'm sorry, Doctor. We're not interested in whether or not there are difficulties. We really are - I am particularly interested in what was your problem with the form and why didn't it deliver, from your point of view, satisfactorily the answers or the information that you thought you needed?
A. Primarily because it didn't articulate the relation with bias and the - that each - the elements of a bias crime, to my mind, needed to be placed on some kind of
a meaningful set, a meaningful taxonomy, and I didn't see a meaningful taxonomy when we were using the instrument. Now --
Q. Sorry, no, no, stopping there, please. When you say you didn't see a meaningful taxonomy, precisely what do you mean?
A. Well, because - so we have these various elements, and - for instance, gang members of - even motive was in there, a lack of motive, as an example. And to me that's so it almost looks like it's brought out of somewhere but where I don't know. How motive relates to other features or elements of a crime that is bias crime is not clear. So it - so I think I needed a sort of a meaningful taxonomy in order to identify --
Q. I'm going to ask you again. You've given one example. Would you like to see the form for the purposes of pointing out what you say was not the meaningful taxonomy? It's fair, I think, if you go to the form. Perhaps Mr Gray will--

MR GRAY: Page 121 of that.
THE COMMISSIONER: Just go to that and by all means go through each of the questions or prompts and help me understand what it is when you say at a general level, as I understand you to be saying, that it didn't provide a meaningful taxonomy. Just make sure we've got the right tab number.

THE WITNESS: Where am I?
MR GRAY: It should be exhibit 1, tab 2.
THE COMMISSIONER: Can someone just check --
THE WITNESS: I don't think I have --
THE COMMISSIONER: Could someone help Dr de Lint find the document.
Q. Perhaps get rid of the other folder for the moment, just to clear the decks, and then if you go to tab 2 , hopefully, of that folder.
A. Page?

MR GRAY: Q. Page 121.
THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Just before you go to it, can I ask you a couple of preliminary questions. In your involvement in the Parrabell exercise, was this the first time you had ever seen such a form as this?
A. I think there is something along - along these lines related to terrorism.
Q. Okay. But you had seen some similar types of questions --
A. Yes.
Q. -- or a similar form in the terrorism context?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that right?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay. And - all right. Thank you. Now, if you go to the page that has been suggested, I'11 let Mr Gray ask you the questions, but I'm interested in content in the comment you made a few minutes ago that it didn't provide a meaningful taxonomy.

MR GRAY: Q. So can you tell us what you mean by that with reference to the form itself? How did it fail to provide a meaningful taxonomy?
A. Well, so bias crime is a message crime, and so one can break down messaging. And so that - that sort of provides some sense of taxonomy because you think, well, you know, "Comments, written statements, gestures" - well, you know, what's the point of that? Well, the point of that is that there is a messaging of bias. So you're trying to fit elements into a rubric, and so that's - so I understand you know, "Drawings, markings, symbols, tattoos", again messaging, right? "Communication, organised hate groups", right? "Victim/witness perception", okay? You know, obviously it's important, you know, how does it fit in. Well, it's - you know, as I say, it's --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. What I'm going to do is this, Doctor. It's after 1 o'clock. I'm going to adjourn for the luncheon break. By all means, if you would like to have a look at that form over the luncheon break, and would you please take away with you the question - namely, your response a few minutes ago, that you did not think it
provided a meaningful taxonomy?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you come back with that focus, and by all means, we will provide some arrangement for you to have a look at that document. Would it help you to have a more careful look at that document over the break?
A. It might.

THE COMMISSIONER: It might? Well, let's just hope that it might, in which case, might you have a look at it, and we will come back to it shortly after 2 . Thank you.

## LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT

THE COMMISSIONER: Dr de Lint, would you be kind enough just to come back into the witness box, thank you very much.

Yes, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Q. Now, Dr de Lint, before lunch you were asked some questions, some of them by the Commissioner, about why it was that you found the BCIF not to provide a satisfactory taxonomy.
A. Yes .
Q. What can you tell us about that?
A. With a taxonomy, you break the phenomenon down into types, usually some kind of division of types. And then you further break that down into maybe crime elements, elements that are necessary and sufficient, I suppose, for the completion of the type in the - and the crime, and then you break that down further into various characteristic indicators, along each type - into each type.

And so that allows you to cluster that information logically from a definition or anderstanding, mutual understanding of the phenomenon, into its constituents, broader constituent parts and into narrower constituent parts, actually. That's what a taxonomy is.

Now, if - and it's not that difficult to see how this may have been derived, you know, from a taxonomy, but the evidence of that taxonomy is not clear in this instrument as it - as it was provided to us.
Q. The evidence of the taxonomy?
A. Of the taxonomy, yes.
Q. What would the evidence of the taxonomy be?
A. The clustering of those characteristics into those types or into those elements.
Q. In the blank template we're talking about, before it's filled in?
A. Before you have this blank template of just
indicators, you've got a - you've got a grouping of these indicators - prior to that you have a grouping of the indicators by type and then elements.
Q. You mean you should have?
A. You should have.
Q. But this didn't have that?
A. Doesn't have it.
Q. And that's a defect from the get-go, is it?
A. Yes. Well, it makes it very difficult to understand the logic, when you're filling in the information.

Now, it's not that it's impossible, but for me, as a person who likes to have an organisation of materials, a logic to the development of the material, it made it very difficult. It made it very difficult and it made it - and the other thing about a taxonomy is it should not be - the characteristic parts or the types should not be redundant; they should be discrete to the --
Q. They shouldn't overlap, do you mean?
A. They shouldn't overlap. And not all typologies do that. Some are - some fail in that requirement, and that causes more difficulty for the --
Q. Was the effect, in your mind of those flaws or defects --
A. $\quad \mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. -- such that you felt the form was not realistically useable?
A. It was, for us, more difficult to use it than to devise an alternative.
Q. But for them, the police?
A. I can't speak for them.
Q. Why not?
A. Because I wasn't using the form as an officer or an investigator. If I was, yeah, possibly I would say, wel1, if - besides, I'm a social scientist, so these things are different for me, $I$ have a different context or perspective.
Q. Let me approach it from this perspective. Could Dr de Lint please have volume 12. I'm going to show you yes, that one could go back for the moment. Would you turn to tab 256 [SCOI. 82366.00001_0001]. This is the report of Professor Austin Lovegrove, which I know you've read - you've read this?
A. I have not read the report in its - have I read the report in its entirety? I think so.
Q. You've provided a document in response to it?
A. Yes, but I did not - yes, I did - as a response to elements of it that $I$ - that $I$ thought were elements that I wanted to respond to.
Q. So you haven't read the whole Lovegrove report?
A. I think I - I'm tempted to say I have read the whole thing but $I$ - you know, I'm hedging my bets there. Yeah, I don't know - I think I've read the whole thing but I don't know for sure.
Q. What about the report of Professor Asquith; did you read that?
A. Yes.
Q. You read that?
A. Yes.
Q. And Ms Coakley?
A. Yes.
Q. So you read those two but you're not sure if you read Professor Lovegrove?
A. I'm not sure if I read the complete - the whole report. Maybe $I$ have.
Q. In your response document that you submitted a few weeks ago, or a couple of months ago -A. Yeah.
Q. -- you referred in various places to Professor Lovegrove's report --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and as I read what you wrote in that document, you were largely, if not entirely, accepting of various things that he said?
A. Yes, some things that he said I was accepting.
Q. Well, I didn't notice you not accepting any of it.
A. Well, I didn't necessarily respond to all of the - all of the report that I would not have accepted.
Q. Even though you were asked to put in a - or invited to put in a response?
A. No - well - sure, yes, even although that, yes. Very much so.
Q. Well, let me just show you the summary part of what he has to say about the form. He says - this is a capitulation of his views. If you turn to page 27 at paragraph 102 he says - and he's talking about the police methodology, including the form, and he sets out the following conclusions; do you see that at 102 ?
A. Yes.
Q. When we get over to 104 , he offers the view that the choice of the form was not soundly based and cannot be taken to be adequate. He gives some reasons. Would you read that paragraph and tell us if you agree.
A. Yes, I agree - I don't know that it needed to - well, yes, I agree.
Q. Thank you. In 105, he points to the different standards of proof applicable to different parts of the form, and you no doubt are aware that, as I did mention to you this morning, for the first indicator - sorry, the first criterion, "No Bias Crime", the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard is embedded in the option?
A. It is embedded in the form, yes.
Q. Yes, and later in the form - later in the form, and if you don't recall this I will show it to you - another part of the process is said to be needing to be dealt with by the civil standard - that is, balance of probabilities. Just assume for the moment that that's so. What

Professor Lovegrove is saying is that having different standards of proof in different parts of the process is problematic. Would you agree with that?
A. I would tend to agree that the standard should be the same. I think that applying a standard of proof is a difficult one but - yes.
Q. And he adds that the use of the standard beyond reasonable doubt for assessments with respect to each of the 10 indicators - that is, as to whether there was evidence of bias crime or not - risked missing cases where bias was actually present; do you agree with that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Then in paragraph 106, he says:

The Strike Force adopted the [form] without any evidence of its reliability and validity.

And he expands on that slightly in $106 ?$
A. Yes.
Q. If you could read 106, could you then tell me if you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. In 107 he says:

With respect to validity, an analysis of its face validity --
and I interpolate alone -pointed to low validity.

Now, appreciating this is a summary of views that he has expressed at greater length earlier in the report, do you agree with 107?
A. Yes.
Q. And at 108 he says:

The preceding three problems render the BCIF a crude instrument for present purposes and the accuracy of any conclusion about the incidence of bias very uncertain.

Would you agree with that?
A. I'm not sure whether "very uncertain" or "uncertain" or "somewhat uncertain" would be the right description.
Q. Well, with the exception of which qualifier to apply
to the word "uncertain", you would agree with what he says in paragraph 108; is that right?
A. Okay, yeah.
Q. And in 109 you can see that he says:

The Strike Force's reporting of their analysis of the case data is too obscure.

And:

This applies to the use of the BCIF in identifying gay hate as a factor ... and, with this, the process of classifying the cases according to the presence of bias.

And he identifies two consequences flowing, the first being the reader has no means of assessing the soundness or validity of the team's judgments; do you agree with that?
A. I would agree with it with a longer - a caveat, and that includes the subsequent point.
Q. What's the caveat?
A. Is there a tool that matches those requirements?

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. No, that is not the question, if I may say so.
A. Wel1, that's my caveat.
Q. No, no, no.
A. Okay.
Q. We are interested in this tool used by the police here, and insofar as it may be your view that it's simply not possible ever to devise such a tool is beside the point, from my point of view for the moment, it might emerge later. So would you go back to looking at it in the context of this tool in this strike force.
A. Okay, yeah.

MR GRAY: Q. So you agree with the point that he makes
in paragraph 109(1)?
A. Yes, it says "social science research project" - oh, you are not talking about (2) yet.
Q. So is that the answer, yes, that you agree with what he says in subparagraph (1)?
A. Yes.
Q. Then as to subparagraph (2) he says:

It fails a basic requirement of a social science research project, namely, the opportunity for independent researchers to replicate the actual study.
A. Yes.
Q. You would agree with that, I take it?
A. Yeah.
Q. So at 110 he says, in his view:

The pivotal role of the BCIF in this study represents faux science; it imparts a false sense of research rigour and validity.

Would you accept with that?
A. Wel1, it's - I would again say that it's - is it
a scientific instrument? I would question that it's
a scientific instrument from the get-go.
Q. Does it impart a false sense of research rigour and validity, given all the matters we've just gone through?
A. I don't know that it does. I don't necessarily think that it's a false sense of rigour and validity. I think the sense of rigour and validity that one gets from it is quite plain.
Q. Go back to 109(1) and (2), which you have accepted as correct.
A. As a social science research project?
Q. $\quad \mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$
A. I don't - it isn't a social science research project.
Q. Does it fail the basic requirement of a social research project?
A. Yeah, it's - it isn't, in my view --
Q. I understand you're saying that, but does it fail the basic requirement of such a project - namely, that an independent researcher has no way of replicating it?
A. It fails the requirement that it isn't, as

I understand it, aspiring to be.
Q. No, you're not answering my question. Is it a report - that is, the police report, using the form - one which does not enable an independent researcher to replicate the study and thus test its reliability?
A. We11, I disagree with the premise.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. It's not a social science research project.
Q. I've taken that out of the question.
A. Okay.
Q. I'11 put the question again. Whether it's accurately characterised as a social science research project or not --
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. -- given the flaws with it which $I$ have taken you through from 104 through to 108 --
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. -- is it the case that the police side of the exercise, employing the form, is an exercise where no independent researcher would have been able to replicate the actual study? It is unverifiable in that sense?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. We11, that imparts a false sense of research rigour and validity, doesn't it?
A. I think there are different standards in terms of research, and you need to place a particular instrument within, $I$ suppose, the community of devices that are relevant or appropriate for that type of instrument, and I think that those standards that Professor Lovegrove is wishing the instrument to meet are exceedingly difficult for many research projects in social science.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. That may be so, but insofar as it clearly isn't, from your vantage point as a social
scientist, a social science tool, then insofar as it purports to give the appearance of rigour and validity, it simply can't, because it is not a social science tool; it's a crude implement - isn't that the position?
A. I don't know that it's purporting to be such.
Q. Not to you, but if someone looked at it and looked at the form, they'd be entitled to think, wouldn't they, that the police were undergoing a process by which they were interrogating their files in order to provide empirical data?
A. Yes.
Q. And insofar as it gives that impression, it clearly, by reason of the fact that it requires such a degree of subjectivity, is not producing empirical data at all; it's producing opinion after opinion of a particular police officer?
A. Now, for example --
Q. No, please --
A. We11, I would say no, I would disagree with that, then.
Q. You would disagree?
A. Yes.
Q. But you were reluctant to endorse the indicators? A. As I explained, because you asked me to talk about taxonomies and why it was that we had difficulty using the instrument.
Q. Well, you say in footnote 20 you were reluctant to endorse the indicators?
A. Yeah.
Q. Why?
A. One, because it was not clear to me, as I described before, what the relationship was between the characteristics, the elements and the typology and then the definition. That thread of relationship is not clear, looking at the way that this instrument is laid out. So that was one of the reasons that I'm reluctant to endorse it.

The other - the difficulty that I'm having, and I don't know if anybody else has it, but - is that in some
social science, what occurs is a concordance. So instead of what Professor Lovegrove is talking about which is, you know, looking at each item as an element and looking and testing it in terms of reliability and validity, what occurs is a more crude method, which is these - and it's referred to by Geoffrey Steer in the term "aide-memoire". What is used is a device to cover, as much as possible, each of the possible universe of characteristics that are related to bias crime.

Discovering these and discovering them with equal equally amongst various people in various - from various different - I suppose, with various different expectations, may produce some concordance over the attribution of that as a - as significant enough to be worthy of a judgment that the criteria has been met.
Q. The basis ultimately of each of these forms was to procure, in effect, anecdotal material, wasn't it?
A. I would not characterise it that way, no.
Q. How would you describe it? It's putting together, by reason of different prompts, different parts of the narrative, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Detected by the police officers?
A. Yes.
Q. So insofar as what it's doing at various points along the way by reference to individual - for example, we know there were no burning crosses, we know perhaps where that comes from. But the reality is each of the prompts was producing no more or no less than the subjective view of the police officer as to the particular part of the narrative that fitted that interrogatory?
A. I think that --
Q. Would you like to answer the question, please?
A. Well, no, I don't think that it's anecdotal.
Q. Okay. So the police officers were doing what, over and above, just extracting at various points by reason of the prompts, aspects of the narrative or the anecdotal material, historical, concerning the individual case?
A. Perhaps if you might repeat the question, I --
Q. Well, the individual prompts, as you have seen from the forms, one of which you were shown this morning, produce different permutations and combinations factually of the narrative surrounding the particular death?
A. Yes, maybe.
Q. We11 - okay, in some instances, the burning cross issue, which I'm asking about too much, perhaps, is crossed off - pardon the pun - because it doesn't arise. But some of the questions, all they merely did, from the forms you saw, was not only produce a narrative or a portion of the narrative but often no more than a repetition of the same narrative?
A. Right. Yep.
Q. That was your impression of what you saw?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. And so, therefore, what the police officers were doing were using the prompts, sure. But all the prompts were doing were the police officer's view as to which part of the narrative might be a relevant response to that prompt? A. Okay, yes. In terms of how the - okay, so part of my answer would be that - yes. But does the use of the tool require that result from the user? In other words, if the police were doing that with this particular tool, does the tool always generate that response from the user?
Q. Well, because it's subjective, you would have to, wouldn't you, say most likely it would not provide a rigorous response, because one police officer's view of the narrative or the appropriate response to a particular prompt may be a different view, subjectively, to another police officer's view?
A. Well, yes. May I say that as long as in the initial investigation, or in a reinvestigation, or what have you, all of the relevant elements of that narrative have been recorded, then - and as long as those relevant elements that have been recorded will then be reflected in the document produced in the BCIF, then you have at least one element of what you need, which is the experimental value.
Q. And whether it's relevant or not, you were entirely dependent upon the choice by the police officer as to relevance?
A. Yes, we would - yes. We would - we assumed, and we may have been wrong, but we made that assumption, that all
of the - the key elements - so in other words, even if this form was used by somebody who didn't really have very good instructions, and, in fact, the form is difficult to use even with someone with good instruction, they nevertheless captured what any bias crime investigator would want to capture in terms of those - for those characteristics. So as long as the - those characteristics were captured and found their way into the narrative, how they were sprinkled around this document wouldn't have concerned me that much, I suppose you could say.

MR GRAY: Q. Does that mean, though, that in terms of what the police were doing, as distinct from what you were later doing in looking at what they had done, in terms of what they were doing, really, they weren't, in effect, using the form at all; they were just selecting from the papers available to them relevant bits generally to what might have something to do with bias crime?
A. I would tend to agree with that.
Q. Right. Well --
A. Now, but --
Q. Doesn't that suggest - sorry, you go on.
A. Again, so what you want to capture with your device like, let's say your device is some kind of, I don't know, like a fly trap, you know, as long as your device is catching the flies that are out there, despite that, you know - despite how it does it, if it does it very crudely, and in a very problematic way, as long as that elemental fly is in the trap and you can sort out that, well, it's there, then, you know - and this goes against the social science question as well - well, what's the purpose of the science? What's the purpose of it? Have you just - you know, do you have some confidence that you have discovered it? Well, that has to do with whether or not the individual officer at the crime, or subsequently with a homicide, or subsequently after that, has scanned the elements to ensure that they've discovered that experimental value.
Q. Yes.
A. And if that has happened, then you're okay. If it hasn't happened, whatever template you're using, you're going to be lost.
Q. But on this template, given that your sense is that
that's probably what happened, then the whole apparatus of the form was basically irrelevant?
A. It's not irrelevant, because - and this is why the prompts are irritating to me, prompts are important, and they should be set out in a structured way so that people are prompted for the purposes that they need to be prompted, but prompts are valuable.

Now, you know, if it's in the narrative and there's a prompt, you can tease it out of the narrative, that has a value.
Q. All right. Let me put this to you: given that your sense is that that's what they did, that only emphasises even more the reality which you yourself have pointed to in your document that, really, in the end, they were simply reading the old material and expressing an opinion subjectively as to whether it was in or it was out of one of these categories?
A. They were - they were - no, I don't think they were yes - well, subjectively - let me - let me say this: if you tease out the - if you tease out the element, it's called the experimental value, which is the bias, the indication of bias crime, then basically - and the tool helps you, assists you in teasing out that element and putting it - and placing it in front of another person, then that - then that is, you know, primarily the value of the tool, I suppose.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Sure. But the plain reality let's address the reality - you could not endorse the indicators and you invented your own categories by reason of the inadequacy of the indicators that were being used?
A. Okay.
Q. No, not "okay".
A. May I answer that --
Q. Would you please answer that question. You could not endorse the indicators, and I'm reading from footnote 20 -A. Yeah.
Q. -- and you didn't say, "We'll use a little bit of the form for this reason and a little bit of the form for that reason". What you then did was to say, "We can't use the indicators, there's no academic support or literature, it's not best practice, and so we need, in order for us to do
our job, to invent a different set of components or characteristics"?
A. I would like to elaborate on that.
Q. I'd like you to answer the question first then you can elaborate.
A. If you are quoting what we said before, of course, that's --
Q. We11, do I misquote you?
A. That's true, then.
Q. Do I misquote you?
A. No, I'm not saying you are.
Q. Therefore, let's go back over it. You couldn't endorse the indicators. There was no literature they could supply. You were surprised, you say in footnote 20 , to discover there was no academic 1 iterature at all in support of the form. You didn't pick little bits out of it, you used the narrative, clearly, that you got from the police, or narratives, and you had your own categorisation for the purposes of achieving what you thought needed to be done? A. Well, there's more to it than that, but yes.
Q. We11, when you say, "there's more to it than that, but yes", is that not an accurate description of precisely what you did? You couldn't endorse the indicators; you then go on to perhaps look at the summaries that you were provided with; but you devise your own categories to answer the question, whether gay hate bias is present or not?
A. We placed some of those indicators, we understood those indicators, some of those indicators to be valuable.
Q. Doctor, I'm terribly sorry to persist and maybe in your neck of the woods it's not capable of concise answer, but I'm reading your terms:

The academic team are reluctant to endorse the indicators.
A. Yes.
Q. You didn't use those indicators, you invented I don't put that pejoratively - you devised your own categories, did you not?
A. Yes, we were reluctant to endorse the indicators.
Q. And you didn't use them; you used your own categories, all right?
A. Yes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Gray, you take over.
MR GRAY: Q. Just on subjectivity, in that same volume you've got, could you turn to tab 258 [SCOI. 82365_0001], which is your response document. On my copy it's the second page but it's under a heading "C. Evaluation and Evaluation Tools". You see the paragraph beginning "The evaluation of bias crime by police"?
A. Oh, I've got - yeah.
Q. You say:

The evaluation of bias crime by police for purposes of recording crime and otherwise is fraught. It is dependent on subjective evaluation or non-objective consensus or concordance-seeking devices?
A. Yes.
Q. That's, as I understand it, something that you are applying to the Bias Crime Indicators Form, which is something you have talked about in the preceding paragraph; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. You're saying that's a problem with the form and it requires - it's dependent on subjective evaluation?
A. Well, it's - more general than that.

THE COMMISSIONER: No, please.
MR GRAY: Q. Read the previous paragraph.
THE COMMISSIONER: Q. I really - Doctor, you chose, did you, on your own, the words in this response document?
A. Right.
Q. And it says at the very front that they were endorsed by Associate Professor Dalton?
A. Yes, it does.
Q. What does that mean? Did he read them and discuss them with you?
A. Okay. Which question am I answering --
Q. You're answering my question, and I'm asking you this document is in your words?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Al1 right. And at the very beginning of it - I'11 come back to this paragraph in a minute --
A. Okay.
Q. -- it says:

This response is written by Willem de Lint and endorsed by Associate Professor Dalton?
A. Yes.
Q. A11 right. So I'm assuming you gave him a draft. You discussed it?
A. I gave him a draft to read.
Q. Did you discuss it?
A. No.
Q. And he wrote back and said either, "I'm happy with it", or "These are some changes"?
A. Yes. He said, "I'm happy". He didn't say, "Here are some changes."
Q. A11 right. Come back to the paragraph you've been asked about now and Mr Gray will ask you some more questions.

MR GRAY: Q. Now, the top section begins:

As described in our report ... the [form]
is a version of a tool created ... [in]
Massachusetts ...
For the reasons $I$ have mentioned, that's not quite accurate. It does include nine indicators from Massachusetts.
A. Yes.
Q. But the Massachusetts document is not a tool in any
relevant sense?
A. Okay.
Q. Then you say:

The [New South Wales] form includes 9 [indicators] ...
you say "from the BCIF", which is again wrong; you mean it includes nine indicators from the Massachusetts document?
A. Yes.
Q. Plus a tenth, "Level of violence"?
A. Yes.
Q. Then in that context, immediately in the next sentence you say:

The evaluation of bias crime by police for purposes of recording crime and otherwise is fraught. It is dependent on subjective evaluation ...

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et cetera?
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A. Yes.
Q. Now, you are applying that, aren't you, to the form as we11 as more generally?
A. That's what $I$ wanted to say, yes.
Q. So - thank you. And you say:

It requires --
and I take it you mean the evaluation of bias crime including by this form:

It requires but cannot deliver on an objective weighing of the role of all necessary and sufficient factors ...
A. Yeah.
Q. Right. So I will put it to you again, if I may, that the actual reality of what the police were doing, whatever usefulness there may or may not have been from prompts in the form, was to extract from the material they had
historically that which they thought had something to do with, relevantly to bias crime being present or not, and then to express an opinion, subjectively; isn't that what they did?
A. Yes, they developed a view of the case using the prompts related to the indicators, which spring from the nine indicators plus the one that they added.
Q. Yes. And, having done that, they expressed a series of subjective opinions?
A. Yes, or they - or they made a determination following from that exercise.
Q. Subjectively, in their minds. I'm not suggesting they were doing it --
A. Well, now, we need to talk about what "subjective means, I suppose.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. No, well, what did you mean by it when you talked about it was dependent on a subjective evaluation - your words?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, tell us what you meant.
A. Okay, so I may - I may be - what I should - what I should say, individual --
Q. No, no, hang on a minute. I'm really - when you say what you "should say", do you mean what you should have said --
A. Should have said, yeah.
Q. -- as opposed to what you have said?
A. Yeah, should have said
Q. Okay, does that mean, then, you withdraw parts of the paragraph commencing "The evaluation of bias crime"?
A. This is why I wanted to discuss what - "subjective" is a - I used the word "subjective" --
Q. Doctor, I'm trying to be organised about this for my own purposes at the moment --
A. Okay.
Q. -- and even for those who are trying to understand what you're saying. Do you stand by the first two sentences in the second paragraph under the heading "C.

Evaluation and Evaluation Tools"? And I will just so that you know:

The evaluation of bias crime ...
et cetera, and the second sentence?
A. Well, yes, but - so some tools are concordance-seeking devices --
Q. Now, Doctor --
A. Yes, okay.
Q. -- I'm terribly sorry --
A. Sorry, yes.
Q. -- I'm not just going to permit to you go off.
A. All right, yes.
Q. I'm asking you a direct question. You are here partly because of your involvement in Parrabell. You are also here because, on one view, of your expertise, okay? Now, do you stand by those two sentences or not, or do you wish to qualify them?
A. Yes, I'll stand by them.
Q. Sorry?
A. Okay, yes.
Q. No, no, look --
A. Yes, I stand by them.
Q. -- when you say, "Okay", I want you to be comfortable that what you are saying "Okay" to is something that you are carefully considering; okay? If you tell me that this is not a careful consideration of a response, that's one thing, but I would have assumed, having received it in the form that it's in - maybe I'm wrong - I assume that you had carefully considered every word of what you wrote, together with all of the references you put at the end of it, or am I wrong about that?
A. I have, and to that - to the - yes. Okay, yes, I I'11 stand by it.

THE COMMISSIONER: All right, Mr Gray.
MR GRAY: Q. Well, to a similar intent, could we turn over a couple of pages in your document, there's a heading
about two pages on which says "3. How are indicators or factors weighed or scored?"
A. Yeah.
Q. And that goes for about a page and a half, so about a page down into that, so it will be on page 5 . We need to scroll down further, a bit further still, and just go another line or two, stop there. No, just back a bit, thank you.

I took you to this before, if you have it open on the page as well, it's probably easier but, anyway, you yourself, in this section, are pointing out the unhelpful and occasionally incorrectly designated nature of some of the prompts and other features of the form, and then you quote, or then you cite Professor Lovegrove pointing out another set of problems; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then would you read to yourself the paragraph beginning "As he observes" - just read that to yourself.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, again, I put to you that what you are again accepting is that the police method involved, in the end, a great deal of subjective interpretation on the part of the officers working on a particular case - these are your words?
A. Yep.
Q. So you agree?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. Thank you. Now, on that same document - and I hesitate to take the time that this might need - if you go back a couple of pages to what is page 3 in the version I have, under the heading of "What is the purpose of the BCIF?", you say in respect of Martha Coakley that she has put forward in her report five primary reasons for the use of the tool - do you see that?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Now, when one goes to the paragraph of her report that you've cited, which is page 12 of her report, it's apparent that she's not putting reasons forward for the use of the tool; she's putting forward reasons for the use of the indicators.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, given the discussion I had with you this morning, do you accept that they are two different conceptual things?
A. Okay.
Q. So the result is that your criticism of her, both in this paragraph and in a couple of other paragraphs, for supposedly saying this or that about the tool, is somewhat misconceived, may $I$ suggest, because in every paragraph where you've done that, she has actually been talking about not the tool, but the indicators?
A. Okay. I'11 take that on, yes.
Q. Thank you. And --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. When you say you'11 take that on? A. I - I hear it, I made a mistake and I appreciate your pointing that out.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Thank you. For example, if you scroll down further there's a heading "What is its applicability?" And go down to the next page. If we could scroll down further, and further still, in the paragraph beginning "Here, Martha Coakley" - just scroll back up again so we can see what comes before, please. Thanks. You quote Martha Coakley referring to the form in that bit that's extracted, the quoted passage, and then you say that her interpretation of the form is at odds with other views of how the BCIF is to be used, and you say:

For instance, it --
and I don't know whether you are referring to the form there, you seem to be --
is also characterised as the "model
protocol for bias crime investigation."
Now - -
A. No, I'm not.
Q. I'm not sure where you've got that from, but you are not saying that about this particular form?
A. No, I'm not, sorry. That's not --
Q. While we're at it, in the next sentence you say this:

It may be observed that the term "investigation" by definition refers to cases that are in the process of being "solved".

Isn't an investigation a process that may or may not lead to solving?
A. It's in the process of.
Q. Of being solved or not being solved?
A. Or of not being solved, sure.
Q. Yes.
A. If it fails in the process of being solved, it's not solved.
Q. Now, move to your methodology. We need a different folder now, we need exhibit 1, tab 2 [SCOI.02632_0001] again. If we turn to page 92 of the Parrabell report, there's a table there, or a graph, which summarises the numerical results reached by the academic team; correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. And it's clear that you have used four categories: one, "Anti-gay Bias"; two, "Anti-paedophile Animus"; three, "Insufficient Information"; and four, "No Evidence of Bias Crime"; correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. Now, in the police categories, they had different categories. Number 1 was "Evidence of Bias Crime", we can see that on the page before, page 91?
A. Yep.
Q. "Evidence of Bias Crime"; "Suspected Bias Crime" --
A. Yes.
Q. -- "Insufficient Information", and "No Evidence of Bias Crime".
A. Yes.
Q. So the third and fourth of those are common to both, "Insufficient Information" and "No Evidence of Bias Crime"?
A. Yes.
Q. But among other things, you don't have a category of "Suspected Bias Crime" or anything similar; you don't have a "Suspected" category, do you?
A. Yeah - no.
Q. You have - either it's in column 1 or 2, which is
"Anti-gay Bias" or "Anti-paedophile Animus"?
A. Yep.
Q. Or it's out altogether as "No Evidence"?
A. Yep.
Q. Or it's in the "Insufficient" category?
A. Yep.
Q. Was there a reason for leaving out that intermediate category?
A. Yes. When we talked about it, we thought, we11, for us, if there is any indication that there is a bias crime, that's sufficient. I think the police were trying to apply their standard that you talked about, beyond a reasonable doubt, and maybe that's why they had that distinction. We didn't try to apply that standard.
Q. Okay. Let me ask you these things: elsewhere in your report, about 10 pages earlier, page 82 , you set out your definition of "Bias Crime"; do you see at the bottom of 82 and up to the top of 83 , with the $(a),(b)$ and (c)? A. Yep.
Q. So "Bias Crime" for your definition (a) expresses a categorical animus directed at a person or group, et cetera; (b) produces an act that intentionally, by way of criminal predation, on the basis of that categorical animus, causes harm to that person or group; and (c) is mitigated or aggravated by an offender's contemporaneous associations that are 1 inked by a commitment of denunciatory non-identification with the vulnerable person; correct?
A. Yep.
Q. That's your definition of "Bias Crime"? Now, in the next paragraph, when you begin your discussion about what flows from your definition, you make it clear, in the third line, that your subparagraph (a) of your definition of
"Bias Crime" requires that the act expresses an animus by some form of communication --
A. Yep.
Q. -- correct? So if an act does not involve some form of communication, it won't be a bias crime, on your approach?
A. It can't be - it can't be discovered, I don't think, if it isn't communicated.
Q. Right. So the answer to my question, accepting what you say, is yes: if you cannot identify some form of communication by the perpetrator, whether it's a degree of violence or whether it's in utterances, statements, gestures or other communications, then it's out; it can't be bias crime?
A. Yeah, there - I think there's no way - otherwise, it's a thought crime without any - without any way of relating that thought, without any real way of discovering that thought, because it hasn't been communicated.
Q. But if someone's killed someone, it's hardly a thought crime, is it?
A. How would you know that the person who's killed somebody is doing that because of a bias towards that person?
Q. No, no, different question. You said if you can't find a communication, it's only a thought crime?
A. There has to be some element, there has to be some trace of communication.
Q. Or else what?
A. Or else you can't discover it.
Q. And so, can't be a bias crime?
A. If you can't discover it - if you can't --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Is the answer it can't be a bias crime? I don't know why you keep qualifying what you're about to say. Your position, as I understand it, is there is a requirement of communication, and if there isn't one, that's the end of it; it cannot be a bias crime because you have no thought, statement, gesture, whatever it may be? A. Yeah.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.

MR GRAY: Q. Well, that was inevitably going to result in a low number of cases meeting your threshold, wasn't it?
A. I don't think so. Why?
Q. Well, for example, would it be difficult to find a communication in the case of a body found at the bottom of a cliff?
A. How - how would you determine that --
Q. No, my question, please.
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. How would you find a communication where what you have is a body at the bottom of a cliff?
A. If that body was pushed by somebody, that is more than a gesture.
Q. That's the very thing that one doesn't know, though, when all you have is a body at the bottom of a cliff?
A. That's right, well--
Q. But you're considering cases that were just a body at the bottom of a cliff?
A. If that --
Q. And you - and, excuse me, according to your approach, that immediately could not possibly be a bias crime because there's no way you could divine any communication; correct?
A. If there was a communication, if that person was pushed off that cliff --
Q. Sure, you could --
A. A push is a --
Q. Of course it is, but you couldn't know that, you couldn't divine it, you couldn't discern it, could you?

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Unless there was evidence to that effect, you wouldn't know one way or the other, would you?
A. Yes, and if there was evidence then it would --
Q. If there was no evidence to that effect you wouldn't know one way or the other, would you?
A. No, but it could still be a bias crime because that the communication could have taken place.
Q. Oh, okay, so theoretically, anything could be a bias crime?
A. Not anything.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. It's one requirement.
Q. Well, I'm trying to follow what you're saying, and

I thought you said a moment ago there had to be
a communication, and if --
A. That's one - pardon, yes.
Q. I beg your pardon?
A. Yes, that's one element.
Q. Well, when you say it's one element, it's the first requirement, isn't it, as described by you?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you mean it's cumulative? Do we go to others or how do I consider what you are saying? I thought you agreed a moment ago --
A. The expression about the degree of violence --
Q. No, please, please. I thought you said a moment ago please correct me if I'm wrong --
A. Yes.
Q. -- I thought you said a moment ago in answer to a question by Mr Gray, if there was no form of communication - read for that no words, no gestures, nothing of the sort that you've identified - that would be the end of it, it could not be classified thereafter as a bias crime?
A. No, I don't agree with that.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
MR GRAY: Q. Why not? I think the transcript --
A. Because --
Q. Excuse me. Just a second. I think the transcript will tell us that a few minutes ago you did agree with that.
A. Okay.
Q. And that's why I want to chase it up. I'11 do it
again.
A. Yeah.
Q. In your page 80 --

MR TEDESCHI: Sir --

MR GRAY: Excuse me.

MR TEDESCHI: -- I object to the fact that this witness hasn't been allowed to complete a single answer now for about 10 minutes.

THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think that's right, Mr Tedeschi. I think, as you well know, non-responsive answers, it is always in the matter of the discretion of the person hearing it as to whether it is non-responsive, and you've taken no objection until now, and you take an objection retrospectively. So I don't understand - I do understand your objection, but $I$ am in a position where, if I think something is non-responsive, there's not one suggestion here that this person is going to be stopped from saying anything he wants to say, but he is obliged, with respect, as anyone is, to answer directly.

MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, with respect, it's very difficult, with such complex area --

THE COMMISSIONER: I know it is complex, and that's why I - -

MR TEDESCHI: Could I please make a submission, Commissioner?

THE COMMISSIONER: Sure.

MR TEDESCHI: It is very difficult with such a complex area to know, after a few words that he is allowed to give, whether it is responsive or not and --

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Tedeschi, there is an element of instinct, $I$ accept. But the fact is if he is asked a direct question and he doesn't purport to answer it, I am entitled to insist that he answers directly and with the caveat that if he needs to qualify it, either by my inviting him to do so, Mr Gray inviting him to do so or you ultimately inviting him to do so, he will be permitted to
do so.

MR TEDESCHI: I must say that my submission is that my perception is that he is being prevented from providing answers to questions.

THE COMMISSIONER: A11 right. We11, I don't see it that way, but thank you very much.

MR GRAY: Q. At page 82 you set out what seemed to be three components of your definition of "Bias Crime"; is that right - (a), (b) and (c)?
A. Okay, yeah.
Q. Well, is that right? Don't say "Okay". Are they the three components of your definition of "Bias crime"?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Are they cumulative - that is, does bias crime, in your definition, need (a) and (b) and (c) or is it something else?
A. It needs (a) and (b).
Q. It needs (a) and (b), and then, as to (c), that might mitigate or might aggravate?
A. Yeah.
Q. Al1 right. So (a) is essential?
A. Yep.
Q. Right. And in the next paragraph you tell us a bit about what (a) means and you say the first requirement --
which is expressed as a categorical animus is that the act expresses an animus, and does so by some form of communication directed at the target and, sometimes, the wider population; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you expand that by saying that the expression in question might be in the degree of violence, or it might be in the utterances, statements, gestures or other communications; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So aren't you saying very plainly that it is an essential requirement of a bias crime, according to your
definition, that there be some form of communication directed at the target?
A. Communication and, in the elaboration of that idea, this expression or this communication might be in the degree of violence or in the utterances, statements, gestures, communications --
Q. Yes, I put all that to you. So do you agree that some form of communication, according to your definition, is essential for there to be a bias crime?
A. Communication as expressed in --
Q. Yes.
A. In degree of violence or in utterances, statements, gestures or other communications.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Doctor, there is no doubt that we are accepting - I am accepting and Mr Gray is accepting, Mr Tedeschi no doubt will accept - that the term "communication" is enlarged or amplified by the expressions you have thereafter used, "degree of violence, utterances, statements, gestures", or a catch-all, "other communications".
A. Okay .

MR GRAY: Q. There is no doubt about that. We accept that that's what you say. But all of that is by way of expanding the point that you are making, which is that the requirement of your definition is expressing an animus by some form of communication. Are you really trying to move away from that or do you still say that?
A. Well, yeah - yes, and that communication --
Q. So the answer is yes. Sorry, I'll let you --
A. But I'm trying to say that communication that I'm referring to could be violence, utterances, statements, gestures.
Q. No, you've said that four times. I've understood that. You don't need to say it again. You've made that very clear.
A. All right.
Q. Accepting that it could be in those different forms, a form of communication is essential?
A. Yes, it is considered a message crime. A bias crime is a message crime.
Q. Is it essential - excuse me, is it essential, according to you, in your definition, paragraph (a) on page 82?
A. Yes, it expresses --
Q. Right. Now, if it --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Sorry, just hang on a minute. You uttered something after you just said "it". I want to make sure, Doctor, that you are agreeing with what is being put to you, that a communication is essential. Is that your first requirement, "communication", as defined by you in the sentence - "degree of violence", et cetera - but is it an essential item?
A. Yes, with the caveats that I've said.

MR GRAY: Q. When you say "with the caveats that I've said", you mean that the communication could be in any of the different forms --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that you have suggested?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that a "yes"?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. Well, take the body at the bottom of the cliff, where all you know is that the body is at the bottom of a cliff. You don't know how it got there, you don't know whether it was pushed, you don't know whether it fell, you don't know anything about it, except there it is. But you are assessing that case as to whether or not it is a bias crime. There is no communication able to be found, is there?
A. I don't know if there is no communication to be found.
Q. Well, what could it possibly be?
A. Well, you know, if there's evidence that the person was pushed.
Q. Excuse me, I just put that in, you don't - in the case that I'm putting to you, all you know is body at bottom of cliff.
A. $\mathrm{Mmm}-\mathrm{hmm}$.
Q. No evidence of being pushed. No evidence of how the body got there at a11. But it's one of the cases you have to address.
A. Mmm-hmm.
Q. How can you find communication?
A. If nothing else is known about that, other than there's a body at the bottom of the cliff, then, yeah, it is very difficult to find bias crime.
Q. Well, impossible?
A. Yeah.
Q. On your approach?
A. Yeah.
Q. Wouldn't it?
A. Yeah.
Q. So any such case, such as the case of John Russe11, would have to be, straightaway, no bias crime?
A. Well, if there is no - no information, yes, if there is no other information, yes.
Q. Thank you for confirming that. Now, your three we11, your (a) and (b) - and you have put (c) in a siightly different category - your (a) and (b) do not contain a component to the effect of the need for the crime to be motivated in whole or in part by bias, do they? There is no "in whole or in part" or something like it in your definition?
A. Well, I didn't put "in whole or in part on the basis of" - I didn't put that in, no.
Q. No. Whereas the police definition that they used did include "in whole or in part", didn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes?
A. It's not in there. It doesn't mean that it isn't --
Q. No, no, please, the question was --
A. It's not in there, yes.
Q. -- the police definition does include "in whole or in part", doesn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that a yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Yours does not?
A. Okay.
Q. Wel1, not "Okay"?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree that yours does not?
A. It doesn't contain that phrase.
Q. No. Why did you not include such a phrase or something similar?
A. To my mind, it's - and I may be wrong - implicit.
Q. How is it implicit?
A. Because any kind of intentionality with respect to harm on the basis of any part of bias would be included.
Q. Where does your report say that?
A. We11, okay --
Q. Anywhere in your report, where do you say that you've included in the category of cases where there is evidence of bias crime, cases where the evidence is that a bias factor was present --

MR TEDESCHI: Page 83, 1ast paragraph, second sentence.
MR GRAY: Perhaps I'11 finish the question that has been testified to from the Bar table in advance.
Q. Where in your report do you say that in cases where you've said there is evidence of bias crime, that will be found even if the evidence of bias is only part of the matrix of contributing factors?

MR TEDESCHI: In answer to that question, he has to be given --

THE COMMISSIONER: No, Mr Tedeschi, I will allow the witness to answer the question.

MR TEDESCHI: I don't mind him answering, but he should be given an opportunity to look at his report. He is being
asked --
THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Tedeschi, no, don't get excited. Would you just please resume your seat.
Q. Doctor, when you're answering this question take as long as you like to read and re-read your report.
Mr Tedeschi's given you a helpful hint from the Bar table, but take a moment to read --
A. I believe that it's in the report. I - I can't tell you where it is.
Q. I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you.
A. I believe it - I believe there's a reference but I don't know where it is.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, all right.
MR GRAY: Q. The suggestion from the Bar table, from counsel representing you is that --

MR TEDESCHI: I object. I don't represent him.
THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Well, we will deal with that another time.

MR GRAY: $Q$. Is that it's on page 83. So read the whole of page 83 and tell us where it is.
A. "Some degree of intentionality".
Q. Where are you pointing to?
A. On the top of - the top of the second paragraph.
Q. "Criminal acts require some degree of intentionality"; is that what you're pointing to?
A. Just a second. Well, I don't - I don't know where it is, but I think we have made reference to any degree of --
Q. Well, it doesn't seem to be on page 83 , does it?
A. Any - any act that includes, you know, a - an animus against an individual, because of their belonging-ness to a category, you know, it sounds to me that that is - that is what's being captured in this - in this situation.
Q. Well, let's explore that. The passage that you have been invited to nominate, and now have nominated, is -A. Well --
Q.

Criminal acts require some degree of intentionality --

THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry, I don't think the doctor is comfortable, by reason of his reaction.

Q what is it --
A. I'm - I - oh, go ahead, sorry.

MR GRAY: Q. You are looking, I take it, at the paragraph beginning:

The second factor ...
Is that where --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- you're finding what you think might be the answer?

Is that where you're pointing to?
A. I don't know where the answer is.
Q. Well, let's look at what has been pointed to by counsel next to me. The paragraph beginning "The second factor" is a discussion of your requirement (b) in the definition, isn't it? ""Bias crime produces an act that intentionally causes harm", and you then say:

The second factor permits a review of the intentionality of harm.

That's what you're talking about, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. And in the context of the requirement of intentionality, you observe that criminal acts require some degree of intentionality and some are planned and calculated, while others are more reactive and defensive, and you go on to flesh out that distinction between planned and calculated acts and others being more reactive. That's what the paragraph is about, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Right. Now, my question was about something different --
A. Okay.
Q. -- which is, in the police definition of "Bias Crime", they say that a bias crime is an offence that is motivated in whole or in part by the bias. Remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. Your definition does not include anything to do with the motivation being sufficient if whole or in part, does it?
A. No, it doesn't state that. It doesn't mean that the intention or - it doesn't mean that, in reading that, that that isn't - that a - well, I don't even know what "in part" really refers to in the definition you're citing, with respect to the what the police are saying.
Q. Turn back, you can see what it refers to, page 81, the definition of "Bias Crime" offered by the police, if you turn to page 81, under the heading "Defining Bias", the police definition is set out:

A bias crime is a criminal offence motivated against persons, associates of persons, property or society that is motivated, in whole or in part, by an offender's bias ...
et cetera. So the "in whole or in part" refers to the motivation, doesn't it, in that definition? Is that a hard question? Why are you taking so long? Isn't that what "in whole or in part" relates to in that definition?
A. Yes, motivation.
Q. Right. Now, in your definition. You talk about expressing a categorical animus and producing an act that intentionally causes harm, don't you - yes?
A. Yes.
Q. You don't say anything about the bias being able to be found present if it plays - if it's wholly responsible for the crime or only partly responsible for the crime, at all, do you?
A. No.
Q. And when you talk about "criminal acts require some degree of intentionality", that is making a different point, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Now, if you leave out the component that bias crime can be found even where the motivation is only partly bias and not wholly bias, then you will end up with a lower number of events found to be bias crime, won't you? A. If you do. It's not necessarily the case, and I would not say it is the case, that, in reading this, one thinks that if a person is, for instance, doing - committing a robbery and intends to commit a robbery against a gay person, perceiving that person to be much more - in a much more vulnerable position - I think that there's nothing in my understanding of what $I$ 've described here as excluding that from being a bias crime.
Q. So with the robbery case - and there were some cases in the 1 ist that had a robbery possibility, at least in them --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- was your approach to say that, well, if it was a gay person being robbed, even if it was only because, seemingly because they were a vulnerable target who might not report the crime, or something, would that be a bias crime or would that be excluded because it was really a robbery?
A. What do you mean by reporting the crime?
Q. I wil1 go back a step. I thought you were referring to cases of robbery of a gay person, which might be explained by the fact that the gay person was easy prey for a robbery, rather than being attacked because he was a gay person; I thought that's what you were getting at?
A. Yeah, I was getting at that if a person selects an individual for the target of robbery, for the purpose of robbery, because they perceive that person to be particularly vulnerable due to their being gay, then that is a bias crime.
Q. That's my question. You would say that was in as a bias crime --
A. Yep.
Q. -- and not excluded because robbery was the - -
A. That's right.
Q. -- sort of main motive, perhaps?
A. That's right.
Q. Thank you. That's clear, thank you very much.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. So it follows from that, does it, that you would include those matters where there were mixed motives?
A. Where there were what?
Q. Mixed motives?
A. Yes. Can you --
Q. I'm so sorry. Provided there was a gay hate bias aspect to it?
A. Yeah, provided that the harm was intended targeting that individual because - partly because, because if robbery is the other part --
Q. Yes?
A. -- they are more vulnerable because of their category.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you.
MR GRAY: Q. Are there any other situations that you can think of now - and if you can't, it's not a criticism, it's not a - where that sort of mixed --
A. Yes.
Q. -- situation arose?
A. There is a strange mixture, situation, which I hate to bring up, but there are - it may have to do with robbery or drugs, but there were a number of cases, as you probably know, that - where there was young men, of adolescent age, that maybe involved in sexual services and in the - in the interaction that ensues, you know, a homicide takes place or what have you. So again, you know, what was - what is the intention there? The intention may have been extract some money from this person, or what have you. So it is actually, it's more like a robbery, so I'll take that back.
Q. Well, apart from the robbery scenario, are there any other examples that you can think of --
A. It doesn't come to mind. I've obviously tried to stretch it too far.
Q. I was just going to ask you, are there any other examples you could think of - and I'm not going to criticise if you can't --
A. Okay.
Q. -- where there were - where you would say that there were mixed motives and you, nevertheless, put it in the "Bias Crime" category?
A. Yeah, I - I tend to think there were, but I - but I again, $I$ am sorry that $I$ - that nothing comes to mind.
Q. No, all right.

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr Gray, I notice the time, but $I$ can sit until 4.30. Would that be of assistance?

MR GRAY: It would be of assistance generally, Commissioner, because of the various time that has been lost, I won't finish today, in any event, but I'm very content to go for another 20 minutes.

THE COMMISSIONER: Let me ask: Mr Tedeschi, I take it it is a matter of indifference to you?

MR TEDESCHI: It's perfectiy al1 right.
THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
Q. Doctor, what would be your preference, to break for the day or to go for another half hour?
A. Half hour is fine.

THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, good.
MR GRAY: Q. Back to page 92 of the report, the breakdown of the figures in your report includes separating anti-gay bias from anti-paedophile animus, doesn't it?
A. Yeah. We saw that as a subset.
Q. Wel1, in the table, at least --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you've set out four?
A. Yes.
Q. And anti-gay is just simply separate from
anti-paedophile?
A. Yes, they are both bias crimes.
Q. Right. So just clarifying that, on page 92 on that column, then, on that table - so you would say that you would add anti-gay bias and anti-paedophile animus together as being, all of them, crimes with a relevant bias factor in them; is that right?
A. Yes. So, sorry, both of those columns being all of the - yeah, yes.
Q. So that would add up to 29 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- altogether? And for "Insufficient Information", 33 altogether. And the ones that you say have "No Evidence of Bias Crime", in total, are 23 out of 85 ?
A. Yep.
Q. A11 right. I'11 come back to that. You say - or you have said just now - that even though you have tabulated them separately, that you regarded the anti-paedophile ones as, nonetheless, to be added to the anti-gay ones in some way?
A. They're a subset. Yeah. It's a - it's a very fraught issue, problem, and I'm - I've never been very comfortable with it, you know, even although it's there. I --
Q. Well, the reader, or some readers, would see in terms of the numbers, that the academics seem to have said there are only 17 cases of anti-gay bias, looking at that table, wouldn't they?
A. Oh, well, that - yes, in terms of how that looks, yes.
Q. And that would look pretty low?
A. Yep.
Q. And was that something that occurred to you when you broke it up in this way?
A. No. Unfortunately not. If it would have occurred to us, this would have been done differently.
Q. If somebody commits a crime against a person where the perpetrator thinks the victim is a paedophile, but thinks that because the person thinks all homosexuals are paedophiles, wrongly, that would be an anti-gay motive, wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And so the anti-gay bias factor would be present, even though the person - the perpetrator, may have had some misconception?
A. Yes. Now, this - this is again - I'm - I'm not comfortable with it. If I - if we were - if I was to be involved in categorising this again, I don't think I would be comfortable in dividing that up. I know - I expected, when we provided our draft to the police, that we would be getting feedback to say, "I don't know what you are doing here, but you might think about it." And in a way, that we didn't, I think, get that strong feedback at the time, and we just left it.

I think that I would - I would not - I would not I would not stand by that.
Q. No. Can I just explore it, though. Is this right, that for you, when you did do it --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- accepting you might have reservations now, but when you did do it --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- where you understood a case to be one where the perpetrator supposed --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- wrong1y --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- that paedophiles necessarily were gay, would you --
A. Yeah, that would be anti-gay.
Q. Wel1, no, could I just ask the question. Would you be putting that into the "Anti-gay" column or the
"Anti-paedophile" column?
A. I believe that we would put that into the "Anti-gay" column, yeah.
Q. And how would you work it out as to what that person's mental state of mind was?
A. If - if the - so if the person is expressing an animus towards paedophiles because he thinks all paedophiles are gay, how would we work that out?
Q. No. How would you work out that that was the person's state of mind, the perpetrator's state of mind? How would you know? Unless he said it, how would you know?
A. Yeah, no, we wouldn't.
Q. So when you didn't know, but there was material that suggested that the victim may have been or may have been, rightly or wrongly, thought to have been a paedophile, but you don't know what the perpetrator's state of mind was, where would it go, which column?
A. I'm trying to remember that process, and I - it's I'm - I'm thinking that we would have put it in an "Anti-gay" column. That's what I think. But I - I'm not certain. I would think that would have to be there. Because there's no other place for it.
Q. What would you say to the suggestion that the more reasonable approach would have been to categorise all such cases as "Anti-gay" unless there was clear evidence to the contrary?
A. I would have to agree with you.
Q. Okay. Could I just ask you to have a look at volume 13, please, and turn to tab 271 [SCOI.79339_0001] have you found 271?
A. Yes.
Q. It is an email chain. I want to just start from the back of it. The first one is from --
A. How far back?
Q. -- Derek Dalton to you and Dr Tyson on 16 February
2017. Do you see that?
A. This one here? Yep.
Q. I think so, yes. And Dr Dalton is talking to you about three outstanding cases?
A. Yeah.
Q. He says:

> ... we need to try (if possible) to reach a consensus about the following 3 disagreement cases.

Do you see that?
A. Yep.
Q. And he names the three, and in each case, he nominates what the police say?
A. Okay.
Q. The police say "SBC" - which is "Suspected Bias

Crime", or police say "NBC", "No Bias Crime"?
A. Yep.
Q. Do you see that? Do you see that?
A. Yep.
Q. Yeah. And he's advancing views about what the better view might be about each of those. But what $I$ want to get from you is this: that's the three of you giving consideration to what the police should say in their approach, isn't it? They are the police's terms, "Suspected Bias Crime"?
A. Yep.
Q. So why are you telling the police what they should say?
A. Why are we telling the police what they should say?
Q. Yes. It's one thing for you to come to your own views about what you say, but why are you reaching a consensus about what they should say?

MR TEDESCHI: I object.
THE COMMISSIONER: What's the objection?
MR TEDESCHI: I don't think it says that.
THE COMMISSIONER: I think it's sufficiently ambiguous, Mr Tedeschi, for the proposition to be put.

THE WITNESS: It seems to me that we're trying to reach an agreement on what we say.

MR GRAY: Q. Well, let's just look at that. He goes, later down the page, to discuss the three of them in the indented part?
A. Okay.
Q.

I think for me Giliies should be SBC.

Doesn't he? Do you see he says that?
A. Yeah.
Q. He says:

For Tonks ... I agree with the police that it is SBC...

For Dempsey ... I am of the mind that it real7y should be SBC.
"Suspected Bias Crime".
A. Yep.
Q. Now, you can't be there discussing what you would say, because you don't have a category of "Suspected Bias Crime", do you?
A. No, we don't have.
Q. But the police do, and you seem to be earnestly discussing, or Dr Dalton is, what the correct approach for the police is, don't you?
A. Yeah, now, if I'm - I'm - I'm not - what the correct approach for the police is?
Q. For the police is under their four categories, because "SBC" is not one of your categories.
A. But did we - did we have - at that point, were we using --

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. You're about to ask the rhetorical question, which $I$ was going to ask you.
A. Okay.
Q. No, no, I was going to ask you exactly the same question. Do you recall when it was you created your categories and applied them?
A. No, I don't exactly.
Q. We11, do your best. I mean, here we are in February 2017, you're on board from October 2016. Do you have any idea at all or was it as a result of, what, the failure to reach a consensus with the police that caused you to have another way of doing it or looking at another way of doing it? $I$ just don't know.
A. I do recall us debating - I'm trying to answer your question.
Q. I know you are.
A. I do recall us debating this problem of suspected bias crime versus simply bias crime, and that we - although the distinction was pretty adamantly retained by the police, we just - we just couldn't see the helpfulness of it. And so we ended up with losing that category.

MR GRAY: Q. So do you think the explanation is that, at this point, which is February, you might have been still at that point --
A. Yeah, I would - I would think that at this point we must have been still at that point.
Q. Still using their four categories?
A. Still with their four categories, yes.
Q. And only at some later point did you --
A. Yes.
Q. -- drop their four and substitute your four?
A. Yes, yes.
Q. Okay. Well, move forward, then, to later on in the chain, to one from you to Derek Dalton on 20 February at 1 pm . That's the one. Now, this may feed in to what you were just suggesting. You say to your two fellow workers:

Derek, as we discussed I think we need an agreed upon tool before we make a guess at what to say. If we merely reproduce the checklist we are given by the police, we really do not have much of a function ...

Et cetera. Does that assist you, does that --
A. Yeah, so that --
Q. Is that talking about the same tool?
A. That's why I think we were still bandying about that SBC category.
Q. All right. Well, in the next paragraph you say:
... since we do not know how the police are using their checklist (what happens
when there is no excessive violence, the offender is not known to be gay, etc, how does that impact the evaluation?) following their method produces unreliable results.

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. So that was your developing view, I take it, by then, that you didn't know how they were using the checklist?
A. Yep.
Q. And that, therefore, trying to follow their method would produce unreliable results?
A. Yep.
Q. Then you move on to a different topic:

It should be clarified if the bias crime is stipulated as anti-gay bias as opposed to anti-paedophile bias.

Do you see that?
A. Yep.
Q. And I'11 just 1 et you read the rest of that paragraph to yourself.
A. Yeah.
Q. Having explained your thinking in that way there, you then say in the next paragraph:

So on this I would classify all the suspected anti-paedophile cases out ...

Now, is that what you did or is it not what you did?
A. I don't think it's what we did. But we - but in after this, what we did was anti- - in putting it under the classification of anti-gay bias, as a subset of anti-gay bias, we, I think, also moved away from this. Because what - and there's one case, and I think it - Assistant Commissioner Crandell talked about it, I forget what it was exactly, but it was a case that they categorised as no bias, and we categorised as bias because we put it in the anti-paedophile bias category, and it was a case where I believe, and I'm just - my memory might be vague on this, is that the perpetrator did attack and murder the victim on
the belief that he was a paedophile and he had a history of - the victim had a history of sexual abuse by a paedophile, and I don't know - I might be wrong - if he indeed was the perpetrator of that sexual abuse as well. So - anyway, I am not going to be comfortably defending this area, as I said before. I - I think it's - we should just simply have collapsed it into bias, anti-gay bias.
Q. All right. Thank you. In Dr Dalton's response, which
is then the one above the one we've been looking at, back to you, on the paedophile topic - stopping there, you see how he has a heading relating to this topic?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. He says:

This is still a mess. I actually disagree with Mason.

He says he thinks that anti-paedophile bias must initially be counted as bias.
A. Yep.
Q. And perhaps that's consistent with what you are saying?
A. Yes.
Q. Perhaps you are saying that, in due course, that's how it played out?
A. And so that's actually how we ended up coding it.

What we ought to have done was take out that whole section and take out that distinct code.
Q. I just want to show you a couple of examples of cases where it seems your team placed cases in the
"Anti-paedophile Animus" column, and just ask you about them. It's in volume 2, tab 49 [SCOI.76961.00014_0001].
You nominated, as we have seen, 1 think, 12 in all as being in the "Anti-paedophile" column, and I don't want to take you to all of them but just a couple as examples.
A. Yes.
Q. On page 2 of this document, do you see down the bottom, case number 5 ?
A. Yep.
Q. You have placed that in the "Anti-paedophile"
category. This was the man who was attacked in a public toilet in Newcastle. What is the basis for bringing in an anti-paedophile factor in that case?
A. I don't know. There's not - there's - I couldn't tell you about - I don't have any information there.
Q. Well, 1et's have a look at number 24.
A. I mean, there's got to be more information than that.
Q. Well, the Special Commission has more information about that case and counsel for the police has it. At any rate, you can't recall anything that might have -A. No.
Q. -- prompted this case being put in that category?
A. No, not at al1.

THE COMMISSIONER: Q. Would it be any more than mere age of the deceased?

MR TEDESCHI: Sorry?

THE COMMISSIONER: No, I'm not talking to you,
Mr Tedeschi. Oh, you want me to repeat it?
MR TEDESCHI: I'm sorry, I couldn't hear -
THE COMMISSIONER: Forgive me. No, forgive me. I do apologise.
Q. Would it be any more than the advanced or - one view the advanced age of the deceased?
A. I don't see anything.

MR GRAY: Q. You see the deceased is aged 69 and the suspect is aged 22? But is there anything else --
A. Without knowing something that the suspect might of said or - I have no idea why - I don't know why it is there.
Q. Wel1, is it possible that --
A. And it may be - as I said - go ahead, I'm sorry.
Q. No, you go.
A. No, I - I don't know. I can't see anything.
Q. Is it possible that it is simply that the victim was

69 and the attacker or the suspected attacker was 22 ?
A. I don't know. If so, it doesn't seem sufficient for that. So I - I don't know. I have no idea.
Q. Have a look at number 24 on page 12. The victim is 26 years old. The killer is 32 years old. In the summary, there is nothing mentioned anything to do with paedophilia, and yet it's in the "Anti-paedophile" category. Why would that be?
A. I can't see anything. I can't see anything.
Q. And number 72 on page 35 ? The victim is 23 , the killer is a year older, 24. There doesn't seem to be any mention of anything to do with paedophilia in the summary, and yet that's where it's been categorised?
A. I don't - yeah, I don't know. I can't say.
Q. Well --
A. I would just go back to my earlier statement and say that we ended up putting these as gay bias, and - I think we went down a track that we shouldn't have gone down.
Q. Just on that - we're about to finish for the day, but in volume 13, I'11 just show you that briefly, at tab 277 [SCOI.80025_0001]. It's quite a long chain. I on1y need to take you to one part of it. It's a chain of emails, and the time is April 2018, so the ACON report is about to come out and indeed the Parrabel 1 final report is not far off being published. It comes out within a couple of months, just to orient you in time.

On the third page of the documents, there is an email from you to Derek Dalton on 18 Apri1 at 1.36pm. Yes, that one. You say to him:

I am wondering if we can come up with
another term to attribute to the complex
animus that we are describing with
paedophilia. If we substitute it for
something more innocuous like: "conflict
identity bias" then we may be better off.
Let me know what you think.
Do you see that?
A. Yep.
Q. He writes back to say - we11, you can see what he says
in the response. Among other things, he says he thinks it might be too late to change it because it was on the verge of being published. Now, first of all, why did you think you needed to come up with something more innocuous? A. I think "innocuous" is the wrong word. I think we were struggling with cases where some of them were - some of them were advances, so people would make advances to other people, and we were - and we were struggling with the genesis of that. Obviously not everyone reacts to an advance in a violent manner, and we looked at some of the research.
Q. But we're talking about paedophilia here?
A. Yeah, no, I think that - I think the - yeah, I understand. And some of the - some of the generation of that reaction, in some of the literature, is related to people that may have had - in their past been the victim of sexual assault, as children. So I'm very uncomfortable with this, and, you know, this is - this was part of where we really needed a little more back and forth with a wider body of people. We had - it was restricted to very few people that we could speak to about these terms.
Q. What wider body of people should you have --
A. Well, in terms of - what would usually happen is, like, what I'm used to in terms of a review process is you put something out and then you have all these people reviewing and saying, "You should have done" - "This is wrong and this is" - and if - when you don't - when you're used to that kind of pattern and you don't get it, it's really - it's really missing. That is just the - the difference in - in a review of a work that's - that's an academic work and how you work in terms of a commission. You don't have the same number of readers who are making substantive comments on areas that need to be sort of considered.
Q. All right. Well --
A. And so this is an area that I think is one that needed more consideration.
Q. Well, you seem to have been - tell me if this is right - coming up with a term, "conflict identity bias", off the top of your head, as it were. That's just a --
A. Well, it's --
Q. -- an invention, is it?
A. In terms of bias, yeah, but in terms of - confiict identity is a very big part of, as you know, the whole bias crime domain, right? So that's - conflict identity is very much in the centre of bias crime.
Q. But you thought you might - you were suggesting that perhaps that's a term that you could use instead of using the word "paedophilia"?
A. Yes. Yes. But - not for the - not - it doesn't reflect all the cases that would have been in that category necessarily, no.

MR GRAY: Well, is that a convenient time?
THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's a convenient time. Now, tomorrow morning, 9.30, Ms Coakley. So I will have it in here.

How 10 ng will you be?
MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, could I just have a word with my learned friend and I might be able to answer that question.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, certain1y.
MR TEDESCHI: Commissioner, my learned friend doesn't have any problem with me speaking to $\operatorname{Dr}$ de Lint in the morning prior to the hearing, and so we might be able to go straight in to my questioning of him.

MR GRAY: No, no, we've got Coakley at 9.30.
THE COMMISSIONER: That doesn't answer my question.
MR TEDESCHI: I'm sorry, after Coakley.

THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but it stil1 doesn't answer my question, how long do you think you will be if it is you with --

MR TEDESCHI: Half an hour.
THE COMMISSIONER: Half an hour. All right. That's fine. We will resume at 9.30 with Ms Coakley. Dr de Lint, by all means, whatever arrangements made to speak to Mr Tedeschi or others, that can take place. If I say in your case,
though, I won't expect you - by all means, you are able to sit in if you wish, but I don't expect you before, say, about 10 o'clock, but if you wish to come in and listen to Ms Coakley, you are entitled to do that. So whatever suits you. You just make whatever arrangement is convenient.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COMMISSIONER: All right. I will adjourn until 9.30. Thank you.

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